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ABSTRACT 
Cultural discourses in Ceauşist Romania: The Hero-Mirror Mechanism 
This thesis is concerned with main cultural discourses of the second phase of 
Communism in Romania (1964-1989), period largely identical with that of CeauşescuÕs 
rule. A secondary aim of the thesis is to look at the post-1989 continuations of these 
publicly influential discourses with the aim of understanding how the educational system 
(HE, in particular) is positioned in relation to the cultural domain. With regard to the 
Communist period, the main assertion of the thesis is that analysis of these discourses 
reveals an underlying cultural mechanism equivalent with a central mode of governance 
employed by the Communist party. According to this assertion, the mission of this 
cultural mechanism, with origins in LeninÕs drastic distinction between the party and the 
proletariat and in the idea that the party must bestow consciousness on the proletariat, is 
to create and regulate positive avatars (heroes imbued with the best of humanity) for 
each social category so as to fulfill and safeguard the aims of the Party. For this reason, 
this device has been entitled the hero-mirror mechanism. The device has also been 
linked with religion and theology. This perspective has found that the mirror-mechanism 
corresponds to the notion of Òimago Dei,Ó and its axes to the notions of ÒkenosisÓ and 
Òimitatio Dei.Ó The assessment of these cultural discourses via the mirror-mechanism 
results in three dimensions of research, each with its own universes of investigation, and 
each with its own findings. In the first dimension, the mirror-mechanism deals with 
discourses as identity, and thus with the deconstruction of Romanian identity. If, as 
observed, the mirror-mechanism receives its first major blow in the 1980s and begins to 
crumble after 1989, what has replaced it since and with what implications for Romanian 
identity? The second dimension views the same discourses as mainly intellectual. Here, 
the notion of Ôinner utopiaÕ is highlighted as a dominant and recurring theme, and, 
therefore, as possibly the dominant feature of the Romanian cultural/political scene 
during and after Communism. If, because of the notion of Ôinner utopia,Õ Ôtrue 
educationÕ is viewed as lying outside the provinces of formal institutions, what then is 
the educational role ascribed to the public space in relation to the HE system? Finally, 
the third dimension assesses these discourses in terms of their claims for anti-
Communist resistance while providing a typology for elucidating such claims.  
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Introduction 
Almost every major Romanian intellectual has remarked the literary-centeredness of 
Romanian culture (Patapievici 20071, pp.95, 182-183; Negrici 2008, pp.27-28; Buduca 
2004; Muşina 2006, pp.201-205; Flonta 2010, p.106; Tănăsoiu 2004, p.94; Cernat 
2010v; Lefter 2012, p.203) although no one has attempted to explain it. In a nation 
which originated and developed as a modern state through the direct efforts of 
intellectual elites (Matei 2004), in which literature has been the only discipline to 
parallel (and in a close embrace) the development of the nation (to the extent that 
literary/cultural currents had always acted as social-political movements and sometimes 
even as the government, at least before being sent in the direction of the Òautonomy of 
the aestheticalÓ by Communism), and also, the only scholarly field elevated to the rank 
of a cult during Communism (Negrici 2008, pp.28-31), this seems somewhat justified. 
Does this mean, however, that this thesis, through its scope and character, has fallen 
victim to this noble but outdated tradition? Is the author, in other words, another 
Eastern-European subject writing, as it can happen, primarily from a concern with self-
identity? In other words, did the author just realize that he had been ÔinhabitedÕ by the 
same notion of Ôinner utopiaÕ highlighted throughout his own thesis (see end of the 
ÒSolar LyricismÓ chapter), particularly in relation to Communism, as the dominant 
feature of the Romanian cultural/political scene? That he is rehearsing the same type of 
scholarship with the ÔencyclopedicÕ intellectuals under scrutiny in his study? While the 
author is aware of him being affected by the notion of Ôinner utopiaÕ by virtue of his 
                                                             
1 Patapievici (2007) attributes this phenomenon to the development of Romanian culture as predominantly 
a Ògeneral culture,Ó but he does not actually investigate literary-centeredness as such, being in fact more 
concerned with the discipline of philosophy and the issue of other underdeveloped specializations.   
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cultural belonging, this is not more than the usual, and as such, not something that has 
essentially shaped this project. Firstly, that the author has had to exit the comfort of his 
discipline and venture outside his normal area of research already suggests that a certain 
distortion might have occurred in terms of his methodology. Secondly, this thesis is 
certainly concerned with synthesis and integration, probably much beyond the usually 
expected level, but this has been caused, both as a challenge, and as an opportunity, by 
the state of current research in social sciences on the topic of Romania. Thirdly, what 
might look as scholarship at Òthe School of the ÔgeneralistÕ geniusÓ (Matei 2010, pp.28, 
35) stems in reality from a comparative methodology which combines hermeneutics 
with Foucault, archetypal criticism, and the history of ideas in specific ways and in 
which narrative is both unified and polycentric (these methodologies and the manner of 
their use have been delineated in the ÔMethodologyÕ chapter). This project started with 
an educational vision ascertaining that the role of an educational system must be derived 
from the needs of society, particularly when that society is experiencing a very turbulent 
transition. Initially, lack of meaningful or coherent data about the educational system or 
about the needs of society resulted in an alternative focus on policy discourses about the 
meaning of transition. At this level, however, the dominant but incipient attempt to 
organize research and policy around a single, more fetishized than understood, radical 
neoliberal agenda, together with the realization that Romanian intellectuals were 
approaching issues of modernization primarily from within a literary-centric perspective, 
permanently shifted the focus onto the realm of cultural discourses. Thus, the orientation 
of the thesis has been conditioned by the literary-centeredness of Romanian culture, but 
this has been an external imposition and not an internal aspiration (this problematic has 
received detailed treatment in the ÔLiterature ReviewÕ chapter).  
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At the level of cultural discourses, however, the author has met with excessive 
fragmentation, with a cultural debate (polemic, in fact) expressed not in research but in 
journalistic form, through essays and personal cogitations located in cultural magazines 
and blogs, and, generally, through an encyclopedic (not specialized) discourse doubling 
a public-intellectual performance. As for the more serious research being carried out, at 
this stage, this was also fragmentary, as disciplines themselves were caught up in the 
process of transition. Trapped between an uncertain, inchoate and pre-paradigmatic 
character and the need to catch up with the West, and lacking institutional capacity, 
these disciplines also tended to accept and promote the neo-liberal models of transition 
without developing alternative paradigms. With key exceptions, the result has been 
either research literature that aims to bring the field up to date with its Western 
counterpart, or a generalist/theoretical essay-like type of literature (the essay and writing 
in cultural magazines still remains the preferred mode of writing for many of the 
important Romanian intellectuals), or research that is empiricist and/or based on a neo-
liberal model. This picture has changed much since this project has started, but the issue 
of how these disciplines will reconstitute a lost, missing, incipient or backward tradition 
of research, and one that is more diverse in its paradigms and also up to date, is very 
much on the table. For such reasons, this thesis has been forced by the material at its 
disposal to be concerned with issues of synthesis and integration. This has been a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, such a vast attempt at integration of diverse research is 
somewhat unique and could have some added value. On the other, it is a strange animal 
amidst the other, more specialized research creatures and, with a strong wave of archival 
research beginning to replace the dominance of literary-centeredness and the 
fragmentation of research, there is hope that this project will become obsolete in the not 
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so distant future. In fact, where once there have been few renowned academics and 
several core readings, now there are countless academics dispersed globally, emerging 
sub-disciplines2, and a huge array of publications of all sorts, for all of which the 
disciplines themselves cannot yet account. Topics for PhDs have also become narrower, 
as more and more literature on the same theme has begun to emerge.3 In my estimation, 
the explosion of knowledge in different areas relating to Romania has increased so much 
recently that it is hard to image a research project such as this could still be attempted in 
the future inductively. In this sense, this project constitutes an occasion that was not to 
be lost. What then is the thesis about, what are its hypotheses and findings, and which 
methodology supports them? Moreover, how are these concerns expressed at the level of 
structure? In short, the thesis is about cultural discourses. At this level, one aim of the 
thesis is to look at the cultural domain with the aim of understanding how the 
educational system (HE, in particular) is embedded in it (or not). However, these 
cultural discourses also are dominant intellectual discourses that have had a defining 
impact on individual and collective identity. At this level, also primarily educational, 
these identity discourses can be compared with garments that everyone in Romania has 
had to wear at some point in time, and to which many have remained particularly 
attached. In themselves, these discourses are ÔhorizonsÕ (see GadamerÕs use of the term 
from Husserl, in Thiselton 2009, pp.219-220), which both limit and make possible, 
someoneÕs views, thoughts and actions. Understanding them, however, is not an 
                                                             
2 Such as that of transitional justice in post-communist Romania, reflected in the writings of Lavinia Stan, 
Raluca Ursachi, Raluca Grosescu and Katherine Verdery, particularly from 2009 onwards.  
3 A good example here can be given from the field of literary studies in relation to the G80. Studies that 
were once concerned with the entire generation or its paradigm/s (early 2000s) have gradually made way 
for monographs (mostly PhD dissertations) centered on a single author (since around 2007 until now), 
while recently the focus has shifted more in depth to more specific thematic content from the works of the 
same author. That this has been the case with the prose of Mircea Nedelciu is documented in the PhD 
thesis of Hărşan (2013, pp.7-8). 
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aesthetical game, but a manner of elucidating to what extent these ÔhorizonsÕ have also 
acted as modes of subjectification controlled or directed by the Communist party (or, on 
the contrary, as forms of resistance).  
Here the main assertion or hypothesis (and research question) of the thesis has been that 
analysis of these discourses reveals an underlying cultural mechanism equivalent with 
the mode of governance employed by the Communist party. I am referring here to the 
mirroring device through which the regular individual partakes of the divine qualities of 
the Logos/Absolute in order to become in its image (conversion) and thus become 
engaged in the building of a new civilization that will reflect the divine pattern (namely, 
the Kingdom of God). This is easily understood in terms of Christ and Christianity, but 
has also been indirectly applied to the Communist Party through the notion of 
Òimpersonal charismaÓ: ÒCharisma is typically associated with a saint or with a knight, 
some personal attribution, and what Lenin did was remarkable. He did exactly what he 
claimed to do: he created a party of a new type. He made the party charismatic. People 
died for the party. ItÕs as if people would die for the DMV. Most people donÕt get too 
excited about the Department of Motor Vehicles because itÕs a bureaucracyÓ (Jowitt 
2000). What Jowitt is referring to, of course, is LeninÕs drastic distinction between the 
party and the proletariat, which led to the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The proletariat, Lenin affirmed, could only receive a revolutionary consciousness from 
the party. This idea that without the party the proletariat could never advance beyond a 
bourgeois consciousness, that Òa spontaneous workersÕ movementÓ was Òincapable of 
developing a socialist consciousness,Ó Òthat the interests and aims of a social class, the 
proletariat, can and indeed must be determined without that class having a say in the 
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matter,Ó (Kolakowski 2005, pp.668-669) was a radical departure from Marx. From the 
notion of a Òvanguard, leading the working class and imbuing it with socialist 
consciousness,Ó the party became the sole repository of consciousness, a sort of Logos 
whose total acceptance by the proletariat implied a divine type of charisma (this 
corresponds to VicoÕs image presented in the Mirror-Mechanism chapter). From this 
point of view, what I describe as the mirror-mechanism is the device through which 
charisma is bestowed upon the party (not mentioned by Jowitt). This can be expressed 
another way. If the Party is responsible for bestowing consciousness on the proletariat, 
then the act of governance requires by its very definition the shaping of collective 
consciousness. It requires that governing work through altering consciousness, 
presumably, via a cultural mechanism. The mirror-mechanism, it is claimed here, can be 
understood as that presumed cultural mechanism. How does this mechanism work? 
Essentially this is a mechanism of identification, of identification with an image 
(mimesis). But it is also a mechanism that demands complete subjection of oneÕs self to 
a higher authority. This is so because, in religious terms, the methodology 
simultaneously demands the mirroring of divine attributes, or qualities, and the complete 
renunciation of the self. This thesis maintains that analysis of cultural discourses during 
the Ceauşescu period reveals that this mechanism has been appropriated by the 
Communist party in both its axes: that of the mirroring of certain qualities, and that of 
displaying full commitment and total sacrifice for the cause of the Party. It should be 
mentioned here that, since the mechanism works through identification with an image, 
the Party can circulate many such images and according to the needs of the moment. The 
party, or the Supreme Leader, need not always be in the images projected by this 
mechanism. Any image of any exemplary of higher humanity can suffice. For these 
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reasons, the mirror-mechanism has been called Ôthe hero-mirror mechanismÕ and its two 
axes have been described as:  
1) the myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything for something greater than himself  
(People, Party, History), 
2) the myth of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the Good Ð 
in this context, the prescriptions/commandments/principles of the moral/social order 
elaborated by the Party. 
It shall be noted here that by circulating different images the Party is able to target 
different social groups in specific ways. It shall also be noted here that while the 
qualities to be reflected or the type of commitment and sacrifice demanded differ from 
period to period (for example, the first axis can imply sacrifice in defending the nation, 
but also commitment to productivity), and from discourse to discourse, within the 
Romanian setting the two axes remain constant.   
It shall also be remarked here that because it replaces ÔdivinityÕ with ÔmanÕ and 
ÔsacrednessÕ with ÔhumanityÕ this mechanism is essentially seen as a Humanistic one. 
Consequently, the assumption has been that the official discourse expressed through this 
mechanism is also a Humanistic one. Because the Communist party had employed the 
notion of Òsocialist humanismÓ to describe its ideological orientation, I have chosen to 
adopt this very term to describe the main discourse of the mirror-mechanism. In the 
context in which almost all research has tended to identify the period of the Ceauşescu 
regime as one of extreme nationalism (and of Ônational-communismÕ), I have tried to 
argue that this period (1964-1989) can equally be represented as a period of Òsocialist 
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humanism.Ó In this sense, all the cultural discourses of this period belong, in the 
structure of this thesis, to the period of Òsocialist humanismÓ (in itself described as the 
second phase of the mirror-mechanism).  
One must also emphasize that there is a deeper side to the hero-mirror mechanism than 
what has just been described above. In the search for the origin of this mechanism in 
Communist Romanian culture, this hypothesis was tested and shown to apply to Platonic 
thought, to different levels of Russian Communist culture (in the everyday functioning 
of the society of the new man, at the level of political and philosophical theory or core 
official ideology, and as the official art discourse of socialist realism), and to certain 
strands of pre-Stalinist Russian culture (the Russian avant-garde, SolovÕev, 19th century 
radical fiction, the medieval texts documenting the life of a saint). Particularly through 
FoucaultÕs (1980, 1988, 2007) work on the Christian apparatus of pastoral power and 
KotkinÕs (1997) concept of ÔTheocracy,Õ by way of the emphasis Clark (1981), Groys 
(1992) and especially Gutkin (1999) place on SolovÕevÕs influence on the aesthetic of 
socialist realism, and through the influence of Frye (1957), this thesis has reached the 
conclusion that the hero-mirror mechanism is best understood as an Òallegorical 
archetypeÓ (Abrams 1957) (which can unfold into ontological, epistemological and 
anthropological frameworks), with its origin in religion. The substance of this argument 
can be found in the chapter entitled ÒThe Mirror-Mechanism of the HeroÓ and in the 
discussion of FoucaultÕs pastoral apparatus in the ÒMethodologyÓ chapter. What this 
trajectory of research has found, rather unexpectedly, is that the concept of the mirror-
mechanism coincides with a key theological structure. To put it short, while the mirror-
mechanism corresponds to the notion of imago Dei, its axis of sacrifice resembles that of 
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Òkenosis,Ó and its axis of purity of heart and mirroring of the Divine resembles that of 
Òimitatio DeiÓ (see subsection entitled ÒThe Mirror-Mechanism and ReligionÓ). 
Furthermore, this development in turn indicated that the mirror-mechanism can be 
imagined as a structure which prefigures, but from only one step away, the Christian 
apparatus of pastoral power and its technologies of self (such as the examination of 
conscience and confession). Further parallels were thus also established between the two 
axes of the mirror-mechanism, technologies of self such as ÒexomologesisÓ and 
ÒexagoreusisÓ (Foucault 1988, 2007), and Stalinist purification practices (Òpurges,Ó 
Òverifications,Ó and Òself-examinationÓ) (Kotkin 1997), while analogies were also 
established with ClarkÕs (1981) notion of the Òmaster-plotÓ and GutkinÕs (1999) avant-
garde notions of Òlife-buildingÓ (SolovÕev inspired) and Òthe struggle with byt.Ó This, 
then, is the deeper level at which the structure of the humanistic hero-mirror mechanism 
can be found, and where it might find some renewed legitimacy and confirmation as a 
hypothesis for the space of Communist culture. Finally, this is the mechanism through 
which certain cultural discourses of the Ceauşist period are being examined in relation to 
the official discourse alongside three dimensions of research, as identity discourses, as 
intellectual discourses and as discourses of resistance, each with its own universes of 
investigation, and each with its own findings in the conclusion.  
At this point, certain methodological issues must be discussed before proceeding with a 
presentation of the structure of the dissertation and its chapters.  
As indicated in the section ÒA Framework for Understanding FoucaultÕs Notion of 
Discourse,Ó the issue of the selection of certain discourses and not others points to a 
weakness in discourse analysis that can never be fully resolved in objective manner. 
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Simply put, the notion of discourse refers almost simultaneously both to a terrain of 
knowledge to be investigated over a certain period of time, and to the inner structure that 
actually forms that terrain of knowledge. The idea is that the first term leads to the 
second, but the manner of selection of a territory cannot be dissociated from notions that 
heavily anticipate or pre-constitute the second term. The notion of discourse is, 
therefore, at least a double structure Ð there are two discourses, with one the alleged 
deeper structure of the other, and there is no way to fully conceptualize them separately. 
In my opinion, the problems highlighted are part and parcel of the process of knowledge 
and cannot be fully escaped. In hermeneutical terms, I associate them with the notion of 
Òpre-understandingÓ and that of Òthe hermeneutic circleÓ (Thiselton 2009, p.14). 
Nonetheless, there are several reasons for which certain discourses have been selected 
for analysis in this thesis and not others. From the very beginning an initial concern has 
been to deal with those discourses most influential in shaping collective cultural identity 
in the Communist period, but also beyond, because of their continuations into the recent 
present. This option materialized with the need to expand the inductive method 
responsible for the hypothesis of the mirror-mechanism from marginal and forgotten 
cultural discourses (see Cernat et al. 2004) to more established discourses. In this I have 
used the literature about Romanian Communism at my disposal, most of which revolves 
around the larger discourses of the nation, Marxism and a supposed Romanian 
Stalinism. This PhD thesis, therefore, mediates between the larger discourses of the 
nation and Marxism, and the more niche Communist cultural products analyzed by 
Cernat et al. (2004) by proposing an intermediate but related unit of analysis: popular 
and influential4 cultural discourses of the Ceauşist period as tested against the 
                                                             
4 An alternative term here could have been ÒmiddlebrowÓ cultural discourses, which is one of the terms 
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humanistic device of the hero-mirror mechanism (and against the main official 
ideology). In the manner of their specific selection, however, I have not been innovative. 
The discourses selected are discourses whose popularity is still very high and whose 
leaders or exponents play a central role on the Romanian cultural and/or political scene 
(or have done so until recently), where claims about the exemplars of true resistance to 
Communism are constantly interchanged. Moreover, the selection of these discourses 
seems to reflect a vague consensus in the literature on Romanian Communism. 
Protochronism and the Noica School, for example, feature heavily in the analyses of the 
ideology of the Communist regime performed by Verdery (1991), Deletant (1998) and 
Martin (2002ii, 2002iv, 2003, 2003i), which also mention Adrian Păunescu. On the other 
hand, Cernat et al. (2004) offer the first important essay on the Flacăra Cenacle while 
also highlighting the role of the G60 poetry to the regimeÕs ideology. Finally, the 
importance of all these discourses (including that of the Păltiniş Group and of the G80) 
in relation to the Communist regime and also post-communism features heavily in the 
collected essays of Dobrescu (1998, 2001), while mention of most of them is made 
again, in more fleeting and subjective a manner, in Cernat et al. 2004i. More recently, in 
a book whose topic very much resembles the subject of this dissertation, Matei (2011) 
again invokes the same discourses in his attempt to trace the continuations and mutations 
of Òromantic CommunismÓ (a syntagm which positions Romanticism as the origin of 
Communist aesthetics and emphasizes the notion of the hero5 as embodying the best of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Clark (1981, vi) uses in reference to the novels of socialist realism. However, the term would have been 
partly misleading as these discourses were ideologically required and sometimes even self-propelled to 
advance on a continuum between high and middlebrow culture and did so to different degrees.  
5 ÒThe desire of (post-) Christian, modern, Occidental man of being a hero surpasses all the others. 
Coupled with the will to power, this wish has made the idea of Communism the standard-idea of the last 
centuryÓ (Matei 2011, p.17).  
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humanity) during post-communism (pp.15-16). Essentially, then, this selection is one 
that captures most of the dominant cultural discourses and intellectual groups on the 
cultural and/or political scene before and after 1989 (a selection itself influenced by the 
literary-centeredness of Romanian culture), classification about which there is some 
vague implicit consensus. The only exception to the rule is constituted by the G80, 
whose discourse cannot be claimed to have become publicly influential until after 1989, 
concomitant with the rising popularity of Cărtărescu. Nonetheless, the discourse of the 
G80 has been essential in post-communism and the movement belongs, through its roots 
and its most significant works, to the early 1980s, reason for which it has been included 
here.  
A word should be also said here about the distinction between primary and secondary 
sources in the bibliography. A hermeneutical approach must rely on a very good sample 
of primary sources, doubled by recognized secondary ones. However, due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of this study (meaning, the diversity of primary sources to be 
covered and the lack of expertise in doing so) and the nature of the discourses under 
scrutiny (the discourse of the nation, protochronism and poetry are not easily approached 
via a purely hermeneutical method), the hermeneutical methodology chosen has had to 
be supplanted with that of archetypal criticism and also that of the history of ideas. This 
has led to instances in which the author has had to rely a lot more on the secondary view 
of experts than on primary material. In such cases, the challenge really has been how to 
integrate the resulting assessment of different and diverse secondary sources (from 
established to non-conventional ones) in a way best reflective of existent and accessible 
primary material. Chapters such as ÒThe Turn to Nationalism,Ó ÒSolar Lyricism,Ó and 
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the ÒFlacăra CenacleÓ are the most clear-cut examples of this type of integration. Still 
the same, but less so, applies to the chapters on protochronism and the G80. The 
direction of the first is heavily influenced by the report of Anneli Maier (1977) and 
different movies of that period, but also, by secondary sources such as Cernat et al. 
(2004) and Verdery (1991). In the case of the G80 the situation is slightly stranger, as 
primary material such as Crăciun (1999) and Muşina (2002) etc. lives alongside 
secondary literature written nevertheless by key poetic figures of the G80 such as 
Cărtărescu (1999), Bodiu (2000) and Muşina (1988) or by former members like Oţoiu 
(2003), all sources essential to that chapter. Finally, the sections on the Noica School 
and the Păltiniş Group rely considerably more on the original texts of key members, 
although the contribution of secondary sources remains still important. This diversity of 
balance between different types of sources could not be captured in the bibliography, 
which remains traditionally divided between primary and secondary sources and in 
alphabetical order.  
The question has also been asked in relation to the title of this thesis of whether I had 
thought of Ceauşism as a term referring only to a chronological period, or as also a term 
referring to an ideological process shaping post-socialist cultural debates elsewhere. My 
first answer here is that Ceauşism refers both to a chronological period and to a unique 
political and social system which deserves to be studied on its own (see Crowther 1988). 
However, the questioning can continue, does not the overlapping and in some cases the 
clear lines of continuity invoked by this thesis between communist and post-communist 
cultural discourses betray a notion of ideological process? Two types of answers can be 
given here, depending on how the notion of ideological process is interpreted. If by 
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ideological process a certain general ideology is alluded to, some forms of continuity are 
indeed observable through the notion of the mirror-device as a mechanism for the 
governing of culture and the ideology of socialist humanism it endorses. However, while 
it is essential that this continuity be emphasized, it is too early to claim that the type of 
ideological process it describes is fully identical with Ceauşism. Firstly, as shown in the 
section dealing with the roots of the mirror-mechanism, the notion or device is not at all 
uniquely or particularly Ceauşist. Secondly, what actually constitutes the official 
discourse of the Communist regime under Ceauşescu is still a topic in need of much 
further elaboration. My option in this case would be to employ Ceauşism as a temporal 
concept, while maintaining awareness that the term could also be envisaged as an 
ideological process were it for the notions of the mirror-mechanism and socialist 
humanism to be confirmed as central to the nature of the Ceauşist regime through further 
research (and essentially, through also research taking place outside the cultural 
domain).  
If by ideological process reference is made to something extending on the continuum 
between the notion of the Ônoble delusionÕ and manipulation of the masses6 and 
implying the actions of the Òpower elite,Ó then three reasons must be given for why I 
have not engaged with such a perspective, all of them derived from my methodology. 
On the hermeneutic side my emphasis has been to operate primarily with a hermeneutics 
of recovery (Ricoeur) rather than with one of suspicion. On the Foucauldian side I was 
                                                             
6
 See the definition provided by Domhoff (1978): ÒThe ideology process consists of the numerous 
methods through which members of the power elite attempt to shape the beliefs, attitudes and opinions of 
the underlying population. É Free and open discussion are claimed to be the hallmarks of the process, but 
past experience shows that its leaders will utilize deceit and violence in order to combat individuals or 
organizations which espouse attitudes and opinions that threaten the power and privileges of the ruling 
class.Ó!
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more interested in the nature of discursive formations rather than in discourses 
emanating from the subject. To that extent, it would have sufficed to me if the discourse 
could have been shown to perform a certain function, whether or not its agent or carrier 
intended it. Thirdly, the tradition of archetypal criticism directed my interest more 
towards investigating the mirror-mechanism as a theoretical construct or structure that 
became central in Communism (the questions being why? and how?), rather than on its 
use as ideological process after. Nevertheless, the question of ideological process can be 
impersonally formulated through the use of analysis of discourses until a certain point. I 
will take the example of the Păltiniş Group7, because it is the most prominent example to 
have been discussed in this light in post-Communist Romania. In an article from 2006 
entitled ÒWhy Noica is not Strauss (and neither Liiceanu, Bloom),Ó Caius Dobrescu, for 
example, raised the issue that the Păltiniş Group members see themselves as an elite of 
the spirit while also actively manipulating their public image, possibly even by the 
inclusion of an intellectual that would fit more the profile of Strauss and of the Chicago 
School, namely, of Patapievici. From a similar perspective, Matei (2004) had described 
the Păltiniş Group as a group whose prestige is built on charisma, developing the 
explanation around the inclusion of Patapievici in the group. MateiÕs book, however, 
receveived some strong criticism including a devastating one from Cistelecan (2006). 
Both these perspectives are examples which have attributed the Păltiniş Group the 
intended and specific use of the hero-mirror mechanism for certain questionable 
purposes. The mirror-mechanism, as has been employed in this thesis, would probably 
pose this problem at the level of discourse in a slightly different way.  
                                                             
7
 I am in fact forced to use this example because any positive answer to the notion of ideological process 
as Ceauşism would immediately imply that the Păltiniş Group is somehow Ceauşist.  
 
 
30 
The Noica School most likely did not operate with the much invoked by Strauss Platonic 
notion of Ôthe noble delusionÕ but rather with a notion of Òinner utopiaÓ (Şerban 2010) or 
of Òthe primacy of the spiritualÓ (Şiulea 2005). These notions emphasized the internal 
dimension of the self as a realm of spirituality which should be prioritized over material 
existence, history and politics. Politics was to be a spiritualizing revolution of the heart, 
or almost nothing of interest at all. There was an  Ôaristocracy of the spiritÕ but not one 
interested in politics. ÔThe noble delusionÕ does not fit well with this. From these 
notions, however, the Noica School was constituted into an apparatus of pastoral power 
like the ones described by Foucault through which the master-disciple relation was 
extended not only to the individual but also to society. In other words, the elite of the 
spirit had to provide, in accordance with the pastoral model, for the spiritual 
development of the masses. The elite had to reach a level of training where they could 
perceive the diseases affecting the life or soul of the nation and prescribe a cure. At the 
same time, this was imagined as a process from which each side would benefit 
spiritually. In this sense I would argue, like Dobrescu (2006), that Noica is unlike 
Strauss. However, after the death of Noica, his disciples entered the field of politics and 
eventually married the pastoral model with the techniques and power of the state, 
continuing to attempt a process of the purification of the collective self (and of 
themselves), not only through the example of charisma and knowledge, but through 
attempting to bear influence on policies and legislation spanning from anti-communism, 
to education and to the Constitution. They have done this in the open, but mostly, I 
would still argue, through their pastoral influence and its use in strategic alliances. Their 
openly stated aim has been the re-education of society into a certain mindset and set of 
values (one that, in their opinion, would heal the remnants of the Communist past), 
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meaning, their own. This sounds very much like ideological process in some ways but 
this is done in the open (similar, in some respects, to the agenda of an NGO), and the 
key issue of whether the Păltiniş group should be seen as supportive or part of the ruling 
elite is not at all straightforward at this point. Is it important to understand how under the 
guise of pastoral power they have legitimated particular sectors of political power as a 
means of sustaining their own project and agenda as described above? And to ask who 
has benefited from this most and least and whether they have been supportive, if not 
part, of a Òpower eliteÓ? Yes, if we are to ever understand their influence as public-
intellectuals. I would also admit that despite Tănăsoiu (2003)8 a less complimentary 
analysis of the political role of main intellectuals in post-Communist Romania (both in 
terms of positive and negative achievements) is sorely needed. Were there instances of 
hermeneutical interpretation where books such as LiiceanuÕs ÒDespre urăÓ9 (ÔAbout 
HateÕ), and the exchange between the Matei-led10 collective project of ÒIdols of the 
ForumÓ11 and the Tismăneanu-led (2010i) ÒThe Resentment DossierÓ made considerably 
more sense as examples of an ideological process and/or a marketing campaign, than as 
arguments developed coherently or systematically and out of a real concern for a certain 
thematic? Yes, they were. But it is my opinion that, preferably in a hermeneutical 
approach, such realizations should be expressed (as legitimate possibilities of 
interpretation) only at the level of the text, through a very detailed examination that 
                                                             
8 An excellent PhD dissertation otherwise, and not to be too harshly judged considering the time of its 
appearance, when the positive estimation of the roles of the Păltiniş Group and the GDS (Group for Social 
Dialogue) was at its highest.  
9 See Cistelecan (2006i).  
10 Such analysis has been performed as part of this project but will not be included here because of its 
length and other considerations relating to the fact that the Păltiniş Group chapter it was part of had to be 
removed and replaced with a summary.  
11 This is a statement about the orientation of the project as a whole and not about individual articles out of 
which a small number are, without doubt, extremely valuable. Also I should mention here that I do not 
include MateiÕs first book, ÒBoyars of the mindÓ in the same category.   
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allows the text to Ôspeak for itself,Õ and not as general judgments about groups or 
individuals, which would lack the backing of social-political analyses in this case. This 
is as far I can see the mirror-mechanism go in terms of providing an answer to the issue 
of ideological process based on this thesis.12 Overall, then, the preference has been to 
treat the authors of discourses as a function and carrier of a certain discourse and 
hermeneutically, as living subjects. This is not to say, however, that a key material 
dimension is not missing from this research, which could have accounted better for the 
uses of power and status.  
With this, the discussion of methodological concerns has come to an end, making way 
for a presentation of the structure of the dissertation and the chapters that follow the 
introduction.  
To start with, certain indications should be given about the peculiar structure of the 
thesis, which is that of a sphere. The traditional view will have it that this represents the 
systemic and ordering function of a unifying symbol as the archetype. The more radical 
imagination will view it as a pulverized archetype (or Logos) resembling an exploded 
supernova (Braga 2006) with a fragment of the sun still to be found. In this case, the 
structure of the thesis resembles a journey from the periphery of a sphere to its centre 
and then out again. The thesis starts with an analysis of RomaniaÕs transition process in 
the recent present (in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4), then goes back in time to 1945 from 
where it gradually emerges in post-communism by travelling through the period of the 
Ceauşist regime, all in successive stages. It also presupposes a journey from an external 
discursive space of transition to an internal one and then through to discourses within it, 
                                                             
12 Although this thesis has suggested that the discourse of anti-Communism provides a perfect ground for 
a Foucauldian analysis, I was not able to pursue such a direction here. 
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leading to a central mechanism, with different forms and with a centre, which then again 
expands into a mechanism travelling through different discourses and periods back to 
the discursive space of transition. Something the Table of Contents could not represent, 
therefore, is the fact that, in the scheme of the thesis, Chapter 4 (ÔThe Discursive Space 
of Transition: The External ContextÕ) is self-standing, while Chapters 7-12 should all be 
viewed as deriving from or as being subsumed under Chapter 5 (that is, under the 
discourse of Socialist Humanism). Similarly, while the Table of Contents assimilated 
without my awareness the idea that the notion of the mirror-mechanism should be 
positioned, as its main hypothesis, at the centre of the thesis (Chapter 6), there are 
problems with keeping the most significant section of the mirror-mechanism chapter 
(ÔThe Roots of the Mirror-MechanismÕ section, and, especially, the ÔMirror-Mechanism 
and ReligionÕ subsection) also in the middle of the thesis, where it should belong. This is 
where it would fit conceptually and this is where I have placed it, but its length in 
comparison with the other subsections around might be disconcerting to the reader. With 
these guidelines established, the order of the dissertation can now be described chapter 
by chapter.  
This introduction constitutes the first chapter of the thesis. The second chapter is a 
literature review which traces the journey from an original vision concerned with 
assessing the Romanian HE system against the needs of a transitional society (barred by 
the lack of research into the actual state of the HE system), to a concern with policy-
making and concrete evaluations of the transition (deterred by the inchoate, pre-
paradigmatic and heavily neo-liberal character of the social sciences and by their lack of 
meaningful debate about policy models and the nature of transition), and, finally, into 
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the realm of cultural discourses (where transition is discussed mainly as a competition 
between cultural models) from which the notion of the hero-mirror mechanism 
ultimately springs forth as the main hypothesis. Chapter 3 discusses theoretical and 
comparative perspectives informing the main hypothesis and unveils a research 
methodology which combines Foucault with hermeneutics, archetypal criticism and the 
history of ideas. The same chapter specifies how the notion of cultural discourses has 
been employed in this thesis, and highlights the reasons for which the mirror-mechanism 
should be envisaged as an Òallegorical archetypeÓ and as a device that closely prefigures 
FoucaultÕs apparatus of pastoral power.  
In this thesis, a specific application of the hermeneutic circle has been to posit the notion 
of a discursive space as the domain (a ÔwholeÕ) where discourses of different kinds, as 
the ones analysed in this work, formulate and meet each-other in interaction 
(interdiscursivity). This dissertation, therefore, has been metaphorically structured into 
two sections. Thus, while Chapter 4 outlines the general features of a Ôdiscursive space 
of transitionÕ as reflected in RomaniaÕs post-1989 external context, Chapter 5 attempts 
the same but in relation to the interior social-political and cultural context of Communist 
Romania and its continuations into the present. Chapter 5, under which Chapters 7-13 
are subsumed, likens Communism to religion and conceptualizes its transformation of 
Romanian society in terms of two religious metaphors (inhale/destruction and 
exhale/creation) indicative of two distinct phases: one in which society is emptied of its 
previous form and content, and another, in which it is filled with a new meaning. These 
phases are then identified as socialist realism (1945-1964) and socialist humanism 
(1964-1989) based on the two types of discourses they seem to promote (but which are 
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nevertheless judged to stem out from the same nucleus of the hero-mirror mechanism). 
The hero-mirror mechanism is then accounted for in great detail in Chapter 6. Here, its 
formulation as a hypothesis through an inductive investigation of texts from Cernat et al. 
(2004), is followed by a search for its origin which confirms it at the level of Platonic 
thought, Russian Communist culture and pre-Stalinist culture and which ultimately 
posits its roots in religion. From this point onward, the testing of the hypothesis is 
expanded from marginal and forgotten cultural productions in Communism to Ceauşist 
cultural discourses highly influential in the public domain during and after 1989, and 
this gives the main body of the thesis. Because of methodological reasons, the analysis 
of each chapter until the conclusion occurs from now on in three parts. The first part 
approaches cultural discourses as symbolic discourses and applies to them a 
hermeneutical analysis that seeks to capture their ÔessentialÕ nature. The resulting 
essence-like characterizations of such cultural discourses are then assessed alongside the 
axes of the mirror-mechanism via the use of archetypal criticism in the second part. 
Finally, the third part examines the type of resistance these discourses put forward. This 
is why it can be said that the mirror-mechanism involves three dimensions of research, 
each with its own findings in the conclusion: discourses as identity discourses 
(concerned with the deconstruction of Romanian identity), as intellectual discourses 
(focusing on intellectual groups, their cultural models and their arrangement in the 
cultural field) and discourses of resistance (concerned with the very contested issue of 
resistance in Communism).  
Within this structure, the sequence of chapters now subsumed under the phase and 
discourse of Ôsocialist humanismÕ (1964-1989) follows their chronological order. 
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Chapter 7, therefore, sets out to investigate why the Romanian Communist regime is 
presumed to have turned towards the ideology of the nation in the early 60s. This 
chapter juxtaposes TănaseÕs (1998) elite theory with VerderyÕs (1991) Ôindigenization of 
MarxismÕ thesis and MartinÕs (2002iv) alternative argument in favour of the 
Òcommunization of the nation.Ó The chapter also examines other assessments of the 
nature of CeauşescuÕs regime, reframes the problematic examined by suggesting that the 
elite of the Communist Party had most likely internalized key aspects of the nationalistic 
discourse even prior to 1949 or 1962, and examines the connections between the 
discourse of the nation and Ôsocialist humanism.Õ Next, Chapter 8 discusses the 
recuperation of aestheticism, particularly under the form of a certain type of lyricism 
advanced by the G60 in poetry, which follows the 1960s return to nationalism. The end 
of Chapter 8 sees the notion of Òinner utopiaÓ introduced and presented as an example of 
how the discourses analyzed in Chapters 7-13 tend to reinforce each other. Following on 
this, chapter 9 offers an interdisciplinary synthesis of perspectives on protochronism, 
shows that the question of whether protochronism derives from the nature of the regime 
or from the structure of the cultural field has not been adequately answered yet, and 
reveals its confirmation of the mirror-mechanism (and of Ôsocialist humanismÕ). Chapter 
10 reveals how NoicaÕs tactic of ju-jitsu aimed to transform the Communist hero of the 
mirror-mechanism primarily into a cultural hero. Here, the scheme at the core of NoicaÕs 
ontology is shown to reflect the notion of the mirror-mechanism particularly in its 
deeper level as theological structure. Furthermore, while NoicaÕs implied Humanistic 
ethics corresponds well to the axis of Ôimitatio Dei,Õ his School or pedagogical project 
confirms the mirror-mechanism in both its axes. Finally, the nationalistic orientation in 
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NoicaÕs writings, his humanistic inclination and his ÔpaideiaÕ are all assessed in terms of 
what they offered as resistance. 
In Chapter 11, the Flacăra Cenacle is presented as a humanist counter-culture movement 
sanctioned by the state, which combines the lyrical discourse of the 60s, the humanistic 
discourse of the regime and the nationalist-communist (protochronist) discourse with 
that of the hippie movement. While its long-lasting appeal derives from its nature as 
kitsch, the Flacăra Cenacle is innovative in that it applies the mirror-mechanism to the 
construction of a certain type of collective mental space, i.e., as a form of collective 
Ôaesthetical self-fictionalizationÕ (Poenaru 2010). This chapter also captures the debate 
triggered by the media spectacle at the death of Păunescu between exponents and critics 
of Ôthe anti-Communist ideology.Õ  
Finally, Chapter 12 examines arguments in favour and against the postmodernist nature 
of the G80, notes its humanistic orientation and offers an assessment of the G80 
paradigm which confirms its discourse as the first to displace the hero-mirror 
mechanism.  
Listed as Chapter 13, the conclusion hints at the potential contribution of the mirror-
mechanism to VoegelinÕs notion of Ôpolitical religionÕ and at its applicability to also 
Fascist regimes, while also highlighting the limitations of the dissertation as a whole. As 
previously indicated, the conclusion reports the findings of three dimensions of research 
that run throughout the thesis: discourses as identity discourses, as intellectual 
discourses and as discourses of resistance. The first dimension looks at post-communist 
art discourses that further delegitimize the mirror-mechanism (Fracturism and the 
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Romanian New Wave, etc.) and at discourses which continue it into post-communism 
(Protochronism, Mr. BecaliÕs and that of the Păltiniş Group) concluding that the mirror-
mechanism has, nevertheless, almost fully dissipated. The second dimensionÕs main 
finding is that the notion of Ôinner utopiaÕ is so dominant amongst the intellectual elites 
and in society at large, that Ôtrue educationÕ is viewed as lying outside the provinces of 
formal institutions (for true spiritual education cannot occur in formal institutions), 
which signals an important divide between the HE system and the cultural field. Finally 
the third dimension proposes an alternative taxonomy of resistance, while pointing out 
that in the case of Romania, cultural discourses should be viewed more as discourses of 
ÒevasionÓ rather than as discourses of resistance.  
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Literature Review 
The Beginning: An Educational Vision and the Challenge of Transition 
The author has started this project motivated by an educational vision according to 
which the role of an educational system must be derived from the needs of society, 
particularly when that society is experiencing a very turbulent transition. This is in 
following with the general line of inquiry present in Dewey (1916), Whitehead (1967), 
Tanner and Tanner (1995), Freire (2000), Botkin et al. (1998) that education should be 
Òfocused on problem solving and critical thinking as applied to living situationsÓ 
(Tanner and Tanner 1995, p.3) and which, in the Romanian context, figures most 
prominently in the Òënvăţămntul Romnesc AziÓ (ÒRomanian Education TodayÓ) 
report: ÒFirstly, our analysis is founded on the idea that the manner in which Romanian 
education presents itself is in a large measure dependent on the state of Romanian 
societyÓ (Miroiu et al. 1998, p.10). 
Such an approach would have required some assessment of the current educational 
system as measured against some evaluation of the current state of society. However, if 
the society to be looked at is in a process of transition that can be described as the 
movement from a state A to a state B, from Òa point of departureÓ to Òa point of arrivalÓ 
(Stănciulescu 2002, p.29), the issue of assessment necessarily involves a triple reality of 
past, present and future. If transition, as Òthe passage of a social system from one model 
of organization to anotherÓ (Zamfir 2004, p.4) is from A to B, what are A and B and 
how does that relate to the present? More problematic is that such an analysis is required 
in a context in which the disciplines of social science are themselves undergoing a 
 
 
41 
significant transition, being themselves engaged in a process of uneven development, 
reformulation, revival, realignment and sometimes even simply of emergence. To 
account for the meaning of transition represents therefore a full blown epistemological 
problem in that the academic disciplines in use are themselves motivated and directed by 
particular understandings and agendas about the transition process (as well as about their 
own constitution as disciplines) which are themselves not fully completed or 
conceptualized, but in a state of flux. In that sense, the knowledge about transition 
developed by any academic field reflects the state of development of that field; where 
those fields are not fully developed or functional, findings must be, by necessity, 
correlated with findings and perspectives from other fields. In such a context, integration 
of knowledge becomes key not only as interdisciplinarity, but also in terms of 
formulating what brings one specific academic field together, when such fields are 
nascent, dispersed or Ôpre-paradigmaticÕ (Kuhn 1970). In some cases this sort of 
evaluation can and should result in providing a de-mystifying critique of an existent 
field/subject. Whatever the case, the Romanian scholar, most often than not, does not 
benefit from the Western advantage of relying on a discipline that is relatively settled on 
its paradigms, trends, methods and traditions of research and which holds a self-
constitution and findings developed gradually over time13.  
 
 
 
                                                             
13 This portion, as well as the entire section on the Romanian HE, has been inspired by the work of Becher 
and Trowler (2001). 
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Romanian HE and the Challenge of Transition 
It is with this problematic that this research project commenced in 2006. Then, like now, 
I maintain the opinion that the Romanian field of education and especially that of Higher 
Education, have generally failed to produce adequate research of the Communist past 
(point A) and of the post-Communist present, being concerned primarily with 
developing and implementing a program of reform for the future (so with point B) based 
on a generalized notion of a Western model.  
 
Studies of the Communist Past and Their Legacy 
Thus, the works of Sadlak (1988, 1990, 1991; Sadlak and Vlăsceanu 2001) which rely 
on general statistics and careful analysis of legislation and policy statements to 
formulate a general overview of the Romanian HE system in its historical development 
are to date the only meaningful assessments of the Communist period14. Their influence 
on Romanian scholars and policy-makers cannot be overstated, particularly in terms of 
setting a model of scholarship and reporting on HE that in diluted form is dominant even 
today.  
By this, I am referring to a model which relies on the general statistical data usually 
provided by the NIS (National Institute of Statistics) and on existent legislation and 
policy documents (as well as on the mix of personal experience in the field with perusal 
                                                             
14 A study that touches on Romanian HE is the work by Wolter et al. (1986) on approaches to planning of 
higher education in CMEA countries. From outside the field of education, noteworthy efforts are 
especially the studies of social mobility by Cazacu (1974, 1991), then GheorghiuÕs (2007) study of party-
intellectualsÕ formation and PălăşanÕs (2009i) historical incursion into party regulations regarding the role 
of social science at the beginning of CeauşescuÕs regime. To these can be added the general educational 
reports of Randolph Braham (1964, 1972) which have sections on the HE system.  
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of available literature on HE in the West) to produce reports that either offer a general 
description of the HE system at a certain point in time, or which advocate for a general 
direction of reform (usually both). Most research written on the Romanian HE system 
from 1989 until today reflects this model with the writer usually adopting 
simultaneously the paradoxical standpoints of researcher, policy-maker, analyst for a EU 
funded body or a World Bank project, and government official devising and 
implementing the reform of HE education. As it can be observed, therefore, the field of 
HE in Romania (and there would be good reasons to argue that such a field, if it exists, 
has been constituted not so much inside the academic domain as outside of it in the 
policy-making realm) does not produce research and literature about the actual state and 
processes of the HE system, outside the general statistical data provided by the NIS 
(which is only sometimes supplanted with questionnaires or opinion polls and, very 
rarely, with interviews). No real qualitative data (or independent data outside 
government agencies) is produced about any essential aspects of the HE system, which 
is why one could assert that Romania has not developed an adequate instrument for 
looking at the quality of HE programs and of the student, faculty and staff experience. 
At the same time, no qualitative studies of the actual state of the HE system (or of any 
parts of it) are undertaken before or after reform initiatives, which have been somewhat 
continuous (at least in terms of legislation) since 1989. Considering that the type of 
statistical information the NIS can provide concerns aspects such as number of students 
enrolled broken down by mode of study, discipline, course, institution, region, ratio to 
teachers, completion or non-completion of study, cycle of study (BA, MA, PhD), size of 
class, financial aid, gender and so on, it is clear that the representations of the HE system 
being constructed through such data cannot touch on the reality of what happens inside 
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the system. To use an expression coined by Black and William (2001, p.1), these 
representations, which could be thought of also as simulacra, treat the university (both in 
terms of research and policy) as a Òblack boxÓ: ÒCertain inputs from the outside are fed 
in...Some outputs follow...But what is happening inside? How can anyone be sure that a 
particular set of new inputs will produce better outputs if we donÕt at least study what 
happens inside?Ó The policy-makers and researchers studying and reforming the 
Romanian HE sector, one could argue, are thus constantly operating with simulacra of 
the HE system. They are reforming a simulacrum they have constructed, not something 
that could resemble in any depth the real system. It is because of this that at the end of 
decades of Western and European reform in HE, particularly in relation to quality, 
assessment and good management practice, we end up with huge explosions of 
plagiarism15, a key indicator about the real health of any HE system: ÒGovernment 
ministers are proven serial plagiarists, students acquire their dissertations for modest 
sums online, and a failure to investigate allows widespread cheating to take place 
without censure. Everyone gets a degree, nearly all MPs are also professors at a 
university they helped to gain accreditation through their influence, and all seem to 
                                                             
15 In 2012, some of the key figures involved were the current Prime-Minister Victor Ponta, the current 
General Prosecutor of Romania Laura Codruţa Kovesi, the current Minister of Environment and Forrests 
Rovana Plumb and Ministers of Education Ioan Mang and Ecaterina Andronescu. Only Mang and then 
Corina Dumitrescu, who would have been nominalized to succeed him otherwise, lost their positions due 
to plagiarism revelations. Under the leadership of Andronescu (July 2012-December 2012) and her 
succesor Remus Pricopie, the Ministry of Education managed to deliver, in most controversial a manner 
(part of the argument being that the current law allows for some degree of plagiarism), verdicts absolving 
the first two (Ponta and Kovesi) of plagiarism charges. That these instances are part of a larger 
phenomenon of Òinstitutional plagiarismÓ  (for example, the term ÔplagiarismÕ itself has been given little to 
no prominence in the University Charta or the Ethical Code of major universities, and current national 
legislation is cumbersome and ineffective in providing a mechanism for identifying and preventing such a 
phenomenon; when such legislation and mechanisms do threaten to act the political factor replaces the 
membership of the commissions involved affecting the outcome; bodies directly responsible like CNE -
National Council of Ethics and CNATDCU Ð the National Council for Attestation of University Titles, 
Diplomas and Certificates are either purposefully dormant or engage in whitewash practices) has been 
clearly documented by Sandu (2012, 2012i).  
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benefit; however, no Romanian university features in the ÒTimes Higher Education 
World University RankingsÓ and the country is stagnating without skilled labourÓ 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). There is a big distance between the simulacrum and the real 
system. 
 
Studies Grounded in a Vision of the Future 
Therefore, I consider these types of studies, which follow the model of research 
described above, as primarily anchored not in the reality of the post-communist present, 
but in a vision of implementing reform for the future that is almost in its entirety 
ideologically derived. The main impetus of these studies is to introduce or record 
change, but the basis for legitimating this type of change lies primarily with policy 
visions or models of policy-making developed in the West and, only secondarily, with 
whatever actual data of the HE system has been collected (which is usually only of the 
NIS kind, and only more recently, sets of statistical and descriptive data provided by 
universities about themselves according to set parameters and categories of 
interpretation). In the absence of self-constructed policy visions for HE, which could 
only derive from intimate knowledge about the inner processes of Romanian HE, it is 
obvious that the organization of statistical data into plans for reform would not be 
possible without certain ideological underpinnings, in this case almost entirely derived 
from Western models of HE policy-making. Why and how the policy-based agenda of 
Romanian HE is a Western one and whether that is good or bad in the current context is 
an issue of great complexity, which I will nevertheless attempt to touch on here. But 
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until then, it is important to acknowledge that judging by the studies described above, 
which constitute a representative sample of the majority of research being produced, 
certain features of Romanian HE as an academic field can be distinguished. Romanian 
HE is limited to describing, if not actively seeking to legitimize, the programmatic 
character of government reform in education; it does not produce research of the 
different aspects of the HE system (beyond operating with statistics and rarely with 
questionnaires or opinion-polls) and it does not possess a qualitative dimension to its 
evaluations (well-structured interviews are rare); it does not produce tests or evaluations 
regarding the impact of reform and in certain manner it does not produce even minimal 
critiques of the unfolding government reform in education, or of the EU and the World 
Bank or any other international agencies involved. One way to explain this is that, 
possibly due to a lack of research and policy-making capacity, the focus of HE 
researchers has been entirely spent on kick-starting the process of educational reform 
from positions which are, if not close to, than almost within the government. Whatever 
the case, the studies that fall in the category above still carry an essential value, and as it 
stands, give most of the main corpus of literature on Romanian HE. I am referring here 
to authors and texts such as Mihăilescu (1996) Mihăilescu and Vlăsceanu (1994), 
Eisemon et al. (1995), Marga (1999i, 1999ii), Nicolescu (2000, 2002), OECD (2000), 
Sadlak and Vlăsceanu (2001), Vlăsceanu et al. (2001), Korka (2000, 2002), Taylor and 
Miroiu (2002), Miroiu (2005), David (2006), Singer and Sarivan (2006), Comşa et al. 
(2007), Miclea et al. (2007), Miron et al. (2007), Roman and Suciu (2007), Roman 
(2008), Korka and Sturza (2009), ARACIS (2009), Teodorescu and Andrei (2009), 
Andrei et al. (2010), Miroiu and Andreescu (2010), Vlăsceanu et al. (2010), Agachi et 
al. (2011), ARACIS (2011), Florea and Wells (2011), Păunescu et al. (2011), Andreescu 
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et al. (2012), Miroiu and Vlăsceanu (2012), Păunescu et al. (2012) and Vlăsceanu and 
Hncean (2012)16.  
Certain things should be mentioned here. Firstly, in his works, Korka (2000, 2002) most 
competently advocates the ideals of government-led HE reform in Romania through 
portrayal of a European vision based on the Bologna declaration, and notions such as 
entrepreneurialism, globalization and the knowledge society. Equally, however, his 
model of reform (which is also the one officially supported by the government) assumes 
a generalized and unique version of a Western model for the HE sector, and one that is 
extremely neo-liberal in its assumptions. Whether this is an honest appraisal or one 
conditioned by the institutional position of the author, what matters is that no critique is 
extended to the European project or to the presumed ideal Western program for reform 
(or, obviously, to the government): one is simply to embrace such reform. Essentially, 
this sort of outlook is generally the norm for all the other studies despite the warnings of 
Sadlak and Vlăsceanu (2001, p.3): ÒWhile initially an abstract model of higher education 
was taken as a frame of reference (for example, the ÔEuropeanÕ university, ÔEuropeanÕ 
standards, Ôthe universityÕ of the developed world, etc.), it has now become evident that 
such a model is not available in practice. Moreover, the higher education systems of the 
Western European countries have themselves been confronted with the need for change. 
What were taken as fixed and unquestionable references proved to be moving targets.Ó 
Secondly, some of the studies above do involve opinion polls (questionnaire-based) of 
students, university staff and employers [Roman and Suciu (2007), Comşa et al. (2007), 
ARACIS (2009), Vlăsceanu et al. (2010)], but these assessments of levels of perceptions 
                                                             
16 This list does not aim to be definitive or all-encompassing but simply representative.  
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are not followed up with more in-depth investigations [Nicolescu (2002) is a possible 
exception here], about what had caused them or how they should be interpreted. An 
interesting if not paradoxical assessment of such findings is offered by ARACIS (2011). 
This study views the apparent satisfaction of respondents with higher education services 
as a Òuniformity of perceptionsÓ derived from the Òweak institutional differentiation of 
Romanian higher educationÓ (idem, p.8). In a strongly centralized system which creates 
a high level of structural isomorphism through a) the Òset of uniform criteria of 
ARACISÓ (The Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education), b) the 
Òso-called basic funding systemÓ operated by CNFIS (National Council for Higher 
Education Funding), and c) the disconnect between local government or private 
enterprise and the educational services, only some actors (doctoral advisers, deans, 
rectors, PhD students and faculty member with high levels of ISI-indexed publications) 
tend to display a level of critical awareness that transcends the general stereotypes 
(pp.12, 5, 9, 15).  
Thirdly, the need for Ôinstitutional differentiation and institutional diversityÕ within the 
Romanian HE sector is highlighted not only by ARACIS (2011), but also by Miroiu and 
Andreescu (2010), Vlăsceanu et al. (2010), Păunescu et al. (2011), Andreescu et al. 
(2012), Miroiu and Vlăsceanu (2012), Păunescu et al. (2012) and Vlăsceanu and 
Hncean (2012).  
What these authors reveal in these texts is not only a homogenous vision but also an 
incredibly similar discourse, both supportive and explanatory of the HE reform 
introduced by the 2011 National Law of Education. It should be emphasized at this point 
that most of these authors either work on bodies implementing the reform, such as 
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ARACIS (Păunescu), CNFIS or both (Vlăsceanu, Miroiu), or have participated in 
drafting key reports for these bodies (Hncean, Andreescu, Florian, Gheorghiu), or are 
actually members of UEFISCDI (Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, 
Research, Development and Innovation - which incorporates CNFIS) (Andreescu, 
Curaj). The theme of diversification is not at all new even in Romanian HE literature 
[see for example the 1980Õs debate between the two policy-positions of Òdiversification 
of higher educationÓ and that of Òintegrated higher educationÓ recorded by Wolter et al. 
(1986, p.91), or discussion of the theme of diversification by Sadlak and Vlăsceanu 
(2001)], but this new policy discourse reflects a particular configuration in the larger 
discourse of quality promoted both by national governments in Europe and the EU. 
Without any clear theoretical foundations or reliance on empirical studies (for an 
example of these see Van Vught, 2007), the Ôinstitutional differentiation and diversityÕ 
policy discourse simply copies a strong managerialist version of the Western discourse 
of quality, at some points even in more extreme forms than has been attempted in the 
West. Certain key assumptions structure this discourse. Firstly, that institutional 
differentiation and diversity is good in itself, for all the participants and beneficiaries of 
Romanian HE: ÒHigher education systems with diverse and differentiated institutions 
are considered to have an increased capacity to satisfy the various expectations of 
beneficiaries. ... Several dimensions of such an outcome are usually considered: 
provision of wider and diverse learning opportunities, increased capacity for institutional 
adaptation to studentsÕ needs, and increased institutional flexibility in responding to 
domestic and wider social changesÓ Vlăsceanu and Hncean (2012, p.55). Secondly, that 
the homogenization of the Romanian HE system has been caused primarily by the action 
of the state through 1) the quality/accreditation procedures and indicators developed by 
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ARACIS and 2) the equalitarian funding system and policies developed by CNFIS, both 
having been too top-down, rigid and uniform in previous times. Thirdly, that the 
introduction of Òfree enterprise, competitive pressures and the operation of market 
mechanismsÕ (Taylor 2003, p.286) into HE, although very desirable, does not by itself 
lead to the effect of institutional differentiation and diversity in the absence of planned 
strong state intervention (Miroiu and Andreescu 2010, pp.97-98): ÒOn an expanding 
market, pressure for diversification and for the increase in the quality of services will be 
weak without state interventionÓ (ARACIS 2011, p.15). Fourthly, that differentiation 
and diversity can only be introduced through new state legislation, new modes and types 
of classification, regulations and incentives. Together, these would operate through a 
more flexible set of quality indicators capable to ensure Òmultidimensional 
differentiationÓ [instead of the past practice of Òusing a fixed, simplified set of 
institutional categories as an instrument for policymakingÓ (idem, pp.94-95)] onto which 
a different, more fluid pattern of funding could then be superimposed. Fifthly, that 
classification would entail moving from the simple ranking of HE institutions against 
similar criteria towards constructing Òdimensions of differentiationÓ through which HEIs 
can be grouped into classes according to how they score in each dimension (idem). 
Sixthly, that this classification requires strong differentiation between the dimension of 
research and that of teaching and learning, and that this should be reflected, in the 
Romanian case, by the legal classification of HEIs into research intensive universities 
(1st category), research and teaching universities (2nd category) and only teaching-
focused universities (3rd category) (National Education Law, Chapter 7, Article 193, 
point 4). Seventhly, that while an ideology that can encompass any aspect of the HE 
system, the differentiation and diversity agenda focuses primarily on issues of strategic 
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management and organization at institutional level: ÒOne striking characteristic of the 
Romanian higher education system is its homogeneity, or at least the existence of a 
powerful process of weakening the differences between State and public universities, 
between old and new ones, between large and small universities, between 
comprehensive and highly specialised universities. Their mission (as codified in the 
university Charts) is quasi-identical, their organisational structures, types of study 
programmes and their organisation, as well as content, procedures and practices related 
to teaching and research, the internal regulations are all similar (if not simply copied 
from one another) and at most incrementally differentÓ (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu 2012, 
p.802). Eighthly and finally, that the process of quality assurance should therefore be 
primarily conceptualized (via the Ôfitness for purposeÕ approach) as one of institutional 
evaluation in which the universities are legally required to provide mission statements, 
followed by a detailed process of self-evaluation comprised of two steps. The first step 
would require universities to present truthful statistical data about all their operations 
across several dimensions (teaching and learning, research, external relations and 
institutional capacity) and according to specific standards and sub-criteria, all in light of 
a detailed taxonomy provided by the government (Ordin 4072, 2011). Based on this, 
ARACIS and/or EUA (European University Association) would then be able to develop 
a set of quality indicators (through statistical modeling) that would function as the basis 
for the hierarchical ranking of universities and study programs, resulting into similarly 
differential funding. As for the second step, this would require universities to present 
and report (both in person and in writing) the strategic and operational plans they have 
derived from their own mission statements to a EUA team of external (and in fact, 
foreign) evaluators (IEP 2013). 
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It must be said here that the general criticism offered by literature in the field of HE on 
the notion of quality assurance also seems to apply to RomaniaÕs case, although the 
tendency has been to dispose of such observations with an optimistic attitude of policy 
implementation. As Harvey (2010, p.2) observes: ÒUnlike most academic disciplines 
that learn from accumulated knowledge and experience, quality assurance, it seems, 
systematically disavows all that has come before.Ó This certainly seems to have been the 
case with Romania, where QA policy has been introduced as if no dimension of quality 
had previously existed in the HE system Ð particularly with regard to good teaching and 
learning or research practice. If, antecedently, quality had been Òa matter for internal 
regulation by academics, who in turn took for granted what quality meant and that its 
sustenance was inherent in academic values and modes of organisationÓ (Kogan et al. 
2006, p.94), should none of that matter anymore? ÒA sign of an ideology is its tendency 
to colonize all before itÓ also asserts Barnett (2003, p.91) before classifying ÔqualityÕ as 
a Òpernicious ideologyÓ because of it a) being imposed from above to deny the academic 
community space over quality affairs (p.92), b) lacking self-reflexivity in not being 
capable or willing to formulate and divulge the tacit idea of higher education which it 
endorses and continuously propagates (p.94), and c) not allowing for any due process, in 
terms of opening itself to Òdialogical spacesÓ (p.96). As already presented, the micro-
ideology of institutional differentiation and diversity permeates, via the National 
Education Law of 2011, the entire HE system, across all its statistically quantifiable 
dimensions. At the same time, this specific ideology is largely lacking a theoretical 
foundation and is not based on empirical studies. Similarly, this policy discourse lacks 
an assessment not only of the current state of the HE system (in a way the idea is that 
through the new QA system such a picture would eventually be captured), but also of 
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how actors and institutions might react to such reform. Here, an honest admission from 
Miroiu and Vlăsceanu (2012, p.806) concerning the overall proposed reform of the HE 
funding system in light of the agenda of ÔdifferentiationÓ is exemplary: ÒHow would the 
actors (universities, staff, and students) respond to this new set of (different) funding 
incentives? This is a question for the future. In the meantime, we are looking for a way 
to better specify and then implement the new funding mechanisms.Ó A similar approach 
is adopted by Vlăsceanu and Hncean (2012), who, lacking any study or data about the 
possible response of actors to the policy model of Ôdifferentiation and diversityÕ, propose 
a competition between two predictive models, one of the desired external reform and 
one of the capacity of HEIs to act autonomously based on internal and informal 
structures. Their conclusion is simply that HEIs cannot resist the force of the state, with 
institutional differentiation being thus achieved despite any type of homogenization 
potentially being triggered via the same process: ÒIn other words, the incentives brought 
forth by the Romanian reforms are so strong and diverse that they involve not only the 
top management of universities but also their operating cores. Even if HEIs respond in 
the same manner to the coercive isomorphism imposed by the state authorities 
responsible for higher education, they are institutionally differentiated using the same 
criteria.Ó Here, it must be mentioned, homogenization stands also for the two negative 
effects of Ògame-playingÓ or Òcompliance cultureÓ (Barnett 2003, p.94; Harvey 2005, 
p.272) and Òde-couplingÓ (of teaching and learning from the overall quality process and 
structures, or of teaching from research) which the quality assurance process can induce. 
When aware of such critiques, but even indirectly [see Miroiu and Vlăsceanu (2012) for 
examples of Ôgame-playingÕ], these authors, however, tend to believe such problems 
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would be overcome in the new system [see, for example, Păunescu et al. (2012, pp.333-
334), in relation to Òde-couplingÓ]. 
Another aspect in which the differentiation/diversity policy discourse can be viewed as 
an ideology is in its somewhat hidden claim to power. As mentioned before, this 
discourse calls for direct state intervention and control of HE institutions, albeit under 
the justification of having to safeguard the diversity and quality of the system and 
through claims that such intervention would in fact increase the autonomy of HEIs.  
Thus, Morley (2003, p.VII) observes that inasmuch as Ò[q]uality procedures translate 
particular rationalities and moralities into new forms of governance and professional 
behaviour...quality is a political technology functioning as a regime and relay of power,Ó 
and Harvey (2010, p.8) wonders if the Òcentralised control that quality assurance 
enablesÓ does not overtake all other considerations in importance. This is particularly 
worrying in the case of Romania for several reasons. Firstly and most importantly, 
because those advocating such a policy discourse and reform prefer to overlook the poor 
record of the Romanian government (and of the Ministry of Education, Research, Youth 
and Sports) in terms of good governance. Secondly, because as Barnett (2003, p.92) 
observes Ò[i]n the ideology of quality, we have a nice example of the tensions between 
the state and civil society.Ó However, considering that Romanian NGOs and professional 
communities are already too weak and unable/unwilling to critically engage with the HE 
quality agenda, who will be able to keep the government accountable while its powers 
are on the increase? Furthermore, if the state lacks the institutional capacity and 
expertise required to presently run and implement such policies, who will benefit most 
and in what ways from the imposition of a Western and European policy model of this 
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kind? Last but not least, MorleyÕs (2003, p.161) warning that Òexcessive regulation 
combined with low salaries is making the academy an unattractive career optionÓ could 
begin to apply to Romania even more than before.   
By far, however, the most potent criticism of QA, and this applies fully to the 
differentiation/diversity agenda, has been that it ignores Òthe intrinsic nature of the 
higher education enterpriseÓ (Harvey 2010, pp. 2, 6), namely, the student experience and 
academicsÕ cultures of professionalism. Having been borrowed from the business and 
industry sectors quality systems tell us how to improve bureaucracies but not the process 
of student learning (idem, p.6): ÒQuality monitoring focused on processes and systems 
rather than engaged with the learning experience of studentsÓ (Harvey 2005, p.273). The 
same transpires from the evaluation methodology that the new reform of HE proposes 
for assessing quality. The 2011 New Law of Education talks about two types of 
evaluation for classifying/ranking universities and their study programs. The yearly 
Òprimary evaluationÓ requires universities to present truthful statistical data about all 
their operations across several dimensions (teaching and learning, research, external 
relations and institutional capacity) and according to specific standards and sub-criteria, 
all in light of a detailed taxonomy provided by the government (Ordin 4072, 2011). On 
the other hand Òinstitutional evaluationÓ occurs every four years and requires 
universities to present, both in person and in writing (a Òself-evaluation reportÓ), the 
strategic and operational plans they have derived from their own mission statements, to a 
EUA team of external (and in fact, foreign) evaluators (IEP 2013). Carried out by the 
European University AssociationÕs Institutional Evaluation Program, this type of 
evaluation involves different teams of five foreign EU experts (HE leaders, academics 
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and a student) visiting twice the same institution for a total of 5 days, on the basis of 
which a final decision is taken and presented into a report. The focus of the IEP is Òon 
the institution as a whole rather than individual study programs or unitsÓ and the primary 
areas of concern are those of Òdecision making-processes...institutional structures and 
the effectiveness of strategic managementÓ (IEP 2013, p.6). In terms of quality, the 
emphasis is on the internal processes of quality assurance and on how these inform 
decision-making and strategic management (idem). To conclude with, it is clear from the 
IEP guidelines presented to the Romanian HEIs that IEP is primarily concerned with 
issues of strategic management and with introducing a Ôculture of qualityÕ within these 
institutions. In terms of quality, the IEP focus is on policy and procedures set up for 
internal quality assurance and not on the actual quality of the learning experience, 
teaching, research, study programs or departments. In fact, whatever qualitative 
information is collected in this process depends entirely on what qualitative data the 
HEIs under scrutiny have chosen to include in their self-evaluation reports (p.10). The 
strange thing is that when scrutinized Òprimary evaluationÓ proves a form of 
Ôinstitutional evaluationÕ as well, this time, not in terms of analysis of strategic 
management decision-making and planning, but in terms of an inventory of statistical 
data concerning the different resources (physical capital, human capital, student base, 
financial incoming streams, networking, and number and types of degrees offered, as 
well as number and types of publications and of funded projects) found at an 
institutionÕs disposal (Ordin 4072, 2011). Thus, under the criterion of Òteaching and 
learning,Ó the sub-heading of Òcurriculum and specializationÓ (the only other sub-
heading concerns Òhuman resourcesÓ) is divided into these four categories:  
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1) Òtotal number of accredited specializations by cycle of study (i.e., BA, MA, PhD), in 
each of the last 5 years (2005/06-2009/10)Ó 
2) total number of graduates, counted separately for each of the five years 
3) students enrolled into their first year, for each of the five years 
4) number of graduates continuing their studies in the same institution, in each of the 
five years (idem).  
What is definitely missing from this is an evaluation of curriculum development, and of 
the student learning experience and the quality of teaching. Even stranger is the fact that 
the same seems to apply to the evaluation for the hierarchical classification of programs 
of study (into five categories: A, B, C, D, and E).  
On this matter the legislation is diverse and confusing, with ARACIS seemingly relying 
both on Law 87/2006, with its further additions such as HG 1418/2006 and OUG nr. 
75/2011, and on the 2011 National Education Law, with its additions such as Ordin 
4072/2011. The first legislative set enforces 3 main domains of quality assurance 
(institutional capacity, educational efficacy, and quality management) with their 
respective criteria, which differ considerably from the other set (teaching and learning, 
research, external relations, institutional capacity) particularly in terms of sub-criteria. 
Both sets have been designed to apply to the evaluations of institutions as a whole, but it 
can probably be assumed that ARACIS employs the first set in order to evaluate study 
programs (as no specific provisions for that exist in the second set) although not enough 
information regarding this type of evaluation exists in current legislation.   
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The 2011 National Education Law asserts that the rankings of universities and study 
programs is to be performed by an evaluative organism comprised of ARACIS, CNCS 
(National Research Council), CNATDCU (National Council for the Attestation of 
University Titles, Diplomas and Certificates) and an international body selected by the 
Ministry of Education (in this case, the body in question is EUA Ð European University 
Association). The first evaluation of this kind is to be undertaken, however, by the 
external agency alone, namely, by EUA, but on the basis of a methodology (for ranking) 
provided still by the Ministry of Education. Considering that the methodology provided 
by the Ministry of Education (ÒDecree regarding the approval of the evaluation 
Methodology for the classification of universities and the hierarchical organization of 
study programs,Ó 2011), similarly to the 2011 NEL and Ordin 4072/2011, does not 
specify any clear criteria for the ranking of study programs, doubts are cast on how this 
process is and has actually taken place. Has the EUA ranked institutions and study 
programs solely on the methodology provided by the Ministry of Education and on the 
basis of the 2011 NEL? This would seem to be the case judging by the assertion of 
Vlăsceanu and Hncean (2012, p.60) that Ò[s]tudy programme ranking has been mainly 
quantitatively oriented.Ó If this is so, then how has the EUA ranked study programs only 
based on institutional evaluation criteria that ignore the quality of learning/teaching etc.? 
Or has the EUA relied also on the legislation from 2006 and its continuation into 2011 
under OUG nr. 75/2011, which at least has some minimal criteria in relation to 
assessment of teaching and learning? If this second part is the case, then that raises the 
question of how EUA, ARACIS and the Ministry of Education have employed different 
sets of conflicting standards and indicators to provide a unitary picture of the HE system 
in terms of the 2011 ranking of HEIs and study programs. However, even supposing that 
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a methodology derived from both sets of legislation has been used, and with the aid and 
sets of data from ARACIS, this still raises concerns. This is so because as Păunescu et 
al. (2012, p.324) have observed, 1) from 1993 until 2005 quality assurance has been 
considered synonymous with accreditation (of private institutions) which led to state-
universities being almost never evaluated in 13 years and 2) the founding of ARACIS in 
2005 did not discontinue the past practices of relying on Òmostly input- and process-
orientedÓ quality assurance indicators despite modified legislation (Miroiu and 
Andreescu 2010, p.99). On this second point, Păunescu et al. (2012, p.327) are most 
eloquent: ÒAnother practice the ARACIS inherited, which also permeated its external 
evaluation methodology, was the focus on measuring and counting input resources 
instead of focusing on the outcomes of education, as the law stated. A recent study on 
the external evaluation methodology revealed, that, in fact, the input indicators are 
predominant in the new methodology while indicators measuring outputs or outcomes 
are missing. At this time the ARACIS is revising its evaluation methodology.Ó  
The arguments presented above will suffice to conclude that Romanian HE, and 
particularly the QA and differentiation/diversity policy agenda of reform, does not 
generally produce qualitative assessments of the HE system at any level, does not 
generally produce assessments of the student learning experience and the quality of 
teaching, and tends to rely solely on forms of institutional evaluation via statistical 
data17, imposed forms of self-evaluation reporting and institutional visits for the ranking 
of universities and study programs (from which very differentiated funding patterns are 
                                                             
17 Finally, if the entire reform and assessment of the HE system relies primarily on statistical data from the 
NIS (National Institute of Statistics) and generally quantitative (and input-oriented) data provided by the 
universities themselves, another important question must also be asked: how descriptive, accurate and 
reliable are these sets of data by and on their own? 
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then derived). Is this a real commitment to reform or just another typical manner of 
ÔborrowingÕ a Western model without creating any real changes in the deeper structure? 
Is the concern here with the reality of the HE system and identifying its current state (the 
present) or with implementing a borrowed policy vision (for the future) with the aim of 
claiming that Romania now has the same QA standards and QA mechanism with the rest 
of the EU? Is the real target of the current reform the HE system or the portrayal of a 
successful construction of a QA mechanism? As Barnett (2003, p.95) has observed, QA 
systems tend to be more concerned with achieving their own ideological aims by 
performing certain types of classifications, rather than with due process and doing 
justice to the evidence: ÒImpatience is built in this ideology: provided that there is an 
outcome that contributes to the inner intents of institutional comparison and which, at 
the same time, appears to render institutions transparent, and, thereby, accountable, this 
quality process will have realized its purpose.Ó  
With this, my discussion of the main body of literature on Romanian HE, and of the 
Romanian HE sector, as being anchored primarily not in the reality of the present, but in 
a vision of reform associated with the adoption of policy-making models from the West, 
has almost come to an end. 
The question, however, is if Romania is not unnecessarily adopting more extreme 
versions of the Òdifferentiation and diversityÓ agenda than even the EU requires. It is 
clear that the entire policy discourse of quality and, particularly, the more recent one 
relating to the ÔdiversificationÕ of HE, has been imported in Romania through the 
influence of European agencies or actors. There is no doubt that the EUA producing the 
2011 ranking of Romanian HEIs and study programs (an earlier partner in policy-
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making), relies heavily on the notions of institutional differentiation and diversification 
of the HE system, both in terms of vision and evaluative practice. Furthermore, the same 
can be said about the European Centre for Strategic Management of Universities and its 
president Frans van Vught, and more importantly, about the European Commission: ÒIn 
a policy paper in 2005, the Commission identified several bottlenecks: a tendency to 
uniformity and egalitarianism in many national higher education systems, too much 
emphasis on mono-disciplinarity and traditional learning and learners, and too little 
world-class excellence (European Commission, 2005c). ... European higher education is 
also over-regulated and therefore inefficient and inflexible.  ... In the view of the 
Commission, the quality and attractiveness of European universities need to increase, 
human resources need to be strengthened both in numbers and in quality, and the 
diversity of the European higher education system needs to be combined with increased 
compatibilityÓ (Van Vught 2009, pp.7-8).  
Reichert (2012, p.813) provides a perfect summary of the central location of this policy 
discourse on the European scene, highlighting, nonetheless, the fact that debates still 
surround it: ÒTo put the current European higher education policy debates into 
perspective, it should be noted that the term Ôinstitutional diversityÕ or ÔdiversificationÕ is 
most often used rather restrictively, referring, first, only to external diversity, i.e. the 
divergent profiles of higher education institutions, rather than the diversity which 
institutions have to address within their institutional boundaries (internal diversity). 
Second, European diversity discussions most often refer to diversity of missions, which 
is understood to signify the varying institutional emphases on particular types of higher 
education activity, such as research, teaching, innovation or continuing education. 
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Curiously, other possible dimensions of mission and institutional identity are not 
discussed under the heading of mission diversity or mission stretch. Currently, the most 
prominent preoccupation with mission diversity concerns the intensity and form of 
research engagement as criteria for institutional differentiation. This concern has gained 
urgency in recent years with the rise of international rankings since the latter focus 
primarily on the measurable research activities which are registered in internationally 
accepted data sources (Hazelkorn 2008; Rauhvargers 2011). The mono-dimensionality 
of this research orientation has given rise to intense discussions, but has not yet led to 
more differentiated approaches to mission diversity (see also Chaps. 19 and 43 by 
Hazelkorn).Ó 
The agenda is clearly one derived from the European project, but there is much 
difference between the softer version advocated by van Vught (and Netherlands), for 
example, and the ÒhardÓ approach taken by Sir John Taylor and the UK Research 
Councils (Vught and Ziegele 2012, p.16). One cannot but feel that, by classifying 
universities as research intensive, research and teaching, and only teaching focused 
universities (and by adjusting their funding accordingly) the Romanian government has 
gone much beyond what was being required by the European higher education agencies, 
following too closely, in fact, the more extreme policy agenda espoused by Taylor 
(2005, p.287): ÒIn 1987, the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) 
recommended that all higher education institutions should be graded R (research 
universities on the American model), X (institutions with selective research missions) or 
T (teaching-only institutions). These proposals were probably too radical ever to have 
any prospect of implementation.Ó Clearly, these proposals were not too radical for 
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Romania to implement, despite the fact that not the same can be said about other 
European countries or, indeed, about the UK itself. To this extent, therefore, it would 
seem that Romania can paradoxically be viewed as a testing-ground for Western models 
of policy-making not yet tried in their home countries.   
 
Studies Aiming at the Actual State of the HE system 
In the above, I have discussed how both literature and policy in the Romanian HE field 
tend to be directed towards a Western policy-model of future reform, without much care 
for past or present. Until now, this has been done through analysis of HE literature that 
deals with the Communist past, and with the implementation and set-up of a borrowed 
policy-program for future reform. At this point the focus will turn to few of the studies 
or texts that seem to be concerned primarily with the actual state of the HE system and 
of the society it frames: Neculau (1997), Miroiu et al. (1998), Stănciulescu (2002), 
Antohi (2004), Ferro (2004), Ginsburg et al. (2005), CUC (2009, 2010), Di Giacomo 
(2010), World Bank (2011).  
Relying on Bourdieu, NeculauÕs essay (1997) discusses the notion of Òacademic fieldÓ in 
RomaniaÕs case, noting some of its transformations from the interwar period, through 
Communism and beyond, via the use of a small study (focus groups with students and 
interviews with faculty). Neculau (1997, p. 40) is noteworthy for emphasizing that 
universitiesÕ decline or progress depends on engagement with social context and life 
problems, and on speaking truth to power. He also observes that the centralized 
Romanian educational system reduces the role of the academic community to that of 
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maintaining internal quality standards by emphasizing certain moral and behavioural 
norms for social interaction (idem, p.39). The findings of his study (p.52), most of them 
reflections on the transition process, are still valid today, like, for example, the 
observation that when faced with reform, the university responds according to a model 
transmitted from professors to students: ÒThe only effort is the one Ôfor perpetuation, 
maintenance, stagnation.Õ We could characterize this process as Òa gradual adaptation, 
step by stepÕ without essentially affecting Ôthe structures, habits, mentalities.ÕÓ Through 
the academic field, not change, but the model of Òresistance to changeÓ is being 
distributed into society (idem).  
The exemplary Miroiu et al. (1998) is an integrative study that focuses on the state and 
reform of the Romanian education system as a whole, as judged against the needs of a 
society in transition (and particularly against poverty and social inequality of different 
specific forms). The study is unique not only in that it views the different parts of the 
educational system in relation to each other (primary education, secondary, tertiary etc.) 
amidst processes of reform, but because it combines data about educational institutions 
and social inequality with theorizing about the main features of the system, with an 
assessment of the current reform and an analysis of the management of the system, all 
resulting into a very strong and well organized critique of Romanian education (with 
precise recommendations at different levels of analysis). In large measure, its 
radiography of the educational system, and particularly its account of how this system 
fails the majority of its students, remains still valid and unmatched in kind today.  
Stănciulescu (2002, pp. 9, 12) is, unlike most studies, a qualitative analysis (combining 
ethnomethodology with phenomenology) assessing the 90Õs transition of the HEI 
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towards a more democratic model. Her book interprets the everyday experience of 
university life with the tools of sociological theory, resulting in abstract analyses about 
the logic of actors and institutions amidst processes of reform. This work is useful to any 
inquiry into how and why democratic reform processes are both partly accepted but also 
seriously undermined by actors and institutions in a post-communist HE system. Instead 
of viewing the failures of transition as caused by the resistance of the traditional and 
stagnant masses to the civilizing and modernizing elites, Stănciulescu (idem, p.38) 
proposes, thus, a different model: ÒIs it not more pertinent and more profitable to ask 
ourselves whether, beyond desires and appearances, there is not a split between political 
strategies and discourses, on the one side, and the practical logics of common actors, 
whatever their social condition may be, on the other?Ó Her analyses reveal that too often 
the social actors of the typical HEI prefer to rely on the sphere of personal relationships 
and on a specific morality associated with culture and tradition, rather than on universal 
and neutral norms that should apply equally to all (p.35), and which are associated with 
the rule of law, formal institutions and meritocracy (or performance criteria). She also 
warns that in some cases the government itself is ready to alter statistics and reports just 
to give the appearance that certain borrowed norms have been implemented 
successfully, without much care for actual effects in practice. Thus, instead of a 
Òregulatory, reflexive mechanism,Ó the rule of law tends thus to act predominantly as a 
Òstructure with a dominant demonstrative functionÓ (p.86).  
Antohi (2004) is simply a personal reflection, from a cultural perspective, on the 
challenges and responses of students and faculty members in conditions of chronic 
underfunding of the Romanian HE system. The essay (p.342) discusses the social, 
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cultural and intellectual challenges of students moving abroad, noting that the academic 
discourses produced about Romania come mostly from outside the country (the West), 
and that the typical ones from within are too Òindigenous, fragmented and 
heterogeneousÓ to ever grow and connect with the larger international discourses. 
Nevertheless, Antohi (p.336) trusts that RomaniaÕs emerging academics can steer clear 
of both extremes: ÒThus, something I have called ÔThe Third Discourse,Õ a fusion of 
local and international discourses situated at a critical distance from both autochthonism 
(with its specific Romanian expression, ÒprotochronismÓ) and Westernization (with its 
local hybrid, imitation, and its reductio ad absurdum political correctness), is being 
proposed by an increasing, although still limited number of authors.Ó 
FerroÕs (2004) study of highly skilled labour migrations from Romania to the West (a 
topic which, strangely, the Ministry of Education has chosen to ignore for decades) is 
one of the first of its kind of a qualitative nature. Her online survey (p.22) has the merit 
of investigating the personal experience of highly skilled migrants found in diverse 
locations (mostly in the West) on a variety of topics: Òthe most leading reasons of their 
moving, the difficulties that skilled workers encountered, the likelihood of a return in 
Romania, the transnational commitment and belonging, and an evaluation of their brain 
drain experience.Ó 
Insofar as I am aware, Ginsburg et al. (2005) is the only journal article to 1) look at 
RomanianÕs HE system in relation to the activities of the World Bank, IMF and WTO 
(or in relation to any of them) and 2) to compare the Romanian HE system with another 
HE system in a qualitative manner (that of Chile, in this case). In short, the conclusion is 
that, in both countries, the policies of the World Bank and IMF have Òpositioned very 
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effectively these systems to be governed by the rules of the GATS/WTOÓ via policies 
introducing the Òprivatisation, domestic marketization and international 
commercialization of higher educationÓ (p.231). Aside from its main argument and 
comparative focus the article is of importance because it touches on the essential and 
continuous role played by the World Bank in the formulation of post-communist 
Romanian HE policy: ÒThe Romanian governmentÕs initiatives to privatise, marketise 
and commercialize the system of higher education were undertaken in the context of- 
perhaps in anticipation of and certainly reinforced by Ð the policy recommendations of 
the World Bank and the structural and stabilisation program conditionalities of the 
World Bank and IMF, respectivelyÓ (p.230). 
In 2007, at the initiative of SAR (Romanian Academic Society) 14 NGOs united to form 
the Coalition for Clean Universities as a mechanism for making universities accountable 
to students and civil society. This resulted into a research methodology that assessed the 
ÔintegrityÕ of all the public HEIs according to criteria belonging to four dimensions 
(Òtransparency and administrative fairness, Òacademic fairness,Ó Ògovernance quality,Ó 
Òfinancial management practicesÓ) allowing for the hierarchical ranking of universities 
in 2008 and again in 2009-2010. With an ingenious methodology that relied on never 
enforced legislation regarding the transparency of HEIs and standards of governance and 
finance, on interviews with students and staff, assessment of number of ISI publications, 
investigative journalism and even legal cases, the CUC studies (2009, 2010) repeatedly 
found widespread instances of plagiarism and nepotism, lack of transparency in terms of 
administrative/academic (staffing, promotions, performance, etc.) and financial decision-
making (budgets, pay increases, public acquisitions, individual asset declarations etc.) 
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and a failure to evaluate students in a meaningful way. The CUC initiative produced 
vehement reactions from ARACIS and the Ministry of Education (who had not yet 
produced any official ranking of Romanian public universities at the time and who 
generally tend to present a more favorable view of the quality of the HE sector), but over 
time the impact of CUC over the government (see the changes regarding nepotism in the 
2011 NEL) and the Romanian HEIs has probably been quite significant. Whatever the 
case, the CUC initiative stands unique in that it combines educational research with a 
civic responsibility to hold institutions accountable to their service of the ordinary 
individual (almost in the manner of the Ôparallel polisÕ described by Vaclav Havel), and 
because it is the only study of scale (no matter how imperfect) seeking to capture the 
real present state of the Romanian HE system.   
Di Giacomo (2010) represents an ambitious PhD dissertation attempting to 
conceptualize the transition process of the entire Romanian education system (towards 
forms of democracy) via a theoretical outlook that combines notions such as 
colonialism, globalization and isomorphism. Of particular interest here are the findings 
of his 2009 interviews with 11 elite members of the Romanian HE sector (from former 
Ministers of Education and other high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Education, to 
researchers, professors, CEOs of educational agencies and UN officials) (pp.109-110). 
Noteworthy amongst them is the theme of isomorphism18 and the notion that the 
education system is moving from a pre-Communist French model towards a more 
Anglo-Saxon one (pp.132, 187). The overwhelming consensus amongst his respondents 
                                                             
18 ÒIn the case of Romania, isomorphism manifests itself primarily as EU policy and a tendency to mimic 
aspects of key Western education systems, which created positive, negative and ambiguous effects in 
RomaniaÓ (Di Giacomo 2010, p.53).  
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is that the influence of exogenous institutions (such as the World Bank, IMF, USAID, 
the EU and OSI Ð Open Society Institute) has been both key and Òpositive and even 
inspirationalÓ in kick-starting and maintaining the reform of the education system 
(p.181), even if at times lacking systemic coherence: ÒInterviewee Mona believed that 
exogenous, i.e., international organizations were the catalyst for most if not all reform 
efforts: Romanian reforms [are] donor driven, [by] OSI, WB [and] EU. [The] EU is [a] 
major one because give the most money but problem of coherence because each entity 
has different ideology and goals. EU wants de-centralization and partnerships. WB 
wants accountability and structures. OSI focus on partnerships between institutionsÓ 
(p.162). Di Giacomo (p.190) reads this tendency to view exogenous influence and actors 
in such a positive light as the manifestation of a colonial mentality. To him, the 
readiness to accept any suggested reform even before scrutinizing its impact and ways of 
implementation highlights RomaniaÕs need for developing its own Òframe of reference 
(p.197).Ó It also points to a resistant tendency to reduce the process of reform to that of 
paying Òlip-serviceÓ only (p.196). To conclude with, Di Giacomo (p.63) finds 
isomorphism in Romania mostly a positive force, but only because of the country 
lacking a trained and experienced elite that could envision, lead and implement reform. 
Unfortunately, studies aiming to assess the influence of any of the exogenous institutions 
mentioned above on the Romanian educational (or HE) system have yet to be produced.  
The World BankÕs Functional Review of the Romanian Higher Education Sector (2011) 
is a report that fits in many ways with the literature focused on the Ôdifferentiation and 
diversityÕ agenda and which is generally concerned with a model of policy-making for 
future reform. Nevertheless, I have chosen to list it in this section because of its capacity 
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to provide a comprehensive and well-informed assessment of the main challenges in the 
Romanian HE sector (although, some of its suggested solutions, particularly when 
moving from administrative/managerial issues into the inner processes of 
teaching/learning/research and assessment of such aspects, are at least debatable19). In 
my opinion, the reviewÕs estimations are critical in at least three aspects. Firstly, a clear 
warning is issued in relation to the lack of assessment of the student learning experience, 
and this can be seen to apply both to the QA frameworks of ARACIS and to the newly 
devised one for the ranking of universities and study programs in the National Education 
Law of 2011:  
ÒMost critically, there are no objective data on how much students learn during the 
course of their study. As such, it is impossible to take stock on where the Romanian 
higher education sector is in 2011, and provide guidance on how far it has improved (or 
regressed) in recent years. This is not to say that data are not available. Data are 
available on how many students (out of a particular age cohort) enroll and how many of 
them graduate. Data are also available on their socio-economic characteristics (using 
household survey data) and what they study. All of these data are analyzed below. 
However, it is important to remember that the study of enrollments and number of 
graduates is, ultimately, the study of how many diplomas are issued, not the study of the 
skills and competencies the sector producesÓ (World Bank 2011, p.32). Secondly, the 
report exposes the massive lack of expertise in the implementing organisms of the 
                                                             
19 The suggestion/directive that the assessment of student learning in Romanian HE should develop via 
standardized tests assessing specific sets of broad competences developed by specialists in each field 
(based on the newly forming National Qualifications Framework) and that such a system would allow for 
differentiating (with a view to adjusting funding) between different institutions and also between the 
private and the state HE sectors based on broad criteria such as Òanalytical reasoning skills,Ó Òcritical 
thinking skills,Ó and Òcommunication skillsÓ is simply laughable (see table and discussion in World Bank 
2011, p.44).  
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Ministry of Education, and the need to rely almost exclusively on foreign specialists. 
The situation is so critical that the review complains about the shortage of internal staff 
having to coordinate these outside resources: ÒThe second constraining factor has to do 
with the number of full time staff available to the intermediary organizations either 
internally or within the Ministry. ...A very small number of internal staff is operating a 
force of external experts that runs into the hundreds and thousandsÓ (p.13). Thirdly, the 
report documents a lack of management and planning capacity at the highest levels of 
the Ministry of Education (for example, the lack of a strategy for ÔinternationalizationÕ 
or the assignment of workloads that exceed by far the institutional capacities of the 
implementing organisms) and a discretionary (and non-transparent) use of public funds 
in the manner in which HEIs receive their core funding and capital expenditure budget 
(p.92).  
 
Conclusions on the State of the HE Field 
With this last example my review of the literature on the Romanian HE system, and in a 
sense, of the nature of the field of Romanian HE, has come to an end. This exercise has 
shown that very little research has been produced about the communist period of the HE 
system or about the real state of the HE system during the decades after 1989 (the recent 
present), with most contributions focusing on the adoption (and implementation) of a 
program of reform for the future constructed via Western models, aid and expertise. The 
strong ÒisomorphismÓ that can be viewed as a key factor in this seems to involve the 
interplay of both long-tem cultural factors (such as an extremely positive or optimistic 
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view of the West as the source and agent of development and modernization) and the 
presumed more medium-term lack of capacity (both institutional and in terms of human 
resources) and expertise. If the name of the game is to constantly play catch-up with the 
latest policy-models and trends in the West, and Romania lacks the capacity for doing so 
critically, it is no surprise that Romanian HE would surrender the initiative in policy-
making to exogenous actors, viewing such influence uncritically and in very positive 
terms. The real worry, however, is that the Romanian HE sector would not have 
developed even this type of policy-making and accompanying research literature without 
the influence of such exogenous actors.  
 
Romanian HE: A Challenging Research Agenda 
In such conditions, a realistic assessment of the current state of the Romanian HE system 
in relation to the needs of society cannot be undertaken today and could not have been 
undertaken back in 2006, at least not single-handedly. Simply put, the body of research 
and the educational data required for understanding the inner processes and 
configuration of the Romanian HE system had not (and have not) yet been constituted. 
To constitute this data and body of literature is to reconstruct the entire field of 
Romanian HE. The distance is that from statistical sets of external data to meaningful 
interpretation of inner processes (how the system actually works and what it does) and 
their correlation to social reality. The same can be said about the concrete educational 
needs of society, which still remain to be determined beyond the realm of borrowed 
ideology or general policy visions.  It is for these reasons, therefore, that this PhD 
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research project found its original intention of assessing the current HE system against 
an evaluation of the current needs of society too daunting to pursue. An X-ray of the HE 
system in transition could have been achieved only to the level of recapitulating the 
successive development of policy legislation (sometimes itself confounding and 
excessive), but without being able to assess the level of implementation. This would 
have effectively reduced the HE system to a simulacrum, namely, to the reality of a 
social system being entirely substituted by the vision of change supported by a policy 
model, with no differentiation between the two. Unfortunately, as can be discerned from 
the type of research literature produced so far, this already constitutes a main trend in the 
field of Romanian HE. Too often the HE system gets represented as the historical 
succession of regulations and legislative action imposed upon it, (and/or as the 
philosophical vision entertained by some borrowed policy-model), as if this was the 
reality of the system. Not differentiating between the two has given policy-making and 
legislation an appearance of rightfulness, objectivity and inevitability. This is highly 
undemocratic and also threatens the process of reform because of not allowing it a 
feedback mechanism.  
A second option would have been to produce a representation of the HE system in 
transition not in terms of the state of the system and its features, but in terms of the 
meanings of transition and resulting policy-models vying to shape the HE agenda in 
Romania. This would have required the research project to slide slightly more towards 
policy discourses than educational ones. However, with the high isomorphism displayed 
by the Romanian HE system, debate between different policy-models and meanings of 
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transition has not occurred at all, at least not in the public domain or in the literature of 
the field. Hence, this avenue could not be pursued either.  
At this point, still true to the vision of relating the HE system to the state of a society in 
transition, the PhD project took a significant detour. 
 
From Educational Discourses to Policy Discourses on Transition 
The research project became concerned with a) assessing the impact of the Communist 
legacy on the present state and needs of society, and with b) identifying what meaningful 
debates about the meaning of transition (and/or about competing policy models) existed 
in society. The final aim was to relate the findings (about the Ôpoint of departure,Õ the 
Ôpoint of arrivalÕ and the current reality of transition) with whatever could be known 
about the current state of the HE system and the policies pursued regarding it. 
The second direction signified a move from educational discourses towards policy 
discourses, i.e., notions of transition or policy models from disciplines such as 
sociology, political science, economics, and the field of development (World Bank, 
UNDP, USAID, Open Society Institute). However the general impression derived from 
this, and here particularities apply to each field (Gheorghiu 2005, Aligică 2002, Barbu 
2002, Larionescu 2002), was that these disciplines tended to accept and promote the 
neo-liberal models of transition as readily, and sometimes as uncritically, as the HE 
field: ÒSo far, the revolution as a path to democracy has been conceived in an 
oversimplified manner that fails to capture its full meaning for the social sciences. 
Hitherto, more detailed issues of political transition and democratization are so far 
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scarcely identified, let alone addressedÓ (Barbu 2002i, p.287).20 This could be ascribed 
to the fact that, as is the case with sociology, most of these fields have lacked a Marxist 
or significantly Leftist orientation: ÒThe image of major theoretical orientations, 
presented before, reveals the absence of Marxism as a paradigm of contemporary 
Romanian sociology. The few exceptions presented, in which Marxist references are 
implicit or associated with other interpretations do not fundamentally change the 
situationÓ (Larionescu 2007, pp.116-117). MihăilescuÕs (2010, pp.186-187) joking 
remark that the post-1989 transition had been largely conceptualized as an off-the road 
return to the high-way of progress and civilization is, therefore, quite telling: ÒOnce the 
belief in the existence of the highway was widely shared, everything became purely a 
technical problem and, eventually, of time: the team of technicians drew ÔdriversÕ log 
booksÕ which we, at the wheel of transition, had to follow carefully pressing to the 
ground the acceleration pedal. ...Thus ÕtransitionÕ had been imagined and lived as a win-
win process, legitimizing both categories of actors engaged in the race: the confirmation 
of a superior Ôknow-howÕ on behalf of the Western ÔtechniciansÕ and the ardent desire of 
the Eastern ÔpilotsÕ to drink the champagne cup waiting for them at the finish line.Ó This 
is not to say that these disciplines did not attempt to engage with aspects and meanings 
of the transition process, at times even issuing alarming assessments of the present 
reality (particularly poverty, marginalization, bad governance and corruption). But this 
has been done so largely without any substantial critique of the current neo-liberal model 
[PastiÕs variant of political sociology (1995 and 2006) and the uninterrupted economic 
columns of Ilie Şerbănescu are an exception here, but their Marxist positions are 
                                                             
20 An illustrative example from the field of political science is the recent CRPE (Romanian Centre for 
European Policies) report (Giosan 2013) about making Romanian politics more democratic. For a critique 
of its suggestions see Barbu (2013).  
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generally considered unconventional and extreme] and without the offering of 
alternative policy models21. The assumption, thus, has largely been that Òthe failure is 
not of the ÔtransitionÕ but of the way in which some have put it into practiceÓ 
(Mihăilescu 2010, p.190). Only more recently, there has been a theoretical 
acknowledgment that Romania must find its own way and Òmake its own choicesÓ 
regarding the mode of its integration into the European structures and society (idem, 
p.195; Pasti 2006, p.27; Dăianu 2006, pp.25, 27, 399-411). However, as Mihăilescu 
(2010, p.195) remarks: ÒRomania does not have yet a project for the country.Ó22  
What is more (and this reveals their uncertain, inchoate, pre-paradigmatic character23), 
disciplines such as sociology and political science have been caught up in producing 
either generalist/theoretical essay-like literature (see, for example, Zamfir 2004; 
Vlăsceanu 2001; Pasti 1995, 2006; Barbu 2004) at times primarily cultural/historical or 
philosophical in orientation (see for example, Miroiu 1999; Barbu 2001, 2005), or 
extremely empiricist technical accounts (see, for example, Sandu 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi 
2002). On the other hand, domains like economics (see for example, Georgescu 2002 
and Dăianu 2004, 2006) and the field of development [see, for example The World Bank 
(1997, 2002) and the noteworthy National Human Development Reports for Romania by 
UNDP (2001, 2002, 2005, 2007)] have been almost entirely concerned with ways of 
                                                             
21 This is the main critique Vlăsceanu (2001, p.85) brings to the highly critical ÒRomania Ð Matter of 
FactsÓ report [Pasti et al. (1997)], probably as important and unique a report in the field of sociology as 
Òënvăţămntul Romnesc AziÓ (ÒRomanian Education TodayÓ) [Miroiu et al. (1998)] has been in the field 
of education. 
22 To the extent of Romania having formulated its own nation-wide policy strategy Mihăilescu seems to be 
absolutely right in his statement. This is not to overlook, however, the agreements from 2009-2010 with 
the European Commission, IMF and the World Bank resulting in the instrument for the national 
implementation of the Europa 2020 Strategy: the National Reform Program 2011-2013.  
23 Here, the assessment of Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p.2) still rings true in some respects: ÒThe world of our 
social sciences, although holding inside it talented or educated people, is a chimera at the moment, not 
even a project, for this would imply a will of transformation at work somewhere.Ó 
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implementing neo-liberal models of reform.24 Not surprisingly, Aligică (2002, pp.159-
160) discusses, for example, how the new Òcore theoretical and methodological 
orientationsÓ in the post-1989 field of economics have been those of Òa free market, 
monetarist, Chicago school approachÓ (more recently challenged by Òan eclectic, neo-
Keynesian approachÓ), of the perspective developed by Austrian School of Economics 
and of the neo-institutionalism strand supported by the World Bank.  
In conclusion, neither of these disciplines seemed, at least not in 2006, to offer a 
meaningful debate about policy models and the trajectory of transition. Even when 
critical accounts of aspects of present reality surfaced, these were not formulated well-
enough to amount to an alternative model, and/or were simply not engaged with 
properly because of the internal disorganization of their own discipline and the lack of 
political will. More importantly, the generalist, essay-like nature of such interventions 
also ensured that, at the level of critique, these disciplines tended to slide ever further 
away from the policy realm into the realm of cultural discourses.  
 
 
 
                                                             
24 An interesting critique was offered by the Marxist-oriented economist Ilie Serbănescu but his ideas were 
mostly scattered in articles on specific and immediate economic issues and never gathered together into a 
book that would imply a more defined and integrated perspective. The same can, in fact, be said about the 
publications of neo-Keynesian Dăianu (2009, pp.110-111), who, while generally supportive of the 
measures of reform and the policy models behind them, is also careful to emphasize the dangerous and 
unethical side of capitalism. As it happens, I fully agree with Antohi (2006) that Serbănescu and Dăianu 
are some of the most important public voices on the Romanian economy in the post-communist period, 
and at some point, a comparison of their specific analyses was even considered a subtheme for this 
research project.  
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From Policy Discourses to Cultural Discourses on Transition 
The slide into cultural discourses was even more prominent in the case of the first 
direction of research concerning an evaluation of the legacy of Communism. Initially, 
this can be attributed to three reasons: the fact that Communism brought about not only a 
different kind of society but also a different cultural project or civilization, the fact that 
many of the analysts of the Communist past (see, for example, Stelian Tănase, Marius 
Oprea, Cristina Vatulescu, Paul Cernat, Ion Manolescu, Angelo Mitchievici, Mircea 
Martin, Eugen Negrici, Ana Selejan, Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu, Ruxandra Cesereanu, Alex 
Goldiş, Alexandru Matei, Alexandra Tomiţa, Ioana Macrea-Toma, Lucia Dragomir, 
Stefan Borbly, Ion Simuţ, Sanda Cordoş, etc.) had first emerged or still operate from 
within the literary field25, and the fact that the evaluation of the legacy of Communism 
was occurring in a politicized context, marked by the intellectual discourse or cultural 
ideology of Ôanti-communism.Õ 
Both directions of study, then, pushed the research project from a concern with policy-
making and concrete evaluations of social reality towards the realm of cultural 
discourses and competing cultural models. At a deeper level, however, this change of 
focus must be attributed to the literary-centeredness of Romanian culture, which as 
observed by Patapievici (2007, pp. 95, 182-183 specifically) and others (Negrici 2008, 
pp.27-28; Buduca 2004; Muşina 2006, pp.201-205; Flonta 2010, p.106; Tănăsoiu 2004, 
p.94; Cernat 2010v Logica resentimentului sau nchiderea minţii, para.2, Lefter 2012, 
                                                             
25 It is interesting to note here that from the initial list of 19 members of the 2006 ÒPresidential 
Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in RomaniaÓ 8 members are or have been 
primarily affiliated with the literary field (Alexandrescu, Goma, Ierunca, Lovinescu, Manolescu, Oprea, 
Rusan, Tănase) while one is more a cultural theorist rather than a historian (Antohi) and another an 
essayist on matters of culture and a writer (Patapievici).  
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p.203) continues to dominate and severely impact on the nature of academic disciplines 
and specializations. From this point onward, and initially without even realizing it, the 
research project slid into the realm of cultural theory, however, via an integrative and 
trans-disciplinary approach. Unexpectedly, a specific hypothesis and research question 
emerged from the strand of literature evaluating the legacy of Communism (Crowther 
1988; Deletant 1997, 1998; Tănase 1998; Tismăneanu 1997, 1999, 2003; Tismăneanu 
and Antohi 2006; Verdery 1998; Martin 2002ii, 2002iii, 2002iv, 2003, 2003i; Boia 1999, 
2005; Cesereanu 2004; Kolakowski 2005; Schopflin 1993; Gleason 1995; Chen 2007; 
Tomiţă 2007; Kotkin 1997; Apor et al. 2004; Pollock 2006; Jowitt 2000; Gavrilă 2004; 
Cernat et al. 2004; Cernat et al. 2004i), and this was adopted as the main line of inquiry 
for this PhD project.  
 
Identifying the Research Question 
Initially, what transpired was an understanding that a certain humanistic discourse was 
central both to the main official Communist ideology26 and to some of its niche 
discourses and more marginal cultural productions. From this point, two further 
developments led directly to the emergence of the research question. Firstly, beyond the 
notion of a humanistic discourse, the readings from the collaborative project (Cernat et 
al. 2004) entitled ÒExplorări n Comunismul Romnesc, Vol. I-IIÓ (ÒExplorations in 
Romanian Communism, Vol. I-IIÓ) seemed to reveal the existence of a specific 
humanistic device, which I have entitled the hero-mirror mechanism. Secondly, this 
                                                             
26 This research direction was in fact pursued, also under the inspiration of Foucault, by Gavrilă (2004).  
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mechanism appeared to apply not only to discourses that had been marginal or niche 
during Communism (and then forgotten in post-communism), but also to publicly-
influential cultural discourses seemingly resistant or opposed to the official ideology. 
The same also seemed to apply to the re-emergence or continuation of these discourses 
after 1989.  
Finally, this led to the research question of a cultural device acting as a governing 
mechanism central to the period of Ceauşist Communism (and, possibly, the entire 
Communist period) both in terms of the official ideology and of resistant discourses. The 
existence of such a mechanism was then launched as a hypothesis to be investigated in 
three ways, the order of which gives the dissertation its structure. Firstly, an inductive 
investigation of different texts from ÒExplorări n Comunismul Romnesc, Vol. I-II,Ó led 
to the formulation of the hero-mirror mechanism as a hypothesis. Secondly, in the search 
for the origin of this mechanism in Communist Romanian culture, this hypothesis was 
tested and shown to apply to Platonic thought, to the key ontological concepts of some 
of the main religions, at different levels of Russian Communist culture (in the everyday 
functioning of the society of the new man, at the level of political and philosophical 
theory or core official ideology, and as the official art discourse of socialist realism), and 
in certain strands of pre-Stalinist Russian culture (the Russian avant-garde, SolovÕev and 
the school of Sophiology, 19th century radical fiction and the medieval texts 
documenting the life of a saint). Thirdly, the testing of the hypothesis (and in a sense, the 
inductive investigation) was expanded from marginal and forgotten cultural productions 
to cultural discourses highly influential in the public domain during and after 
Communism. This third part, i.e., the analysis of cultural discourses, also conceptualized 
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as both intellectual and identity discourses, was used then to frame the main body of the 
dissertation and develop its conclusions. Finally, in drawing the conclusion three 
dimensions were observed: a sort of deconstruction of Romanian identity and its main 
cultural mechanisms/models (with implications for Romanian HE policy-making), the 
educational role ascribed to the public space in relation to the HE system, both in terms 
of elite intellectual formation and the education of the masses (with implications for the 
reform of the HE system), and the very contested issue of ÒresistanceÓ during 
Communism (with the provision of an alternative taxonomy).  
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Methodology 
Introduction 
This section simultaneously combines a discussion of the theoretical and comparative 
perspectives that specifically inform this project together with a delineation of the 
methodologies employed as part of the study.  
The idea that Communist culture has made extensive use of the notion of the hero is 
nothing new. Communism, it is widely accepted, had produced the heroization of 
culture, science, leader, and of the nation. However, few efforts have been made to date 
to uncover the underlying mechanism or logic for such occurrences otherwise widely 
documented. Most attempts have seen the issue dutifully noted and classified as part of a 
larger interpretative paradigm or notion such as Ôtotalitarianism,Õ Ôdictatorship,Õ 
Ôutopianism,Õ Ôcult of the leader,Õ Ôideological control,Õ etc., essentially without further 
light being shed on the issue.   
That any heroÕs journey has similar stages in every culture has been argued relatively 
successfully by Joseph Campbell. As Campbell (1949, pp.28-37) sees it, however, the 
purpose of such mythical stories and archetypes is to testify to the existence of some 
divine source on which our life here depends (transcendence). The ÔmonomythÕ is, thus, 
nothing but a story in which the hero eventually manages to reconnect with such a divine 
source (thus, also finding himself) in order to rejuvenate his whole community (idem). 
The simple question, then, is why would the Communist system produce and appropriate 
countless stories of this kind and insist that everyone internalize and identify with at 
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least a certain considerable number of them? Moreover, why would the elites internalize 
similar models of the story themselves, suggesting that the notion of the hero is 
somehow also ingrained in the unconscious of the system and its elites?  
Only later in my PhD project I became aware of works concerned with Russian Ôsocialist 
realismÕ that specifically looked at the issue. If seen from the perspective of the question 
of the hero or socialist realism, this PhD thesis can be considered, thus, to generally fall 
within the tradition represented by Clark (1981), Groys (1992) and Gutkin (1999), 
although without this having counted as an initial source of inspiration. As discussed at 
length in the chapter entitled ÒThe Mirror Mechanism of the Hero: Its Discursive 
Matrix,Ó from these works, only Clark (1981) provides an in-depth analysis of the issue 
of socialist realism and the models of the hero, and, on these lines of inquiry, it is her 
work that this thesis has come to resemble most. In short, it could be said that this work 
sets out to achieve what Clark (1981) has done for socialist realism, only in the realm of 
cultural discourses. Having said that, analysis of cultural discourses is very different 
from narrative plot-analysis in novels (although some cultural theorists could argue that 
both mediums can be similarly seen as ÔtextsÕ), and, despite their parallelism, the same 
applies to the two types of structures identified as findings: the Òmaster-plotÓ vs. the 
hero-mirror mechanism. In these two fundamental aspects, therefore, this project 
essentially diverges from ClarkÕs (1981). 
 
For, if seen from the perspective of cultural discourses, this dissertation resembles, has 
its clear origin in, and continues the analyses of Romanian Communist culture 
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performed by Cernat et al. (2004), Gavrilă (2004), Verdery (1991) and Martin (2002ii, 
2002iii, 2002iv, 2003, 2003i), occupying a space in-between.27 As noted before, the 
hero-mirror mechanism emerged, via an inductive method, from the analyses of 
marginal, niche or forgotten Communist cultural products performed by Cernat et al. 
(2004). Verdery (1991) views Romanian Communist official ideology as the result of a 
battle won by the discourse of the nation over the discourse of Marxism. In a direct 
critique of Verdery (1991), Martin (2003, Nationalist sau comunist?, para. 10) argues 
that CeauşescuÕs objective was Òthe communization of the nation, not the nationalization 
of Communism or the indigenization of Marxism.Ó This PhD thesis follows this linkage 
between official ideology and main cultural discourses but in a significantly different 
manner. Firstly, via the humanistic device of the mirror-mechanism, a third discourse, of 
socialist humanism, is posited as a hybrid form between discourses such as humanism, 
Marxism-Leninism and nationalism. In particular, the period of CeauşescuÕs rule is then 
equated with the centrality of this discourse, also viewed as the main official ideology. 
Gavrilă (2004) fits in well here, because of his analysis of Ôsocialist humanismÕ as an 
official policy-discourse of the Ceauşescu regime. Secondly, the PhD thesis mediates 
between the larger discourses of the nation and Marxism, and the more niche 
Communist cultural products analyzed by Cernat et al. (2004) by proposing an 
intermediate but related unit of analysis: popular and influential cultural discourses of 
the Ceauşist period as tested against the humanistic device of the hero-mirror 
mechanism (namely, against the main official ideology).   
                                                             
27 Another indirect but essential source for this whole dissertation particularly in relation to Òthe figure of 
the heroÓ (Matei 2011, p.31) and the notion of Ôcultural resistanceÕ (and one also unacknowledged by 
many of the secondary sources used in this project) have been the writings of Caius Dobrescu (1998, 
2001, 2010), who despite his literary career, represents in my opinion, the most significant representative 
of the field of Ôcultural studiesÕ in Romania.  
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At this point, it becomes difficult to continue discussing the other theoretical and 
comparative perspectives informing this work without engaging the issue of 
methodology and, particularly, of the notion of cultural discourses being employed. As 
highlighted at the end of the Literature Review chapter, the methodology used consists 
of three separate parts, mirroring three different sections, or phases, in the project.  
 
Methodological Considerations: Positing the Hypothesis of the Mirror-
Mechanism 
The first part relies on an inductive approach, via which the model of the hero-mirror 
mechanism with its two axes [1) Ôthe myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything for 
something greater than himselfÕ and 2) Ôthe myth of the pure-hearted individual who 
seeks to actively internalize the GoodÕ] is derived or rather abstracted from different 
texts in Cernat et al. (2004) highlighting either or both of the two axes. At this level, this 
inductive methodology resembles that of Clark (1981) except that instead of analyzing 
the plots of different novels to derive a master-plot, the focus here is more on how 
ÔtypicalÕ characters are being constructed in different cultural productions. As can be 
witnessed, this type of narrative analysis and its findings constitute the first part of the 
chapter entitled ÒThe Mirror-Mechanism of the Hero: Its Discursive Matrix.Ó  
 
 
 
 
87 
Methodological Considerations: the Roots and Origin of the Mirror-
Mechanism 
In the second section of the thesis, concerned with identifying the origin of the mirror-
mechanism in Romanian Communist culture, the methodology can be said to loosely 
resemble that of the history of ideas advocated by Arthur O. Lovejoy (see Mandelbaum 
1965). While the hero-mirror mechanism is employed, in LovejoyÕs fashion, as a 
specific Òunit-idea,Ó this thesis falls short of the standards set out in works such as ÒThe 
Great Chain of Being,Ó where the role played by such Ôunit-ideasÕ in different systems of 
thought is accounted for in terms of historical causality and continuity. Such a 
comprehensive inquiry lies outside the scope of this thesis and the powers of its author. 
The aim here is simply to make an argument for the existence of a notion such as the 
hero-mirror mechanism by illustrating its different historical contexts of appearance that 
could be relevant to Romanian Communist culture. The simple methodology employed 
has been to follow the chains of association which different works relevant to the theme 
of the mirror-mechanism have set up from one to another and across cultural contexts. 
Key here has been the assumption that the centrality of the mirror-mechanism should be 
traced, as many other cultural and policy features of the Communist period have been28, 
to Russian Communist culture. Initially, this has led, for example, to works such as 
Kolakowski (2005), Jowitt (2000) and Pollock (2006), which confirm the notion at the 
level of Leninist and Stalinist Communist ideology, and to that of Kotkin (1997), which 
does the same in relation to Stalinist material culture. Additionally, the theme of cultural 
policy has led to works such as Clark (1981), Groys (1992) and Gutkin (1999) whose 
                                                             
28 A very interesting discussion of this kind occurs in Kligman and Verdery (2011) concerning the 
collectivization of agriculture in Romania based on the Soviet blueprint.  
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analyses of socialist realism clearly reflect the notion of the mirror-mechanism, but 
which also highlight the role of Platonic theory, of the Russian avant-garde, of radical 
Russian literature, of SolovÕevÕs philosophy, and of medieval hagiographies. From here 
on, by following the link to SolovÕev (Smith 2011), for example, the notion of the 
mirror-mechanism was further traced back to the school of Sophiology and to Orthodox 
Christianity, which, in turn, led to a further inquiry into other religions. Eventually, this 
led to the conviction that, due to the fact that this is where the hero-mirror mechanism 
can be found in its most theoretically developed and clearly specified form, this cultural 
device most probably has its origins in religion. Nonetheless, it must be said here that 
the methodology employed cannot account for a relationship of historical causality 
between any of the different contexts within which the notion of the mirror-mechanism 
has been traced. In MandelbaumÕs (1965, p.38) terms, this thesis cannot eventually 
demonstrate that the mirror-mechanism should be viewed more as a Òcontinuing ideaÓ 
(where a Òdirect historical connectionÓ can be established between different contexts) 
than a ÒrecurrentÓ one (which can occur at different times and in different contexts 
without any link of causality). This project, therefore, can only offer Òhistorical 
parallelsÓ where the aim would have been to Òestablish historical connectionsÓ (p.41). 
Nevertheless, as Mandelbaum (p.40) observes, Òthe importance of a preliminary logic 
analysis of unit-ideasÓ (here Mandelbaum distinguishes between logical connections 
based on similarity as opposed to historical connections based on causality), is that it can 
lead to Òoften immensely valuableÓ hypotheses. As the purpose of this thesis is to put 
forward a credible hypothesis, such an outcome would more than suffice its aims.  
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Methodological Considerations: Analysis of Cultural Discourses 
Finally, the methodology employed in the third part of the dissertation involves the 
analysis of cultural discourses. At this point, it becomes important to discuss how the 
notion of cultural discourse has been employed in this dissertation. There is no doubt 
that this PhD dissertation leans heavily on the superstructure side of the famous 
base/superstructure Marxist dichotomy (Williams 1973). To a considerable degree this 
has been caused by the successive distortions imposed upon the original research agenda 
of the project by the state of different Romanian academic fields and, particularly, of the 
HE field, in the years before and until 2006-2007. Such matters and the constraining 
influence of the literary-centeredness of Romanian culture on academic disciplines, and 
over this thesis, have been carefully presented in the Literature Review chapter and will 
not be reviewed here. To this extent, emphasizing culture and consciousness over the 
actual material processes and the economical and political realities of transition has 
indeed been an effect imposed on the author. However, inasmuch as other options have 
always existed (in terms of deviating from or severely minimizing the original research 
agenda) the current direction of this research project cannot be fully ascribed only to 
such constraints. If, forced into the field of culture, the author has chosen to engage with 
such terrain, it is also because prior or as part of this process he had come to develop an 
inclination for epistemological issues. It is from such an epistemological perspective, 
and here I would particularly refer to Foucault [see HearnÕs (2012, p.84) discussion of 
why FoucaultÕs study of power falls under the umbrella of Òepistemological 
approachesÓ], that the author approaches the notion of discourse. By viewing discourses 
as Òbodies of knowledgeÓ (McHoul and Grace 2002, p.26) this project, therefore, departs 
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significantly from the fields of cultural studies and critical discursive analysis 
(Fairclough 2003; Van Dijk 2006, 2008) and from domains such as structuralism, socio-
linguistics and semiotics, which tend to conceptualize discourses as language, signs and 
texts. There are arguments to be made for classifying this project as Òstructuralism in the 
broadest senseÓ [see SturrockÕs (2003, pp.22-23) distinction between ÒstructuralismÓ and 
ÒStructuralismÓ], or as relating to the field of cultural studies,29 or to the critical 
discursive analysis Fairclough (2006, 2000) applies to the notion of globalization or to 
the ÔThird WayÕ political discourse of New Labour. What is essential here, however, is 
that the author prefers to view discourses primarily as a function of knowledge rather 
than of language. For Foucault, for example, such discourses are not made of fixed units 
such as propositions, sentences or speech-acts (where the focus is on enunciation) but 
out of statements (where the focus lies with what is being ÒenouncedÓ) that depend on 
historically contingent discursive rules and which cannot, therefore, be pinned down 
according to Òa formal logical, linguistic, or even language-like systemÓ (McHoul and 
Grace 2002, pp.35-39, 29). This is not to say, however, that FoucaultÕs perspective on 
discourses remains unchanged throughout his work, or that it succeeds in avoiding some 
of the criticism generally affecting all forms of discourse analysis. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, I would like to operate with a very simplistic account of the different 
phases in FoucaultÕs work on discourses. This framework presupposes that at one time 
Foucault was concerned with scientific discourses, at another, with discourses as 
embedding discursive practices, and yet at another, with discourses of the subject.  
                                                             
29 See, for example, SaukhoÕs (2003, pp.19, 33-34) discussion of how the paradigm of the field combines 
the three methodologies of hermeneutics (Òlived experiencesÓ/ÓhumanismÓ strand), structuralism 
(Òdiscourses or textsÓ/ÒstructuralismÓ strand) and Òthe realist project of making sense of social realityÓ 
(Òsocial contextÓ/the New Leftist or ÔcontextualistÕ strand). At the level of methodology, an interest in 
Foucault, hermeneutics and the potential of discourses for resistance against an official discourse, confirm 
this projectÕs reliance on a generally similar tri-partite methodology.   
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A Framework for Understanding FoucaultÕs Notion of Discourse 
The first phase sees Foucault question the manner in which groupings, divisions, parts or 
bodies of knowledge (in other words, Ògroups of statementsÓ) have been united and 
imagined as scientific discourses (Foucault 1972, p.22). Here FoucaultÕs (pp.26-27) 
method is, firstly, to suspend the presumed continuities structuring the unity of a 
discourse, thus setting the entire field of discourse free, and secondly, to identify, within 
that newly released region (now made up only of Òthe totality of all effective 
statementsÓ), Òmore firmly grounded unities.Ó In other words, Foucault breaks up the 
structure of a given scientific discourse in order to reveal a more lasting and permanent 
structure (idem). He achieves this by revealing the problematic assumptions of unity 
through which discourses have previously been constructed: that statements can form a 
discourse if they refer to the same object over time, or if they form Òa codified and 
normative system of statementÓ (Òa series of descriptive statements,Ó for example), a set 
of Òpermanent and coherent concepts,Ó or a certain persistent thematic that can animate a 
group of discourses (idem, pp.34-35). None of these options seem valid to him, and their 
failure as hypotheses results in the need to attempt to see the unity of a discourse not in 
terms of a continuous fixed object, or of persisting normative statements, concepts or 
themes but in terms of the Òrules of formationÓ which govern the Òfield of strategic 
possibilitiesÓ into which such configurations (or others resulting from the play of 
statements) seem to emerge, perish and be replaced successively (pp.32-38). The Òrules 
of formationÓ are therefore concerned with Òobjects, mode of statement, concepts, [and] 
thematic choicesÓ and the system of their dispersion (but also formation and 
reappearance) that these rules describe gives the true structure of a discourse, or rather 
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the real discourse behind the discourse being analyzed (p.38). Already from this first 
phase, a certain criticism of any notion of discourse emerges, which in my opinion, can 
never be fully resolved in objective manner. Simply put, the notion of discourse refers 
almost simultaneously both to a terrain of knowledge to be investigated over a certain 
period of time, and to the inner structure that actually forms that terrain of knowledge. 
The idea is that the first term leads to the second, but the manner of selection of a 
territory cannot be dissociated from notions that heavily anticipate or pre-constitute the 
second term. The notion of discourse is, therefore, at least a double structure Ð there are 
two discourses, with one the alleged deeper structure of the other, and there is no way to 
fully conceptualize them separately. In a way, these problems have been touched on in 
Barker (2008, pp.150, 169): ÒHow do researchers know what ÔtextsÕ or bodies of 
materials to choose, for analysis? To whom are they relevant other than to the analyst? 
... What standards of evidence are required to ÔnameÕ something as a coherent, effective 
discourse? And what standards then apply to knowledge about peopleÕs encounters with 
those, sufficient to count as having been ÔpositionedÕ by them?Ó In my opinion, the 
problems highlighted are part and parcel of the process of knowledge and cannot be 
fully escaped. In hermeneutical terms, I associate them with the notion of Òpre-
understandingÓ and that of Òthe hermeneutic circleÓ (Thiselton 2009, p.14). This is not to 
say that analysis of discourses cannot be extremely useful, but that the importance of the 
results lies probably more in the specificity rather than the generality of the findings, and 
that, as Saukho (2003, pp.15-34) argues, their validity can only be increased by 
performing multiple analyses based on different methodologies.  
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Going next to the question of FoucaultÕs second phase in the analysis of discourses, this 
can probably be best described as a concern with discursive practices. Discursive 
practices are either associated with institutions (the prison, the school, the hospital and 
so on) and their procedures and regulations, or with the government and the notion of 
governmentality. Foucault describes them as Òtechnologies of dominationÓ (Foucault 
1980) (or, in short, ÒdisciplinesÓ) by which individuals or populations are studied and 
ÔdisciplinedÕ so as to be rendered Òdocile and usefulÓ (Foucault 1995, p.231): ÒThe 
historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was 
born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of 
its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it 
more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed 
was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its 
elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of 
power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A Ôpolitical anatomy,Õ which 
was also a Ômechanics of power,Õ was being born; it defined how one may have a hold 
over othersÕ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may 
operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one 
determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, ÔdocileÕ bodies. 
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes 
these same forces (in terms of political obedience). ...If economic exploitation separates 
the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the 
body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased dominationÓ 
(idem, pp.137-138). It follows then, that in this second phase, institutional or policy 
discourses or any discourses directly expressed in social action (be they scientific, 
 
 
94 
pseudo-scientific or non-scientific), can be seen as discursive practices, situated at the 
interface between power and knowledge. Unfortunately, the manner of the relation 
between knowledges or academic disciplines with discursive practices is too complex to 
be analyzed here. It will suffice to mention that inasmuch as sciences could not have 
been formulated outside the domain of discursive practices and of disciplinary 
ÒapparatusesÓ (Agamben 2009) their manner of producing knowledge is at all times 
intricately intertwined with the production of regimes of power and the proliferation of 
such disciplinary apparatuses: ÒThere are bodies of knowledge that are independent of 
the sciences (which are neither their historical prototypes, nor their practical by-
products), but there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any 
discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it formsÓ (Foucault 1972, 
p.183).  
If in the second phase Foucault is concerned with technologies of domination, or in other 
words, with Òthe procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct of othersÓ 
(Foucault 2010, p.4), the third phase sees his focus shift unto Òtechnologies of selfÓ 
defined as Òthe articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourses about 
the subjectÓ (Foucault 1980). Foucault tends to use the terms ÒtechnologiesÓ and 
ÒtechniquesÓ interchangeably, and he defines these as Òtechnologies of the self, which 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortalityÓ (Foucault 1982, Context of Study, para. 2). As in 
the second phase, it is impossible to easily differentiate between discourses of self and 
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techniques or practices of self. These are always intertwined and, in this case, must be 
explored within the ethical, philosophical and religious domains of experience. These 
types of discourses could be described as ethical discourses of the kind we are used to 
(and, thus, as normal symbolic discourses or as discursive formations regulated by the 
old rules of formation such as that of being organized around a persistent thematic), 
except for them being reconstituted in historical succession and transformation and 
particularly through reference to the practices they lead up to or they develop from. 
Following, for example, the Socratic theme of Òthe care of the self,Ó through its specific 
Epicurean, Stoic and, in particular, Christian configurations over centuries, Foucault 
argues that until recently philosophy had presumed that the subject must undergo some 
type of transformation in his very being in order to have access to the truth (Davidson 
2005). The rise of modernity (the philosophies of Descartes and Kant in particular), 
however, caused philosophy to become dissociated from what Foucault describes as 
Òspirituality,Ó resulting in a philosophy relying on solely the condition of knowledge as 
access to truth (and, therefore, in regimes of ethics which establish morality as a code of 
abstract rules defined through reason): ÒWe will call ÔphilosophyÕ the form of thought 
that asks what it is that allows the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts 
to determine the conditions and limits of the subjectÕs access to the truth. If we call this 
Ôphilosophy,Õ then I think we could call ÔspiritualityÕ the pursuit, practice, and 
experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on 
himself in order to have access to the truth. We will call ÔspiritualityÕ the set of these 
pursuits, practices and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, 
renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are 
not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subjectÕs very being, the price to be paid 
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for access to the truthÓ (Foucault 2005, p.15). In this separation, furthermore, Foucault 
sees modernity appropriating certain practices from the Christian technology of self, 
such as self-examination and confession, but only so as to transform them, at the level of 
impersonal rational procedures, into disciplinary practices. The full link is thus made 
between technologies of domination and technologies of self, both being simultaneously 
connected to each other and to ÒdispositifsÓ of power (Deleuze 1992).  
If one reads Foucault carefully and in the major phases of his work, two observations 
emerge that render the framework presented above quite integrated and coherent. Firstly, 
as Foucault presents his work, it is clear that discourses as bodies of knowledge or 
scientific disciplines are deeply implicated with discourses as disciplinary practices 
(technologies of domination) and both closely intertwined with discourses about the 
subject (technologies of self). The sense one gets is that all three types of discourses are 
separated by very thin and mobile boundaries, and that one cannot study one set without 
also acknowledging the other:  
ÒI think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western society, he 
has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the 
self. LetÕs say he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of 
techniques, the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one 
another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself and 
conversely, the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of 
coercionÓ (Foucault 1980).  
 
 
97 
 ÒThe apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked 
to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, 
condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces 
supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. In seeking in The Order of Things to 
write a history of the episteme, I was still caught in an impasse. What I should like to do 
now is to try and show that what I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the 
episteme; or rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the 
apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being 
much more heterogeneousÓ (Foucault 1980i, pp.196-197). 
Secondly, FoucaultÕs oeuvre constantly reveals his interrelated methodological interest 
in human sciences, disciplinary practices and discourses about the self, with each of his 
phase acting as a period of increased focus on one of these categories, but never without 
highlighting the implications for the other two. In this sense, the movement from human 
sciences and their formation of the subject, towards disciplines as quasi-sciences and 
practices of domination of the subject, and, finally, to practices and discourses through 
which the subject is transforming himself, reveals a great sense of coherence in his body 
of work: ÒUp to the present I have proceeded with this general project in two ways. I 
have dealt with the modern theoretical constitutions that were concerned with the subject 
in general. I have tried to analyze in a previous book theories of the subject as a 
speaking, living, working being [in ÒThe Order of ThingsÓ]. I have also dealt with the 
more practical understanding formed in those institutions like hospitals, asylums, and 
prisons, where certain subjects became objects of knowledge and at the same time 
objects of domination. And now, I wish to study those forms of understanding which the 
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subject creates about himselfÓ (Foucault 1993, p.203). This framework, of the three 
types of interrelated discourses and general types of thematic described above, is also 
what gives this PhD project its general foundation and impetus.  
 
The Christian Apparatus of Pastoral Power and the Hero-Mirror Mechanism 
The question then becomes how is my methodology Foucaldian and to what extent? 
Firstly, I would like to emphasize that in the case of Communist countries the thin 
barriers between the three types of discourses and their general spheres of thematic 
concern are overlapping to an even greater extent than in the Western societies studied 
by Foucault. This is to remark that publicly influential cultural discourses can originate 
from academic fields carrying both a political significance in terms of Communist 
ideology and disciplinary practices, and an ethical one, in terms of the practices for self-
transformation advocated. Another issue of significance is that this projects starts where 
Foucault has left off, meaning, with ethical-political discourses about how the subject 
can and should transform himself, and their correspondents in publicly influential 
cultural discourses (from domains such as literature, philosophy, history, and popular 
culture). Furthermore, this exercise reveals a cultural mechanism that seems to have 
dominated the permutations of images of self-transformation of the subject during the 
Communist period. Two important observations have to be made here. Although not a 
disciplinary apparatus, this can be construed as the symbolic structure reinforcing such a 
type of apparatus by opening up an ideological space (at the level of culture and self-
identity) which disciplinary apparatuses of a certain kind could then inhabit. To 
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precisely identify this type of disciplinary apparatus for the Romanian Communist 
society is impossible at this point. However, judging on the symbolic structure that is the 
hero-mirror mechanism, it can be posited that this yet unknown dispositif is, at least in 
part, identical with the Christian apparatus of Ôpastoral powerÕ described by Foucault 
(2007). In what follows, I will attempt to briefly demonstrate these two observations 
starting with the second.  
Foucault (2007, pp.169, 203-204, 239) argues that the Christian apparatus of pastoral 
power relies essentially not on law, salvation or the notion of truth, but on a set of 
techniques and principles that allow the formation of a symbolical and institutional 
network able to constantly guide and assess the inner and outer lives of the individual 
and the community based on the idea of a fundamental relationship of pastorship 
between God and man (which is manifested in descending order from God to Christ and 
then via his apostles to the bishops, abbots and even the parish-priests): ÒAnd finally, if 
Christianity, the Christian pastor, teaches the truth, if he forces men, the sheep, to accept 
a certain truth, the Christian pastorate is also absolutely innovative in establishing a 
structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-examination, and the 
examination of others, by which a certain secret inner truth of the hidden soul becomes 
the element through which the pastorÕs power is exercised, by which obedience is 
practiced, by which the relationship of complete obedience is assured, and through 
which, precisely, the economy of merits and faults passesÓ (Foucault 2007, p.239). 
FoucaultÕs work in this area is unfinished and he approaches the theme from different 
perspectives, without explicitly connecting them. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
techniques he sees as the defining feature of the Christian apparatus of pastoral power 
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are Òthose oriented towards the discovery and the formulation of the truth concerning 
oneself,Ó such as, Òself-examinations, examination of conscience, and confessionÓ 
(Foucault 1980): ÒEach person has the duty to know who he is, that is, to try to know 
what is happening inside him, to acknowledge faults, to recognize temptations, to locate 
desires, and everyone is obliged to disclose these things either to God or to others in the 
community and hence to bear public or private witness against oneself. The truth 
obligations of faith and the self are linked together. This link permits a purification of 
the soul impossible without self-knowledgeÓ (Foucault 1988, V, para. 3). Two such 
important models of techniques of self Foucault explicitly mentions (1988, section ÒVÓ), 
and out of which the later Òsacrament of penanceÓ and the Òconfession of sinsÓ develop, 
are the early Christian practices of ÒexomologesisÓ (or Òpublicatio suiÓ) and 
Òexagoreeusis.Ó  
Foucault (1988, V, para. 7-9) defines ÒexomologesisÓ as Òa ritual of recognizing oneself 
as a sinner and a penitent,Ó a sort of dramatization enacted in the public space through 
which the penitent shows that Ò[t]he acts by which he punishes himself are 
indistinguishable from the acts by which he reveals himself.Ó According to him (idem, 
V, para. 13, 15), such a form of ÒexposÓ was believed to efface the sins because, at its 
core, the practice of ÒexomolegesisÓ relied on a Òmodel of death, of torture, or of 
martyrdom:Ó ÒThe theories and practices of penance were elaborated around the problem 
of the man who prefers to die rather than to compromise or abandon the faith. The way 
the martyr faces death is the model for the penitent. For the relapsed to be reintegrated 
into the church, he must expose himself voluntarily to ritual martyrdom. Penance is the 
affect of change, of rupture with self, past and world. It's a way to show that you are able 
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to renounce life and self, to show that you can face and accept death. Penitence of sin 
doesn't have as its target the establishing of an identity but serves instead to mark the 
refusal of the self, the breaking away from self: Ego non sum, ego. This formula is at the 
heart of publicatio sui. It represents a break with one's past identity. These ostentatious 
gestures have the function of showing the truth of the state of being the sinner. Self-
revelation is at the same time self-destruction.Ó  
On the other hand, as a technique of self-examination and self-disclosure, 
ÒexagoreeusisÓ implies the correlated principles of obedience and contemplation (idem, 
VI, para. 3). To Òmake sure that his heart is pure enough to see GodÓ and to achieve 
Òpermanent contemplation of God,Ó the monk must constantly examine his thoughts like 
a money-changer would coins, identifying which thoughts lead to nearness to God and 
which to Òmovements of the spirit that divert one from GodÓ (idem, VI, para. 7, 11). 
However, in Christianity this can only occur if the monk submits in complete obedience 
to the will30 of a Ôdirector of conscienceÕ and exposes his inner life to him completely 
through Òthe permanent verbalization of thoughtsÓ: ÓHere obedience is complete control 
of behavior by the master, not a final autonomous state. It is a sacrifice of the self, of the 
subject's own will. This is the new technology of the self. ...By telling himself not only 
his thoughts but also the smallest movements of consciousness, his intentions, the monk 
                                                             
30 ÒThe endpoint towards which the practice of obedience aims is what is called humility, which consists 
in feeling oneself the least of men, in taking orders from anyone, thus continually renewing the 
relationship of obedience, and above all in renouncing oneÕs own will. Being humble is not a matter of 
knowing that one has committed many sins, and it is not merely accepting being given and submitting to 
the orders given by anyone whomsoever. Being humble is basically, and above all, knowing that any will 
of oneÕs own is a bad will. So if there is an end to obedience, it is a state of obedience defined by the 
definitive and complete renunciation of oneÕs own will. The aim of obedience is the mortification of oneÕs 
will; it is to act so that oneÕs will, as oneÕs own will, is dead, that is to say so that there is no other will but 
not to have any willÓ (Foucault 2007, p.234). 
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stands in a hermeneutic relation not only to the master but to himself. This verbalization 
is the touchstone or the money of thoughtÓ (idem, VI, para. 16).  
Fundamentally, what I am trying to get at through this analysis of ÒexomolegesisÓ and 
ÒexagoreeusisÓ is that, according to Foucault, the types of techniques of self which 
constitute the Christian apparatus of pastoral power revolve around the notion of the 
renunciation of self: ÒThere is a great difference between exomologesis and exagoreusis; 
yet we have to underscore the fact that there is one important element in common: You 
cannot disclose without renouncing. Exomologesis had as its model martyrdom. In 
exomologesis, the sinner had to "kill" himself through ascetic macerations. Whether 
through martyrdom or through obedience to a master, disclosure of self is the 
renunciation of one's own self. In exagoreusis, on the other hand, you show that, in 
permanently obeying the master, you are renouncing your will and yourself. ...This 
theme of self-renunciation is very important. Throughout Christianity there is a 
correlation between disclosure of the self, dramatic or verbalized, and the renunciation 
of selfÓ (idem, VI, para. 20-21). Now, the point that I wish to make here is that, as 
illustrated above, the technologies of self posited by Foucault as central to the Christian 
apparatus of pastoral power correspond very clearly to the axis of sacrifice in the mirror-
mechanism (axis which is later identified as having its source in religious notions similar 
to that of ÔkenosisÕ). Although FoucaultÕs analysis of technologies of self does not 
explicitly confirm the second axis of the mirror-mechanism (Ôthe myth of the pure-
hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the GoodÕ), this could be attributed 
to the fact that Foucault did not identify specific historical practices relating directly to 
this theme. Clearly, there are points where his analysis of pastoral power and such 
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technologies comes very close to this second axis. As Foucault (1993, p.211) observes: 
Òto make truth inside of oneself, and to get access to the light of God and so on, those 
two processes are strongly connected in the Christian experience.Ó And what else would 
be the purpose of the renunciation of the self if not so that it can fully manifest or mirror 
the light of God? Was not the pastor or the master, as Foucault himself seems to 
acknowledge31, supposed to offer a model on which the monk or the individual believer 
could pattern his behaviour accordingly (and not only a will to which one had to subject 
his conscience in complete obedience)? At the same time, was not the whole pastorship 
model, as Foucault (2007, pp.203-204) also seems to describe it, based on the idea of 
imitation of God, first through Christ as Òthe first pastorÓ and then through apostles, 
bishops, and abbots and even until parish-priests? This sort of statements would seem to 
indicate that FoucaultÕs apparatus of Christian pastoral power also relates well to the 
second axis of the mirror mechanism, which stands associated, as shall later be 
discussed, with the religious notion of Ôimitatio DeiÕ. To conclude with, then, these are 
my arguments for why the hero-mirror device should be considered a symbolic device 
suggesting the existence, in the political domain, of a Christian-like apparatus of pastoral 
power. That such an apparatus of power could be more central to Eastern societies of the 
Communist type than to those in the West (and, in fact, based on the notion of Ôimitatio 
DeiÕ corresponding to the second axis of the mirror-mechanism) has been noticed by 
Foucault (2007, pp.207-208) himself in discussing the conventional image given of the 
Tsar: ÒWe have here, I think, an admirable image and an admirable evocation of a 
                                                             
31 ÒWhat I mean is that the pastor has a teaching task vis-a-vis his community. We can even say that this is 
his primary and principal task. ...Clearly this teaching task is not one-dimensional; it is a more 
complicated affair than just giving a lesson to others. The pastor must teach by example, by his own life 
and whatÕs more the value of this example is so strong that if he does not give a good example by his own 
life, then any theoretical, verbal teaching he gives will be nullifiedÓ (Foucault 2007, p.236). 
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Christlike (christique) sovereign. This Christlike sovereign does not appear to me to be 
typical of the West. The Western Sovereign is Caesar, not Christ; the Western pastor is 
not Caesar; but ChristÓ. Furthermore, parallels between the Christian technology of 
examination of conscience and the technique of examination of conscience as part of 
diary practices in the Stalinist period have been remarkably well captured by Hellbeck 
(2006). Two key areas where the nature of the apparatus of power in Romanian 
Communism could be productively investigated on Foucault lines are those of 
surveillance by the secret police [see VatulescuÕs (2010, p.49) discussion of the personal 
file with its moments of ÒcharacterizationÓ, Òauto-biographyÓ and Òconfession,Ó and of 
the surveillance file with its Òsurveillance transcripts and periodic synthesesÓ] and of 
censorship (especially, of literature). Unfortunately, whatever work has done in this area 
has not followed from FoucaultÕs investigations and/or is not readily translated into such 
paradigms. The exception is Vatulescu (2010), but inasmuch as her captivating study 
originates from a literary vision about the aestheticization of politics (developed out of 
Russian Formalist and Bakhtinian theories and the writings of Walter Benjamin) and her 
use of Foucault is stereotypically restricted to remarks about ÒDiscipline and Punish,Ó 
she misses the links between personal and surveillance files and technologies of self 
such as the examination of conscience and confession.  
Until now, I have argued about how the hero-mirror mechanism can be seen to posit a 
Christian-like pastoral apparatus as possibly central to Romanian Communist society. 
What remains to be discussed is the status of the hero-mirror mechanism as a type of 
structure that relates to and, in fact, ideologically prepares the conditions of existence for 
the types of apparatuses Foucault talks about.  
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In the chapter entitled ÒThe Mirror-Mechanism of the Hero: Its Discursive Matrix,Ó the 
origin of the mechanism is posited within the domain of religion, as it is here that the 
notion of the mirror-mechanism with its two axes appears most developed conceptually. 
For reasons of space, that conceptual presentation of the mirror-mechanism cannot be 
rehearsed here. Suffice it to say that, in theological Christian terms, the foundation of the 
mirror-mechanism lies with the concept of Òimago Dei,Ó its axis of sacrifice resembles 
that of Òkenosis,Ó and its axis of purity of heart and mirroring of the Divine resembles 
that of Òimitatio DeiÓ. 
As I have also argued in that chapter, the mirror-mechanism is not only an allegorical 
structure, but also, a highly symbolic matrix out of which ontological, epistemological 
and anthropological frameworks can emerge. The mirror-mechanism represents a 
symbolic master-structure, but one that specifies criteria and even provides clear 
guidelines about the ontological reality and epistemological possibilities of human 
existence. However, the language is allegorical and the possibilities of interpretation, if 
only we judge historically, are countless. Nonetheless, the two aspects of the mirror-
metaphor specify the directions of human action in a way that is almost practical to 
follow. What I mean by that is that, if pursued, the next level of interpretation would 
most likely result not only in the establishment of a well-defined ontological or 
epistemological framework of a religious or philosophical kind, but, most importantly, 
in concrete human practices. To give more definite structure to this allegory is to 
formulate an entire body of Christian or Islamic doctrine, of Jewish jurisprudence or 
Sufi mysticism (the same applies to Eastern religions if considering the nature of the 
Divine-human agent as the first emanation from God, or as his energy of illumination), 
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and what is more importantly here, of religious and, thus, of cultural and social practice. 
The mirror mechanism, I argue therefore, is a symbolic matrix or structure that 
conceptually prefigures, but from only one-step away, any institutionalized religious 
discourse or practice. In this sense, the mirror-mechanism prefigures, but only from one-
step away, the Christian apparatus of pastoral power and its technologies of self. The 
relationship between them is as close as that found between the axis of ÔkenosisÕ and the 
two practices of ÒexomologesisÓ and Òexagoreusis.Ó Kenosis is the general principle, 
while exomologesis and exagoreusis are two specific historical interpretations given to it 
at the level of institutional practice. On the other hand, the notion of ÔPastorshipÕ is just a 
specific modality amongst many of interpreting the more general concept of Ôimago 
Dei.Õ 
 
Between Foucault, Hermeneutics and Archetypal Criticism: How Cultural 
Discourses are Employed in this Dissertation 
 
Foucault  
If this relationship applies to the two structures, the same also applies to the type of 
discourses these two structures can investigate. Every discursive practice relating to the 
apparatus of pastoral power or any technology of self relating to scriptural religions must 
have its foundation in some symbolic discourse that prefigures it. This is something that 
Foucault himself has hinted at: ÒSo it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted 
in a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. 
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It is constituted in real practices-historically analyzable practices. There is a technology 
of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using themÓ 
(Foucault, 1994, p.277). The idea is not new and was mentioned earlier by Althusser 
(2003, p.79), who argued that the structure of a discourse, Òproduces only effects of, let 
us say, meaning, whereas practices produce real modifications-transformations in 
existing objects, and, at the limit, new real objects (economic practice, political practice, 
theoretical practice, etc.).Ó Nonetheless, Althusser (idem) also argued, discourses can 
have Òeffects [exercer dÕefficace] on real objects, but they do so only by virtue of their 
insertion-articulation into the practices in question, which then make use of them as 
instruments in the Ôlabour processÕ of these practices.Ó My argument here is that 
discourses are not only inserted or articulated in practices that make use of them, but can 
also function as the symbolic matrices for such practices. This is particularly relevant for 
symbolic discourses that have an ethical orientation and are thus theoretically 
predisposed to laying the groundwork for the formation of technologies of domination 
and/or of self. There are several arguments for claiming that the discourses I look at in 
this work are precisely this sort of symbolic discourses that prefigure, from only one step 
away, the formation of practices of self (ethics) and/or of domination (discipline). 
Firstly, that in Communist countries there are thin barriers and also large areas of 
overlap between symbolic discourses (truth), technologies of domination (power) and 
technologies of self (ethics). Secondly, that Communist ideology is, more than any 
other, both an ethical-political discourse and a set of practices about how the subject can 
and should transform himself. I would even go as far as to say that Communist ideology 
is obsessed with the notions of transformation and self-transformation, or the creation of 
the new man, and with identifying and then spreading out the ideas and techniques 
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through which this could take place. Thirdly, cultural discourses like the ones analyzed 
in this thesis are, of course, by themselves heavily invested in the notion of cultural 
transformation and self-transformation as part of the larger concern with cultural 
identity. Their explicit aim is to be able to re-fashion the human self (and this, from 
within oneÕs self). Nonetheless, this natural propensity is both added impetus and 
distortions by the high-press game of ideology, which constantly urges the cultural field 
to engage in its political-ethical project of self-transformation.  
Until now, we have discussed how the notion of cultural discourses has been 
conceptualized in this work. Two arguments have been put forward. Firstly, that these 
discourses are looked at through the framework constructed by FoucaultÕs oeuvre in 
relation to the idea of discourse, and particularly, through the notion of discourses about 
the subject (or ethical discourses) that correspond to his third phase. Here, FoucaultÕs 
general framework is present in the concern with identifying how these discourses 
function as intellectual discourses (or how they are constructed and what they 
communicate), as identity discourses (what they specify about the construction and self-
construction of the self), and as resistance discourses (ways in which discourses about 
the subject challenge or correspond to official ideology and associated technologies of 
domination). Secondly, an argument has been made that these cultural discourses are 
symbolic discourses that can prefigure, from very close, practices of self and/or practices 
of domination. In this sense, the mirror-mechanism must be read also as the unearthing 
of a structure corresponding to and prefiguring an apparatus similar to that of pastoral 
power described by Foucault.  
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Nevertheless, Foucault has not engaged with an analysis of cultural discourses of this 
type, and none of the three methodologies he has advocated as part of his oeuvre are 
being employed here. No archaeology of academic fields and no genealogy of a 
disciplinary apparatus of power have been undertaken here, although a sort of 
symbolical precursor of such an apparatus has been identified. Most importantly, 
although the methodology employed relates possibly most to his method of a Òtext-
driven hermeneuticsÓ (Paras 2006, p.12) that characterizes the third phase of his 
research, the two are distinctly different. In his third phase, FoucaultÕs analyses are of 
specific literary texts, which are grouped into certain discourses about the subject via the 
unity of a certain thematic that cuts across those texts (see, for example, the notion of 
care of the self). In this dissertation, the analysis of cultural discourses relies on a 
methodology that combines hermeneutics with archetypal criticism. The hermeneutical 
aspect reflects a concern with how certain cultural discourses have been constructed 
(including in relationship with each other) and what they seem to communicate. In other 
words, the hermeneutical manner attempts to capture an essence-like characterization of 
such discourses, although such constructions can only be of limited and temporary 
validity. On the other hand, the use of archetypal criticism derives from the need to 
assess the essence-like characterizations of such cultural discourses along the 
dimensions of the mirror-mechanism.32 As discussed in the chapter devoted to it, the 
notion of the mirror-mechanism refers to an allegorical structure and to a highly 
symbolic matrix out of which ontological, epistemological and anthropological 
                                                             
32 Except for where my language or thought have failed me, a certain degree of repetition is unavoidable 
in those chapters where the methodology employed relies on both a hermeneutical approach and on 
archetypal criticism. In terms of exposition, such a methodology would presuppose that a delineation of 
the main features or structure of a cultural discourse or theory is to be followed, in the second part of the 
chapter, by a discussion of how the mirror-mechanism relates to those main features or structure.  
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frameworks can emerge. Since the mirror-mechanism can be defined as primarily an 
archetypal and allegorical structure, or to use a concept from Abrams (1953, p.31), as an 
Òallegorical archetype,Ó its use in the analysis of cultural discourses has relied on the 
type of archetypal criticism developed by Abrams (1953), Frye (1957) and, more 
recently and in Romania, by Braga (1999, 2006). Through the notion of the mirror-
mechanism as an archetype like structure, it will be noticed, this tradition of thought 
features then as another theoretical and comparative direction informing this 
dissertation.  
 
Hermeneutics 
Cultural discourses are seen in this study as bodies of (public) knowledge established by 
intellectual groups or communities in ways that interact and influence each other. There 
are exceptions to this, such as the discourses of the Flacăra Cenacle and of Mr. Becali, 
but such discourses represent just more specific and more performative instances of 
cultural discourses already discussed in this work. Surely, because these discourses are 
affiliated with intellectual groups, and even individual projects, there is a view that such 
discourses originate with their author. However, this project departs from both the 
classical notion of discourse put forward by Kinneavy (1971) and from the post-
structuralism of the early Foucault by embracing RicoeurÕs attempt at an integrative 
resolution. In relation to the notion of discourse, the subject and consciousness, and even 
the unconscious, cannot be fully discarded successfully, even if operating with such 
notions is, as Foucault seems to state, extremely problematic: Òif meaning is not a 
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segment of self-understanding, I donÕt know what it isÓ (Ricoeur 1963, cited in 
Thompson 1981, p.56). In other words, as Ricoeur has argued, hermeneutics must 
acknowledge the problematic of textuality and the usefulness of structuralism, but not 
entirely at the expense of the subject or consciousness (Thiselton 2009, p.233). In my 
opinion, the tripartite framework of discourses given by the oeuvre of Foucault, and 
certainly the later Foucault, support a similar perspective. In terms of hermeneutics, such 
a perspective can be traced back to SchleiermacherÕs distinction between grammatical 
and psychological interpretation: ÒEvery act of speaking is related to both the totality of 
language and the totality of the speakerÕs thoughtsÓ (Schleiermacher 1977, cited in 
Thiselton 2009, p.157). Essentially then, in this work the notion of discourse implies a 
body of knowledge constructed by an intellectual group or an academic community, but 
in the manner in which a cultural current succeeds or grows out of another (so, therefore, 
based on a tradition of thought and practice) in a culturally and politically contested 
territory, and which relies on and benefits from the role of founding or key figures. 
Thus, at different points, the same discourses might be looked at as an abstract set of 
rules or structures of meaning, as the manner in which intellectual groups advance their 
knowledge-claims and legitimize their position, and yet again, as the key aspects 
crystallized by the discourse of a key or founding figure. The specifics of this depend, at 
any one time, on the workings of the hermeneutic methodology employed. However, the 
method here differs from the classic methodology of the critical hermeneutical approach 
described by research methodology books such as Bryman (2008). In such works, the 
critical hermeneutical approach stipulates an analysis of the socio-historical context of 
an author and of a particular text together with a formal analysis of the text in terms of 
each of its components and of the Òwriting conventions employedÓ (idem, p.533). Being 
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group-based in most cases, but even outside such a feature, the types and number of 
discourses analyzed in this work present too high a diversity of authors, disciplines, texts 
and types of writing conventions for the above methodology to be employed 
successfully and to completion solely, or even primarily, on the basis of primary 
resources. This is where the hermeneutical method finds its limit and continuation in the 
method of archetypal criticism. Braga (2006, pp.7-8) discusses how archetypal criticism 
presupposes a comparative method that is Òmulti-disciplinaryÓ and ÒintermediaryÓ and 
must rely on the findings of specialists regarding their fields. Such a comparative 
researcher seems condemned to an Òeternal dilettantism,Ó in comparison with his fellow-
specialists, but he benefits from a vantage point from which certain inter and trans-
disciplinary connections can be established and a more complex general perspective 
formed, both of which tend to escape his fellow-specialists (idem). According to Braga 
(2006, p.9), and this applies well here, the aim of the comparative method as archetypal 
criticism is Òthe research and delineating of invariants, of cultural archetypes, of myths, 
themes, symbols, characters and recurrent scenarios, which pass from one culture into 
another, which have an existence that transcends the limits of an epoch, or of a domain.Ó 
As is the case with this thesis, such a comparative method relies not necessarily on the 
ability to generate new research in a domain, but rather, on the ability to rely on and 
select the types of information made available by discipline-specialists in order to form a 
trans-border architecture, to highlight unseen connections and, if possible, to identify 
some type of trans-disciplinary invariants. The hermeneutical method employed in the 
analysis of cultural discourses in this study, has therefore, been altered by the overall 
considerations brought by the comparative method of archetypal criticism. As a 
consequence, the resulting hermeneutics methodology employs the three concepts of a 
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hermeneutics of recovery (or the notion of ÔempathyÕ), a hermeneutics of suspicion, and 
of the hermeneutical circle in a manner that lends considerable importance to secondary 
sources.   
ÒT[o]lerance, mutual respect, and reciprocal listening one to another with patience and 
integrityÓ (Thiselton 2006, p.7) are aspects of dialogue, of analysis and interpretation, 
largely missing from the Romanian scene and the Romanian public sphere, but key to 
the hermeneutical approach. The analysis of cultural discourses starts in this work, 
therefore, with a Òhermeneutics of recovery or recollection,Ó which as Ricoeur intended 
it, is Òinclined towards affirmation and rehabilitationÓ (Fairfield 2011, p.181). In this 
phase, the focus of the analysis is emphatic identification not necessarily with the 
author/s as much as with the type of knowledge transmitted. To some extent these 
aspects are inseparable but the distinction in terms of accent is essential. One can 
empathetically view knowledge as the result of biography or one can attempt to 
empathetically relate to the author by following closely his trajectory of thought, 
personal struggle for meaning and cultural identifications as developed across the 
background of certain thematic ideas highlighted by his context and biography. The 
second approach has been taken here and to this extent the authors have been identified 
primarily through their discourse rather than through their biography. Nonetheless, this 
has followed Rudolf BultmannÕs imperative, which Gadamer endorses, that 
Òunderstanding a person or text [in this case, primarily a text], must entail having Ôa 
living relationshipÕ to what one seeks to understandÓ (Thiselton 2006, pp.6, 220). The 
idea, then, has been to become familiar with a discourse and engaged with it, to the point 
of internalizing it and being able to live through it and the type of identity it provides. 
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This ideal of emphatic identification with the discourses looked at has resulted in a very 
close reading of texts from both primary and secondary sources, reflected in the manner 
of writing. In other words, the author of this work has tried to abstain as much as 
possible from the role of the objective, impartial judge who summarizes authors and 
areas of knowledge in his own voice. Granted, something of the kind has been applied in 
the final sections relating the assessment of the discourses under observation to the 
notion of the mirror-mechanism, but the aim has been to postpone this moment. There is 
no doubt that this method of writing, presupposing the notion of a critical thinker who 
seeks to approximate universal reason, and is thus aiming to display a full control of its 
objects of analysis and pass judgment on them, has much to its merit. The empathetic 
approach here, however, has been to offer a type of writing which allows for a close 
examination of arguments and themes put forward by different intellectual groups or 
authors as expressed in their own voice, and in relation to each other. In some cases, this 
sort of tapestry has revealed a diversity of outlooks and a complexity at times hard to 
enclose within one unitary perspective, or in one evaluative judgment. In such cases, the 
tapestry constituted in relation to a discourse can be seen as identical with the evaluative 
judgment of that discourse. Another way to look at it is to say that such tapestries 
provide the reader with the opportunity to select which of the different interpretations or 
perspectives presented could work best as a determining evaluative judgment. In other 
words, the reader is exposed to the evidence examined, and at times, to its very open-
endedness, and not simply delivered a verdict and presented with the underpinning 
reasoning. This approach is a more difficult one for the reader, who could more easily 
follow a clearly ordered and summarizing judgment of the author, but also one which is 
more empathetic, in terms of the reader having to come to terms, and even quite 
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intimately, with the nature of the discourses under question. Contrary to expectations, 
this empathetic approach has been applied to both primary and secondary sources. In 
terms of secondary sources, the initial focus has been on those assessments given under 
the form of self-reflection by actors involved in the production of the original discourse 
(that such actors are often found in the role of major critics of their own movement, 
intellectual grouping or discourse, is very typical in Romania) or somehow affiliated 
with it. Similarly, the descriptions provided by such secondary sources, usually key in 
capturing the stated ethos of the discourse under question and in providing an internal 
account of it, have been supplemented by any kind of noteworthy positive evaluations 
provided by other types of secondary sources.  
In reverse terms to Ricoeur (Thiselton 2006, p.233), who emphasizes a Òwillingness to 
suspectÓ before the Òwillingness to listen,Ó this hermeneutic methodology starts with the 
empathetic approach and then moves on to a hermeneutics of suspicion. Both types of 
hermeneutics, however, depend heavily on the notion of the hermeneutical circle defined 
by Charles Taylor (1985, p.18): ÒWhat we are trying to establish is a certain reading of 
text or expressions, and what we appeal to as our grounds for this reading can only be 
other readings. The circle can also be put in terms of part-whole relations: we are trying 
to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial 
expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where 
expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial 
expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole.Ó The first and more 
classical application of this definition, particularly in its second aspect, is to read a 
certain text (or also, oeuvre) by reference of its parts to the whole and its whole to the 
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parts. Implied in this is the notion that a text will be read in light of its stated aims and 
the interpreting guidelines it sets for itself. This can lead both to an empathetic approach, 
because of respecting and following the aims and guidelines set by the author, but also 
to a hermeneutics of suspicion, in case divergence between these and the whole of the 
text become apparent (in some cases, the second part has generally, and in quite 
reductionist a manner, been referred to as ÔdeconstructionÕ). If conceptualized as Ôtexts,Õ 
most of the discourses analyzed in this work are not susceptible to such a method. 
However, this method has been applied whenever possible, as in the case of the Păltiniş 
Group member Patapievici and of the Noica School, but also, primarily, as a main 
background technique for the key secondary sources employed. In addition to this, 
however, the notion of the hermeneutical circle has also been applied in three other 
ways.  
The first of these relates to the first aspect of TaylorÕs definition above. In short, due to 
the emerging, fragmentary and disordered (or Ôpre-paradigmaticÕ) nature of fields such 
as those of the social sciences, as well as the tendency for cultural debates and 
discourses to occur not in research but in journalistic form, through essays and personal 
cogitations located in cultural magazines, TV shows and internet blogs etc., the tendency 
has been to see the hermeneutical circle as comprised of all those meaningfully involved 
in the shaping or interpretation of a discourse. It is for such reasons as described above, 
therefore, that the notion of hermeneutical circle has seen this author navigate not only 
between secondary and primary sources (with many secondary sources located on the 
internet), but also between tertiary sources of less academic reputation (such as 
 
 
117 
Wikipedia33) and sources, such as the personal blog of one of the Flacăra Cenacle 
sessionsÕs participants or such as TV shows available on Youtube, which cannot 
normally be classified in any of the categories mentioned above. Nonetheless, I would 
maintain that the strength and novelty of this thesis relies exactly on the diversity of 
perspectives and ideas that such an approach brings to the fore.   
Another specific application of the hermeneutic circle has been to posit the notion of a 
discursive space as the domain (the ÒwholeÓ) where discourses of different kinds (the 
ÒpartsÓ), as the ones analyzed in this work, formulate and meet each-other in interaction 
(interdiscursivity). This dissertation, therefore, has been metaphorically structured into 
two sections: the first, outlining the features of a Ôdiscursive space of transitionÕ in 
relation to RomaniaÕs external context, and the second, in relation to its internal, 
cultural, political and social space. Beyond its metaphorical usage, this notion is 
essential in positing that all the discourses analyzed relate to each other in ways that are 
specific, in some cases reinforcing each other, in other cases having the opposite effect, 
but always developing in relation to each other. Of course, if judged by the order of their 
historical emergence, such relations can be, as is the case with the earliest cultural 
discourse analyzed, one-sided. However, the co-existence of these discourses in terms of 
their overall effect in the cultural sphere (and, therefore, their interpretation) knows not 
such temporal bounds (an exemplification of these considerations is provided at the end 
of the chapter ÒSolar Lyricism and the Recuperation of the ÔInner SpaceÕÓ particularly 
via the notion of Òinner utopiaÓ).  
                                                             
33 There are many instances in which Wikipedia has posted articles deemed inadequate by the worldwide 
academic community. Nevertheless, I would argue that in the case of topics relating to Romania, 
Wikipedia plays a huge role. This is so, because in many cases, one cannot find a better informed, or more 
up-to-date, or any entry at all, on a certain topic, personality or institution relating to Romanian culture 
and society.  
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Finally, the third application of the hermeneutic circle has revolved around the notion of 
ÔtriangulationÕ. The manner in which this notion has been applied extends the 
hermeneutic circle from what the cultural discourses analyzed reveal about each-other, 
to discourses which they claim as origin or inspiration (an important claim considering 
the tendency of disciplines and discourses in Romania to imitate or derive inspiration 
from the West), and finally, to ÔunmentionedÕ discourses that cover the same topic, but 
from another perspective (see for example the discussion of ÒliquidityÓ provided in 
relation to PatapieviciÕs ÔOmul RecentÕ in the Păltiniş Group section). These features 
could be referred to as forms of intertextuality. Thus, triangulation has been employed in 
this thesis in several ways: firstly, in using, as part of their analysis, the different 
descriptions which cultural discourses under scrutiny provide of each other (for 
example, the G80 generation refers to the G60, the Noica School, the Flacăra Cenacle 
and to the protochronists in particular ways and the reverse is true for each of these 
groupings), and secondly, in measuring one discourse in light of other discourses it 
allegedly claims to rely on (that is, checking a discourseÕs internal logic against the 
authors/discourses it claims to rely on), or in light of discourses which have the same 
discursive object but which stem from a different perspective (checking them by 
comparison with a similar discourse but which stems from a different ideological 
position or from a different field, or against the very same discourse but at a 
significantly different time in its evolution). Noticeably, by employing the hermeneutic 
circle via the procedure of ÔtriangulationÕ what is being established is a hermeneutics of 
suspicion. 
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Overall, then, I am looking at discourses via how their structure has been defined by the 
discourses themselves, by secondary literature, and through triangulation as either 
interdiscursivity or intertextuality. That also means I do not have a similar structure, or 
more specific grid, through which I similarly analyze all these discourses (such as is the 
usual case with critical discourse analysis). Moreover, the self-descriptions provided by 
discourses, secondary literature and triangulation can point in very different directions. 
While, therefore, no claims to objectivity can be made, this methodology is meant to 
capture the existing state of consultation/consensus regarding the nature of a particular 
discourse at a particular point in time.  
 
Archetypal Criticism 
It has now remained to be discussed how the characterizations of cultural discourses 
resulting from the hermeneutical approach have been assessed against the mirror-
mechanism via the method of archetypal criticism. In his first chapter, Braga (1999, p.5) 
identifies three types of Òarchetypal invariantsÓ historically employed in the analysis of 
texts: Òmetaphysical (or ontological), psychological (anthropological) and cultural.Ó The 
metaphysical archetype is Òan ontological essence,Ó meaning, it represents an Òobjective 
presenceÓ that goes well beyond the realm of human existence and of subjectivity 
(idem). Such archetypes can be conceived of as either Òtranscendental essencesÓ (for 
example, as either PlatoÕs ÔIdeasÕ or as Òtranscendental principles with ontological 
priorityÓ such as the Logos, the ÔOneÕ in Plotinus or SchopenhauerÕs notion of ÔWillÕ) or 
as Òimmanent essencesÓ (AristotleÕs Ôformal causes,Õ or the theory of chromosomes) 
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(p.6). In this case, the role of archetypal criticism is to uncover the metaphysical 
archetypes located behind the ideas and images contained in a discourse (idem). 
However, due the postmodern critique, this correspondence must be viewed as evincing 
some sort of parallelism (between a theological or philosophical text and a literary one) 
rather than as implying a relationship of causation (p.7). In other words, the meaning of 
a literary text cannot be restricted to an ÔoriginalÕ sense found in a theological text. As 
for the psychological archetypes, these represent not categories of the real, but Òmental 
categoriesÓ which function at the level of the conscious (KantÕs categories) or of the 
subconscious (JungÕs archetypes or BlagaÕs Ôabyssal categoriesÕ; also here is listed the 
Ôcultural morphologyÕ approach of Frobenius, Spengler, Wolfflin and Blaga) (pp.9-12). 
In this case, archetypal criticism is directed at uncovering, within the psychology of the 
author, the forces that motivate his writing and of which he remains unaware (idem). 
Last but not least, cultural archetypes can be envisaged as the attempt to identify cultural 
invariants in terms of their ÒmaterialityÓ and the types of relations they establish 
between themselves, that is, in a realm of culture detached from metaphysical or 
psychological explanations (p.14). The system of religious myths described by Eliade, 
the fractal-like invariants of Culianu, as well as NorthropÕs invariants in the field of 
literature, represent the more radical examples of this approach (p.15). In this case, then, 
archetypal criticism aims at unveiling a system of Ògeneral-human constantsÓ that can be 
seen to form a universal or specific cultural configuration (at a general level, this 
resembles structuralism) (p.14). It is clear that, drawing on Jung, Braga (1999) proceeds 
to analyze Romanian cultural phenomena through the use of psychological archetypes. 
A relevant example here is his analysis, via the Oedipus myth, of the relations (and 
resulting literary conventions) established between the literary generations of G80, G60 
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and G90 (pp.190-220). In contradistinction, this thesis operates with what begins as a 
cultural archetype, but which is eventually described as having its origin in an 
Ôontological essenceÕ or Ômetaphysical archetypeÕ.  
A work with which this thesis has more to share than the above is that of Abrams 
(1953). Abrams (1953, p.31) employs the notion of the Òallegorical archetypeÓ to build a 
theory of aesthetics that accounts for the development of poetry from Antiquity to 
modernity34. This developmental scheme runs from Ômimetic theoriesÕ of art (Plato and 
Aristotle), through Ôpragmatic theoriesÕ (from the Hellenistic and Roman era and until 
the 18th century; these can be equated with classicist poetics), to Ôexpressive theoriesÕ 
(romanticism) until finally reaching the Ôobjective theoriesÕ of art (these could now be 
equated with symbolism or, in terms of literary criticism, with the ÔNew CriticismÕ 
movement) (Abrams 1953, p.28; Van Rooden 2010, p.69)35. Within this scheme, 
Abrams is particularly concerned with charting the shift from mimetic and pragmatic 
theories emphasizing art as mimesis of nature or the divine, or as the cultivation of 
pleasure and moral instinct in an audience via imitation of set ideals, towards the 
expressive theories highlighting the inner feelings and the imagination of the poet as the 
fundamental source of poetry. Of interest to this thesis, Abrams (1953, p.viii) sets out to 
chart this transition via analysis of two Òmetaphors of mind,Ó Òthe mirrorÓ and Òthe 
lamp,Ó which he identifies as Òallegorical archetypes:Ó ÒTo put the matter schematically: 
                                                             
34 Van Rooden (2010) is right to observe that the entire scheme Abrams develops to trace the development 
of aesthetical theories cannot be seen as neutral or objective inasmuch as it is entirely derived from the 
aesthetical categories put forward by Aristotle. However, this does not fully invalidate the role of the mind 
metaphors in the formulation of such a scheme, inasmuch as Abrams uses these metaphors at every stage 
of argumentation, including the moments of transition between one phase and another. In other words, if 
Aristotle provides the general hypothesis, the mind metaphors provide the mode of argumentation or 
demonstration.  
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for the representative eighteenth-century critic, the perceiving mind was a reflector of 
the external world; the inventive process consisted in a reassembly of ÔideasÕ which were 
literally images, or replicas of sensations; and the resulting art work was itself 
comparable to a mirror presenting a selected and ordered image of life. By substituting a 
projective and creative mind and, consonantly, an expressive and creative theory of art, 
various romantic critics reversed the basic orientation of all aesthetic philosophyÓ (p.69). 
How could the two metaphors, or Ôallegorical archetypes,Õ be ascribed such a crucial role 
in the development of aesthetical thought? Abrams answers this in two ways. Firstly, he 
simply maintains that Ò[i]n any period, the theory of mind and the theory of art tend to 
be integrally related and to turn upon similar analogues, explicit or submergedÓ (p.69). 
In other words, his first answer expands the role of the metaphors form the aesthetical 
field to an even wider area of thought. Secondly, he emphasizes the role of certain 
Ôallegorical archetypesÕ as foundational elements of any theory: ÒWhile many expository 
analogues, as conventional opinion proposes, are casual and illustrative, some few seem 
recurrent and, not illustrative, but constitutive: they yield the ground plan and essential 
structural elements of a literary theory, or of any theoryÓ (p.31). This description and 
indeed, the notion of Ôallegorical archetypeÕ (as I have argued already), apply well to the 
concept of the hero-mirror mechanism. The reasons for this are quite easy to spot. 
Although he comes across this type of association repeatedly, Abrams fails to observe 
that the metaphors of the human mind are derived and in fact, inseparable, from an 
ontological concept of the Divine. In other words, that the metaphors of the mind as 
either mirror or lamp had originated and were already present within the ontological and 
theological structure represented by the mirror-mechanism. Two such examples that 
easily come to mind are the Old Testament statement that ÒThe spirit of man is the lamp 
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of the Lord, searching all his innermost partsÓ (Proverbs, 20:27) and RumiÕs verse ÒThe 
awakened heart is a lamp; protect it by the hem of your robeÓ (Rumi 1998, p.167). 
RumiÕs verse clearly exemplifies how both notions are contained in the mirror-
mechanism. If at the beginning, the mirror of the human heart reflects the Sun of God 
and starts a process of purification, in time a fire of love is kindled which grows to 
transform the human heart into a lamp, that is, the reflection of the image of the Sun in a 
clear mirror becomes fully apparent. Suffice it to say that Abrams (p.276) sees such an 
ontological connection, but does not distinguish clearly enough the ontological or 
theological structure behind the mind metaphors: ÒOur concern, however, is with 
another derivative from the basic analogy between God and the poet. If the making of a 
poem Ð or rather, in the present context, the making of certain poetic elements Ð is a 
second creation, then to poetize after this fashion is to recapitulate the original 
cosmogony. Hence it becomes important for critical theory which of the competing 
theories of the creation of the world are transferred from philosophy into the psychology 
of poetic invention: whether the Hebraic account of a creation ex nihilo by fiat and (in 
SidneyÕs words) Ôthe force of a divine breathÕ; or the theory in PlatoÕs Timaeus of a 
Demiurge who copied from an eternal pattern; or PlotinusÕ doctrine of emanation from a 
perpetually overflowing One; or the Stoic and Neoplatonic tradition of an endlessly 
generative Soul in Nature itselfÓ (p.276)...ÒAs early as 1801, Colleridge had written that 
the perceiving mind is not passive, but Ômade in GodÕs Image, and that too, in the 
sublimest sense, the Image of the Creator...ÕÓ (p.283) ÒBehind this concept of the poem 
as its own world does there not still loom, dim but recognizable, the generative analogue 
of the Deus Creator?Ó (p.284) As shown above, although Abram does not move from 
metaphors of the mind to a discussion of allegorical archetypes at a theological and 
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ontological level, he is, nevertheless, at pains to prove that even the Renaissance notion 
of the poem as a Òheterocosmos,Ó notion which anticipates and is a central characteristic 
in the later emerging objective theory of art (in particular, of the idea that Òa poem is an 
object-in-itself, a self-contained universe of discourseÓ), relies on an analogue between 
the human mind and God (p.272). In the end, the impression one gets from Abrams 
(1953) is that the core aesthetical notions and metaphors of the mind of Western 
civilization were initially formed in relation to an ontology of the Divine and to 
traditions closer to religious thought, but that the move away from God has gradually 
erased the remembrance of these connections.  
Finally, nowhere is the method of archetypal criticism better defined and more closely 
affiliated with the notion of the mirror-mechanism than in Northrop FryeÕs (1957) 
ÒAnatomy of Criticism.Ó In this complex work, Frye proceeds to entirely refashion the 
notion of literature as well as the method of literary criticism starting from the notion of 
the symbol as archetype. His method of archetypal criticism, if judging by the 
development of his argument, proceeds in the manner of an arc that is at first ascending 
and based on an inductive method, and then descending and based on a deductive 
approach. Literature, Frye (1957, p.7) commences, should be examined not through 
principles borrowed from Òtheology, philosophy, politics or science,Ó but through Òa 
conceptual framework derivable from an inductive survey of the literary field.Ó In this, 
Frye identifies the body of literature as an autonomous system that develops, like 
mathematics, based on its own principles and hypotheses. In the case of literature, these 
take the forms of poems and Frye insists that each poem is a creation of poems from 
before it, i.e., that it draws on them and on the recurrent imagery that traverses them. It 
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is easy to see how concern with Òthe analysis of recurrent imageryÓ in poems leads Frye 
(p.86) to those more persistent and potentially universal symbols, which he refers to as 
archetypes. At this point, and this is where his inductive method comes to the fore, Frye 
(p.121) sets out to examine the extension of the archetype in relation to the whole of 
literature: ÒWe said that we could get a whole liberal education by picking up one 
conventional poem, Lycidas for example, and following its archetypes through 
literature.Ó This method leads him to develop two abstract conclusions, of which one 
also receives a surprisingly concrete form. The first conclusion is that, seen through the 
complex and uninterrupted patterns created by the archetypes, the entire body of 
literature can be viewed as a whole: ÒThe study of archetypes is the study of literary 
symbols as parts of a whole. If there are such things as archetypes at all, then, we have to 
take yet another step, and conceive the possibility of a self-contained literary universeÓ 
(p.118). The second conclusion is that the tracing of the archetypes across the domain of 
literature points to the existence of a center to this ÔwholeÕ. In other words, Frye (idem) 
argues that Òfar from being an endless series of free associationsÓ the archetypes point 
not only to the existence of Òa real structureÓ but also to the existence of a Òcenter of 
archetypesÓ consisting of Òa group of universal symbols.Ó Concretely, while shunning 
away from identifying this center with Òthe Word of God, the person of Christ, the 
historical Jesus, the Bible or church dogma,Ó that is, with Òan object of faith or an 
ontological personalityÓ (p.126), Frye locates this center in Òthe symbolism of the BibleÓ 
(p.135). With this center found, the inductive method reaches its end. However, before 
proceeding further, several aspects must be emphasized here that point to an essential 
relationship with the mirror-mechanism. If Frye refuses to identify the center of 
literature with Christ or any other Ôontological personalityÕ this is so only because he 
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seeks to establish the domain of literature as distinct and autonomous from outside 
domains such as that of religion. For, in fact, Frye (pp.119-120) retains the abstract idea 
that all symbols and archetypes are united into a center as into a single being, and also 
identifies this being with the idea of an Òinfinite and eternal living bodyÓ of man, i.e., 
with Òa universal man who is also a divine being.Ó Therefore, at the core of the 
archetypal method, of the apparatus of literary criticism and of literature, stands the 
same Divine-human agent that is located at the center of the mirror-mechanism. This 
carries huge implications. Firstly, if such a center exists, then all poems and all aspects 
of literature are reflective of it and connected to it: ÒThus the center of the literary 
universe is whatever poem we happen to be reading. One step further, and the poem 
appears as a microcosm of all literature, an individual manifestation of the total order of 
wordsÓ (p.121). Secondly, a new type of criticism can be developed in relation to the 
imagery surrounding the notion of center, referred to as Ôanagogical criticismÕ: ÒIf we 
look at Lycidas anagogically, for example, we see that the subject of the elegy has been 
identified with a god who personifies both the sun that falls into the western ocean at 
night and the vegetable life that dies in the autumn. In the latter aspect Lycidas is the 
Adonis or Tammuz whose Ôannual wound,Õ as Milton calls it elsewhere, was the subject 
of a ritual lament in Mediterranean religion, and has been incorporated in the pastoral 
elegy since Theocritus, as the title of Shelley's Adonais shows more clearly. As a poet, 
Lycidas's archetype is Orpheus, who also died young, in much the same role as Adonis, 
and was flung into the water. As priest, his archetype is Peter, who would have drowned 
on the ÔGalilean lakeÕ without the help of Christ. Each aspect of Lycidas poses the 
question of premature death as it relates to the life of man, of poetry, and of the Church. 
But all of these aspects are contained within the figure of Christ, the young dying god 
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who is eternally alive, the Word that contains all poetry, the head and body of the 
Church, the good Shepherd whose pastoral world sees no winter, the Sun of 
righteousness that never sets, whose power can raise Lycidas, like Peter, out of the 
waves, as it redeems souls from the lower world, which Orpheus failed to do. Christ 
does not enter the poem as a character, but he pervades every line of it so completely 
that the poem, so to speak, enters himÓ (pp.121-122). Thirdly, and this is where our 
discussion of the second part of the method of archetypal criticism resumes, if expanded, 
the reality of Christ or the Word/Logos provides an essential ontological structure from 
the center of which the archetypes of literature can seem to unfold or descend: ÒThus the 
apocalyptic world of the Bible presents the following pattern: 
divine world = society of gods = One God 
human world Ñ society of men = One Man 
animal world = sheepfold = One Lamb 
vegetable world = garden or park = One Tree (of Life) 
mineral world = city = One Building, Temple, Stone  
The conception 'ChristÕ unites all these categories in identity: Christ is both the one God 
and the one Man, the Lamb of God, the tree of life, or vine of which we are the 
branches, the stone which the builders rejected, and the rebuilt temple which is identical 
with his risen bodyÓ (pp.141-142). Again, it shall be noticed here that this fits well with 
the observation that in its most complex form, the mirror-mechanism is identical with 
the description of the nature of the Divine-human agent. The same is obviously true of 
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the center of literature as a whole identified by Frye. From here on, a model of diffusion 
or descent takes over which could be resembled with a deductive method in terms of 
application. This constitutes the second part of the method of archetypal criticism. The 
first manner in which this model of diffusion can be understood is in relation to the 
operations applied to the Òapocalyptic imageryÓ discussed above. From its 
Òmythological mode,Ó apocalyptic imagery becomes first attenuated in the Òanalogical 
imageryÓ of romantic, high and low mimetic modes (an idealized world of heroes and 
heroines in an age of innocence), to then find its exact opposite counterpart in the 
Òdemonical imageryÓ of the ironic mode (ÔheavenÕ vs. Ôhell,Õ Ôtree of lifeÕ vs. Ôtree of 
death,Õ Ôwater of lifeÕ vs. Ôwater of death,Õ Ôpurgatorial or cleansing fireÕ vs. Ôhellish fireÕ 
etc.) (pp.148-151). Frye (p.137) refers to this process of diffusion as Òdisplacement,Ó 
highlighting the difficulties encountered in attempting to trace it across the different 
types of imagery: ÒIn a myth we can have a sun-god or a tree-god; in a romance we may 
have a person who is significantly associated with the sun or trees. In more realistic 
modes the association becomes less significant and more a matter of incidental, even 
coincidental or accidental, imagery.Ó Based on this displacement of Òapocalyptic 
imageryÓ into ÒanalogicalÓ and Òdemonical imageryÓ Frye proceeds to outline certain 
categories for fictional modes, the notion of symbol and for broader literary genres 
(comedy, romance, tragedy, irony). The issue of the broader literary genres is too 
complex to be discussed here. Suffice it to say that these notions correspond to the cycle 
of the seasons that plays an essential symbolic role in religious literature, and to 
movements within the continuum stretching from the demonical to the anagogical and 
the apocalyptic. The pattern of diffusion is more easily discernible in the notion of the 
symbol, with the resulting configuration corresponding to different types of literary 
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criticism. Thus, the symbol as sign is contained in the symbol as motif, contained in the 
symbol as image, itself being enclosed within the notion of the symbol as archetype, 
itself incorporated by the notion of the symbol as monad: ÒAnagogically, then, the 
symbol is a monad, all symbols being united in a single infinite and eternal verbal 
symbol which is, as dianoia, the Logos, and, as mythos, total creative actÓ (p.121). 
Finally, the model of diffusion appears most clearly, and this is of direct relevance to the 
concept of the hero-mirror mechanism, in the classification of the types of fictional 
modes based on the notion of the hero: 
ÒFictions, therefore, may be classified, not morally, but by the hero's power of action, 
which may be greater than ours, less, or roughly the same. Thus: 
1. If superior in kind both to other men and to the environment of other men, the hero is 
a divine being, and the story about him will be a myth in the common sense of a story 
about a god. Such stories have an important place in literature, but are as a rule found 
outside the normal literary categories. 
2. If superior in degree to other men and to his environment, the hero is the typical hero 
of romance, whose actions are marvellous but who is himself identified as a human 
being. ... 
3. If superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment, the hero is a 
leader. He has authority, passions, and powers of expression far greater than ours, but 
what he does is subject both to social criticism and to the order of nature. This is the 
hero of the high mimetic mode, of most epic and tragedy, and is primarily the kind of 
hero that Aristotle had in mind. 
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4. If superior neither to other men nor to his environment, the hero is one of us: we 
respond to a sense of his common humanity, and demand from the poet the same canons 
of probability that we find in our own experience. This gives us the hero of the low 
mimetic mode, of most comedy and of realistic fiction. ... 
5. If inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves, so that we have the sense of looking 
down on a scene of bondage, frustration, or absurdity, the hero belongs to the ironic 
modeÓ (p.33). 
This might seem simplistic but with this pattern of diffusion and its resultant fictional 
modes Frye traces the historical development of Western literature. In other words, the 
pattern of diffusion originating with archetypal imagery and ending with demonical 
imagery is, in FryeÕs view (pp.34-35) historically inscribed:  
ÒLooking over this table, we can see that European fiction, during the last fifteen 
centuries, has steadily moved its center of gravity down the list. In the pre-medieval 
period literature is closely attached to Christian, late Classical, Celtic, or Teutonic 
myths. If Christianity had not been both an imported myth and a devourer of rival ones, 
this phase of Western literature would be easier to isolate. In the form in which we 
possess it, most of it has already moved into the category of romance. Romance divides 
into two main forms: a secular form dealing with chivalry and knight-errantry, and a 
religious form devoted to legends of saints. Both lean heavily on miraculous violations 
of natural law for their interest as stories. Fictions of romance dominate literature until 
the cult of the prince and the courtier in the Renaissance brings the high mimetic mode 
into the foreground. The characteristics of this mode are most clearly seen in the genres 
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of drama, particularly tragedy, and national epic. Then a new kind of middle-class 
culture introduces the low mimetic, which predominates in English literature from 
Defoe's time to the end of the nineteenth century. In French literature it begins and ends 
about fifty years earlier. During the last hundred years, most serious fiction has tended 
increasingly to be ironic in mode.Ó 
As discussed, however, all literature, all poems, all symbols and all heroes originate and 
can be brought back, as the pattern of diffusion evinces, to one single ÒWordÓ or 
ÒInfinite ManÓ (p.126).  
Until now this section has discussed that the mirror mechanism is an Ôarchetypal 
invariantÕ of the metaphysical kind (as opposed to a psychological or cultural one) and 
an Ôontological essenceÕ (see Braga 1999) which can structure a theory in the manner of 
the Ôallegorical archetypesÕ described by Abrams (1953). Inasmuch as I have worked 
with archetypes and not in the anagogical mode of criticism, the methodology employed 
in relation to the mirror-mechanism deserves (in line with FryeÕs definitions) the label of 
Ôarchetypal criticismÕ. Much like Frye, I have followed the extensions of the archetype 
of the hero inductively and across different types of discourses (bodies of literary works 
for Frye), identified an ontological pattern (the realms of being and the categories 
together described as Ôapocalyptic imagery,Õ from which the continuum of apocalyptic, 
analogical and demonical imagery unfolds) that also translates into a cultural mechanism 
(an apparatus of literary criticism in FryeÕs case), and traced its origin to a religious core 
(Logos, the Word, Christ, Òthe Infinite ManÓ). There are, however, significant 
differences. In this work, the hero-mirror mechanism is not applied as a spread-out 
ontological pattern and also not only as an ontological pattern. In the hero-mirror 
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mechanism the ontological pattern, while there, is minimal. It is represented by the 
concept of the Divine-human as both a mediator between three ontological levels (of 
God, the Divine-human agent, and the human being) and as the perfect reflection of 
those levels in relation to man. Or in very simple terms, and as applied to the cultural 
discourses analyzed, the notion of the hero. However, in addition to being an ontological 
scheme, the mirror-mechanism also describes, even if only in symbolical or 
metaphorical terms, the type of relation established between these ontological levels, 
particularly in what concerns the human being. The mirror-mechanism functions 
therefore as an ontological scheme that is also at the same time an ethical, aesthetical 
and anthropological scheme prefiguring what Foucault has referred to as Ôtechnologies 
of selfÓ (but, potentially, also what he has referred to as Ôtechnologies of dominationÕ). I 
am referring here to the two axes of the mirror-mechanism that are identical to the 
Christian theological notions of imitatio Dei and kenosis. Thus, when applied to the 
analysis of cultural discourses, the methodology of archetypal criticism has sought to 
verify whether essential content corresponded or not to the notion of the hero (as 
imitatio Dei), and to the two axes of imitatio Dei and kenosis. In this exercise, what has 
been sought after principally has been not a similarity of imagery or metaphors 
(although some has been identified in the archetype of the hero, for example) but of 
philosophical ideas. 
Three things remain to be added as a conclusion to this entire section on methodology. 
Firstly, that although I am aware many have treated the notion of discourse as a more 
flexible and, therefore, more capable alternative to the notion of ideology, I prefer to 
retain both as equally important and as interlinked in the manner described by Verdery 
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(1991, p.9): ÒDiscourse is, for the cases I examine, the most common form of signifying 
practice through which ideological processes occurred.Ó As for the notion of ideology, I 
disagree with those interpretations that seek to equate it with a system of belief in its 
entirety, being in favour of the definition given by Frye: ÒAn ideology starts by 
providing its own version of whatever in its traditional mythology it considers relevant, 
and uses this version to form and enforce a social contract. An ideology is thus an 
applied mythology, and its adaptations of myths are the ones that, when we are inside an 
ideological structure, we must believe, or say we believeÓ (Frye 1982, cited in Hart 
1994, pp.208-209). It is in this sense that I interpret the notion of the hero-mirror 
mechanism, in its specific and peculiar reflection of the theological notions of imago 
Dei, imitatio Dei and kenosis, as central to the official discourse of Romanian 
Communism. Secondly, I also seek to depart from the monolithic notions of ideology 
put forward by advocates of the totalitarian paradigm (such as Tismăneanu) in the 
manner specified by Hellbeck (1994, pp.12-13): ÒRather than a given, fixed, and 
monologic textual corpus, in the sense of ÔCommunist party ideology,Õ ideology may be 
better understood as a ferment working in individuals and producing a great deal of 
variation as it interacts with the subjective life of a particular person. The individual 
operates like a clearing house where ideology is un-packed and personalized, and in the 
process the individual remakes himself into a subject with distinct and meaningful 
biographical features. And in activating the individual, ideology itself comes to life.Ó In 
this work, I have sought to recover the workings of this Ôferment,Õ not only in terms of 
the specific subject (issuing or responding to a discourse), but particularly in relation to 
the types of variation produced within the cultural discourses analyzed.  
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Last but not least, this work has been identified as fitting with four theoretical and 
comparative perspectives: with a strand of literature concerned with Russian Ôsocialist 
realism,Õ with literature that seeks to analyze Romanian Communist culture at the level 
of cultural discourses, with FoucaultÕs work, particularly in its third stage, and with the 
tradition of Ôarchetypal criticism.Õ 
The other perspective that informs this project and which has not yet been discussed is 
one that seeks to combine a certain sociological and at times epistemological strand from 
field of Higher Education (such as Burton Clark, Tony Beecher, Paul Trowler, Mary 
Henkel and Peter Scott) with a more cultural approach to the issues of education and 
higher education (Ronald Barnett and Alan Bloom). This perspective is more visibly at 
work in the Literature Review chapter and in the concluding chapter.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that, since Òthe scholar does not have any privileged 
access to a space ÔaboveÕ discourses but is also formed by them,Ó this chapter has been 
written under SaukhoÕs (2003, p.75) insistence that the validity of any methodology for 
the analysis of cultural discourses depends on the authorÕs self-reflexivity in relation to 
it.  
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The Discursive Space of Transition: The External 
Context 
  
The Meanings of 1989 
The formation of the discursive space of transition is inextricably linked with the 
meanings and interpretations given to the year 1989 as the revolutionary moment that 
marked the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As Goldfarb (2001, p.993) 
has observed, Ò[w]hen we think about the meanings of 1989, we usually think about big 
issues: the fall of an empire, the victory of capitalism, the end of an ideology - if not 
ideology in general; the end of history, an international effervescence of democracy, the 
victory of civil society.Ó Probably, however, the most important ideological consequence 
of the fall of communism has been the widespread perception that there is no alternative 
to Western capitalism: ÒCommunism is one thing and capitalism another, and 
communism has been defeated, therefore the only alternative solution is capitalism. 
Communism and the Left have brought totalitarianism, capitalism and the Right bring 
democracyÓ (Ţichindeleanu 2005, ãNEA,Ó Mitul Mare: Nu-Există-Alternative, para. 1). 
To some extent, this has been the result of the Cold War ÔoverbiddingÕ of Western 
capitalism as a realized utopia in the face of similar claims launched by the Soviet Union 
regarding its own social model: ÒThe true challenge posed by the Soviet experiment was 
the claim made by Stalin (and then constantly reiterated by the Soviet leadership) that 
the Soviet Union represented the place and earthbound incarnation of utopia - if not in 
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the sense of its total fulfillment, then at least in terms of its practical advancement. To 
win the competition against Soviet communism, its rivals felt compelled not only to 
appropriate this claim as their own but even to outdo it - and thereby redefine their own 
societies as universal political models. The present political and cultural situation is the 
consequence of this protracted one-upmanship. What has been lost is the neutral ground 
between the affirmation and negation of each individual model of society. The pressure 
to make a choice is mounting; the question of the distinction between utopia and anti-
utopia has become the central political issue of our timeÓ (Groys 2009). 
This utopian and anti-utopian investment had significant effects after 1989. On the one 
hand, the West, and America in particular, could not help but celebrate this as the 
triumph of liberalism, capitalism, free market and democracy extending to the rest of the 
world. Only few voices in the West were found to suggest caution (Bobbio 1991), 
expressing the opinion that the fall of Communist regimes should be understood as a 
challenge to existing Western capitalism and democratic institutions and to the 
fashioning of a new world order. Out of these, most described the Communist fall as an 
opportunity for Eastern Europe to cultivate the liberal and democratic project in its ideal 
form, experiment which could serve to reactivate liberal democracies in the West 
(Tismăneanu 1999), thus arguing for a sort of revisionist and more complete liberalism. 
This, while somewhat muted leftist thinkers were left to worry about how, instead of 
taking advantage of the fall of Communism, socialist and social-democratic parties had 
slid to the right by adopting the political pact of an ineffective Third Way, and, also, 
about how the crisis of Communism could help fuel right wing populist parties and 
terrorism, through the absence of a political space for challenging the neo-liberal, global 
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hegemony (Mouffe 2005). Or, to simply reassure each other that the true purpose of 
socialism, Òto save humanity from a productive system that has got out of its control, but 
in which people can live lives worthy of human beingsÓ was Òstill on the agendaÓ 
(Habermas 1991, p.325).  
These counterpoints passed mostly unnoticed as the ensuing Western condemnation of 
Communism Ð the continuation of the Cold War anti-utopian investment by the West, 
was followed by pronouncements on the death of socialism and Marxism and on the 
irrelevance of the Left.  
At the same time, in the background, the decline of Communism served the ascendancy 
of neoliberal capitalism over postmodernist critiques. The unchallenged utopian 
investment of Western models at global stage silenced and bypassed the postmodernist 
critiques and engagements of the 1980s through the route of instrumental reason and the 
language of efficiency: ÒThe legitimacy of producing a theoretical discourse on 
modernity passed from the competence of critical philosophy, of the philosophy of right 
or science, to the anti-utopian discourse of technocracy and of the newly established 
disciplines such as comparative political science, in particular, and comparative social 
sciences in general. ... Retreating within the academic worlds of critical theory, the 
debate on postmodernity became itself a sort of metanarrative, more or less 
museumficated, a triadic fundament or precondition for the critical-theoretical discourse 
in Western academiaÓ (Ţichindeleanu 2006, Postmodernity as a Finished Project, para. 
5). 
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To sum it up, it was in this context that former Communist countries had to face their 
unresolved trauma: that of emerging from the catastrophic collapse of socialist/Marxist 
models and onto the global scene as exponents of failure, namely, with a condemned 
past, a condemned ideology and to the extent they had invested in socialist utopias, with 
a condemned identity (Groys 2008). While communism had introduced the competition 
of societal models at global stage - battle which it lost, post-communist countries now 
also failed to meet the resultant postmodernist taste of the global market for difference 
and Òcolorful diversity,Ó leaving them with a condemned and outdated European identity 
(that of Marxism) and a developing ÔZeligÕ syndrome:  ÒThe post-Communist subject 
must feel like a Warhol Coca-Cola bottle brought back from the museum into the 
supermarket. In the museum, this Coca-Cola bottle was an artwork and had an identityÑ
but back in the supermarket the same Coca-Cola bottle looks just like every other Coca-
Cola bottle. Unfortunately, this complete break with the historical past and the resultant 
erasure of cultural identity are as difficult to explain to the outside world as it is to 
describe the experience of war or prison to someone who has never been at war or in 
prison. And that is why, instead of trying to explain his or her lack of cultural identity, 
the post-Communist subject tries to invent oneÑacting like Zelig in the famous Woody 
Allen movieÓ (Groys 2008, pp.151, 156-157).  
This seemingly desperate Òquest for a cultural identityÓ appears to be rooted, then, not 
only internally, but also externally, in Òthe requirements of international cultural 
marketsÓ (idem, p.157). ÒEastern Europeans want now to be as nationalistic, as 
traditional, as culturally identifiable as all the others,Ó but, while their Òapparent 
nationalismÓ seeks mainly to accommodate the Western cultural taste Òfor othernessÓ the 
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West receives this Òas a ÔrebirthÕ of nationalismÓ reinforcing Òthe current belief in 
otherness and diversityÓ (idem). 
 
From the Global Myth of ÔNo AlternativeÕ to an Incipient Acceptance 
of a New Left 
As described before, the myth that there is Ôno alternativeÕ to capitalism has been 
described as having its roots in the Cold War utopian and anti-utopian overbidding 
between the US and the USSR (Groys 2009). According to this interpretation, the black 
and white mythological thinking portraying communism as the only alternative, and 
capitalism as evil, has resulted in the inevitable reversal of these terms after 1989. 
Ultimately, this reversal occurred not only in the psyche of the West but also in that of 
post-communist countries, now free from Communism but still trapped in its Manichean 
and absolutist logic.  
A similar discussion has seen global capital credited with the creation, within post-
communist countries, of an industry of cultural production (Ţichindeleanu 2005) and of 
a mass-media culture (Srbu 2006) that emphasizes, in clear Manichean terms, a 
neoliberal ideology of transition.  
For Ţichindeleanu (2005, Imperativul fragmentării, para. 4), the industry of cultural 
production has cultivated an ÒInquisitional rhetoricÓ about Marxism, and has promoted, 
instead of reflection and anamnesis, the trial, condemnation and the forgetting of 
Communism: ÒÔCommunismÕ, Ôthe leftÕ are overwhelmingly treated in the ÔcivilizedÕ 
 
 
141 
press in Romania as non-thoughts and through non-thinking. We do not think when we 
speak about communism: we accuse, swear, point the finger, we run as much as we can 
away from thinking. ÔWe know what it is all about,Õ all we have left to do is to deride it, 
to anathematize and condemn it. The recourse to purely negative references, most often 
associated with concrete people, names and faces (ÔIliescuÕ), instead of ideas and 
concepts, is primarily a comfortable refusal to make the effort of thinking, to reflect on 
what has been, on what Ôwhat has beenÕ could mean.Ó The condemnation of 
Communism functions therefore, according to Ţichindeleanu (2005) as a way to 
postpone thinking about the past, as a way to induce forgetfulness, in short, as an 
intellectual repression of the trauma of the past.  
On the other hand, for Srbu (2006, ¦ 5), capitalist mass culture has replaced ideology 
with Òthe spectacle of capitalism,Ó namely, the beguiling circulation of irrelevant goods, 
information and popular divertissements; thus leaving ÒCapitalÓ unhindered in its 
processes of reproduction. Ţichindeleanu (2005, Capitalul, opium al revolu!iei, p.2) 
echoes this view by stating that with the penetration of capital the mystical hunger for 
consumerism had replaced the post 1989 symbolic hunger for reality: ÒIt must be 
emphasized here, without emitting any other conclusions, that the avalanche of the 
formations with symbolic meaning that pull, in an absolute sense, the entire universe 
around the subject, be it religious, nationalist, intellectual or just simply [economically] 
poor, has coincided with the penetration of capital on the Romanian market and with the 
imposition of the constitutive myth of the new Romanian society: capitalism means 
democracy.Ó To sum it up, then, for Ţichindeleanu (idem, Dezvrăjirea dezvrăjirii, para. 
1, 6) the false communism/capitalism dichotomy has been equivalent with the rejection 
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of critical thinking in the Romanian cultural space and with the unquestioning 
acceptance of capitalist symbolism: ÒLike any pretension to put an end to myths, the 
statement about the Ôfailure of communismÕ has come to propose a new, final myth: that 
capitalism is the natural essence of democracy and of the market economy.Ó 
Last but not least, a third viewpoint has identified main Western commentators and 
specialists on Eastern Europe as responsible for putting forward, as a dominant 
interpretation of the 1989 events, the triumph of liberalism. According to these writers, 
the 1989 revolutions had brought nothing new to the existent political order in the West, 
except the possibility and indeed the imperative that Central Europe should partake of 
the already well-tested features of Western liberal-democracies:  
ÒAs Gale Stokes writes, in his recent history of the Central European revolutions: 
ÔTheirs was not a revolution of total innovation, but rather the shucking off of a failed 
experiment in favor of an already existing model, pluralist democracyÕ (Stokes, 1993, p. 
260). This is surely the dominant interpretation of 1989. Thus, Bruce Ackerman 
identifies 1989 with Ôthe return of revolutionary democratic liberalism,Õ É This thesis 
has been stated most forcefully by Timothy Garton Ash, who maintains that the 
European revolutions Ôcan offer no fundamentally new ideas on the big questions of 
politics, economics, law or international relations. The ideas whose time has come are 
old, familiar, well-tested onesÕ (Garton Ash, 1990a, p. 154) - liberal ideas about the rule 
of law, parliamentary government, and an independent judiciaryÓ (Jeffrey Isaac 1999, 
p.124). 
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Essentially, as observed by Isaac (1999), the impact of this dominant perspective has 
been the organization of academic research and of policy around one agenda: that of 
identifying what it would take for the new regimes in Eastern Europe to become liberal 
democracies on the Western model.  
Twenty years later, the myth of Ôno alternativeÕ has seen its dominance slightly 
challenged even in the public space of post-communist Romania. However, this has 
occurred because the myth had been eroded globally by a series of successive economic 
crises, and mostly, because countless movements of protest (ÒArab springÓ inspired), 
from the Spanish ÒIndignados,Ó to the Occupy movements in North-America and the 
UK, to the "indignes" in Portugal, Athens and France, to the Ò750 Occupy events world 
wideÓ (Rogers 2011) etc., and even to Òminefield-type explosionsÓ such as the UK riots 
(Bauman 2011), have brought Òthe radical imaginationÓ back into fashion (Graeber 
2011), despite, or maybe precisely because of their seemingly unorganized and 
ideologically diffuse character. A global reality to which Romania, through the new 
forms of mass-media, has by now become well synchronized, and to which it has 
responded in its own way through a most atypical (even according to current 
international standards) unstructured protest [a general reaction against the Romanian 
political class as a whole (Antonesei 2012) but without even an incipient programmatic 
vision, if compared to the Occupy like movements] at the beginning of 2012. The 
movement has allowed an incipient intellectual Left to become visible in the public 
domain (Mixich 2012), but this group (mostly affiliated with the ÒCriticAtacÓ group and 
platform of ideas Ð formed in 2010) has not attempted (or succeeded) to provide the 
protests with organizational impetus or an anti-capitalist programmatic vision, partly 
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because of a postmodernist Ôbottom-upÕ vision, partly because of supporting the 
opposition representing the old Communists, and partly because the movement itself had 
insisted on not having any political figures (even from the opposition) affiliated with it.  
 
Re-entering History  
In general, the emergence of post-communist countries on the global scene has been 
initially experienced not as the integration into a new global order but rather as a pure 
moment of liberation, as the irruption into an unrestricted zone of complete freedom and 
democracy. Through their isolation from world events, post-communist societies had 
developed an undifferentiated view of the world, where a monolithic and imaginary 
conception of the West as the antithesis of everything evil in Communism functioned as 
sole reference to the rest of the world (conception which, arguably, reinforced 
Eurocentric thinking in Eastern Europe). This conception had as single frame of 
reference the ideals of the Enlightenment as manifested at the turn of the century in 
Europe, ideals preserved almost intact because of the humanistic and Enlightenment 
foundations of Communism, and because of decades of lack of information in the public 
space about the post-Second World War history of the world. Hence, the post-1990s 
interpretation of Communism as simply an interruption or a break in the normal 
evolution of Eastern-Europe countries, Òa materialized Nothing, which, after its 
disappearance, dissolved itself in NothingnessÓ (Groys 2005, p.1), thus signaling the 
return to Europe. And derived from this, the highly idealistic and very naive hurried 
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acceptance of everything that came from Europe as the return of that utopia promised, in 
fact, by Communism: that of true freedom, true democracy, world peace etc.  
In fact, the most problematic aspect of the transition of Eastern Europe could reside 
exactly in this reading of Europe strictly in terms of the utopian promises of 
Communism. For almost twenty years this reading has not been able to differentiate 
between modernities, types of capitalism, forms of democracies, varieties of Marxism, 
and in fact, has presented no inkling of the challenge of postmodernity, decolonization 
and post-coloniality, or the diverse leftist or human-rights social movements in the rest 
of the world. There was only one Europe (or Occident), to which the global scene could 
be reduced, and only one capitalism and democracy, that of the Enlightenment-based 
utopia of modernity. After twenty years, this is now shifting, but even this change has 
emerged because of the disruption caused in the social-political sphere of Western states 
by the current global economic crisis. In the context provided by successive protest 
movements, the emerging New Left (its gradual rise can be traced back to around 2006 
but not before 2004) is just now beginning to formulate its intellectual and political-
social agenda (CriticAtac 2010, ÒWho we areÓ). For now, this seems to revolve around 
two axes: a critique of capitalism in the Romanian context and the ideal of closing the 
gap between the elites (particularly, the intellectual elites) and the masses. But it is very 
early stages, and the European project, on the continued integration with which 
RomaniaÕs fate largely depends [including the containment of Òits illiberal national 
forcesÓ (Chen 2007, p.168)], seems more uncertain than ever.  
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The Discursive Space in Transition: The Interior 
 
"Behold, I will create new heavens and a new earthÓ (Isaiah 65:17). 
ÒOn the day when the earth shall be changed into another earthÓ (Quran 14:48).  
ÒThen I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had 
passed away...Ó (Rev. 21:1) 
Whether by emphasizing its ÒmillenarianÓ character (Boia 2000, p.157), its similarity to 
a ÒGnostic systemÓ (Besanon 2007, p.19), its political system being organized as a 
ÒtheocracyÓ (Kotkin 1997, pp.286-298), its similarity with Christianity in terms of issues 
of doctrinal continuity and succession (Kolakowski 2005, p.661), analysts of 
Communism have always highlighted that, in some way or another, it resembles a 
religious phenomenon. None more so, probably, than those viewing Communism as a 
Òsecularized religionÓ: ÒThe Marxist theology further developed by Soviet MarxismÐ
Leninism was based on the Judeo-Christian eschatological model: The Garden of Eden Ð 
Original Sin and the Fall Ð Redemption Ð and the Second Coming. The alleged primitive 
communism was substituted for Eden, private property and the division of labor for the 
Fall, the proletarian revolution for the Redemption, and the future communist society for 
the Second Coming and return to ParadiseÓ (Khazanov 2008, p.123).   
Establishing the religious character of Communism is not a concern of this thesis. 
However the structure of this work unfolds along two concepts, one allegorical and one, 
of analysis, that can be viewed as religious in origin. The second one refers to the notion 
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of the hero-mirror mechanism, which shall be presented shortly. As for the first concept, 
it concerns a certain view of the author regarding the religious character of Communism, 
but one that is only allegorical.  
In this view, Communism appears as a quasi-religious movement because it sees 
political power, revolution and progress as a problem of culture, as a problem of interior 
morality that cuts across all aspects, visible or invisible, of civilization. In this particular 
feature, Communism corresponds to the notion of Òinner utopiaÓ (Şerban 2010), 
highlighted in several of the following chapters. In short, the notion of Òinner utopiaÓ 
originates with the Platonic idea that knowing oneself should form the basis of political 
organization, and envisages political models as fundamentally requiring an existential 
change in the inner selves of the people and of each individual. In this aspect, it can be 
said that Communism departs from Marxist theory and assumes a religious character: 
ÒThis was a direct revision of classical Marxism, which claims that existence determines 
consciousness. The Soviet rulers wanted consciousness to determine existenceÓ 
(Khazanov 2008, p.13). By having as its external subject global humanity and as its 
internal subject the very humanity of man Communism was, it can be presumed, a 
totalizing project, seeking to alter reality at all levels. In the manner of the Russian 
avant-garde, its spirit sought to destroy existent reality and replace it with a completely 
new creation: to re-start creation.  To make Òthe first heaven and the first earthÓ pass 
away and replace them with a new heaven and earth. In religious terms, this Òchanging 
of the earthÓ (Bah'u'llh 1862, p.48) can also be expressed through a different 
metaphor, that of the Divine Breath (ÔHoly SpiritÕ derives from the Hebrew word Breath 
or Wind) as an act of creation. For the rhythm of breathing consists of inhaling and 
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exhaling. This is quite clearly expressed in Hinduism: ÒWhen Maha-Vishnu exhales, the 
material elements and universes emanate from Him, and when He inhales, the universes 
are destroyed and merge back into His body. Thus the universes and their respective 
Brahmas are created and destroyed with every breath of Maha-VishnuÓ (Dasa 2012).  
This metaphorical image, of creation and destruction through the inhaling of an old 
world order and the exhaling of a new one, is useful in describing the 
simultaneous/successive processes of destruction and creation which Communism 
applies to society and culture. The Communist transformation of society and culture can 
thus be conceptualized as consisting of two phases: one in which society is emptied of 
its previous form and content (inhale/destruction), and another, in which it is filled with 
a new meaning (exhale/creation). The process is simultaneous but in terms of an order of 
temporality, we can say that for Romania, the period 1945-1964 corresponds more to the 
first phase, and the period 1964-1989 more to the second.  
 
The Leveling of Society 
A number of analysts (Verdery 1991, Deletant 1997, Tănase 1998, Tismăneanu 2003) 
have seen the development of Eastern-European forms of communism (excepting former 
Yugoslavia) as conditioned by the lack of national legitimacy ascribed to their ruling 
Communist Parties, imposed through and relying on solely Soviet military power. In this 
constellation of Communist regimes, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) has been 
identified as occupying the most marginal position, mainly because of its almost 
complete lack of support at home. Therefore, the dilemma of how to escape the 
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relationship of full dependency with Russia by gaining legitimacy and control at home 
through its help constitutes the starting point for the development of the RCP. To this, 
the fight for power between different elites within the same Party adds another element 
of complexity. For Romania, then, the question becomes the following: how to 
consolidate one faction of the ruling elite at the expense of others, gaining support and 
recognition but also independence from Moscow, while at the same time obtaining 
control over the society governed. It is alongside this continuum, and within this 
complicated triangle involving the Russian Communist Party and the society at home, 
that Romanian Communism develops as a form of totalitarianism. It counts enormously 
that from the three factions competing for power, 1) that of those arrested and sent to 
prison Ð Òthe national factionÓ led by Gheorghiu Dej and comprising people like 
Gheorghe Apostol, Nicolae Ceauşescu, Alexandru Drăghici, Teohari Georgescu etc., 2) 
that of the communist leaders who took refuge at Moscow during the Second World War 
so as to avoid arrest - Ôthe Moscow BureauÓ led by Ana Pauker, and 3) that of the 
veterans of the Communist movement in Romania, which remained in Romania, 
operating illegally Ð led by Stefan Foriş and also including Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu etc. 
(Deletant 1998, pp.62-63), the first one, shaped mainly through the experience of 
illegality, would gradually impose itself through the complete elimination of the other 
two (Pauker arrested, excluded from the Party and placed under observation, while Foriş 
and Pătrăşcanu executed). As Tănase (1998, pp.47-49) observes, the underground 
experience of illegality, exile and jail was the main cohesive element of an elite group 
obsessed with suspicions and intrigues and which displayed a sectarian mindset and a 
top-down hierarchical structure that elevated the Party chief to the rank of a cultish 
figure. It was this fundamental experience that led the group to conceptualize society Òas 
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a hostile and alien realityÓ and which most defined its political conduct (idem, p.46). 
Eventually, this experience combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology, in its Stalinist 
form (and with the cult of the party and its leader), resulting in a Soviet-assisted effort to 
firstly gain control of society through a repressive apparatus, and secondly, to transform 
the marginal Romanian Communist Party into a mass party able to rule the nation as a 
satellite regime of the Soviet Union. The role of the ruling elite in this process: to act as 
the vanguard for the ÔmodernizationÕ of the existing society based on the Marxist-
Stalinist model, namely, to promote the destruction of any spontaneity existing in 
society so that society as a whole could be brought under the control of the communist 
elite (idem, p.67). ÒAnnihilating spontaneityÓ (idem) implied destroying the existent 
structures, institutions and groups giving society its character, and replacing them with 
institutions and types of social formations subordinate to a single political will: ÒOne of 
the essential concepts of Marxism is that of the Ôclassless societyÕ, which proletarian 
revolutions aim to bring about. In fact, the destruction of the traditional classes is 
equivalent with extending the dominance of the Marxist elite of Ôprofessional 
revolutionariesÕ over a society these are attempting to level. Stalinism became a 
totalitarian regime after the successive destruction of the large landowners, of the 
industrial, commercial and financial bourgeoisie, of the small bourgeoisie, the 
craftsmen, the artisans, of those possessing small workshops, of the well-to-do 
peasantry, as well as of that owning some land and the one poor, which it dispossessed. 
The leveling did not end with the old classes, but rather extended also to the new socio-
professional levels and groups, the bureaucracy, the army, the party, the intellectuals etc. 
The destruction of all differences, forbidding the manifestation of any other interests 
except those of the regime, the isolation and mass-formation of the individual, the 
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absolute dominance of the state, of the governing elite, of the supreme leader finally, 
were the direction of movement for the Stalinist regimeÓ (idem, p.25).  
As in the case of Russia, the second part of this process required massive and intensive 
industrialization in order to transform the existing peasantry into the industrial 
proletariat needed to form the social basis and, indeed, to justify, retrospectively at least, 
the proletarian revolution of the ruling communist elite.  
It is in this ÔlevelingÕ of society, or ÔannihilationÕ of its ÔspontaneityÕ, manifested first 
through the stages of terror and repressive violence encompassing all levels of society 
(1945-1964), and then through the symbolic-ideological control of the population to be 
accommodated in different spaces into the newly reconstituted society (1964-1989), that 
the previous notion of the emptying of the social-cultural environment of its form and 
content (the ÒinhaleÓ phase) gets reflected:  
ÒNot only the groups of interests and the socio-professional categories of pre-war 
Romania were eliminated, annihilated, remodeled, the family and the individual also 
became the target of attacks by the ruling elite. ÉThey were dislocated from their 
traditional structures, separated from their places of birth through mobilization, exodus 
to the cities. They were isolated from their natural environment, forced to become 
someone else in order to survive, to renounce (realistically or just formally) their own 
system of values. Individuals were constantly under the propaganda offensive of the 
regime, subjected to indoctrination through education and mass media. É Annihilated 
was any autonomous space in which the individual could have survived through his own 
means. Educated he was to obey the elite. Proposing the de-alienation of the individual, 
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Marxism (the Communism derived from it as a political system) produced for him the 
most radical form of alienation. His insertion into society had been emptied of content, 
his belonging to it, illusory (Tănase 1998, p.104).  
Finally, while this discussion of the emptying of the social-cultural environment stems 
from a political/sociological perspective, the same can be seen to apply from a cultural-
anthropological perspective:  
ÒLeaders trying to instill a new symbolic order will aim to destroy or absorb into the 
political apparatus alternative orders and alternative meanings not yet bent to a new will. 
Wars are declared on cultural accumulations of an older era (intellectuals are purged, 
older authors are removed from bookshelves, school texts are rewritten), as new 
accumulations are slowly amassed to replace them. The possibility of different claims 
and justifications, of a different construction of reality that these older forms contain 
cannot be permitted to flourish. The extreme of this declared war is to be found in Pol 
PotÕs Kampuchea or in CeauşescuÕs Romania of the 1980s, with the razing of churches 
and buildings and entire villages that signify an ÔoutmodedÕ social worldÓ (Verdery 
1991, p.97).  
 
 ÒSocialist RealismÓ or the Leveling of National Culture 
The following will take this process of Ôchanging of the earthÕ deeper into the cultural 
realm, attempting to describe not only what had been emptied or marginalized but also 
what the Ôcorridors of powerÕ have constructed, voluntarily as well as involuntarily, as 
main official discourses on culture. Generally, the periodization given by Deletant 
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(1998, p.27) for state police terror within Communist Romania, 1945-1964 for 
eliminating the opposition and gaining control of society, and 1964-1989 for ensuring 
the continued obedience of the population, can also be applied to culture. The 1945-1964 
period of executions, mass arrests, deportations, and labour camps (the leveling of 
society), that is, the implementation of a terror system of Stalinist extraction (with Òthe 
SecuritateÓ agency paralleling the NKVD under the infiltrated leadership of former 
Moscow agents), complements and corresponds to the introduction of the constricting 
regime of Stalinist socialist realism in the domain of culture, with its interdiction of 
essential authors, works and magazines (the leveling of culture). Thus, between 1945 
and 1949 the party bans 8779 publications, both Western (Plato, Nietzsche, Bergson, 
Poe etc.) and Romanian (Negrici 2010, p.54). The list of banned Romanian authors 
surprises, as Negrici (idem) remarks, for it encompasses almost the entire spectrum 
(from center to margin) of Romanian writers or cultural personalities and it extends 
throughout the history of the nation: ÒVasile Alecsandri, Nicolae Bălcescu, Grigore 
Alexandrescu, Ion Agrbiceanu, ...Lucian Blaga, Gh. Brăescu, Al. Brătescu Voineşti, 
Dimitrie Bolintineanu, Dimitrie Cantemir, Otilia Cazimir, Şerban Cioculescu, George 
Coşbuc, Anghel Demetriescu, Victor Eftimiu, Mihai Eminescu, Nicolae Filimon, Ion 
Ghica, Octavian Goga, B. P. Haşdeu, G. Ibrăileanu, Titu Maiorescu, Gib I. Mihăescu, 
Costache Negruyyi, Alexandru Odobescu, Dimitie Onciul, Petre Pandrea, Anton 
Pann...[and so on]Ó. 
While past Romanian authors come under attack with their works forbidden or re-edited 
under the charges of nationalism, fascism or decadence/elitism (closely associated with, 
or derived from, class origin) Ð resulting in a society deprived of its most important 
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authors (the ÔclassicsÕ of the time of nation-formation or those writing about the nation, 
the inter-war intellectuals engaged with issues of modernity, and those engaged in 
cultural exchange with the West), contemporaneous authors enter the all pervasive gaze 
of the Party apparatus, with its censorship and its pressure to co-opt. Obtaining control 
of the means of production is the PartyÕs imperative in the sphere of culture as well. 
While hundreds of professors are dismissed from university departments and tens of 
thousands of intellectuals lose their jobs, are arrested, and even jailed (Tănase 1998, 
p.165), professional associations such as the Romanian Academy, or the Society of 
Romanian Writers and the Society of Romanian composers are dismantled and replaced 
with new ones, with hundreds of former members being excluded (Wikipedia, 
ÒRealismul socialist n RomniaÓ). In addition, publishing houses, printing houses, 
cinemas, institutes and foundations become state-owned (Tănase 1998, p.165).  
In this first phase, the cultural void thus created is filled with Social Realist art generated 
either in the Soviet Union or based on the Soviet classic models. In the Romanian 
context, that translates into a similar literary or artistic account: that of the young 
proletarian revolutionary, fighting against his whole decadent society - family, friends 
and class, borrowing on the Ôlight from the EastÕ to become the Ônew manÕ of the 
Enlightenment: morally enlightened, scientifically a genius, and causing the uplifting of 
his people through the implementation of the Soviet Communist model (both as a moral 
order and a technological civilization) (Cernat et al. 2004). 
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All Things Anew: A new Humanity (ÒSocialist HumanismÓ) 
Inasmuch as the Dej regime is a Stalinist one, the 1953 de-Stalinization campaign does 
not produce much change within Romania. A period of relaxation occurs, however, 
starting with 1964, when the governing elite - the nomenklatura - feels itself unified in 
its strictly top-down hierarchical model, fully entrenched within Romanian society, 
having permeated all its levels, and even confident enough to assert its own industrial 
policy in front of the Soviet Union. As observed by Tănase (1998, p.239) this 
corresponds with the creation of mass support through the introduction of the proletariat 
in its party apparatus, and also with the formation, out of the proletariat masses, of the 
technocratic professional elites responsible for pushing forward a more nationalistic 
agenda, particularly in industry. In fact, instead of de-Stalinization, the period 1953-
1964 gradually brings about a period of de-Sovietification, and a return to nationalism.  
Thus, the 1963 rehabilitation of Titu Maiorescu (1840-1917), art critic and aesthetician 
who defended the principle of Ôart for artÕs sakeÕ (arguing against the social usefulness 
of art), is equivalent with the official abandonment of socialist realism by 1964 and with 
the beginning of the rehabilitation of 19th century exponents of national culture and even 
of some authors from the 20th century (Deletant 1998, pp.171-172).  
From 1965 onward, therefore, the Party starts calling for Òthe construction of an 
engaged, militant literature, based on the principles of socialist humanismÓ (Ceauşescu 
1965, cited in Deletant 1998, p.179) thus inaugurating an important recuperation and 
also mutation within the Marxist/Leninist discourse.  
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This sort of socialist humanism could be described to have resulted in two ways. Firstly, 
as Ôsocialist realismÕ stripped of its Russian imperialism and cult for Stalin in favour of 
the supremacy of the Party as the standard of Truth and Leader of the Nation. And, 
secondly, as the ideology of Ôsocialist realismÕ (needed for the formation of the 
proletariat) making way for a Ôgeneralized humanismÕ (which it had already contained as 
an important undercurrent) able to disseminate/consolidate the desired 
Communist/Socialist mentality within the population at large.  
It is important to emphasize that, while constituting a relative mutation within the 
previous cultural-political discourse, Ôsocialist humanismÕ nevertheless refers to a strand 
already existent within Ôsocialist realismÕ and, thus, embodies a certain form of 
continuity.  
In the following, my intent will be to demonstrate that, from the very beginning, 
humanism had been essentially inscribed into the mechanism governing the cultural 
sphere during Communism, and that, as such, socialist humanism and socialist realism 
stem, in fact, from the same nucleus. In short, I will argue that categorizations such as 
Ôsocialist realismÕ and Ôsocialist humanismÕ or even ÔprotochronismÕ can be 
meaningfully envisaged as variations of the same governance cultural mechanism. 
Because art or cultural discourses in Communism (such as socialist realism) are so 
closely concerned with (and expressed as) actual modes of governance, it is important to 
acknowledge that classification through solely cultural concepts cannot take place 
without a description that can relate those concepts to some sort of governance 
mechanism. Nevertheless, because the cultural domain within Communist Romania 
presents so much complexity across fields and disciplines with their own developmental 
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time-frames, discourses and forces, neither general concepts like socialist realism or 
socialist humanism, nor the governance mechanism to be delineated later, can be 
claimed to assume either a neat and clean (Ônon-fuzzyÕ) description and periodization of 
the cultural domain or anything resembling an actual account of its characteristics. 
Nevertheless, by viewing main cultural discourses and also resistant discourses as 
variations of, or as responses to a governance mechanism, I intend to show 1) that the 
governance of the cultural domain was aimed at controlling the mind by constantly 
adjusting it to new forms of behaviour or identity and 2) that this process moved from a 
phase of all-pervasive repression to an attempt at total inclusion (with a diversity of 
results) Ð both equivalent with the limitation of other discursive options (through either 
incorporation or rejection) for most of the population. 
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The Mirror-Mechanism of the Hero: Its Discursive 
Matrix
36
 
 
As an explosive mix of millenarian mythology and Enlightenment scientific myths (Boia 
2005, p.6), Communism can be interpreted as a religious ideology that replaces the 
terms ÔdivinityÕ with ÔmanÕ and ÔsacrednessÕ with ÔhumanityÕ. From this perspective, 
Communism is really one of the modern religions of the ÔNew ManÕ, a harbinger of, and 
a guide to, the ideal humanity/perfect society: ÒCommunism is, without doubt, primarily 
a religion. A modern, meaning an aesthetical one. The communist appears, before taking 
the guise of genius executioner Stalin or of neurotic Ceauşescu, as a new Jesus which 
aims to redefine humanityÓ (Matei 2011, p.99). In this ÒdesacralizedÓ (Eliade 1987, 
p.23) religion Logos is replaced, therefore, with the ideology of Marxism/Leninism-as-a-
form-of-Humanism and as embodied in the form of the Party and its Leader.  
The reason for this discussion is to suggest that Communism employs to some extent a 
model of governance characteristic of religious movements. More specifically, I refer 
here to the mirroring device through which the regular individual partakes of the divine 
qualities of the Logos/Absolute in order to become in its image (conversion) and thus 
become engaged in the building of a new civilization that will reflect the divine pattern. 
                                                             
36 The first two sections of this chapter, it will be observed, are based almost entirely on readings of texts 
from the collaborative project of ÔExplorări in Comunismul Romnesc, I, IIÕ (Cernat et al. 2004), ordered 
so as to form one coherent argument or structure.  
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 ÒThe Light Comes from the EastÓ is a famous line used to refer to the millenarian role 
of Communist Russia as the place where Logos originates. With the use of this metaphor 
we can conceive of the Communist Bloc as a structure of minor churches reflecting the 
typology and directives of a central Church: the Logos (Light) being transmitted from 
USSR to each Communist satellite-nation based on the same mirroring device set to 
regulate the relationship between the individual and the Party/Party Leader.  
I would like to call this mirroring device the Ôhero-mirror mechanism.Õ This is so 
because in the case of Communism the religious mirroring device is divested of its 
model of the Divine, and replaced with that of true Humanity, embodied in the model of 
the true revolutionary, the hero that can bring the whole of humanity to Ôthe promised 
landÕ:  
ÒLenin the intellectual knew how to think like a worker. Lenin the orator spoke without 
empty phrases, without bombastic phrases. The man that had shaken the whole world, 
the man in whose conscience boiled everything that worried this world, this man 
retained until the end of his wonderful life his capacity to think, and to think like a 
Chinese coolie, like a black docker. He understood perfectly the Jew or the oppressed 
Hindu which for him were each like an open book, the same way the metallurgist from 
Leningrad, the textile worker from Paris or the miner from New Virginia. Lenin is the 
perfect model of the new man; he remains for us the prototype of the man of the futureÓ 
(Vaillant Couturier, cited Stanomir 2005, p.17).  
As a consequence of this shift from the ineffable, or the sacred, to an ideal humanity 
historically manifested through concrete beings, the mechanism of the hero imposes on 
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the regular individual (nation) the need to reflect a complex of qualities (norms) 
personified by the Party Leader/Party (USSR).  
Lenin, who was first at everything (a man of science and a revolutionary), the expression 
of the genius of his people, which he embodied through the purity and innocence of his 
soul, gives the measure of the hero-mechanism at the individual level (Stanomir 2005): 
ÒHe, whom the masses of people had lifted from their midst, in order to express in clear 
and resolute words, similar to the ring of a bell, their unorganized cry, so as to build, 
from the confused chaos of diffuse yearnings, the idea, in order to rule the world; to lead 
them and to bring them together, and together with them, to conquer the worldÓ (Ivan 
Olbracht, cited in idem, p.19). 
On the one hand, the individual must reflect the fighting spirit of the revolutionary ready 
to sacrifice everything including himself for the larger cause of Communism, a hero that 
is the first not only in terms of social struggle and scientific revolution, but also, in terms 
of reflecting all human qualities at the highest level. On the other hand, derived out of 
this, the values of purity of heart, justice, steadfastness and obedience combine to 
require the alignment of the individual soul with the divine pattern of the Logos, the 
social norms and individual attributes described by the Party or Party/Leader. To 
summarize then, the hero-mechanism functions alongside two axes37:  
                                                             
37 This is well summarized by Ceauşescu in a speech from the 26th of January 1973 Ð his 55th birthday, 
occasioned by the Doctor Honoris Causa title conferred upon him by the University of Bucharest (see 
Ujica, 1:36:39 Ð 1:37:02): ÒDo you remember KogălniceanuÕs words to Cuza? Do everything to be just 
and to serve the people. This motto needs to guide all communistsÉÓ 
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1) the myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything for something greater than 
himself
38 (People, Party, History) Ð in everyday life this refers to mobilization in terms 
of the aims of the party (nation), which are generally organized around the principle of 
production (Gavrilă 2004, pp.49-50).  
Example:  
ÒTo be a patriot, to love your country means to do everything in order to enhance the 
national riches, the socialist property, to give everything for the fulfillment of the 
communist party policy, which corresponds to the vital interests of the whole nationÓ 
(Exposition regarding the political-ideological and cultural educational activity of 
forming the new man, devoted and conscious builder of the multilaterally developed 
socialist society and of communism in Romania 2 June 1976, cited in Stanomir 2004i, 
p.419).  
ÒThe communists, all the builders of socialism from our country, must demonstrate a 
valiant spirit in their thinking and in their work, in their entire life, audacity and 
resolution in the application of the new, in the defense of the supreme interests of the 
people, to manifest themselves as fearless fighters for social and national justice, for the 
fulfilment of the aspirations for independence of all countries, for new, democratic, 
equal and respectful relationships between all nations, for the making of a better and 
more just world on our planetÓ (the RCP Program 1974, cited in Stanomir 2004i, p.424).  
and  
                                                             
38 ÒBut Stalin saw his own role embroidered with both Arthurian chivalry and Christian sanctity: ÔYou 
need have no doubt, comrades, I am prepared to devote to the cause of the working class...all my strength, 
all my ability, and if need be, all my blood, drop by drop,Õ he wrote to thank the Party for acclaiming him 
as leader (Montefiore 2003, pp.50-51) 
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2) the myth of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the 
Good Ð in this context, the prescriptions/commandments/principles of the moral/social 
order elaborated by the Party.  
Example: 
 ÒThe communist must be an example of righteousness, honesty, of the spirit of 
responsibility, in the fulfillment of their work dutiesÓ (Central Committee of RCP 1977 
September, cited in Stanomir 2005, p.419)  
Ò...school is meant to mold advanced political-moral traits upon our youth in order to 
create the physiognomy of the new man, builder of communism and socialism with a 
wide horizon of thought, knowledge and comprehension, with a rich spiritual life, also 
owning superior ethics. The duty of school is to prepare the youth for active 
participation into the heroic work underwent by our people for edifying MDSS39Ó 
(Congresul Educaţiei Politice si al Culturii Socialiste, June 2nd  Ð 4th 1976, cited in 
Gavrilă 2004, p.77). 
This fundamental mix of activism Ð the hero, and obedience Ð the good soul, is what 
shapes the imaginary of the individual towards submission even at the subconscious 
level. Called on to aspire towards these elevated attributes, the individual is made aware 
that it is the Leader who expresses these high attributes in an almost unreachable form. 
Once the Ôdivine lightÕ has been recognized, the Ôgood soulÕ can do nothing else than 
declare his allegiance to the norms/program originating from this source of Logos: ÒThe 
Party is so placed, a luminous entity in the middle of the nation, it being the vital centre 
                                                             
39 ÔThe Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society.Ó 
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from which Ôradiate the creative energies of the whole nation, and which illuminate the 
way to the high peaks of communist civilizationÓ (Programul Partidului Comunist 1974, 
cited in Stanomir 2004, p.408). 
The following image, the Frontispiece of Giambattista Vico's Scienza Nuova, illustrates 
this above quotation very well. The Logos, that is, the Party in this case, is mirrored in 
the heart of the Party Leader, who then is himself mirrored in the rest of his communist 
subjects. 
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My argument here is that the hero mechanism functions both as a mode of governance 
and as a mode of ethics, that is, techniques of self (in the Foucauldian sense) through 
which people develop their own identity (Foucault & Carrette 1980). Modes of 
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governance and techniques of self come together because the Communist system is 
deeply involved in constructing consciousness based on the mirroring model: ÒWe need 
art, cinematography, a theatre which presents the essence, presents the model of the man 
we must build. The people, and the youth have a significant role here, it is the people 
that have achieved everything we have obtained in the socialist development of our 
nation. They are the heroes that need to have their place in films, in theatre, in poetry, 
art, in literature, in painting, in all domains of art. Them it is that we must representÓ 
(Ceauşescu 1983). (mode of governance = the mirror mechanism of the hero) 
ÒI dream of a hero who would build a factory of love, or better said of wisdom, a factory 
for all, on earth.  
Who could this hero be that makes me dream of him?Ó  (Quote from one of the literary 
works of the pioneers from Bucharest, taken from the anthology ÒDintre Sute de 
CatargeÓ 1969, cited in Cernat 2005i, pp.317-318) (technique of self = the mirror 
mechanism of the hero)  
In addition to this, I see this mirror mechanism of the hero as the mode through which 
the Communist system of governance is given amazing flexibility and reach in terms of 
transporting the image of the Logos at all levels, from the international to the national 
level, and from there to that of the concrete individual. For example, while USSR was at 
some point represented as the hero-nation (and were not the Russians the first at 
everything, including technological inventions?) fighting for equality, democracy and 
world peace Ð the absolute model for Communism, the national Communist Parties 
ÔappearedÕ as the true heroes of their nation and as local heroes of Communism (to the 
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point that in terms of national history, they constructed avatars of the Party and its 
Leader from important historical national figures or movements), this while the 
individual often took on the role of the humble and unsung hero of the common people 
who devoted himself to the cause of Communism (like the Communist engineer who 
brings electricity and, implicitly, enlightenment to his village, the factory worker who 
works to surpass the quota for production, the children who try to Ômake a good deed 
everydayÕ, the party activist who fights for the implementation of collectivization in a 
remote village or the science fiction characters Ð usually engineers, who discover 
technological solutions that can save the planet, or meet with alien civilizations that 
validate the communist model as the best possible in the universe etc.) (Cernat 2004iv, 
2005i; Manolescu 2004ii). 
 
The reach and depth of the Mirror-Mechanism 
The importance of the hero-mechanism resides in the fact that, in terms of reach and 
depth, the Communist Party was able to employ it in very diverse forms and locations by 
operating with a different type of hero-image (avatar) for each existent social group.  
 
Children 
Pre-school children live under the horizon of the slogan ÒThe Falcons of the Fatherland 
do a good deed every day!Ó and have to practice their literacy by memorizing popular 
poems such as ÒThe Party is in everything/In those that now are/And those who 
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tomorrow will laugh in the sun/É/In the baby from the cradle and the man whose hair 
turns grey/É../In the life that eternally never dies/ÉÓ (George Lesnea, cited in Cernat 
2005, p.245). First-graders learn the alphabet through poetry, ÒWherever I go/In all I 
feel/ Alongside me you are/Beloved PartyÓ (Spelling-book 1977, cited in Manolescu 
2004ii, p.219), and by navigating through images of the ideal pupil Ð sometimes 
represented as TV character/puppet ÔAşchiuţăÕ - thanking the nation for the education he 
receives diligently (YouTube 2011, February 26).  
In fact, children 3 to 7 of age (the ÔfalconsÕ) are supposed to have as main avatar the 
image of the ÒpioneerÓ: ÒAll the falcons of the fatherland dream of the day when they 
would become pioneersÓ (From the cover of Ôthe Haws of the FatherlandÕ Almanac, 
1988). Basically, for children until 14 years of age the pioneer constitutes the main 
avatar the Party offers (the ÔPioneer orderÕ is one in which only Ôthe bestÕ pupils 7 to 14 
of age are accepted). Pioneers live in a continuous race against time (in and out of 
school) to achieve perfection in self-development, Òthe humanist ideal of Communism,Ó 
by battling Ôthe enemy inside,Õ their ego: ÒHe has to be, by necessity, an athlete of 
absolute performance, of the sublime dream, of self-surpassing, of total devotional 
selflessnessÓ (Cernat 2004iv, p.238). The avatar stretches from the pupil called on not to 
confine himself by modest bourgeois ideals to Òthe sublime species of the pioneer-
saving-heroÓ (saving someone from drowning or rescuing important folklore, for 
example) (idem, p.242), covering an impressive range of qualities, Òabnegation, 
commitment, integrity, anonymous modesty, responsibility, audacity, patriotism, critical 
spirit etc. which must be attained through Ôinstructive exercisesÕ, the self-discovery of 
the youth being equivalent with the discovery of the Guiding-Party in his heart,Ó (p.236) 
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and activities: ÒThe pioneers take care of the forests, cultivate flowers, participate in the 
cleaning of towns, in competitions of artistic creation and interpretationÉ, make 
propaganda to humanity and bring the wayward on the right pathÓ (p.243).  
Youth 
For the adolescent youth, the avatar takes on different forms, in all cases representing an 
arduous journey towards self-actualization in which love combines with initiation into 
the philosophy of class struggle, creating a triangle of love woman/nation/Party, through 
which the hero becomes the embodiment of the ideal Party order in his specific setting.  
If in the first period of Communism, the youth initiate confronts directly with real and 
overwhelming external forces that sometimes lead to martyrdom, in the second period, 
the challenge is mostly of an interior/ascetic nature (although Ôretrograde elements 
persistÕ as elements of context):  
ÒThe bourgeois demon of egoism, a spiritualized and sometimes blas demon tries time 
and again de young aspirant, the communist knight on his initiatory journey to obtain the 
Golden Fleece, the Grail, or the apples from the Hesperides GardenÉHis biggest 
challenge will, of course, be the confrontation with egoism, with individualism, the key 
of all uprooting, of the malignant dissociation from the herd, the ultimate trialÓ 
(Mitchievici 2004i, pp.186-187). More specifically, the journey involves types of avatars 
like, for example, the ones identified to characterize the novel before 1965: Ò1) the 
underground communist fighter without a revolutionary tradition, 2) the young worker 
who comes into contact with the construction site and whose consciousness experiences 
profound transformations, 3) the intellectual of bourgeois origins who converts to 
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socialismÓ (Mitchievici 2004, p.256). Furthermore, these avatars can be broken down 
according to the mythological features that constitute them. The underground communist 
fighter, for example, is constituted according to the following trajectory: Ò1) hard life, 2) 
hunger/thirst for knowledge, 3) initiation into the Party, 4) professional revolutionary, 5) 
heroic deathÓ (Şerban 1997 cited in idem, p.274). 
The Worker 
Forcing a definition, the workersÕ hero is the laborer who continuously exceeds 
production norms and quotas. Normally, at the other end of the spectrum stands the 
saboteur. The humanist ideal is also present here. If the construction site is the place of 
revolutionary change, this refers not only to the production of material things but also to 
the construction of the new man (the communist). This has a number of implications. 
For example, workersÕ theatre brigades having to stage plays about the life of the worker 
assume certain avatar-like roles, one of them being that of the worker-artist: ÒThe actor 
and the proletarian meet each other either in the endless surpassing of norms, or in the 
mimicking of such activities, in a sort of space-time continuumÓ (Mitchievici 2004i, 
p.196). Another consequence is the equivalence drawn between the quality of products 
and the quality of men: a flawed product testifies to a flawed soul. Which also implies 
that Ôthe master,Õ or any other representative of Ôquality control,Õ is able to ÔcorrectÕ not 
only the products but also the mentalities that generated such flawed products. The 
trajectory of the industrial hero is usually the same as for all the other avatars. The 
worker gets tested (cheating in a competition, slacking off or being sidetracked by 
propositions of a sexual nature, and initially fails ideologically by choosing the wrong 
option or side. Through discussion with his tovarisch (usually a model industrial hero) 
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he is brought on the right path and by acknowledging everything in the front of the 
collective (confession = Communist praise) he receives redemption and becomes a true 
communist. With that, production resumes, but at a higher level (idem).  
The Intellectual 
The intellectual is closer to being corrupted or affected by the decadence of the 
bourgeoisie than any other social type. Part of this has to do with the ÔunhealthyÕ class 
origin of the intellectuals and part of it with the fact that art is seen as a symbolic sphere 
constructed to promote the interests of the bourgeoisie: ÒThe bourgeoisie holds a 
powerful symbolic advantage, namely, the art through which it surrounds itselfÉAnd 
exactly here lies the malefic-seductive character of the bourgeois society, in the cult for 
the beautiful, of art for artÕs sake, of decadent aestheticismÓ (Mitchievici 2005i, p.186). 
Aestheticism is rejected (and countered instead with socialist realism) with the onset of 
Communism because it tends to dwell on the self (at the expense of the masses), to 
promote conflicted characters (rather than positive heroes as representatives of the 
masses), and to introduce negative categories associated with nostalgia and defeatism: 
ÒConsequently, nostalgia, backward-looking, melancholy and reverie will become 
trademarks of an intolerable, ÔreactionaryÕ, pessimistic, defeatist attitude, incompatible 
with the lan of the ascending classesÓ (p.172). True recognition of the cause of 
Communism as an unstoppable social revolution (decreed by the Law of History) 
implies vitality, energy, namely, a state of positivism that can be transmitted from the 
intellectual to the masses he serves. In short, what is required is faith, expressed and 
epitomized: ÒIn a teleological way, the novel must be populated with positive, 
exemplary heroes who succeed, because failure will be eradicated from the symbolic 
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economy of the system. Failure hides a defeatist attitude, a lack of trust, it contradicts 
life, codified through victory and proletarian emancipationÓ (p.170). Parallel with this 
rejection of aestheticism as a form of defeatism comes the rejection of another form of 
bourgeois decadence, namely, that of the principle of art for artÕs sake. Non-aligned art 
sits under the sign of decadence. The independence or neutrality of art as a domain is 
condemned as a form of separation from the masses which are identified as the central 
origin of revolutionary consciousness and also as the body through which it flows in its 
pure form: ÒAn intellectual who does not adhere to the high ideals of the people 
contravenes against scientific exigencies themselves. The intellectual betrays his Ôreason 
for beingÕ not only when regimented within the ranks of the reactionary but even then 
when he isolates himself in his ivory tower, because this way, he does not help with the 
preservation of the purity of thinking, but rather sterilizes it, breaking it away from the 
living roots of life and truthÓ (Gheorghiu-Dej 1946, cited in Stanomir 2004ii, p.13). 
Consequently, in Communist mythology, historiography and political imagery Òthe hero 
is, above everything, an individual in permanent contact with the large popular massesÓ 
(Stanomir 2004iii, p.125) a genius that quintessentially represents the best qualities of 
his people. This formula also applies to the avatar of the intellectual. To conclude with 
then, the trajectory of the model intellectual involves a moment of going astray (if of 
healthy social origins) or a state of disease (if of unhealthy social origin) which is 
surpassed with the help of the unlearned from the masses (Ôthe living roots of lifeÕ) or 
through the assistance of fellow-intellectuals who are on the right path, through a 
method that involves self-critique and public confession. Aestheticism can tempt the 
intellectual into decadence, from forms such as nostalgia and defeatism to isolationism, 
mysticism and even open and active cultural resistance. Like in the case of the worker, 
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the saboteur, namely, the Ôideological saboteurÕ, populates the opposite end of the hero-
spectrum (idem, p.137). Ultimately, the mission of the intellectual avatar is to create 
model avatars for all other categories, supposedly not by creating fiction, but by visiting 
factories, construction sites etc. and accurately recording reality so as to construct ideal 
models for specific groups after these have been observed in detail: ÒIn their capacity as 
Ôengineers of the human soulÕ, writers have the Ôobligation and missionÕ to reconfigure 
the subjective world of social actors in such way that these will accept, will align 
themselves with and even aspire to matrixes of identity as these are redefined by the 
ruling powerÉTheoretically, the writer must instill in the soul of each and everyone a 
list of sentiments which embody the moral portrait as this is described in party 
documentsÓ (Lungu 2003, cited in Cernat 2005, p.226).  
The Humane Communist and the MDSS Man 
Superimposed on the transition from oppressive governance towards a period of mild 
relaxation, and marking the transfer of power from Dej to Ceauşescu, a new avatar, that 
of the local party secretary, marks the limits of de-Stalinization in Romania (Stanomir 
2004, p.335): ÒThe district secretary, close to the people, preoccupied with the common 
good, is the first historical avatar of the new manÓ (p.337).  
A path-breaker in theatre and literature ÒPower and TruthÓ, the 1972 play by Titus 
Popovici (who, in partnership with Sergiu Nicolaescu also took a central role as film 
screenwriter) sets the model for how to exorcize previous abuses of Communism. The 
play advances three characters, Stoian (former party prime-secretary), Olariu (former 
chief of ÔThe SecuritateÕ) and Duma (current party prime-secretary) clearly 
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representative of Dej, Drăghici (Chief of Securitate and competitor of Ceauşescu for 
party leadership after the death of Dej) and Ceauşescu himself. OlariuÕs profile serves to 
describe and explain the presence of the abusive ÔSecuristÕ in the early phases of 
Communism. Olariu is undoubtedly devoted to the cause of the people, but in a fanatical 
and mystical way associating party devotion with party protection through the 
extermination of class enemies. Olariu is all emotion and little reason, and despite his 
pure motives, he deserves to lose his position and role in the Party because he has 
betrayed the generous ideals of the Communist Cause (rationality and humaneness) by 
committing abuses in setting up investigations. Similarly, the main difference between 
Stoican and Duma, equally committed to the cause of Communism, is based on the way 
in which they see and treat people: ÒRefusing to view the common man as means rather 
than end, tovarish Duma rediscovers the essence of party humaneness. It is about 
affirming the finality of the project, untarnished by abuses: the happiness of the popular 
massesÓ (idem, p.338). Ultimately, the interaction and dialogue between the current 
Prime-Secretary and his former mentor sets up the new avatar of the democratic Humane 
Communist (ÒComunist de omenieÓ):  
ÒDuma: Where did the break between you and people occur?  
  Stoian: Mind your own business! Who do you think you are enlightening? 
  Duma: I think I know. In the moment when you forgot that man is an entire world, not 
a simple bolt. A destiny and not a file.  
  Stoian: Stop with this gibberish. We do not have the time to explain to every VasileÉ 
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  Duma: Millions of such Vasile, as you call them, follow this party because, beyond the 
constructions, the sites, beyond everything we must do, they know that here something 
more important, something fundamental is being born. For which these people have a 
fabulous word, Humanity. The rule of HumanityÓ (p.339).  
The ÒGolden AgeÓ of the Humane Communist also introduces, in a new form, the 
humanist ideal of the Renaissance man, through the use of a new concept, namely, the 
man of the Òmultilaterally developed socialist societyÓ: ÒThe multilaterally-developed 
man is Ð actually Ð the communist, ÔproletarianizedÕ avatar of the Universal ManÓ 
(Cernat 2004ii, p.385). The ÔMDSS manÕ, the avatar of the common man, is formed as 
the subject constantly at the center of Party policy documents.   
These are some examples, derived from analyses of cultural production during 
Communism, of the types of avatars the hero-mirror mechanism has engendered at 
different points in time. The capacity of the system to regulate the avatars for each social 
group (and across different types and situations) in ways so complex that it becomes 
impossible to decipher and deconstruct them completely is what gives the Communist 
system the appearance of its totalitarian character and what fixes its lasting legacy 
throughout post-communism. At the level of peopleÕs imaginary, the Communist system 
was seen to inhabit everything, from conscience to gesture. And indeed, it tried to do so 
by constantly regulating and adjusting the mechanism of the hero-avatars, their roles and 
relationships, in order to instill certain traits, or inscribe certain messages and modes of 
reaction in the consciousness of different groups, in ways that responded to existent 
challenges at a particular time.  
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Targeted were not only specific age and social groups but also any sort of identity 
profiles that could be rendered accessible to the influence of an avatar: the peasants, 
ethnic groups, women, the ecologists, football club-supporters, parents and children, 
romantic lovers, the rebellious youth, friends, enemies, heretics, the discontent, those 
outside the countryÕs borders, and even the ruling family (Cernat 2004i, p.371). 
Moreover, the mirror-mechanism of the hero was employed not only as a mode of 
structuring cultural production but also as a way of reordering the public space (anyways 
state owned). Alongside cultural avatars that operated through arts, media and policy 
discourses, a flurry of portraits [like the ones with Ceauşescu which covered the walls in 
every office or classroom, or the historically falsified photo that places the presidential 
couple in the middle of a huge anti-Nazi manifestation in 1939 (Stanomir 2005, p.12)], 
statues (like the ones where Ceauşescu is depicted alongside other historical figures 
representing the 2000 years of national history), or other symbols of gigantic heroic 
achievement (such as the ÔPeopleÕs House,Õ now Palace of the Parliament) served as 
visual imagery suggesting the ubiquitous Presence of the Party and its Leader.  
More than an ever-present set of images serving the internalization of a Panopticon like 
outside gaze, the hero-mirror mechanism took on a very personal role as it involved 
discourses together with specific mechanics of the body Ð from oratory, to proceedings 
in party meetings and in festivities [like the manual stories about the pioneer festivity of 
receiving the red tie during which the pupil is pledging: ÒAt this moment now, I commit 
myself to serving endlessly and undeterred, the people, and to always be ready (to serve) 
the cause of the partyÓ (Cernat 2004iv, pp.251-252)], to giant marches of the masses 
carrying and voicing banner-inscribed slogans (for example ÒCeauşescu-
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heroism/Romania-communism!Ó (Manolescu 2004ii, p.217), and, finally, to the 
amazingly complicated mass choreography that marked any national celebration.   
This is how Verdery describes the impact of the celebration of a historical national hero, 
such as Horea (executed on the breaking wheel for his political stance), whose peasant 
uprising from 1784 was seen to prefigure the Communist revolution: 
ÒA third vital element of the festivities was that they showed the stateÕs control over 
Time, not only through displaying its power to control the past (and therefore the 
present) by parading a redefinition of history, but also through proving its capacity to 
expropriate the time and effort of others. The occasion was a magnificent display of the 
stateÕs ability to gather up Time from living persons and redistribute it to the dead. By 
mobilizing the bodies of so many children and parents, who waited for hours in the cold, 
by compelling people to procure rationed flour and sugar and to provide the time and 
labour necessary for making the cakes, together with the hours of drill implied by the 
impressive synchrony of the childrenÕs recitations: by all this, peopleÕs bodies were 
informed of their subservience to a defining power. The celebration quite literally em-
bodied history and subordination as aspects of peopleÕs daily existence. With all this, 
Horea and his connection to power, state and Nation became lodged in these villages and 
schoolchildren at a level more profound than the one touched by their television shows 
or memorized textbooks: he and all he implies were lodged in their very bonesÓ 
(Verdery, 1991 p.242).  
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This is not to suggest that the common communist manÕs soul was inhabited by the 
avatar-like constructions surrounding him, but their presence and circulation was, 
nonetheless, remarkably ubiquitous and continuous.  
 
The Roots of the Mirror Mechanism
40
  
As just shown, the idea of a hero-mirror mechanism operating with different avatars 
results entirely from a combination of readings from the collaborative project of 
ÔExplorări in Comunismul Romnesc, I, II,Õ (which later also included Cernat et al., 
2004i) academic exercise best described as pertaining to the area of Òpost-communist 
cultural studies.Ó Interdisciplinary [Òpolitology, history, anthropology, literary history, 
sociology, ethicsÓ (Cernat et al. 2006, ¦ 28)], focused on unearthing types of cultural 
productions/Communist propaganda largely ÔneglectedÕ or ÔforgottenÕ during post-
communism [literary, quasi-literary and non-literary texts such as Òcomic books or 
presidential discourses, film scripts or Ôbooks of wisdomÕ for pioneers, laudatory texts, 
patriotic and revolutionary poetry, popular novels, new folklore, etc.Ó (Cernat et al. 
2004, Vol. I, p.7)] and with a hermeneutical methodology emphasizing connections with 
the self and the autobiographical, this project can be said to explore the multitude of 
heroes created by propaganda across the diversity of the cultural landscape.  
                                                             
40 The previous section has just explored the reach and depth of the mirror-mechanism. This section 
attempts an archaeology of the mirror-mechanism in order to give more background and a more explicit 
theoretical formulation to a concept that is central throughout the rest of the dissertation. It constitutes a 
necessary detour (because of its length and not because of its topic), but one without which the rest of the 
dissertation could still be read, although at a considerable loss of perspective. It reflects the importance of 
the fact that, at times, a particular moment in the trajectory of research must be considerably expanded 
upon, or zoomed in (to capture a different level of depth to which the proces of knowledge has skipped 
briefly), before proceeding any further.   
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If these are the beginnings of an inchoate idea/hypothesis, its later 
development/confirmation comes from an analysis of cultural discourses in Romanian 
communism revealing the hero-mirror device as a common basic feature and, in fact, as 
the possible depiction of an underlying cultural/governance mechanism. To this extent, 
therefore, the notion of the hero-mirror mechanism appears mostly as an effect of the 
analysis of cultural discourses pertaining to Communist Romania. However, there are 
good reasons for arguing that such a mechanism is confirmed not only at the level of 
Russian Communist culture and, in particular, in its doctrine of socialist realism, but 
also, as an important characteristic of Platonism and of pre-Communist Russian culture. 
Step by step, therefore, this section traces the notion of the mirror-mechanism across 
such domains to a point of origin that is ultimately posited within the realm of religion 
and theology. The importance of this exercise derives from the necessity to understand 
why or how such a mechanism has been so central to Romanian Communism, and also 
as a way of verifying that the hypothesis of the mirror-mechanism is a valid one to 
entertain. Amongst other things, an important implicit comparison is established 
between the Romanian Communist avatars of the mirror-mechanism and the Russian 
ones as seen through their underpinning discourses.  
 
The Mirror-Mechanism and KotkinÕs ÒTheocracyÓ 
It seemed a good idea, as part of an approach that mostly situates the mirror-mechanism 
at the level of cultural discourses and ideology, to commence with something different, 
that is, with an analysis of Stalinist material culture. Exactly such an analysis, based 
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largely on primary sources, is offered by KotkinÕs (1997, p.365) historical reconstruction 
of a utopian project imagined, constructed and administered as a Òreal life Stalinist 
microcosmos,Ó i.e., the city of Magnitogorsk.   
KotkinÕs (p.293) account of the Socialist state reveals a Òbifurcated political systemÓ in 
which party and state agencies constantly parallel and overlap each other. This dualism 
is manifested in the Ònongovernmental yet omnicompetent statusÓ of a Party legally 
listed as a Òpublic organizationÓ but also empowered to lead both party and state 
organizations (p.294). Its origin lies with the central role given to the Party in leading the 
revolution and, soon after, with the 1918 Trotsky-issued practice of having Party 
structures (Òpolitical commissarsÓ) ÔshadowÕ all other state agencies (from the army to 
Òthe judiciary, schools, industry, trade unions, soviets, and governmentÓ) (p.292) in their 
dangerous transition from a bourgeois to a socialist order.  
The question that Kotkin (p.292) poses, and whose answer is of great relevance here is, 
therefore, the following: ÒSoviet Russia had a government, Sovnarkom, and state organs, 
the soviets, so why did it need a parallel structure of party organizations?Ó  
On the one hand, Kotkin (pp.292-293) seems to argue, this dualism had emerged from 
the past practice of ÒshadowingÓ: Òwhereas the stateÕs role was defined in terms of 
competent technical and economic administration, the partyÕs was defined in terms of 
ideological and political guidanceÓ (pp.292-293). On the other hand, ÒshadowingÓ had 
systematized the practice of Òloyalty verificationÓ of personnel designated for key 
appointments in administration, practice that was extended to both industry and the local 
government after 1923 (idem). Dualism played, therefore, an essential role in 
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maintaining and administering an ever-expanding human resource apparatus: ÒUsing the 
nomenklatura mechanism, the party functioned as an ever-expanding personnel machine, 
placing Communists from its appointment lists in positions of responsibility throughout 
industry or government, or requiring those already in such positions to join the partyÓ 
(idem).  
As Kotkin (p.293), observes, however, the reasons for the existence of the Òparty-stateÓ 
dualism went deeper than the need for Ôpolitical guidanceÕ and the practice of 
appointments. As the main carrier of the ideology of the system the party itself had to 
become a body to be organized, trained, disciplined, assessed and examined in certain 
ways and to certain purposes. Naturally, both aspects derived from the practice of 
ÔshadowingÕ mentioned above were increased. The party had to be trained, committed 
and up-to-date with all aspects of ideology and its personnel had to be continuously 
scanned and assessed at each level. In other words, the party, as a body or organization, 
had to be constantly re-formed to meet its ideological role. What then, was its 
ideological role, and what were the practices through which it was being constantly re-
formed?  
 
Partiinost 
The answer Kotkin (p.293) gives to the first part of the question is that the partyÕs role 
was not to replace factory administrations or local governments but to Òimbue such 
bodies with partiinost, or party spirit, by which was meant a historical and political 
understanding derived from ideology.Ó For Kotkin, this is enough reason to refer to the 
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party as a ÒchurchÓ (pp. 296, 337) or Òspiritual guideÓ (p.298) and to the party-state as a 
ÒtheocracyÓ (p.293). In my opinion, Kotkin cannot be faulted for this view. How else to 
make sense, even if transposed in a Western scenario, of a class of managers operating 
on bodies parallel to those of the state, based on a single but extremely prescriptive 
ideology, representing the main or only party in power and its leader, and whose main 
and sole duty is to offer ideological oversight? Nothing could resemble more the dualism 
of a Church-state system.  
In addition, as Ôparty-mindednessÕ or Ôparty-spiritÕ the notion of ÔpartiinostÕ resembles 
more the definition of faith than that of scientific reasoning or of another type of 
rationality. The same stands even if defined as Òthe perception of reality from class 
positionsÓ or as the expressing of views and assessing of events Òin accordance with 
Marxism-LeninismÓ (Loeber 1990, p.93). It cannot be conceived as some type of 
procedural or tacit knowledge because it relies on clear ideological texts. It also cannot 
be conceived as some type of interpretative or hermeneutical exercise (of texts) because 
it relies on an inner predisposition and requirement to anticipate, and on a need to 
reflect, the manner in which ideology is constantly reinterpreted and reinvented at the 
center of the system. In other words, its subject must constantly study, incorporate and 
internalize the ideological interpretations given by the center, or the Ôauthorized 
interpreterÕ of Marxist-Leninist ideology, so as to second-guess, distribute and reflect 
into society at large the specific ideological prescriptions the center itself would have 
allotted to any given situation: ÒEvery citizen, but especially party members, had to 
measure his or her thoughts and actions against the goals and pronouncements of the 
party leadershipÓ (Kotkin 1997, p.294). This uncomfortable and constant tension 
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between loyalty and reason cannot be easily classified as anything else but ÔfaithÕ. That 
ÔpartiinostÕ has been defined as a type of conduct or state of mind that captures or 
accurately reflects the spirit of the party cannot be considered a coincidence. In this 
definition, it must be emphasized, the concept of ÔpartiinostÕ corresponds well to the 
second axis of the mirror-mechanism, which shall be reproduced here in full: Ôthe myth 
of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the Good (-in this 
context, the prescriptions/commandments/principles of the moral/social order elaborated 
by the Party).Õ 
 
Practices of Purification 
However, in order to imbue other bodies with partiinost or party spirit, the party, as one 
body or structure, had to first fully acquire or reflect it. This regulation of the body of the 
party was achieved through procedures that Kotkin describes at large, particularly in the 
case of Magnitogorsk. To be brief, these will be described as the movement of personnel 
alongside the entry-exit dimension characteristic of human resource management. Entry 
into the ranks of the party was a complex procedure which started with a full confession 
regarding oneÕs background and personal history, and one which would be repeatedly 
called upon as a means of checking on oneÕs credentials and future testimonies: ÒA 
prospective member had to be recommended by current members, make a full 
confession of his or her (presumably appropriate) social background and life history, and 
go through an apprenticeship as a ÔcandidateÕ before being welcome into Ôthe ranksÕ and 
taking on the Ôhigh titleÕ of a ÔBolshevikÕ and ÔCommunistÓ (p.295). Once formed, the 
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body of the party had to undergo successive evaluative operations. These were 
conceptualized as operations of ÔpurificationÕ and involved the practices of ÔpurgesÕ 
(ÔchistkiÕ), ÔverificationÕ (ÔproverkaÕ) and Ôself-criticismÕ (ÔsamokritikaÕ). ÒTo maintain 
what was called the ÔpurityÕ (chistota) of the ranks,Ó Kotkin (p.295) for example 
observes, Òperiod ÔpurgesÕ (chistki) were undertaken.Ó It is important to acknowledge 
that Kotkin views these practices both in relation to the city of Magnitogorsk and at the 
general level of Stalinist culture. Similarly, these are conceptualized as distinct practices 
originating from the center of the government, with each corresponding to a particular 
period of time. In the case of Magnitogorsk, the first purge starts in April 1933 and, 
though scheduled to end in November 1933, continues until May 1935 when the first 
ÔverificationÕ takes over. The first verification is completed in the summer of 1935 but 
the whole procedure is restarted at national level by September 1935. This second 
ÔverificationÕ is still ongoing in 1936 when it is replaced by a third type of ÔverificationÕ 
involving Òthe exchange of old party cards for new onesÓ (p.310). This third 
ÔverificationÕ is officially completed by August 1936, but it is soon followed, in 
November, by a campaign of Òvigilance against spies and wreckersÓ (currently referred 
to as a Ôcampaign of terrorÕ or Ôthe terrorÕ) that lasts until the end of 1938. This last 
phase centers, more than the rest, on the internal party practice of Ôself-criticism.Õ  
 
Purges 
The practice of purges is depicted by Kotkin (p.300) as a public form of self-
examination through which the party-member opened himself to the scrutiny of the 
party: ÒOne by one party members were called in front of an ad hoc commission formed 
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by the representatives of local party leaderships. Approaching the front of the room, 
Communists placed their party cards on a red-draped table and, with portraits of the 
partyÕs leaders in the background, recited their political biographies and prepared to 
answer questions. Commission members, occasionally joined by an audience of invited 
Ôparty activistsÕ and the Ônonparty mass,Õ then explored the depths of a CommunistÕs 
political sophistication and sometimes challenged the veracity of the autobiographical 
presentations. ...Moreover, in the buildup to the purge, special receptacles had been 
installed inside all institutions for the collection of signed or more often anonymous 
testimony about the Communists in that organization. No party member could be certain 
of what the commission had managed to find out or might ask. The atmosphere in the 
hall could turn hostile or friendly, depending on the disposition of the commission 
toward the particular party member before it.Ó As a result of this procedure more than 
2000 members, Òpredominantly from the rank and file,Ó were excluded from the 
Magnitogorsk Communist party (p.301). Those expelled from the party but wanting to 
be reinstated, as well a large number of those not expelled, Òwere required to offer 
public acts of repentance, or Ôself-criticismÕ (samokritika)Ó and to undertake serious 
improvement of their political education (p.301).  
 
ÔVerificationÕ 
In terms of its unfolding as an event, the practice of ÔverificationÕ is presented as akin to 
that of the purge, except for its lack of a public audience: ÒAt the interrogation itself, 
which like the purge began with the placement of oneÕs card on the table but unlike the 
purge was without an audience, the questioning could become intense. Statements made 
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by each member during the first verification, the 1933-1934 purge, and other occasions 
were compared, as party membersÕ biographies, and the way they had been previously 
reported, became potential trapsÓ (p.307). However, there were important differences. 
The practice of ÔverificationÕ relied on a much more complex network of information, 
pulling documentation from different periods, diverse organizations and from multiple 
locations, in addition to the knowledge generated locally. It aimed at Òrecord keepingÓ 
(p.302) and it did so by seeking to recapture the entire historical dimension of oneÕs 
biography before and after entry into the party. Secondly, its aims were not only to 
expose and expel Òalien people, deceivers of the partyÓ (First Secretary Khitarov 1935, 
cited in Kotkin 1997, p.308), like in the case of the purge, but also the Òilliterate and 
passive CommunistsÓ (p.309). Unlike the purge, therefore, this practice of ÔpurificationÕ 
also aimed at mobilizing, at instilling a Òrenewed activeness (aktivnost)Ó and at reviving 
the partyÕs spirit, in other words, at increasing the amount of Òinternal party work and 
party mass workÓ (p.309). Last but not least, for party officials the consequences of 
ÔverificationÕ posed the real threat of arrests and imprisonment by the NVKD (the secret 
police).  
 
ÔSelf-criticismÕ 
Such risks were the norm during the campaign for the search of spies and wreckers 
(inside and outside the party) triggered in 1936 first by the Moscow trial of 
ÒoppositionistsÓ such as Trotsky, and then, by the Novosibirsk trial for Òindustrial 
sabotageÓ (pp.311, 316). Here, several aspects merit consideration. Firstly, this 
campaign made central a practice that had already been in use from the time of the first 
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purge, i.e., of Ôself-criticismÕ and employed it wider: ÒTo the Ôdouble-dealersÕ and 
concealed ÔoppositionistsÕ holding party cards were added ÔwreckersÕ and ÔspiesÕ among 
industrial managers and engineers, along with ÔbureaucratsÕ and ÔtoadiesÕ in the party 
apparat who suppressed self-criticism, the all-important weapon for unmaskingÓ (p.332). 
At its core, Ôself-criticismÕ presupposed the offering of a Ôpublic act of repentanceÕ but 
with the aim of disclosing or denouncing an existent but hidden reality. Thus, the 
practice could embody self-criticism as well as the denunciation of others, the idea being 
that the public airing of such matters in party meetings would increase accountability 
and ÒÔunmaskÕ concealed internal enemiesÓ (p.316). To combine personal self-criticism 
with the denunciation of others might seem incongruous, but the distinction fades away 
if we perceive of the actual entity engaged in Ôself-criticismÕ as the collective organism 
of the party. ÒSelf-criticismÓ should be viewed here, therefore, not only as a practice at 
the level of the individual, but really as a practice at the level of the party. KotkinÕs 
(p.328) account reveals how this practice was so revealing of shortcomings that after 
such a party meeting in Magnitogorsk most officials from the city and the regional party 
committee were arrested, with some even being executed. This feeds well into another 
aspect concerning Ôself-criticism,Õ namely, that in the carrying out of this practice the 
party role was overshadowed by that of the NKVD, which, normally from the shadows, 
operated the link between Ôself-criticism,Õ arrests and executions. ÒBy one incomplete 
official reckoning,Ó Kotkin (p.344) reveals, Òin 1937-38 seventy Ôleading officialsÕ in 
Magnitogorsk were executed and another fifty-seven were sent to labor camps. These 
were substantial numbers (a July 1936 list of the top factory management personnel 
(nachalstvo) carried only fifty-four names.Ó In other words, the quest for purification 
was ending in the ÒpartyÕs self-immolationÓ (p.293), i.e., the party itself was being 
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sacrificed as part of the procedure. This aspect is captured well by Kotkin (p.298): 
ÒPredictably, a self-declared vanguard organization that was also a movement founded 
on iron discipline, absolute purity, and supreme personal sacrifice had a difficult time 
remaining true to its own ideals. But try it did, laying the basis for the terror.Ó At this 
point, only one thing remains to be said. According to Kotkin (p.336) the NKVDÕs 
insistence on obtaining confessions Òderived from the nature of the crime the NKVD 
sought to expose and eradicate: counterrevolution.Ó In other words, the crime being 
traced was Òa state of mindÓ opposed to the revolution and which could have or could 
have yet not been expressed into action (p.336). As Kotkin (p.305) also remarks, the 
same argument applies to the practices of purging, verification and self-criticism, all of 
which rely on forms of ÔconfessionÕ to capture Òthe suspectÕs true inner thoughtsÓ as 
somehow Òcontrary to the ÔrevolutionÕÓ (p.336). Kotkin (p.305) finds that through these 
procedures, charges were brought forward Òfor a kind of thought-crime analogous to 
medieval heresyÓ and that this led to a treatment of party members that went well 
beyond that extended to ÔhereticsÕ at the time of the Inquisition (pp.336-337): ÒThe 
imputation of double-dealing would have made no sense in the absence of the partyÕs 
obsession with orthodoxy as well as the appearance of unanimity, an obsession that was 
made operational by StalinÕs relentless drive for power. But orthodoxy and unanimity 
could have become necessary only because the partyÕs authority was based on absolute 
claims, meaning that even a single dissenting voice became dangerous as the potential 
ground for an alternative orthodoxy. Such were the implications of the partyÕs church-
like status which every Communist, especially those who disagreed with specific party 
policies, had to confront, and which almost always elicited their capitulation.Ó Thus, at 
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the end of this line of reasoning, Kotkin identifies the party with the Inquisition and the 
NKVD with the supporting secular arm of the state (idem).   
 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that KotkinÕs account of Stalinist material culture fits well with 
the notion of the mirror mechanism. Envisaged as both a conscience and a model for the 
rest of society, Kotkin constantly refers to the party as a Ôspiritual guideÕ carrying what 
is, ultimately, a purely ideological mission. This is not a metaphor but a characterization 
based on the material and political practice of party-state dualism. Also at this level, the 
party is described as an entity having to undergo certain procedures in order for it to 
attain to that key state of spirit referred to as Ôpartiinost.Õ In other words, the party 
appears as a Logos receiving its ideological mission from on high, be it from the party-
leader or from within the realm of history itself. At the same time, the mandate of the 
party is to distribute this ideological awareness within society at large, so that each and 
all can partake of the same ÔpartiinostÕ and become transformed by it, i.e., become Ônew 
menÕ. The party, therefore it can be said, acts as an intermediary mirror seeking to 
reflect a higher reality onto the plane of human existence. Kotkin acknowledges this 
point while emphasizing how the party itself was constantly overwhelmed by the 
immensity of the task or ideal, which it, however, could not give up. This depiction 
clearly places the party as central to the hero mirror-mechanism. However, the party, 
like also the individual party-member and the common Socialist man, is not simply a 
receptacle into which Ôparty-mindednessÕ flows. The party, as the individual man, must 
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undergo certain continuous procedures and operations in order to develop the capacity to 
mirror such a higher reality. That these practices are referred to as ÔpurificationÕ again 
fits extremely well with the mirror-mechanism. In fact, when analyzed at the level of the 
party as either entity or individual, the practices of Ôpurging,Õ Ôverification,Õ and Ôself-
criticismÕ feature exactly as self-sacrifice, or Ôself-immolation,Õ which clearly 
corresponds to the first axis of the mirror-mechanism: Ôthe myth of the hero [here, the 
party as both an entity and the individual party member], ready to sacrifice everything 
for something greater than himself (People, Party, History).Õ That the notion of 
ÔpartiinostÕ itself corresponds to the second axis of the mirror mechanism has already 
been discussed. Using terms developed in the last chapter of this section and hinted at in 
the methodology section, it could be easily said that while ÔpartiinostÕ corresponds to the 
theological concept of Ôimitatio DeiÕ and thus to the second axis of the mirror-
mechanism, the practices of ÔpurificationÕ correspond to the theological notion of 
ÔkenosisÕ and thus to the first axis of the mechanism. There is, also, another level of 
specificity to add to this. If seen as a Ôpublic form of self-examinationÕ involving Ôpublic 
acts of repentanceÕ the practices of ÔpurgingÕ and Ôself-criticismÕ come pretty close to the 
notion of ÔexomolegesisÕ as discussed by Foucault  (see subsection entitled ÒThe 
Christian Apparatus of Pastoral Power and the Hero-Mirror MechanismÓ of the 
Methodology chapter). In similar manner, Ôverification,Õ and in particular, the emphasis 
on confession that runs through all the practices of purification, fit well with FoucaultÕs 
notion of Ôexagoreeusis.Õ Both the notions of ÔexomolegesisÕ and ÔexagoreeusisÕ feature 
as a model of renunciation of the self that fits, it has been shown, with the first axis of 
the mirror-mechanism and the concept of kenosis. Another way to put his is that the 
three practices of Ôpurging,Õ ÔverificationÕ and Ôself-criticismÕ match closely the key 
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Christian practices of self-examination and confession, which Foucault refers to as 
Ôtechnologies of self.Õ Through such correspondences, and others which can be 
established between the notion of party as Ôspiritual guideÕ and the model of 
Ôpastorship,Õ between ÔpartiinostÕ and the Ômoney-changerÕ metaphor for the constant 
examination of thoughts, or between the function of pastorship as oversight of each and 
all and the inclusiveness of the Communist welfare state, the ÔtheocracyÕ of Kotkin can 
be seen to resemble and fit with the Christian apparatus of pastoral power described by 
Foucault, and, therefore, with the mirror-mechanism.  
 
The Mirror-Mechanism and PlatoÕs Philosophy 
In a sense, similar claims can be advanced in relation to PlatoÕs philosophy although it 
would be hard to suggest that consensus exists in how any part of his work has been 
interpreted. Nevertheless, there are three ways in which the mirror-mechanism could be 
investigated as part of Platonic thought. ÒPlato,Ó as Potolsky (2006, p.15) observes, 
Òprovided the first and unquestionably the most influential account of mimesis.Ó PlatoÕs 
negative account of mimesis and art, however, stems from a certain ontological 
perspective in which all the objects of physical existence are presented as a series of 
more and more imperfect copies of some eternal and unchanging essences, that is, of the 
Forms. Mimesis, as Plato seems to argue, Òreflects Ôsomething that is like the being, but 
is not beingÕ (Plato 1991: 279)Ó (idem, p.23), and, as is the case with the imitation of a 
flute in a painting, contains no knowledge of what is being represented (p.24). The 
problem of mimesis seems to be then that it does not produce intellectual knowledge 
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about the being of what it imitates. This notion of negative reflection, however, has its 
counterpart in a notion of reflection that is positive: ÒOr do you think that someone can 
consort with things he admires without imitating them? I do not. ItÕs impossible. Then 
the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the 
slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human 
being canÓ (Plato 1992, p.174). Different from mimesis, this act of reflection concerns 
the act of intellectual contemplation through which the soul ascends to the realm of 
Ideas and reunites with them, or partakes of their reality, based on an original 
resemblance or ÒkinshipÓ (Louth 2007, p.3). The idea of reflection applies here because 
in the same way in which the physical sun makes it possible for human beings to 
visualize it, the Good makes it possible for the human mind to have knowledge of it: 
ÒWhat the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and 
intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things. 
ÉSo that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is 
the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also the 
object of knowledgeÓ (Plato 1992, p.182). Following on this, it would seem possible to 
argue then, in a language reminiscent of Ficino (2009, p.31), that when the mind 
approaches the light of the Good it becomes illumined with Òdivine blessings,Ó that is, it 
becomes the recipient of (and indeed one with) the virtues or Forms mirroring the Form 
of Good (Louth 2007, p.3).  
It is in relation to these two types of reflection or imitation (negative and positive) and in 
relation to the larger ontological view that makes them possible that the mirror-
mechanism can be envisaged as part of Platonic thought. The connection between 
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Platonic ontology and the notion of reflection is well captured by ClarkÕs (1981, p.146) 
delineation of Òthe Neo-Platonist element in High Stalinist epistemologyÓ: ÒOrdinary 
reality was considered valuable only as it could be seen to reflect some form, or ideal 
essence, found in higher-order reality.Ó However, this begged the question of how one 
world could be elevated into the likeness of the other, or rather, of the type of agency 
that could mediate between these two worlds and effect such a transformation. PlatoÕs 
answer to this problem of ontological mediation is unequivocal. Only the philosopher, 
i.e., the one who has attained to the Sun of Reality via contemplation, is able to bridge 
this ÒcleavageÓ between Òotherworldliness and this-worldlinessÓ (Lovejoy 2001, p.24): 
ÒThe vision of the Good and the Beautiful, of the source of true reality, enables one to 
understand how all true reality fits togetherÓ (Louth 2007, p.15). And from here on, 
bestowing upon the class of philosopher-kings, or guardians, the attributes of Logos is 
just one step away: ÒBut only after the philosopher has contemplated God, who rules the 
heavens, will he, and he alone, be able to rule the earth in god-like fashionÓ (Ficino 
2009, p.31). 
With Plato then, the philosopher-kings become the translators of the divine Forms into 
principles of human governance, and in that sense, the god-like force shaping the human 
world according to the divine pattern. The world in its entirety must mirror the 
consciousness achieved by the class of philosopher-kings, a consciousness supposedly 
mirroring the divine. In this principle, it can be recognized, reside not only the 
foundation of the mirror-mechanism but also the future Leninist notion of the 
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dictatorship of the proletariat41. This constitutes the first claim regarding the connections 
between Platonic thought and the idea of the mirror-mechanism.  
The second claim concerns the figure of Socrates as the actual embodiment of the hero-
mirror mechanism in both its axes. ÒTo escape [evils or injustice], Plato asserts in 
ÔTheaetetus,Õ Òis to become like god so far as is possible and to become like god is to 
become just and holy, together with wisdomÓ (Plato, cited in Sedley 1999, p.312).  As 
Sedley (p.313) argues then, not only is the Òideal of godlikenessÓ central to Platonic 
thought and to the figure of Socrates, but in this case, it consists of mirroring the five 
Òcardinal virtuesÓ of Òjustice, moderation, wisdom, courage, and holiness.Ó This, it will 
be observed, corresponds to the second axis of the mirror-mechanism. As for the first 
axis of the mirror-mechanism, it can be easily distinguished in SocratesÕs decision to 
sacrifice his own life (a sort of Òjudicial sacrificeÓ according to Bloom 1983, mins.15-
16) in the name of philosophy, of following the divine command of his god and of 
promoting the greatest good amongst his fellow-citizens (Plato 1994).  
Last but not least, if following the negative type of reflection discussed by Plato, that is, 
his account of mimesis, we find that ÒThe RepublicÓ employs the mirror device as a 
comprehensive governance mechanism. As Taylor (1999, p.281) observes, PlatoÕs ideal 
state has Òan all-pervasive ideologyÓ which reproduces itself both as the ruling ideology 
and as the ideology legitimizing the Ôaristocratic stateÕ in front of the masses. This 
ideology is inscribed in the system of education that is passed on from generation to 
                                                             
41 ÒAll political decisions are made by the guardians without any reference to the citizen body. The 
guardians, moreover, are neither elected nor removable from office by popular vote. Politically, their 
power is absoluteÉAnd finally the locus of political power is identical with the source of the ideology, 
viz. the intellect of the guardians. The knowledge of the Good which is the most precious possession of 
that intellect determines the content of the ideology, which in turn provides the justification for the power 
which that intellect exercises via its knowledge of how Good is to be realizedÓ (Taylor 1999, pp.281-282). 
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generation and despite their absolute power, the guardians themselves are Òunder an 
absolute moral obligation not to allow any deviationÓ from it. This is so, Taylor explains 
(p.282), because Òinnovations in music and poetry (i.e. in education) gradually spread to 
affect peopleÕs character and behaviour, their personal relations, and finally laws and 
constitutional forms Ôuntil in the end they overthrow everything both public and privateÕ 
(424d-e).Ó What Taylor (1999) fails to mention, however, is that the mechanism through 
which artistic or educational innovation can result in the demise of the aristocratic state 
(and the best form of human government) is one based on mimesis: ÒBoth discussions of 
mimesis in the Republic begin by defining and criticizing artistic mimesis, but end with 
considerations about the safety of the republic and the ÔregimeÕ of the soulÓ (Potolsky 
2006, pp.27-28). PlatoÕs specific discussions of mimesis concern the artistic image, 
poetry, the telling of stories, the education of the youth and the impact of tragedy, but 
when taken together these are taken to impact the very Ònature of humanityÓ (idem, 
p.29) and of human society. Why then, is mimesis Òa danger to the republicÓ (idem)? At 
a general level, this has to do with the definition of mimesis as a negative type of 
reflection or imitation. Mimesis emphasizes pleasure and the emotional at the expense of 
reason, the false over the true, appearance over the real, the excessive over the ordered, 
and the unnecessary over the essential (idem pp.18, 20). Its danger resides in its drug-
like Òpower to circumvent reasonÓ and to turn Òethical training into a matter of 
automatic and unthinking imitation rather than rational choiceÓ (p.20). Artistic images, 
for example, present only Òthe physical appearances of things, not their rational truthÓ 
and appeal to our senses rather than to reason, thus introducing confusion in the soul 
(pp.22, 28). Moreover, they direct the soul towards appearances and away from the real: 
ÒA mirror reflection might prompt you to look at the thing being reflected; an imitation 
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keeps your eyes on the copy aloneÓ (Pappas 2012, 4. Imitation, Inspiration, Beauty, 
para. 1). On the other hand, mimetic narrators (imitating Òthe character in voice or 
gestureÓ) or poets, as well as actors, are inherently liars hiding their true character 
behind someoneÕs else, and thus opening up possibilities for deception (Potolsky 2006, 
pp.20-21). Moreover, through imitation, they Òtake on the qualities of the characters they 
describe,Ó which results in the fragmentation of their own personalities (pp.21, 28). This 
line of thinking continues with stories, where Plato maintains that Òartistic imitation 
inevitably begets behavioural imitationÓ reason for which children (the future guardians) 
should have access only to certain Òapproved talesÓ and forms of behavior (p.19). 
Finally, tragedy has it in its nature to encourage audiences to identify with emotion and 
suffering: ÒIt is easier to imitate violent emotion than rational contemplation. Emotion is 
noisy and visible, while the prudent individual is difficult to understand from without. 
Much as the painter imitates what a couch looks like rather than what it is, so tragedy 
only shows what human character looks like from the outsideÓ (pp.26-27). Tragedy stirs 
the emotions and by allowing the audience to suffer Òalong with the heroÓ it produces 
amidst its ranks both Òsympathetic imitationsÓ of the hero and the pleasure of expressing 
emotion in the context of everyday life (p.27). This creates imbalance and division in the 
soul, for Ò[r]ather than being ruled by reason, we are now ruled by emotion,Ó and that 
constitutes a major threat to the city: ÒAnd if you admit the sweetened muse in lyrics or 
epics, pleasure and pain will jointly be kings in your city instead of law and that 
argument which in each instance is best in the opinion of the communityÓ (Plato 1991, 
cited in idem).    
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Such are the dangers of mimesis described above that Socrates responds to them Òwith 
political actsÓ such as Òofficial censorship and exileÓ (p.27).  It follows then that ÒPlatoÕs 
theory of mimesis,Ó as Potolsky (p.29) correctly observes, Òis very much a theory of 
political lifeÓ based on the notion that Òpolitical power lies in the control of images.Ó In 
other words, Platonic mimesis has not only an exclusionary function, of censorship, 
banishment and exile, but also, and more essentially, a constitutive one. The aristocratic 
state, it can therefore be affirmed, is based in its mode of governance (and ideology) on 
the regulation of mimesis. It relies heavily on a mechanism which extracts or 
manufactures certain types of images to be circulated and mirrored within society, while 
editing, banning and censoring others: ÒSocrates wants to control both the subject of the 
tales, and the way (and by whom) they are told (p.19).Ó Nothing could come closer than 
this to the notion of the mirror-device and its acting as a governance mechanism.  
 
The Origin of the Mirror-Mechanism in Communism and in Russian Culture 
Through the idea of mimesis, the mirror mechanism links to the entire history of 
Western thought, both in terms of philosophy and art. However, despite the usefulness 
of these larger considerations in relation to philosophy, art and religion, the more 
fundamental question remains unaddressed: what is the origin of the mirror-mechanism 
in Communism? Or, put another way, why did the mirror-mechanism resurface as a 
central governance mechanism during Communism? Why did a Communist system 
select a cultural mechanism borrowed from religion and Platonic theory as its key mode 
of governance?   
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By Ôcultural mechanismÕ I refer here to the mirroring device through which the regular 
individual partakes of the divine qualities of the Logos/Absolute in order to become in 
its image (conversion) and thus become engaged in the building of a new civilization 
that will reflect the divine pattern. This is easily understood in terms of Christ and 
Christianity, but has also been indirectly applied to the Communist Party through the 
notion of Òimpersonal charismaÓ: ÒCharisma is typically associated with a saint or with a 
knight, some personal attribution, and what Lenin did was remarkable. He did exactly 
what he claimed to do: he created a party of a new type. He made the party charismatic. 
People died for the party. ItÕs as if people would die for the DMV. Most people donÕt get 
too excited about the Department of Motor Vehicles because itÕs a bureaucracyÓ (Jowitt 
2000, ¦ 5). What Jowitt is referring to, of course, is LeninÕs drastic distinction between 
the party and the proletariat, which led to the Leninist principle of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. The proletariat, Lenin affirmed, could only receive a revolutionary 
consciousness from the party. This idea that without the party, the proletariat could 
never advance beyond a bourgeois consciousness, that Òa spontaneous workersÕ 
movementÓ was Òincapable of developing a socialist consciousness,Ó Òthat the interests 
and aims of a social class, the proletariat, can and indeed must be determined without 
that class having a say in the matter,Ó (Kolakowski 2005, pp.668-669) was a radical 
departure from Marx. From the notion of a Òvanguard, leading the working class and 
imbuing it with socialist consciousness,Ó the party soon proclaimed itself the sole 
repository of consciousness, a sort of Logos whose total acceptance by the proletariat 
implied a divine type of charisma (this corresponds to VicoÕs image on page 166). From 
this point of view, the mirror-mechanism can be thought of as the device through which 
charisma was being bestowed upon the party (no such device is mentioned by Jowitt). In 
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Platonic terms, Lenin had identified the Party and its consciousness as the ontological 
mediator between Ôhigher-order realityÕ and Ôordinary reality.Õ With LeninÕs ÒWhat Is to 
Be Done?Ó (1901), the party elite had come to replace the class of Òguardians.Ó 
This can be expressed another way. If the Party is responsible for bestowing 
consciousness on the proletariat that means that the act of governance requires by very 
definition the shaping of collective consciousness. For governance to work through the 
altering of consciousness some type of cultural mechanism must be presumed. The 
mirror-mechanism, it is claimed here, can be understood as that presumed cultural 
mechanism.  
In general terms then, the origin of the mirror-mechanism (or the immediate reason for 
its re-emergence during RussiaÕs Communist period) lies with LeninÕs refashioning of 
the role of the party, i.e., with his concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, 
the matter is not all that simple, as what guides the formulation and functioning of the 
hero-mirror mechanism, throughout its many phases and through its manifold features, is 
a tapestry of influences that relate to Russian culture as a whole. In this sense, what is 
needed for uncovering the hero-mirror mechanism is an archaeology at the level of 
Russian socialist culture.   
The following is my attempt to provide a limited archaeology42 of the hero-mirror 
mechanism in the Russian cultural space by recourse to three bodies of work dealing 
                                                             
42 I do not intend to refer here to FoucaultÕs archeology, which is both a specific methodology and a 
historical discourse in itself. This chapter, as discussed in the Methodology section, relies on a 
methodology distinctly opposed to that of Foucauldian archeology, meaning, that of the history of ideas. 
The metaphorical use of the term ÔarchaeologyÕ is apt here because it refers to the surveying of books and 
themes as the surveying of layers in continuous succession and linkage with each other, and also because 
the search attempted concerns a point of origin.   
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with the question of Socialist Realism. In chronological order these are, ÒThe Soviet 
Novel Ð History as RitualÓ (1981) by Katerina Clark, ÒThe Total Art of StalinismÓ 
(1988) by Boris Groys, and ÒThe Cultural Origins of the Socialist Realist Aesthetic 
1890-1934Ó (1999) by Irina Gutkin.  
The assumption underpinning this discussion is that the hero-mirror mechanism of 
Russian origin becomes more and more visible in the Romanian cultural space with the 
onset of the Communist period. This assumption seems justified judging by 
resemblances in the literary conventions of Socialist Realism in the works of Clark 
(1981) and Negrici (2010), but until the emergence of literary (or cultural) research that 
closely compares the two traditions, its validation remains in question. Even if refusing 
to acknowledge such an assumption, however, the following discussion of the roots of 
the mirror-mechanism in the Soviet space has the merit of expanding and adding 
concreteness to the general idea that the mechanism had originated with Leninist 
thought. This could be useful provided that the functioning of the mirror-mechanism in 
the cultural space of Romanian Communism cannot be entirely dissociated from the 
logic and manifestations of the same device in Soviet culture.  
 
The Hero-Mirror Mechanism and ClarkÕs ÒMaster-PlotÓ 
Although not a source of inspiration, the work of Clark (1981) on the Soviet novel has 
more in common with this thesis than almost any other work encountered. This is so for 
two main reasons. Firstly, both exercises attempt to isolate, via an inductive 
methodology that is at best quasi-structuralist, some type of pattern or mechanism as 
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central to Communist culture/politics. Secondly, because in both cases the 
argumentation proceeds by an examination of how diverse reflections of this pattern 
succeed themselves almost continuously in the field of culture during Communism. 
While both works look at Ôtexts,Õ it is in relation to the object of study and the optic 
adopted that difference sets in. Whereas ClarkÕs work looks at novels from a perspective 
that situates the plot as the essential feature of the text, this study examines cultural 
discourses in a manner that emphasizes character over plot. What is it then, that a study 
of the plot could tell us about a study of character? Could it be possible that one would 
confirm the other?  
In what follows, the discussion of ClarkÕs study of the novel will follow the pattern set 
out in her book: firstly, the notion of the Ômaster-plotÕ will be delineated, and secondly, 
this notion will be discussed in terms of different phases/periods in the historical 
development of the Russian novel.  
 
ÒThe biographical patternÓ 
Clark (1981, pp.3-50) defines socialist realism pragmatically as Òa canonical doctrine 
defined by its patristic textsÓ and then proceeds to construct Òa single master plotÓ based 
on the commonalities of plot extracted from the Òofficial ÔmodelÕ novelsÓ of the Socialist 
era. This effort results in the identification of two points of convergence, which 
essentially give the structure of the Òmaster-plot.Ó The first aspect that Clark (p.44) 
identifies as a common feature of most canonical works is Òthe informing scheme of 
human biography that underlies each work and has its roots in Marxist-Leninist 
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historiography and revolutionary lore.Ó The Socialist novel, Clark thus argues, revolves 
around the unfolding biography of some kind of positive hero. However, this type of 
biography is of a very specific type. In it, the ÒSocialist Realist heroÉ is actually so 
deindividualized that he seems closer to a figure in one of the various genres of the Old 
Russian written tradition that tell the virtues of some positive figure (p.47).Ó ÒHis 
image,Ó Clark (idem) maintains, Òis reminiscent not only of hagiography, which tells of 
a saintÕs religious virtue as illumined in his life,Ó but also of the Òsecular virtues of 
princesÓ documented by the chronicles of old, and, as such, it appears to function simply 
as the illustration of a set of fixed standards about what constitutes the ideal human life: 
ÒWhether the text told of a saint or a princeÉ[i]f actual historical figures were chosen as 
subjects, the details of their lives were pruned, embellished, or even ignored in order to 
make the subject fit the conventional patterns of the virtuous life.Ó The point that Clark 
(p.50) is trying to make here is that the scheme of human biography in the Socialist 
Realist novel is so ÒformalizedÓ that its heroes attain an Òessential timeless guiseÓ and 
become the embodiments of myth. In other words, ÔdeindividualizationÕ in the Soviet 
novel produces a type of description in which heroes are ÒdepersonalizedÓ and Òreduced 
to a function of their rolesÓ which, in turn, elevates these ÒrolesÓ into the realm of myth 
or legend, arranging them into a kind of archetypal pattern (p.58). And as Clark 
suggests, when these ÒrolesÓ are viewed in their unfolding, that is, as a sequence of 
Òformulaic phasesÓ of the plot (p.11), the biographical pattern reveals the formula of the 
master-plot (p.44). 
That the Socialist Realist novel produces such a biographical pattern can be related to 
three causal factors mentioned by Clark. The first has to do with the Socialist ideal to 
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produce a literature both internationally recognized and accessible to the masses (p.42), 
that is, a Òpopular,Ó at most Òmiddlebrow,Ó type of literature (p.xi). The wish to create a 
Òliterature of essential essences, accessible to all,Ó then, is one factor responsible for the 
mythical, parable-like structure of the biographical pattern (pp.36-37). The second factor 
relates to the Òmodal schizophreniaÓ of the Soviet novel, which Clark (p.37) defines as 
Òits proclivity for making sudden, unmotivated transitions from realistic discourse to the 
mythic or utopian.Ó Here, the Neo-Platonism of Stalinist epistemology, with its demand 
that Òevery event of the present timeÓ derive its significance from Òidentification with a 
moment either from the official Heroic Age or from the Great and Glorious Future,Ó acts 
as another source of the biographical pattern: ÒFictional, historical, and actual 
experience were homogenized insofar as they all tended to be refracted through the lens 
of myth to form one of the archetypal patternsÓ (p.40). Finally, the last factor concerns 
the main ideological source for the plot in a Communist society. As Clark (pp.9-10) 
observes, the Soviet novel works Òas a sort of parable for the working-out of Marxism-
Leninism in historyÓ with the life of the positive hero recapitulating Òthe stages of 
historical progress as described in Marxist-Leninist theory.Ó Here, the Marxist-Leninist 
vision of historical progress selected to structure the Socialist novel is a specific one: not 
Òthe transition É from a class society through proletarian hegemony and on into that 
ultimate state, the classless society, i.e., communismÓ but Òthe working-out of the so 
called spontaneity/consciousness dialecticÓ at the level of individual biography (p.15).  
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The spontaneity/consciousness dialectic 
Together with the Ôscheme of human biographyÓ this dialectic constitutes the second 
point of convergence between the canonical works of Socialist Realism, and as such, 
forms the second essential feature structuring the master-plot. In Leninist terms, 
historical progress is driven by Òa dialectical struggle between the forces of 
ÔspontaneityÕ (which predominate in the earliest, most primitive social forms) and the 
forces of ÔconsciousnessÕ (which are present from the very beginning, although largely 
only as a potential)Ó (p.16). This process takes the form of successive Òhigher-order 
syntheses (Ôleaps forward,Õ or revolutions) resulting in ever-higher forms of both 
ÔspontaneityÕ and Ôconsciousness,ÕÓ until Òa final synthesis, which resolves the dialectic 
once and for allÓ is reached at (idem). In this final stage, ÒconsciousnessÓ triumphs but 
in a form in which it is no longer Òin opposition to ÔspontaneityÕÓ and Òthe age-old 
conflict between the individual and societyÓ is resolved (idem). The Soviet novel, as 
Clark argues, is shaped by this view of historical progress, which is, nonetheless, 
expressed in individual and not in class terms. In relation to the master-plot then, the 
Ôspontaneity/consciousness dialecticÕ refers to the individual (human being) being 
portrayed as moving from a state of spontaneity (Òwillful, anarchic or self-centeredÓ 
self/actions) to one of consciousness (a state of Òpolitical awareness and complete self-
controlÓ in which Òthe hero achieves greater harmony both within himself and in relation 
to societyÓ). This is summarized by Clark (pp.16-17) as follows: ÒThe great historical 
drama of struggle between the forces of spontaneity and the forces of consciousness is 
unfolded in a tale of the way one individual mastered his willful self, became 
disciplined, and attained to an extrapersonal identity (pp.16-17).Ó Ò[T]he Socialist 
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Realist novel,Ó it can thus be concluded, Òmight in effect be seen as a politicized version 
of a Bildungsroman (idem).Ó   
In relation to this dialectic, Clark develops two interrelated discussions, both essential to 
the master-plot and both revolving around the issue of terminology. Here, Clark (pp.17, 
20) starts by noting that the spontaneity/consciousness binary emerged in Òthe 
voluntarist/determinist controversyÓ (the question of whether historical change is 
effected by ÒnecessityÓ/Ótranspersonal forcesÓ or Òdeliberate actionsÓ/Óself-
consciousnessÓ) of the first Russian Marxist groups. The question of how a Communist 
revolution could be achieved in a predominantly agrarian country like Russia was, of 
course, answered by Lenin in 1902 with the Òdoctrine of the vanguardÓ (p.18). Lenin 
himself believed that in time, after the revolution and after the masses had become more 
Ôconscious,Õ the vanguard of the proletariat as well as the state would Òprogressively 
Ôwither awayÕ as Marx had stipulatedÓ (pp.18-19). This never materialized and by the 
time of Stalin in the 1930s (when the master-plot becomes formed), the party had started 
to face uneasy questions about this from Òdetractors in the left-wing movementÓ (p.19). 
The function of ÒapologistÓ for the Party befell the domain of literature and this led to 
the spontaneity/consciousness dialectic being introduced in the master-plot: Òinstead of 
providing edifying tales about the class struggle, official Soviet literature generated 
myths for rationalizing the Bolshevik position in the perennial radical controversy over 
the roles of consciousness and spontaneity in history. ...The Socialist Realist tradition 
began with parables (such as Mother) illustrating the workings of the 
spontaneity/consciousness dialectic, but, under Stalin, extra conventions were added to 
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the master plot so that it also affirmed symbolically that the progress to communism was 
specifically assured under the present Soviet leadershipÓ (p.19).  
Nevertheless, Clark warns, one should not give undue weight to this single view, as the 
reasons for the structure of the master-plot can be both political and cultural in nature. 
LeninÕs depiction of the dialectic of historical progress as structured around the two 
poles of spontaneity and consciousness, while relying on the conceptual vocabulary of 
the early Russian Marxists (1890s), does not exist as such in Marxism (where the 
dialectic is envisaged as one of ÒfreedomÓ vs. ÒnecessityÓ). This change in terminology, 
Clark (pp.20-21) argues, shows that Marxist ideology could not escape being ÒcoloredÓ 
by Russian culture and, thus, becoming Òmore and more the ideology characterizing a 
certain branch of the Russian radical intelligentsia.Ó While the term ÒsoznatelÕnostÕÓ 
(consciousness) related to oneÕs conscience and Òcould hence be associated with the 
intelligentsiaÕs tradition of assuming the role of Russian societyÕs conscience,Ó 
ÓstixijinostÕÓ (spontaneity) referred to the Òelemental,Ó both as Òwild, uncontrollable 
ÔforcesÕÓ (human or otherwise) or as something ÒnaturalÓ (not artificial) and therefore, 
ÒgoodÓ (pp.21-22). When these two terms were put together, the resulting binomial 
structure came to represent not only Òthe existential dilemmas of the Russian 
intelligentsiaÓ but also Òone of the key binary oppositions in Russian culture, 
comparable to, for instance, the ideal/real opposition in Scholasticism or the 
subject/object distinction in the nineteenth-century German thoughtÓ (idem): ÒThe 
opposition suggests, for instance, that much-celebrated gulf in Russia between the vast, 
uneducated peasant masses (the ÔspontaneousÕ) and the educated elite (the ÔconsciousÕ) 
or, to put it slightly differently, between backward rural Russia (the realm of 
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ÔspontaneityÕ) and modern urban Russia (the realm of ÔconsciousnessÕ), or, again, 
between those seething masses, capable of spontaneous popular uprisings, and the 
autocratic, heavily bureaucratized, and hierarchical state, which seeks to control these 
masses and direct them. The spontaneity/consciousness opposition can also be seen as a 
schematization of some aspects of the old Slavophile versus Westerner controversy, i.e., 
the question whether the way forward for Russia could be found in Western models and 
ideas, in bringing reason, organization, order, and technology to this backward, anarchic 
country, or whether Western civilization was sterile and spiritually impoverished as 
compared with the native Russian or Slavic ethos, which was antirational, spontaneous, 
instinctive, perhaps even antiurban and against state order.Ó 
 
The mirror-mechanism and the general definition of the Òmaster-plotÓ 
Having discussed both Òthe biographical patternÓ and the Òspontaneity/consciousness 
dialectic,Ó we are now able to relate to the definition that Clark (p.16) gives to the 
master-plot: ÒAs is generally true of ritual forms, the master plot personalizes the 
general processes outlined in Marxist-Leninist historiography by encoding them in 
biographical terms: the positive hero passes in stages from a stage of relative 
ÔspontaneityÕ to a higher degree of Ôconsciousness,Õ which he attains by some individual 
revolution.Ó The same discussion of these two terms also illuminates some of ClarkÕs 
major claims about the importance of the Òmaster-plot,Ó as well as acting as a platform 
for evaluating if any correspondences can be established with the notion of the mirror-
mechanism.  
 
 
209 
Clarks makes four important claims in relation to the Òmaster-plotÓ: 1) that its main 
function is similar to that of a ritual (p.9), that one can in fact identify it with Socialist 
Realism, i.e., Òin order for a Soviet novel to be Socialist Realist, it must replicate the 
master plotÓ (p.6), that more than just the result of Leninist/Marxist discourse, it 
represents Òthe literary expression of the master categories that organize the entire 
cultureÓ (p.14), and finally, that, as a cultural formation, it antedates the emergence of 
the official discourse of Socialist Realism (Òthe pre-Stalinist novels which became the 
cornerstone of Socialist RealismÓ being published before the end of 1927, that is, much 
before the 1932-1934 period of administrative centralization of Soviet literature) (p.43).    
 Already at this general level some important similarities can be established between the 
Òmaster-plotÓ and the mirror-mechanism.  
It is a striking coincidence that both the mirror-mechanism and the Òmaster-plotÓ (here 
particularly with regard to the spontaneity/consciousness dialectic) are identified as 
having their Communist origin in LeninÕs introduction of the notion of the Ôvanguard of 
the proletariatÕ (or his version of Ôthe dictatorship of the proletariatÕ). If in the case of the 
mirror-mechanism, the notion of the ÒvanguardÓ had granted the Party the Logos-like 
function of bestowing ÒconsciousnessÓ on the proletariat, in the case of Òthe master-plotÓ 
this is taken even further.  The process of bestowing consciousness on the proletariat is 
dominated by the Party actually transmitting this very exact vision of its own special 
role in history. This occurs subtly by the adoption of the concept justifying the Party 
elite at the level of Marxist/Leninist theory, i.e., the spontaneity/consciousness dialectic, 
into the structure of the Socialist Realist novel. Thus, the Soviet novel becomes a ritual-
like literary illustration of the doctrine of the ÒvanguardÓ in everyday life, that is, of the 
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PartyÕs constant function in the binary opposition between spontaneity and 
consciousness. The notion of the ÒvanguardÓ is, thus, not only the theoretical standpoint 
that provides the Party with a Logos-like function, but also the very image constantly 
produced for the imagination of the masses via the medium of the novel, in this case, by 
providing a biographical tale about an individual moving from ÒspontaneityÓ to 
ÒconsciousnessÓ under the guidance of the Party. All of this stands in agreement with the 
idea of the mirror-mechanism as a governance mechanism.  
The scheme of human biography, by producing such a deindividualized, depersonalized 
hero, reveals the persistence, in the structure of the Socialist Realist novel, of a 
formulaic set of fixed characteristics and roles associated with the virtuous profile of a 
mythical hero. Behind the protagonist of every Socialist Realist novel, therefore, lies an 
archetypal pattern. The formulaic hero betrays the presence of the archetype. In the end, 
what the Socialist Realist novel creates is not so much characters as avatars, that is, 
images of a central archetype. If the Òmaster-plotÓ can be viewed as an archetypal 
pattern operating with avatars alongside a mythical/heroic dimension, then what can be 
distinguished in it is the mirror-mechanism. Moreover, it can also be said here that the 
scheme of human biography enforces the first axis of the mirror-mechanism. 
The Socialist Realist hero is on a path of transformation that sees him move from 
ÔspontaneityÕ to Ôconsciousness.Õ At the end of the novel, therefore, ÔconsciousnessÕ is 
bestowed not only upon the main character, but also more essentially, on the reader. 
Inasmuch as ÔconsciousnessÕ signifies a kind of political awareness that is also ethical 
and metaphysical, that is, a state in which the hero has found his true self (i.e., an 
Ôextrapersonal identityÕ) by achieving harmony with society (nature or the cosmos), it 
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can be said that the Ôspontaneity/consciousnessÕ dialectic corresponds to the second axis 
of the mirror-mechanism. Surely, that the two axes connect in the central image of the 
hero is confirmed by the fact that attainment of consciousness (harmony with the cause 
of social progress, and also self-transcendence) generally implies some form of 
Òsymbolic deathÓ if not, in fact, the motif of martyrdom (pp.179-181).  
 
The mirror mechanism and the historical development of the Socialist Realist novel 
Both in terms of its Leninist origin, and its two essential components then, the master-
plot can be seen to resemble or confirm the model of the mirror-mechanism. If this is 
true, both the specific permutations of elements triggered by the historical development 
of the Socialist Realist novel in the master-plot, as well as the other potential sources for 
its origin, are of interest to the archaeology of the mirror-mechanism. The cursory 
description of these elements will follow the historical development of the Socialist 
Realist novel according to the stages envisaged by Clark.  
 
Pre-revolutionary fiction 
That literature Òmust have more than aesthetic significanceÓ and Òthe search for a 
Ôpositive heroÕÓ (p.251) that Òshould be Ôtypical,Õ should exemplify moral and political 
(or religious) virtue, and should show the Ôway forwardÕ for RussiaÓ (p.46), are themes 
rooted in the great tradition of Russian literature from the 19th century (see Dostoevsky, 
Tolstoy etc.). Nevertheless, the Socialist Realist positive hero seems to be modeled more 
after the medieval texts documenting the life of a saint (hagiography) or a prince 
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according to a fixed, formulaic pattern (pp.46-48). Another influential strand, 19th 
century radical fiction (Chersyshevsky) was also modeled after religious writings and in 
it Ò[m]inimally, the revolutionary hero was expected to lead an ascetic life of 
extraordinary dedication and self-deprivationÓ (p.49). Nevertheless, because it was Òtoo 
novelistic,Ó lacked a totalizing view of history, and its characters were not sufficiently 
deindividualized, pre-Bolshevik fiction never became hagiographic. It did not influence 
the Socialist Realist novel as a model but it provided it with three Òsymbolic patterns:Ó 
the idea of a political movement being envisaged as a Òfamily,Ó the conversion pattern 
acted out by a master/disciple relationship, and the theme of martyrdom (pp.49-52).  
 
Key sources of the master-plot (1906-1927) 
The three exemplars, which together give the structure of the master-plot, are GorkyÕs 
ÒMotherÓ (1906), GladkovÕs ÒCementÓ (1925) and FurmanovÕs ÒChapaevÓ (1923). 
ÒMotherÓ is hagiographic, that is, the positive hero resembles the image of the saint or 
prince in that it is depersonalized or sketched through Òsparse, formulaic detailsÓ: 
ÒLoving Christ [cf. revolution], loving towards his brothers, fair of face, with shining 
[svetly] eyes, and a stern [grozny] countenance, extraordinarily brave, good-natured 
[alternative translations of this epithet Ð serdcem legy Ð include ÔopenÕ and ÔsimpleÕ in 
the positive sense], good  [laskovy] to his men [actually, ÔretainersÕ], majestic, strong in 
mind, stands for truth, keeps himself pure in body and soulÓ (pp.58-59). ÒMotherÓ 
corresponds to GorkyÕs ÒGod-BuildingÓ period and as such it clearly interprets 
ÒconsciousnessÓ as enlightenment (p.66). Martyrdom, as well as the master/disciple 
pattern in the achievement of consciousness, is present here.  
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Unlike Òthe static, icon-like image of the revolutionary in MotherÓ embodying 
Òconsciousness,Ó ÒCementÓ portrays a ÒdynamicÓ hero, all energy and action (p.66), a 
ÒwarriorÓ achieving Òfantastic featsÓ through his enormous powers of will (pp.73-75). In 
this regards, the hero of ÒCementÓ is modeled after the image of the Òbogatyr,Ó i.e., of 
the Òmythical knight of the Russian oral epic or bylina,Ó and constitutes an emblem of 
the forces of Òspontaneity.Ó While later criticized for being too ÒanarchicalÓ and lacking 
the guidance of a master, CementÕs positive hero nevertheless constitutes the model for 
the Soviet novels of the 1930s and 1940s.  
ÒChapaevÓ very much resembles the plot of ÒMotherÓ except that its hero starts as 
Òspontaneity incarnate,Ó and then, with the aid of a master, moves towards attaining 
ÒconsciousnessÓ (p.86). In effect, this provides not only a Òformula for combining the 
different hero types of Mother and CementÓ but also a modality by which to solve the 
spontaneity/consciousness dialectic at the level of the plot (p.86). The Òmaster-plot,Ó 
therefore, originates at this junction between ÒMotherÓ, ÒCementÓ and ÒChapaevÓ 
(idem).  
 
The first period of High Stalinism (1928-1931) 
The time of intense industrialization and collectivization under the Five-Year Plan, this 
period is marked by a Òvision of industrial utopiaÓ which saw all aspects of life as 
Òsubsumed under ... the myth of industrialization.Ó Consequently, the machine became 
the main metaphor for society (one of order, progress, planning, control, technology and 
practical reason and in which enlightenment would be equally distributed all over the 
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land, thus bridging the gap between the urban and the rural areas), and this led to all 
individuals being portrayed as parts of the same Ògreater whole Ð the machine,Ó and as 
brothers united Òfor an all-out industrial effortÓ (pp.95-98). There was a cult of the Ôlittle 
man,Õ of the everyday, of the prosaic, the practical taskÓ (p.91) and the literature 
produced was Òantiheroic, and mired in facts and statistics,Ó corresponding to the 
RAPPÕs Òproletarian realismÓ and to a Òpositivist ageÓ (p.34).  
 
The second part of High-Stalinism (1931-1944) 
An important theme of the Five-Year Plan was Òthe struggle with natureÓ in which Ôthe 
machineÕ (i.e., technology) was to triumph over elemental forces (pp.100-101). The 
wave of reaction against the plan triggered by Stalin himself in 1931 replaced this 
scheme with Òan epic struggle between man and the elements in which the machine 
often played no greater role than that of the trusty steed in a bylinaÓ (p.101). The 
metaphor of the machine was thus supplanted with that of nature in two acceptations: as 
Òa struggle with elemental forcesÓ which, if won over through the power of will, would 
lead back to nature as a Ògarden of harmonyÓ (pp.105, 111). With the demise of the 
machine, the ideal of a society of ÒbrothersÓ or Òlittle menÓ working in harmony (a 
horizontal mode of kinship), was replaced with the ÒStalinist myth of the great family,Ó 
a vertical mode of kinship in which ÒSoviet societyÕs leaders became ÔfathersÕ (with 
Stalin as the patriarch); the national heroes, model Ôsons; the state, a ÔfamilyÕ or ÔtribeÕÓ 
(p.116). This had a double impact. On the one hand, a literature about Òlittle menÓ was 
replaced with a literature about ÒfathersÓ and ÒsonsÓ (p.129). On the other hand, the 
vertical mode of kinship led to an interest in differences between generations, which 
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translated into a concern with biography. However, this shifted from a focus on Òreliable 
citizens,Ó to the production of an entire series of fantastic heroes representing a new 
order of humanity (p.119). Soon, all biographies became Òstandardized so that every 
subjectÕs life, in both fiction and non-fiction, fit mythicized patterns...Ó (p.123). This 
served to Òrationalize the status quo and legitimate the current leadershipÓ (p.122), but 
also, to create a new form of literature. The Soviet novel was to provide, above all, Òan 
entire heroic biography to function as an example for othersÓ (p.132). As both in fiction 
and non-fiction Òall biographies were now fantastic,Ó (p.123) this meant literature had to 
be hagiographic (p.124). Two types of biographies were established: of ÒfathersÓ and of 
Òsons.Ó The first kind was meant Òto inspire the population,Ó the second, Òto provide 
models for the populace to emulateÓ (p.124). There was a difference in the heroic status 
of these two orders: ÒAlthough all official heroes were of a truly extraordinary caliber, 
they were not all ÔequallyÕ ÔbigÕ. ... the ÔbiggestÕ were model ÔfathersÕ while the less-
than-absolutely-extraordinary were model Ôsons.ÕÓ In this hierarchy, the model sons 
(such as the Stakhanovites or the aviator-hero) represented Òexamples of positive 
spontaneity,ÕÓ while the fathers resembled Stalin, i.e., someone with Òcomparable 
ÕwisdomÕ, ÔcareÕ and ÔsternnessÕ to guide the chosen sons to consciousness (p.129).Ó The 
sons were constructed after the image of the ÔbogatyrÕ- who was not only a man of 
Òamazing feats,Ó but ÒdaringÓ and a ÒrebelÓ (p.138). In this age of Òidealism verging on 
mysticismÓ the achievements of the Stakhanovites were described as Òqualitative leaps 
forwardÓ (the notion suggested that history progresses through leaps, or revolutions). 
The same way water could undergo a qualitative change (of boiling) simply as a result of 
quantitative changes (being heated), the same way the human could make the leap and 
become superhuman: ÒAll those paragons of the new master race, the symbolic heroes, 
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were said to make such a leap, figurative or actual, and thus go ÔhigherÕ (p.137). The 
Neo-Platonic epistemology of the High-Stalinist era established an ontological 
distinction between those with access to higher truth and those without. This scheme 
posited the existence of two worlds, a higher and an ordinary one, and only those with 
access to the first could lead. For both the chosen ÒfathersÓ and Òsons,Ó Òthe ultimate 
criterionÓ was thus Òepistemological.Ó ÒThat Lenin had access to higher-order truth was 
axiomatic in this periodÓ (p.142) while the Òmain source of all the thirties symbolic 
heroesÕ ÔknowledgeÕ came ex post facto (after the feats) in encounters with Stalin at the 
Kremlin.Ó Any qualitative leap forward had to be motivated by knowledge derived or 
obtained from the embodiments of Logos, i.e., Òthose supraterrestrial beings, Lenin and 
StalinÓ (p.142). Only the ÒfathersÓ had full access to the higher-reality (p.141) and this 
ensured a sort of Òapostolic successionÓ: ÒLenin passed his ÔlightÕ and ÔmysteryÕ on to 
Stalin. Now Stalin was passing it on to his chosen fewÓ (p.145).   
 
The post-war Stalinist years (1944-1953) 
This period was one of cultural conservatism rehearsing the same themes of Òthe 
elements, fathers and sons, bogatyri and so onÓ but also motifs belonging to the 
Òmachine-ageÓ (p.191). Many forties novels were modeled after ÒCementÓ and 
contained motifs from the 1930s such as ÒArctic or taiga explorers, aviation heroes, the 
sufferings of prerevolutionary Bolsheviks in prison and exile, and StakhanovitesÓ 
(p.192). Nevertheless, literature saw several types of changes being introduced. The cult 
of the symbolic heroes made way for the veneration of culture and for the rise of the 
cultural hero: the Stakhanovites entered the temple of science (p.195). Concerned with 
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establishing Òpriority in scientific discoveries,Ó Soviet Russia thus replaced its 
superheroes Òfrom aviation, production, exploration, etc.Ó with heroes that Òtended to be 
scientists, inventors, scholars, and creative people generallyÓ (p.195). After a speech 
from Zhdanov, the idea that the Soviet man returning from the 2nd World War had 
achieved a Ôqualitative leap forward,Õ that is, he had become a new man, was also 
introduced into literature. Thus, the Soviet novel returned to the motif of the war-hero, to 
his exceptional feats and transformation. At the same time, corresponding to the rise of 
the technocratic classes, the image of the hero performing super-human feats was 
attenuated for one of the hero able to achieve the most difficult of human administrative 
tasks. ÒThe forties hero was a leader and an organization manÓ and his main task was to 
perfect himself in the art of leadership (p.201). Last but not least, Soviet writers began to 
undermine the PartyÕs attempts to reduce the private life of the individual to that of his 
public life and duties by deliberately introducing the theme of adultery in relation to 
their main characters (p.208).   
 
The Khrushchev Years (1953-1964) 
The function of biography as a mode to legitimize the Communist leadership continued 
despite the death of Stalin and Ôde-Stalinization.Õ The Stalinist government had provided 
only a ÒfalseÓ instance of leadership (distorting ÒconsciousnessÓ) but, this time, true 
consciousness was present in the new leadership (p.212). After the fifties, the death of 
Stalin was followed by a reaction against the values of ÒHigh Stalinism.Ó This led to the 
attempt of replacing Òthe cult of the titanic heroÓ with a cult of Òthe ordinary person as 
an individualÓ (p.215), one whose individual private life would be allowed to unfold 
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unhindered (p.216). However, the most ÔdissidentÕ novel of this period, ÒNot by Bread 
Alone,Ó returned literature to the conventional hero of the High Stalinist era, particularly 
through Òsuch salient traits of Stalinist culture as Promethean symbolism, the notion that 
there is a higher-order knowledge accessible only to the chosen few, and the myth of the 
martyred member of the intelligentsiaÓ (pp.218, 220). At the same time, the attempt by 
the Òcommunist idealistsÓ to engage with the question of how Òinitiative and discipline Ð 
independence and complianceÓ (idem, p.221) could be reconciled, that is, of the ideal 
type of government, was made impossible by the response to the 1956 Hungarian 
uprising. After the public denunciation of Stalinist abuses, the leadershipÕs attention to 
issues of human dignity Òwas hailed as a Ònew ÔhumanismÕÓ (p.224). Writers were able 
to discuss the deportations, the excesses of collectivization, StalinÕs failure to prepare 
the country for the 2nd World War and, later, even the camps. In the late Ô50s and early 
Ô60s, a reaction took place against what was perceived as the excessive liberalism of the 
post-Stalin era and a return was made to the Heroic Age. The ÒfathersÓ ÒsonsÓ link had 
been severely disrupted by StalinÕs heavily discredited image. Thus, the presumed angst 
of the youth of the post-Stalinist era was given direction through the emergence of the 
Òyouth-novelÓ (p.226). Its plot unfolded, like in a typical Stalinist novel, along the path 
from spontaneity to consciousness. Like in a fairy tale, here the hero Òmakes a journey 
from the profane world (the false) to a higher reality (the true)Ó (p.227). The youth-novel 
hero leaves Moscow or Leningrad and his ÔfalseÕ family and friends behind (almost 
instinctively), and discovers consciousness (himself, a true love and a true ÔfamilyÕ) in 
Òthe provincial town, factory, construction site, or kolkhozÓ (p.227) and in the value of 
work.  
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Fiction after 1964 
The heroes of the youth novel now remain in their metropolis and end up being engaged 
in social deviant behavior: Ò[t]hey never went anywhere and never found any 
wholenessÓ (p.232). With the rise of the Ònew proseÓ (a literature about Òalienation, 
disintegration, confusionÓ and Òfractured psychesÓ) it seemed that Òthe attempt at a 
Ôheroic revivalÕ had failed (pp.232-233), but it was not to be so. For diverse reasons this 
new wave of experimental literature was dwarfed by other waves. The literature of 
destalinization and the Neo-Stalinist literature that sought to oppose it, fall in this 
category. Clark (p.236) observes that those writers seeking to oppose the Stalinist values 
often ended up re-articulating their own values by use of the same Socialist Realist 
conventions. This applies not only to the literature of destalinization but also to that of 
samizdat and tamizdat: ÒMost ÔsamizdatÕ and ÔtamizdatÕ publications (other than 
manifestos, articles, or light reading matter) are either memoirs or fictional exposes of 
Soviet oppression (the camps, detention of dissidents in mental hospitals etc.) or contain 
critiques of Soviet society presented from a religious or some other traditional Russian 
(as distinct from Soviet) point of view. As far as form goes, they are not markedly 
different from the sort of writing published in the Soviet Union. They also resemble 
official literature in being heavily didacticÓ (p.235). ÒByt proseÓ departed from the 
Stalinist models by depicting the Òmoral quagmireÓ (death, divorce, neglect, and human 
frailty) of everyday reality, and by leaving its characters without a moral guide or exit, 
trapped in their prosaic, imperfect life. On the other hand, Òvillage proseÓ posited that 
Òspiritual regenerationÓ could be found far away from Moscow, in the village, i.e., 
where nature as Ôa garden of harmonyÕ could be found (p.242). The myth of the Ôgarden 
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as harmonyÕ was presupposed, in Marxist and Leninist theory, to materialize with the 
construction of a Communist society. Now the intelligentsia seemed to return to the 
same myth Òwith a sense of loss,Ó keen to roll back the time to a moment when 
acceptance of God could have led the way (p.245), somewhat ready to discard Stalinism, 
but not its mythical structure.   
What does this history of the Soviet novel tell us about the mirror-mechanism? Firstly, it 
indicates possible sources in the medieval texts documenting the lives of saints 
(hagiography) and princes, in folk or popular literature (the bogatyr), in 19th century 
literature (the injunction that literature must transcend the aesthetical) and, particularly, 
in the outlook of the 19th century Russian intelligentsia: ÒThe longing for a 
Gemeinschaft world and the nostalgia for the world of Ônature,Õ the source of so many 
incongruities in High-Stalinist fiction, are in fact common sentiments of the old Russian 
intelligentsia, as are the ideals of the martyr-hero and of historical self-transcendenceÓ 
(p.252). Secondly, except for a very short period at the beginning of the Stalinist era (the 
period of the Five-Year Plan), the literature of the period, in its many phases, reflects, in 
mostly a very strong way or sometimes in an attenuated fashion, the type of conventions 
that confirm the mirror-mechanism. Considering that RomaniaÕs turn to Communism 
occurred in the time of Stalin, this would confirm the idea that the model of the mirror-
mechanism became central to this culture because of Russian inspiration. Finally, Clark 
reveals an extraordinary array of sources, influences, and phases for the Òmaster-plot,Ó 
which span from the political and economical to the religious and cultural. In all this 
complexity, the pattern described by the Òmaster-plotÓ manages to retain its central place 
(even if sometimes as only a spectral presence) throughout the Socialist Realist period, 
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also because different forms of opposition to the Stalinist values tend to rely on the same 
mythical structure. This would seem to make the task of delineating an archaeology of 
the mirror-mechanism, or a full description of its phases and functions, extremely 
complex if not practically impossible. However, it is such a task that must be attempted 
in order for the period of Socialist Realism to be understood in some orderly fashion.    
 
The Mirror Mechanism and GroysÕ ÒTotal Art of StalinismÓ 
Although methodologically different from the Òinterpretive cultural historyÓ provided by 
Clark (1981, p.xiii), GroysÕs study (1988) similarly attempts Òto establish a conceptual 
pattern by which the internal evolution of Stalinist culture may be understood (idem, 
p.13).Ó As such, ÒThe Total Art of StalinismÓ represents another project that can be seen 
to closely resemble the type of work undertook in this thesis. In short, Groys (idem) 
proposes, in a work that is a lot more theoretical than historical, a Òcultural archaeologyÓ 
able to explain the evolution of avant-garde, Stalinist, and post-utopian art via the same 
conceptual structure. 
 
The Avant-garde art 
The Russian avant-garde, Groys (p.14) argues, can be defined by Òa single formula,Ó that 
is, the Òdemand that art move from representing to transforming the world.Ó When 
spread out, this formula reads as a conceptual structure based on two types of visions, 
one derived from the thought of SolovÕev, and the other, of Nietzschean inspiration. 
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From SolovÕev, the avant-garde inherited four important concepts: 1) that humanity is 
facing an impending apocalypse from which it can save itself by choosing to organize 
society, in all its aspects, so as to reflect the divine principle in its entirety Ð if achieved, 
this would reveal an Òapocatastasis,Ó i.e., it would make apparent the state of grace that 
had been enveloping all things from the very beginning of existence (p.19), 2) that 
achieving this required the Òtrue understanding and organization of lifeÓ (SolovÕev 1988, 
cited in Gutkin 1999, p.7), that is, Òan all-embracing theoryÓ or Òa general plan for the 
transfiguration of the existing imperfect reality into a new ideal lifeÓ (idem) Ð this is 
reflected in MalevichÕs (1968, cited in Groys 1988, p.17) assertion that Ò[e]very form of 
a spiritual world that is created should be built according to a general, single planÓ with 
Òno special rights and liberties for art, religion or civil life,Ó 3) that the function of art is 
to be Òlife-building,Ó (SolovÕev 1966, cited in idem, p.18) that is, to implement this plan 
of universal salvation [even if this implies art subordinating its autonomy to Òa single 
universal purpose,Ó i.e., to Òsomething higher than any temporal goal, namely, the 
transformation of the world as a wholeÓ (Groys 1988, p.29)] 4) that artists had to 
embrace this demiurgic role, both in its vision and in its implementation, that is, to 
Òbecome priests and prophetsÓ not only Òpossessed by a religious ideaÓ but also able to 
Òconsciously control its earthly incarnationsÓ (SolovÕev 1988, cited in Gutkin 1999, 
p.11).  
NietzscheÕs inspiration can also be summarized in terms of three interrelated themes: the 
death of God, the will to power and the idea that Òthe building of a new world... can only 
be justified aestheticallyÓ (Groys 1999, p.4). The impact of the death of God on the 
avant-garde is described by Groys (p.14) as follows: ÒThe intrusion of technology into 
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European life in the nineteenth century caused this picture of the world to disintegrate 
and gradually led to the perception that God was dead, or rather that he had been 
murdered by modern technologized humanity. As the world unity guaranteed by the 
creative will of God disappeared, the horizon of earthly existence opened, revealing 
beyond the variety of possible forms of this world a black chaos Ð an infinity of 
possibilities in which everything given, realized, and inherited might at any moment 
dissolve without a trace.Ó This black chaos, Òthat nothing toward which...all progress 
was moving, which coincided with the primordial substance of the universe, or in other 
words, the pure potentiality of all,Ó is represented in the famous black square paintings 
of Malevich (p.16). From these, ÒÔVictory over the SunÕ, in which the sign of the black 
square first appeared, reproduces this Ômurder of the sunÕ and the falling of a mystical 
night in which is ignited the artificial sun of the new culture and new technological 
worldÓ (p.65). It is not then that the avant-garde artists chose to be destructive or 
nihilistic, but rather, that they regarded Òthe destruction of the divine work of art that had 
been the worldÓ as an irreversible process: ÒIf the avant-garde followed NietzscheÕs 
maxim to the effect that what is falling should still be pushed, it was only because it was 
deeply convinced that the fall could not be brokenÓ (p.15). Similarly important, it was 
perceived that the death of God had left an empty place, which now had to be occupied 
by some human agency ready to assert the power of creating a new reality. The avant-
garde artists felt called upon to hasten the destruction of the old world, then, also 
because they thought it inevitable that this Òwould be succeeded by the single total 
project of reorganizing the entire universe, in which God would be replaced by the artist-
analystÓ (p.10). In Nietzschean terms, therefore, the avant-gardist artists responded to 
the death of God by asserting their Ôwill to power.Õ  
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Malevich believed that the suprematist artist could recover the Òsubconsciously 
operating mechanismsÓ embedded in the harmony of the world before its destruction by 
technology, and could learn to Òcontrol them consciouslyÓ (p.16). In other words, that he 
could control, organize and harmonize some Òhidden stimuliÓ present only at the level of 
the subconscious, so as to create a new world and a new humanity (p.17). Similarly, 
Khlebnikov Òassumed that the ordinary forms of language concealed a purely phonetic 
ÔtransrationalÕ language that worked secretly and magically upon the listener or readerÓ 
(p.18). Calling himself ÒChairman of the WorldÓ and the ÒKing of Time,Ó Khlebnikov 
believed he could reconstruct this Òlanguage of the subconscious,Ó and, that this would 
in turn grant him Òthe ability to organize the whole world on a new audial basisÓ (idem). 
When, after years of civil war and the October Revolution, it was thought that that Òzero 
pointÓ of the black chaos had been finally reached, the avant-garde artists moved on to 
change the world not only through contemplation of the subconscious but, more directly, 
through material means (p.21). ÒThe constructivists themselves,Ó Groys (p.22) remarks, 
Òregarded their constructions not as self-sufficient works of art, but as models of a new 
world, a laboratory for developing a unitary plan for conquering the material that was 
the world.Ó Later, when Òthe most active radical wing of the avant-garde, the LefÓ 
moved away from constructivism, it did so to embrace ÒÕproductionism,Õ that is, the 
production of utilitarian objects and the organization of production and everyday life by 
artistic methodsÓ (p.24). While initially the constructivists saw themselves, in relation to 
the Bolsheviks, as the only ones supposed to lead and implement the plan for the total 
reorganization of the society, over time, both the constructivists and Lef agreed to 
submit to political power as long as their aesthetical project was to be implemented (pp. 
22, 24). Groys (p.21) sums up the overall position of the avant-garde as follows:  
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ÒAvant-garde artists, on the other hand, to whom the external world has become a black 
chaos, must create an entirely new world, so that their artistic projects are necessarily 
total and boundless. To realize this project, therefore, artists must have absolute power 
over the worldÑabove all total political power that will allow them to enlist all 
humanity or at least the population of a single country in this task. To avant-gardists, 
reality itself is material for artistic construction, and they therefore naturally demand the 
same absolute right to dispose of this real material as in the use of materials to realize 
their artistic intent in a painting, sculpture, or poem. Since the world itself is regarded as 
material, the demand underlying the modern conception of art for power over the 
materials implicitly contains the demand for power over the world. This power does not 
recognize any limitations and cannot be challenged by any other, nonartistic authority, 
since humanity and all human thought, science, traditions, institutions, and so on are 
declared to be subconsciously (or, to put it differently, materially) determined and 
therefore subject to restructuring according to a unitary artistic plan. By its own internal 
logic, the artistic project becomes aesthetico-political. Because there are many artists 
and projects and only one can be realized, a choice must be made; this decision is in turn 
not merely artistic but political, since the entire organization of social life is dependent 
upon it.Ó  
 
Stalinist art 
As exemplified above, Groys (p.26) goes at length to emphasize that it is because of the 
logic of its own aesthetical-political project that the avant-garde renounces its position of 
creator of reality in favour of the political force capable to implement such a project. 
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StalinÕs era, Groys (p.34) therefore affirms, represents the fulfilment of the avant-garde 
project: ÒThe avant-gardeÕs dream of placing all art under direct party control to 
implement its program of life-building (that is, Ôsocialism in one countryÕ as the true and 
consummate work of collective art) had now come true. The author of this program, 
however, was not Rodchenko or Maiakovskii, but Stalin, whose political power made 
him the heir to their artistic project.Ó 
At this point it becomes clear that the Ôconceptual patternÕ that Groys employs 
throughout his study is nothing else than the motif of the Demiurge. This is what defines 
the avant-garde movement, the Stalinist era, the purges and the character of Socialist 
Realism. The source of the avant-garde project, Groys (pp.64-65) argues, is Òin the 
mystical, transcendental, ÔsacredÕ sphere,Ó and is, Òin that sense completely Ôirrational:ÕÓ 
ÒThe avant-garde artist believed that his knowledge of and especially participation in the 
murder of God gave him a demiurgic, magical power over the world, and he was 
convinced that by thus crossing the boundaries of the world he could discover the laws 
that govern cosmic and social forces. He would then regenerate himself and the world by 
mastering these laws like an engineer, halting its decline through artistic techniques that 
would impart to it a form that was eternal and ideal or at least appropriate to any given 
moment in history.Ó Consequently, when Stalin inherited and chose to continue the 
artistic project of the avant-garde, Òthe predicates of the artist-demiurge were transferred 
to the political LeaderÓ (p.63): ÒThe moment the avant-garde artistÕs position is occupied 
by the party leadership and the real figure of Ôthe new individual, the rebuilder of the 
Earth,Õ the avant-garde myth becomes a subject for art, and the figure of the avant-garde 
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demiurge breaks down into the Divine Creator and his demoniacal double ÐStalin and 
Trotskii, the Ôpositive heroÕ and Ôthe wreckerÕÓ (pp.62-63). 
Socialist realism, its positive and negative heroes, as well as the purges (pp.61-62) can 
be best understood, therefore, as the expression of Òdemiurgic forcesÓ at work in society: 
ÒThe art of socialist realism, therefore, is not realistic in the traditional sense of the 
word; that is, what it provides is not a reflection of worldly events in their worldly 
contexts and motivations, but hagiographic, demonological, and other such depictions of 
transcendental events and their worldly consequences. It is not for nothing that socialist 
realist aesthetics always speaks not of ÔportrayingÕ positive or negative heroes, but of 
ÔincarnatingÕ them by artistic means. In and of themselves the positive and negative 
heroes have no external appearance, because they express transcendental demiurgic 
forces [my emphasis]. However, to demonstrate these forces in a manner that is 
Ôintelligible to the peopleÕ (Ôthe peopleÕ here meaning not actual consumers of art but 
mortals who lack transcendental vision), they must be symbolized, incarnated, set upon a 
stage. Hence the constant concern of socialist realist aesthetics with verisimilitude. Its 
heroes, as is stated in certain of the quotations cited above, must thoroughly resemble 
people if people are not to be frightened by their true aspect, and this is why the writers 
and artists of socialist realism, constantly bustle about inventing biographies, habits, 
clothing, physiognomies, and so on. They almost seem to be in the employ of some sort 
of extraterrestrial bureau planning a trip to Earth Ð they want to make their envoys as 
anthropomorphic as possible, but they cannot keep the otherworldly void from gaping 
through all the cracks in the mask (p.63).Ó In these conditions, the artistic criterion of 
partiinost (partymindedness) refers not only to Òthe ability to intuit new currents among 
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the party leadership,Ó but, more essentially, to the Òability to anticipate the will of Stalin, 
who is the real creatorÓ (pp.51-52). For in the end, Ò[t]he mimesis of socialist realism is 
the mimesis of StalinÕs willÓ (p.53).  
 
Post-utopian art 
The post-utopian demands on art are described as follows by Groys (p.115): ÒLeft to 
themselves today, artists and writers must simultaneously create text and context, myth 
and criticism of myth, Utopia and the failure of Utopia, history and the escape from 
history, the artistic object and commentaries upon it, and so on.Ó The primary merit and 
characteristic of Òsots artÓ (a term resulting from the combination of socialist realism Ð 
ÔsotsrealismÕ and pop art, but which denotes the postmodernist art developing in Russia 
in the 1970s) in this context, is that it acknowledges it cannot be purified from a will to 
power (which Western postmodernist art does not), and it sets out to Òmake this identity 
the central object of artistic reflection, demonstrating hidden kinship where one would 
like to see only morally comforting contrastÓ (pp.10, 12): ÒThe goal now is to analyze 
this aesthetico-political will to power, which artists acknowledge to be primary in all 
artistic projects including their own (p.81).Ó 
 
Conclusion 
The visions of Nietzsche and SolovÕev that motivate the avant-garde, and then constitute 
the essential character of Stalinist art (including socialist realism) and post-utopian art 
can be described through one motif: that of assuming the function of the Demiurge, of 
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inhabiting the Demiurge. In other words, what emerges as the central issue, or 
Òconceptual pattern,Ó of this entire period is control of the mirror-mechanism, of the 
apparatus of Logos. Whoever controls this mirror-mechanism can ÔbecomeÕ a substitute 
for Logos, and therefore unleash Ôdemiurgic forcesÕ in his own image (or can choose to 
describe and partially deactivate the mechanism itself, revealing its functioning and 
effects, both from within and outside of it Ð like the exponents of Ôsots-artÕ did). These 
Ôdemiurgic forcesÕ can be the positive or negative characters of Socialist Realism, or, in 
effect, an infinite multitude of avatars or archetypes. That Stalin had engaged with the 
function of the Demiurge in this manner is clear from the expression of demiurgic forces 
both in literature and on the open scene of social and political life (the Stakhanovites and 
the purges are illustrations of this). Furthermore, as Groys (p.68) suggests, the function 
of the Demiurge can also be associated with the cult of Lenin: ÒLeninÕs mummy can at 
the same time be regarded as the model for the ÔincarnationsÕ of the socialist realist hero; 
the external ÔhumanÕ wrapper is here merely that: a shell, a husk doomed by the 
demiurgic and dialectical forces of history that they may manifest themselves and then 
exchange it for another. Thus ex post factum it is Lenin, and not the avant-garde 
claiming the role, who is acknowledged to be the demiurge of his age.Ó In conclusion, to 
the extent that the mirror-mechanism is reflected in the problematic of the Demiurge and 
its central role in avant-garde, Stalinist and post-utopian art, GroysÕs study would 
suggest that important roots for the mirror-mechanism are to be found in the Russian 
artistic avant-garde. Here, another study, by Gutkin (1999), comes to both contest and 
validate the importance ascribed by Groys (1988) to the Russian artistic avant-garde.  
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The Mirror Mechanism and ÒThe Cultural Origins of the Socialist Realist AestheticÓ 
In a critique of Groys (1988), Gutkin (1999, pp.4-5) argues that socialist realism 
emerged out of Òan intellectual revolutionary paradigmÓ commonly shared by the 
political and the artistic avant-garde movements between the years 1890-1935.  
Immediately, two consequences result from this definition. The first is that socialist 
realism stands identified with a Ògeneral worldview that guided Soviet civilization as a 
whole,Ó an argument that can only be developed by the uncovering of links between the 
two types of avant-garde projects, and more importantly, between the aspects linking a 
general paradigm to a specific form of historical practice. While one cannot contest the 
reasonableness and necessity of such a perspective, GutkinÕs study shows neither the 
clear-cut manner of argumentation of Groys (1988) nor the ability to link the general 
with the historically particular as manifested in Clark (1981). These limits, however, 
should probably not be imputed to Gutkin as much as to the difficulty of the subject. The 
second consequence is that socialist realism is envisaged as simultaneously both a 
political and aesthetic phenomenon (p.4).   
In its shortest form, the Ôintellectual revolutionary paradigmÕ is defined by Gutkin (1999, 
p.9) as ÒRussian intellectualsÕ quest for a theory of total knowledge and their search for 
redemption by aesthetic means.Ó This paradigm is formed at the interaction of two 
Òalternative utopian schemes for transforming realityÓ corresponding to the political 
avant-garde and, to the aesthetical avant-garde, respectively: Òthe ÔmaterialistÕ Marxist-
Leninist one,Ó and Òthe one based in SolovÕevan neo-Christian idealismÓ (p.9). Both 
these schemes, Gutkin (pp.8, 16) observes, had their origin in ÒHegelianism,Ó 
particularly in terms of identifying a Òtotal organization theory of life.Ó Marx 
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emphasized a form of Òhistorical and dialectic materialismÓ which presupposed that the 
transcending of past modes of production through the vehicle of class struggle could 
reunite the producer with the means of production from which he had been alienated, 
and thus with the full humanity of himself and his oppressors. A blueprint for the 
rational organization of the entire society, Marxism posited that, once erected, Òthe 
materialist base of CommunismÓ would wrestle control from nature providing 
humankind with the freedom to Òfully realize its creative potentialÓ (p.17). The ultimate 
purpose of Marxism, therefore, was the recovering of full humanity by all members of 
the human race, through the development of their creativity, so that Òeveryone in whom 
a Rafael lies hidden must have the opportunity to untrammeled developmentÕ (Marx and 
Engels 1957, cited in Gutkin 1999, p.17). As Gutkin puts it (idem): Ò[t]hus, the task of 
the total transformation of the world was not an end in itself Ð the end was ideal 
humanity, freedom from economic material necessity, and most important, freedom to 
create.Ó 
The account of SolovÕevÕs thought that Gutkin provides is very similar to that provided 
by Groys (1988) and will not be repeated here except to emphasize that SolovÕev 
Òenvisaged total synthesis as the transformation of matter by the incarnation of a 
Ôsupramaterial actant,Õ or the Ôspirit,Õ in the material realmÓ (p.17). This transfiguration 
of life implied the organization of Òour entire realityÓ according to the divine principle 
(SolovevÕs aesthetic theory allegedly described this principle in the form of Òa universal 
theory of knowledgeÓ which posited unity at different levels: of science, religion and 
philosophy, of the Churches, of church and state etc.) through the medium of art and the 
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agency of artists and poets; in this sense, art became Ôlife-building,Õ able to transform all 
life so as to re-create everlasting life on earth (pp.11, 17, 22).  
Each of these schemes has to be expanded if the trajectory of socialist realism according 
to Gutkin is to be discerned, but the many connections between their constituent strands 
makes the whole exercise appear extremely complicated and potentially never-ending at 
times. Historically, the Marxist-Leninist scheme starts from Hegelianism, activating a 
strand of ÒPrometheanismÓ (with a clear aesthetical orientation) and the notion of a 
unified plan for the reorganization of the whole of society which runs from FourierÕs 
doctrine (p.8), through Saint-Simon and his notion of the creative role of Ôles industrielsÕ 
and of the artists in revolutionizing society (p.10), to the Òutilitarian aesthetic of the 
radical realistsÓ such as Chernyshevskii (who offered moral criteria for Òthe organization 
of daily existenceÓ under the form of fiction) (pp.8, 41, 83), and through to the Marxist 
theory which finds its ultimate Russian form in LeninÕs notion of the Òvanguard 
party...organizing the consciousness of the Russian emerging proletarian class in a 
predominantly peasant countryÓ (p.10). This scheme, then, gives the cultural tradition of 
the Russian political avant-garde and transfers a demiurgic role to the political elites.  
From here, things become more complex. For example, the Ògod-buildersÓ movement of 
Lunacharskii and Gorki (p.19) together with BogdanovÕs Òcomprehensive epistemologyÓ 
of all branches of knowledge (including aesthetics) and his Ôempiriomonism,Õ seeking to 
overcome Òthe duality of spirit and matterÓ so as to create Òa supreme human being fit to 
live in the ultimate human collectiveÓ (p.23), can be ascribed between or within both 
schemes. Ultimately, the same can be said about BogdanovÕs inspired ÔProletkultÕ 
organization, about the Smithy poets and about the Association of Proletarian Writers 
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(RAPP), all movements emphasizing Òthe proletariatÕs messianic culture and historical 
role,Ó partly the reason for which they were all eventually disbanded by either Lenin or 
Stalin (pp.26, 45).  
Historically, the SolovÕevan scheme starts with Hegelian idealism and then connects 
with and reinterprets the philosophies of Fedorov and Nietzsche through the 
encompassing ÒtheurgyÓ of SolovÕev (p.42). The influence of this scheme is obvious in 
the aesthetics of the symbolist movement, of the Futurists, and of the Left Front and the 
production art movement (constructivism) Ð which together form the aesthetical avant-
garde. Through it, artists receive Òthe metaphysical authority to create the ideal future 
worldÓ (p.18). Gutkin proceeds to discuss each of these groups, highlighting the 
contribution made by each to the aesthetical discourse that would become socialist 
realism.  
The symbolists (Merezhkovskii and Belyi, for example), Gutkin argues, sought to 
transform imperfect reality into an Òideal future community in which all will become 
demiurgesÓ through Òthe creation of a new artistic languageÓ (p.18), seeing themselves 
in the process as direct competitors to the political revolutionaries (p.27): ÒIn other 
words, the symbolists esteemed an artist who, rather than merely depicting or imitating 
reality, organized and transformed the physical and psychic matter of this world 
according to the ideal order of future reality revealed to him now in an afflatus. The true 
artist had to be someone with a vision of universal designÓ (p.43). Drawing on the 
theurgy of SolovÕev, the symbolist artist had, therefore, to be able to read Òthe ultimate 
reality of the ideal futureÓ (ÒrealioraÓ) within Òthe ordinary reality of the everyday life in 
the present (ÒrealiaÓ) (p.42).  
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Less involved with actual politics, the futurists (Khlebnikov, Maiakovskii and Malevich, 
for example) most clearly Òposited the artist or aesthetician (rather than the political 
leader or the proletariat itself) in the messianic roleÓ (p.25) as the Òmaker[s] of the 
human soulÓ (p.52): ÒTaking an even more fiercely antimimetic stance than their 
predecessors, they strove to do this in their art either by ÔdetonatingÕ the crass existing 
material world so that it could be reorganized beautifully at an artistÕs will or ultimately 
by reducing preexisting culture to Ôground zeroÕÓ (p.44). From the status of messiah the 
futurists later reduced the status of the artist to that of Òa mere artisan-craftsman,Ó (Òlike 
Ôa shoemaker, a woodworker, a tailorÕÓ) and to a prophetic function that consisted solely 
of Òleading the new man toward the communist faith.Ó Nonetheless, this resultant type of 
artist still Òcreated value autonomouslyÓ (pp.53-54).  
Not exactly the same can be said about the Left Front theorists (and particularly the 
production art movement of Arvatov), who, Òin an attempt to put the theory on an 
explicitly Marxist platform, embraced the notion of art as production and of the artist as 
engineerÓ (pp.54-55): ÒÔnext to the man of science, the art worker must become a 
psychoengineer, a psychoconstructor,Õ who shapes and organizes the psyche and the will 
of the working masses.Ó Based on this, Gutkin (pp.52, 57) claims that the Òsocialist 
realist definition of the artistÓ did nothing more than to endorse Òthe avant-gardeÕs ideas 
of aesthetic engineering and art as productionÓ by capitalizing on the avant-gardeÕs 
search for Òthe artistÕs cultural roleÓ throughout the revolutionary period. ÒThe purpose 
of the First WritersÕ Congress and the socialist realist aesthetic,Ó she thus concludes 
(idem), Òwas to finalize the definition of the artistÕs relationship to the general project: 
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Writers became engineers of human souls in the sense that they created models of the 
new men for imitation by the masses.Ó  
It is essential to note here that unlike Groys (1988), Gutkin does not interpret socialist 
realism mainly as the submission of the avant-garde to a political force capable to 
implement its aesthetical-political project (Stalin). Instead, her aim is to show the 
emergence of socialist realism at the meeting point between the utopian schemes of the 
aesthetic and the political avant-gardes by emphasizing the connections between them 
and between certain of their strands. Nowhere is this clearer than in the discussions of 
ÔultrarealismÕ and of Ôthe struggle with byt.Õ 
ÒUltrarealismÓ is the name given by Left Front theorist Nikolai Chuzhak to the artistic 
method resulting from his attempt to interpret the Òdialectic principleÓ of Marx via 
SolovÕevÕs Òtheurgical aestheticsÓ (p.46). Chuzhak thought that, if divested of its 
religious imagery, SolovevÕs theurgic art, with its aim of providing an understanding of 
life in the present but also of making transparent Òits future dialectic negation,Ó would 
provide a sure foundation for a Marxist aesthetics: ÒTo expose the sprouts of the future, 
ripening in invisible reality, to expose new reality, hiding in the depths of 
contemporaneity, to cast off the dying, the temporarily domineering Ð such is the true 
goal of art, viewed from the dialectic point of view. ...To transform reality in its distant 
perspective, to perceive it in all its chaos, to illuminate it with the far-off light and to 
create future reality Ð such is the thorny, but joyful, path of the geniusÓ (Chuzhak 1921, 
cited in Gutkin 1999, p.46). Starting from an aesthetical principle of SolovÕev (Òthat art 
must represent Ôany object or phenomenon from the point of view of its ultimate state or 
in the light of the future worldÕÓ) also reflected in the slogan of the symbolists and 
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futurists (ÒTo bring art into life until art is fully dissolved in itÓ), and receiving the 
backing of Left Front theorist Sergei TretÕiakov (Òthe revolutionary artist must depict Ôa 
dialectically perceived reality which is in the state of perpetual formationÕÓ), this 
ultrarealism or Òlife-buildingÓ aesthetics of  Chuzhak was finally adopted, at the First 
WritersÕ Congress of 1934, as part of the unifying aesthetic doctrine of socialist realism 
(pp.46-49). This, at least, is the claim that Gutkin puts forward. She also notes that since 
the contribution was unacknowledged by the Ôcreators of socialist realism,Ó such as 
Gorki (so as to ensure the adoption of the doctrine by different competing groups), this 
link between the avant-garde and socialist realism is only discernible to those Òfollowing 
closely the evolution of Russian symbolismÓ (pp.49-50).   
During the revolutionary period, the issue of transfiguring life or of Òlife-buildingÓ is 
inextricably linked with the notion of Ôbyt.Õ As a term, ÔbytÕ refers both to notion of 
Òeveryday lifeÓ and to that of ÒlifestyleÓ (p.81). Gutkin (idem) defines it as Òa 
combination of customs and mores manifest in the forms of everyday life characteristic 
of a given social milieu,Ó and she is keen to emphasize the Òmaterial aspectÓ of this 
meaning. As Òheirs to Russian Ôromantic anticapitalism,ÕÓ the theme of Òthe struggle 
with bytÓ is from the very beginning present in both the political and the aesthetic avant-
garde: ÒWhatever the differences may have been between Merezhkovskii, Belyi, Gorkii, 
and Lenin, in their criticism of Ôpetty bourgeois philistines,Õ they stood on common 
ground. All reviled the middle class for the meanness of its ideals, which were 
materialist in nature and firmly rooted in a complacent acceptance of existing reality Ðin 
short, for not striving toward an ideal future for all, and for an unwillingness to sacrifice 
for the sake of the Ôhigher spiritualÕ or radical revolutionary aspirationsÓ (pp.13-14). 
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ÒThe struggle with byt,Ó it can thus be seen, stems from Òthe animus toward bourgeois 
forms of lifeÓ and is manifested as a concern with all Òforms of ordinary daily existenceÓ 
(p.15). The issue, and one generally shared, is not only the dismantling of the old ÔbytÕ 
but the construction of a new one. The doctrine of socialist realism, Gutkin (p.92) 
claims, was formed at the junction between three different conceptions of Òthe struggle 
with byt:Ó of the political avant-garde, of the aesthetic avant-garde, and of the proletariat 
-oriented Association for the Study of the Contemporary Revolutionary Everyday 
(AKhRR). For the political leadership the issue of ÔbytÕ referred, unsurprisingly, to 
matters of public conduct such as Òmass drunkennes, foul language and spitting in 
public, a poor work ethic, sexual promiscuityÓ and so on. Opposed to the futurist ideal of 
the Òtotal remaking of the everyday,Ó the AKhRR aesthetic focused, instead, on 
Òdepicting the everyday Ôas it is:ÕÓ Òthe aim must be to Ôreflect with documentary 
accuracy in genre, portrait and landscape, the life of contemporary Russia, and to depict 
the whole working life in its multi-faceted characterÓ (p.92). As for the artistic avant-
garde, although symbolists, futurists and the Left Front engaged with the issue of ÒbytÓ 
differently what can be discerned is a common underlining paradigm or aesthetical 
system. The symbolists saw Ôthe struggle with bytÕ in spiritual terms, as a struggle to 
escape the inertia of matter in order to attain to a higher reality and a higher level of 
creativity (p.85). This implied a very personal struggle with the mores of the previous 
generation. The symbolists took it on themselves, therefore, to replace Òtraditional 
family ties by a circle of like-minded friends, as well as [by] experimentations with 
erotic partnershipÓ and to challenge other established norms of society, in the quest to 
formulate a Ònew culture of the futureÓ through their own lives (pp.84-85). In particular, 
lifestyle in the apartment Òwas identified as the solid protective core of the stagnant, 
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stuffy ÔbourgeoisÕ bytÓ because it attracted a Òcorresponding worldviewÓ (p.86). For the 
futurists, Ôthe struggle with bytÓ took on more radical forms, in both their lifestyle and 
their artistic work, which in fact, were seen as one: ÒThe futuristsÕ every action Ð their 
manner of dressing (for example, MaiakovskiiÕs Ôyellow jacketÕ) and of public conduct 
(the repeated appearances in public with painted faces, which they explained as a way 
Ôfor art to invade lifeÕ in order to present Ôa new way of propagationÕ of Ôthe new lifeÕ), 
the language of the manifestos, and the very look of their publications (printed on the 
crudest paper, some of the covers fashioned out of coarse burlap) Ð all were calculated, 
as was emphasized by the title of Russian futurismÕs most famous manifesto, to have the 
effect of Ôa slap in the face of public taste,Õ or of a terrorist bomb exploded  in the midst 
of daily life governed by bourgeois proprietyÓ (p.87). The futurists were thus ready to 
continue the civil war or the anti-bourgeois revolution by aesthetic means, making Òthe 
conquest of the everydayÓ their highest mission (p.89): Ò[Take aim] at byt! Fire at byt! 
Right through the brain of man! Right through the heart of the woman!Ó (Maiakovskii 
1939-1949, cited in Gutkin 1999, p.94). While this did not result in aesthetic strategies 
for the construction of the new byt, this task was taken over by the Left Front, who 
argued Òthat art must join industrial culture in order to produce ideal forms of material 
objects for the everyday Ð clothes, furniture, architecture.Ó The Left Front suggestions 
for a new byt resulted both in utopian schemes such as KlebnikovÕs vision of a future 
apartment as consisting Òof a mobile glass cabin that could be easily loaded on a train, so 
that each citizen could have a place to live in any cityÓ (p.91) and in Òthe forerunners of 
contemporary armchair beds and sleeper sofasÓ (p.95). Even so, with the apartment still 
constituting the central target for the struggle against the byt of bourgeois taste, the 
suggestions of the Left Front theorists focused more on its ÒannihilationÓ rather than its 
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reconstruction as an ideal living space: Òa modern individual needed no more than an 
empty room, a mattress, a folding chair, a table, and a gramophoneÓ (p.95). In practical 
terms, therefore, Ôthe struggle with bytÕ reflected a concern with the renunciation of 
material desires, and in fact, with a form of self-sacrifice that could usher in a new 
reality.  
On this theme, Gutkin offers three more essential observations. Firstly, although not 
explicitly mentioned, one can see that Gutkin (p.84) describes the overall paradigm of 
the aesthetic avant-garde as equally relying on both the concept of Ôlife-building,Õ or 
Ôultrarealism,Õ and on the notion of Ôthe struggle with bytÕ: Òin the aesthetic ideology of 
the artistic avant-garde, from symbolists, to pre- and postrevolutionary futurists, to 
production artists and constructivists, the struggle with byt Ð that is with the old byt and 
for the new, ideal byt Ð became the rhetorical embodiment of the avant-garde Ôs aesthetic 
and ethical stance: (1) the negation of existing Ôstable forms and normsÕ of daily life as 
bourgeois, or crassly materialist and outmoded, and the urge to annihilate them; (2) the 
view that the revolution was to constitute a spiritual conquest over the inert, ÔstagnantÕ 
physical matter of life; (3) a vociferous antirealist attitude, and the imperative that Ôtrue 
artÕ must not imitate life but rather shape it by the force of creative spirit; and (4) the 
endeavor to anticipate the envisioned future synthesis of art and life.Ó It is obvious that 
in the scheme presented above, and which summarizes the aesthetical theory of the 
Russian avant-garde, the first two points relate to the notion of Ôthe struggle against byt,Õ 
and the last two to the concept of Ôlife-buildingÕ or Ôultrarealism.Õ This, therefore, 
emerges as the scheme, in my view, through which Gutkin defines the aesthetical system 
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of the Russian artistic avant-garde, and through which she sees it continued or 
incorporated into the doctrine of socialist realism.  
Secondly, based on the above definition of socialist realism, Gutkin (p.73) rejects 
Evgenii DobrenkoÕs emphasis on the role of the Russian readership in defining Òthe 
character of the socialist realist novelÓ: ÒAlthough intended as a synthetic genre that 
would overcome the split between elite and mass culture, the socialist realist novel was a 
product of the visionary, theoretical discourse of the cultural elite.Ó 
Thirdly, Gutkin (p.100) observes that while the avant-gardeÕs Ôstruggle with bytÕ is soon 
defeated (early 1930s) at the political and social level by the inertia of the bourgeois-like 
materialist culture present in the elites and the masses, the notion continues to operate, 
albeit only at a symbolical level, in socialist realist literature43: ÒIt was rather on a 
mythic level, manifest in socialist realist art, that the Soviet elite Ð the Party leaders and 
artists Ð continued to bear the burden of the Ôadvancement toward the communeÕ by 
having to provide the masses with models of advanced communist consciousness Ð the 
advancement was measured principally in the correct attitude to everyday life.Ó  
The question that must be posed now is how the description that Gutkin provides in 
relation to socialist realism relates to the mirror-mechanism. At a general level, the 
answer is quite clear. Both the political and the artistic avant-gardes shared, as part of 
their common Ôintellectual revolutionary paradigm,Õ Òthe goal of creating an ideal 
society of supermen in the immediate futureÓ (p.12). By conceptualizing the artist as an 
Ôengineer of the human soul,Õ both avant-gardes specified a clear role for the socialist 
                                                             
43 ÒOverall, in socialist realist fiction, Gutkin (1999, p.104) therefore argues with fitting examples, Ôa 
characterÕs attitude toward the everyday, toward domestic comfort, was destiny.Ó 
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artist: the creation of Òmodels of the new men for imitation by the massesÓ (p.57). In 
other words, the role of the socialist artist was to produce countless models of new or 
ideal humanity, an impressive list of which is carefully provided by Gutkin (1999), but 
which will not be analyzed here inasmuch as such issues have already been discussed in 
relation to Clark (1981). It would suffice to add here that, generally, these models 
correspond well to the two axes of the mirror-mechanism. Less obvious, but of more 
interest are the two main constituents of the scheme through which Gutkin defines both 
the aesthetical theory of the artistic avant-garde and the doctrine of socialist realism, that 
is, Ôlife-buildingÕ and Ôthe struggle with byt.Õ Particularly in the manner of their 
description by Gutkin as an integral scheme (p.84) it can be easily be discerned that a) 
Ôthe struggle with bytÕ constitutes an essential prerequisite for engaging with Ôlife-
buildingÕ and refers to a sort of asceticism, renunciation of (material) desire and even 
self-sacrifice, while b) Ôlife-buildingÕ refers to a process in which the individual begins 
to partake of his ideal state, or of a higher reality, and begins to mirror the creative force 
of that spirit by constructing inner and outer reality (all forms of life) in its image.  
It is clear from this that while the notion of Ôthe struggle with bytÕ corresponds to the 
first axis of the mirror-mechanism (Ôthe myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything 
for something greater than himselfÕ) or to the theological notion of kenosis, the principle 
of Ôlife-buildingÕ reflects very well the second axis (Ôthe myth of the pure-hearted 
individual who seeks to actively internalize the GoodÕ) or the notion of Ôimitatio Dei.Õ 
This should not come as surprise as both elements, Ôthe struggle with bytÕ and Ôlife-
building,Õ appear in integrated form in SolovÕevÕs theurgic vision of the transfiguration 
of matter by the spirit. This last connection is clearly emphasized in GutkinÕs work. A 
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certain final conclusion, therefore, imposes itself here: through her analysis of socialist 
realism in terms of these two concepts of the avant-garde, Gutkin posits (possibly 
involuntarily) the theological thought of SolovÕev as central to both the aesthetical 
system of the avant-garde and the doctrine of socialist realism. If this is true, the inquiry 
into the origin of socialist realism must enter the domain of theology and religion.   
 
The Mirror-Mechanism and Religion 
Before directing myself to the topic at hand, I must admit that this chapter has been the 
farthest and also the one unexpected milestone reached on a research trajectory (with 
limited time) that started from Foucault, and then navigated through Romanian and 
Russian Communism as civilization and culture. It might still be that a better 
explanation could be put forward on mythological or some other kind of grounds. 
However, the issue cannot be ignored. Some similarity between the hero-mirror 
mechanism and religious aspects was always easy to spot, but this was not of concern to 
me for most of the project. Thus, my research that started with a humanistic device 
derived out of Cernat et al. (2004) and which seemed to revolve around the issue of 
ethics, gradually became a formation somehow paralleling FoucaultÕs notion of the 
Christian apparatus of pastoral power on the one hand, and on the other, an archetypal-
metaphysical structure that seemed to belong somewhere between religion and 
philosophy. In this, the specific turn to investigating religion has been caused by the 
confirmation of FoucaultÕs thoughts on the pastorate in Kotkin (1997) and Hellbeck 
(2006) and by the emphasis Clark (1981), Groys (1992) and especially Gutkin (1999) 
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place on the influence of SolovÕev on socialist realism. From SolovÕev, the domain of 
Christian theology and of religious literature in general was just a step away. In 
particular, SolovÕev and his magnificent attempt to formulate a unified 
philosophy/theology based on the notion of Christology was important in highlighting to 
me that the notion of the mirror-mechanism should be viewed, at a maximal level, as an 
ontological, epistemological and anthropological scheme (or otherwise put, as both the 
problematic of Ôimago DeiÕ and of Christology). An example of how this problematic 
was reflected in SolovÕevÕs thought can be found in the remarkable work of Oliver 
Smith (2011):  
ÒThe early Soloviev engages this task on several fronts. On the ontological plane, he 
attempts to resolve the question of what matter actually is, its nature and laws, and what 
there might be besides it. On the metaphysical plane, he argues for the absolute 
principleÕs reliance on matter for its own realization, or concrete manifestation. In his 
anthropology, he sketches a portrait of the human being as the mediator between the 
spiritual and material realms, and of Christ the God-man as the bringer to perfection of 
such mediation in his Incarnation and Resurrection. In all these spheres, the common 
feature is SolovievÕs attempt to discover the locus of mediation between spirit and 
matter, and from there to work out its precise character and meaning for the created 
world.Ó  
In theological Christian terms then, my conclusions are that the foundation of the mirror-
mechanism lies with the concept of ÒImago Dei,Ó while its axis of sacrifice resembles 
that of Òkenosis,Ó and its axis of purity of heart and mirroring of the Divine resembles 
that of Òimitatio Dei.Ó I will try to describe this in the briefest way possible. The concept 
 
 
244 
of ÒImago DeiÓ44 establishes the likeness of man with God, i.e., that man is made in 
GodÕs image. However, this concept is significantly more complex because it 
presupposes an intermediary agent that mediates this relationship of mirroring.45 This 
agent can be referred to spiritually as the emanation of God responsible for creation 
(Logos46, Holy Spirit47, Universal Intellect48, Word of God, Sophia49, the Dharmakāya50 
                                                             
44 There are significant differences between the Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions and between them 
and their various mystical branches on how to answer the issue of man having been created in the Ôimage 
of God.Õ A brilliant exposition of the notion for Islam is provided in Michot (2006) who looks at various 
contrasting approaches to notions such as Òform,Ó Òimage,Ó Òsimilarity,Ó Òsigns,Ó ÒcovenantÓ and how 
they cover the similar problematic given by the notion of imago Dei. Alternatively, Salvesen (2009, 
pp.160-161) provides an introduction into the Christian perspective: ÒA few interpreters wearied of 
attempts to define or locate the image of God É As for those who did attempt to find in what way humans 
resemble God, we can summarize their respective positions roughly as follows: 1.An inner quality such 
as the soul or mind: the Trinitarian reflection falls within this category. 2. An outward form, usually 
the posture. 3. An exalted position on earth analogous to that of God in heaven. 4. The dominant 
view, however, is that Christ alone is the true image, and that only through him can human come to 
resemble the divineÓ [my emphasis]. In my opinion, however, this interpretation is partially misleading, 
because of leaving the Word of God, Logos or Holy Spirit, and also the creation of Nature, which can also 
be considered reflective of GodÕs image, out of the picture, or rather as hidden in the problematic of 
Christology. Essentially then, in this thesis, the concept of Ôimago DeiÕ is implied as a spread out 
ontological scheme that relates elements such as of God Ð Human-Divine/Spiritual Entity Ð Man Ð Nature 
(Animal/Vegetal/Mineral), scheme characteristic of LovejoyÕs (2001) ÒGreat Chain of BeingÓ or 
SolovÕevÕs theology (Smith 2011).   
45 One of the clearest uses of this metaphor I could find appears in `Abdu'l-Bah (1908, p.207): ÒAnd 
know that the proceeding of the Word and the Holy Spirit from God, which is the proceeding and 
appearance of manifestation, must not be understood to mean that the Reality of Divinity had been divided 
into parts, or multiplied, or that it had descended from the exaltation of holiness and purity. God forbid! If 
a pure, fine mirror faces the sun, the light and heat, the form and the image of the sun will be resplendent 
in it with such manifestation that if a beholder says of the sun, which is brilliant and visible in the mirror, 
ÒThis is the sun,Ó it is true. Nevertheless, the mirror is the mirror, and the sun is the sun. The One Sun, 
even if it appears in numerous mirrors, is one. This state is neither abiding nor entering, neither 
commingling nor descending; for entering, abiding, descending, issuing forth and commingling are the 
necessities and characteristics of bodies, not of spirits; then how much less do they belong to the sanctified 
and pure Reality of God.Ó  
46 ÒIn an allegorical interpretation of Genesis 2.1-3.19, he [Philo of Alexandria] argued that God first 
made GodÕs image, the Logos, and then created humanity Ôafter the image,Õ i.e. resembling the Logos 
rather than GodÕs own self. The resemblance in each case is at the level of mind, nous, which in the Deity 
governs the universe and in human controls the rest of the bodyÓ (Salvesen 2009, p.157). 
47 ÒVarious notions were been propounded in history to explain the work, role and person of the Holy 
Spirit. ... The overwhelming amount of books and articles produced as popular and theological reading 
material on the Holy Spirit attests to a moving away from the strong Christcentric views of people like 
Karl Barth who reduced and concentrated nearly every act and work of GodÕs involvement with human 
beings and with the natural cosmic world in GodÕs revelation in Jesus Christ. The increasing fashionable 
tendency of late 20th century Christianity of emphasising the Holy Spirit in theological and ecclesial 
reflection as the initiating actor of the avenues of access to God is in a sense new but also a recurrence of 
what happened in various periods in the history of Christendom. In several historical contexts when 
people were concentrating in their discourses on the relationship of God and Jesus Christ, the Holy 
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etc.) and historically, or in human terms, as the perfect or super-human beings 
represented by the prophet-messengers of God, the ÒSeal of ProphetsÓ51 or the ÒSon of 
God,Ó52 or the ÒManifestation of God,Ó53 or the ÒTwelfth Imam,Ó54 or the Sufi ÒPerfect 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Spirit has been viewed as the indispensable unifying and binding element between them (Berkhof 
1986:329-334)Ó (Nigrini 2006, pp.123-124) [my emphasis]. 
48 A key term in the philosophy of Plotinus: ÒPlotinus taught God's unknowability, the emanation doctrine 
of creation, and the co-eternity of the universe with God. He also asserted the existence of a Universal 
Intellect as a metaphysical principle between God and the physical universeÓ (Cole, 1982 ¦ 2).  
49 ÒFor wisdom is more mobile than any motion; / because of her pureness she pervades and penetrates all 
things. / For she is a breath of the power of God, / and a pure emanation of the glory of the AlmightyÉ / 
For she is a reflection of eternal light, / a spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of 
[GodÕs] goodness.Ó Wisd. 7:24-26, 29b-30 (McFarland 2005, p.23)   
50 ÒTibetans believe that the Buddha, as a realized being, manifests himself on many different levels. 
Following Indian tradition, they divide these levels into three primary "bodies." First is the nirmanakaya, 
emanation body, the Buddha's physical, human form in which-as described in his early biographies-he 
appears as a prince, renounces the world, and follows the path to enlightenment. Second, the Buddha 
appears as the sambhogakaya, body of enjoyment, his brilliant, transfigured, nonphysical form of light. In 
this body he journeys to the heavens, teaches the gods, and reveals himself to highly attained people. 
Finally there is the Buddha's dharmakaya, the body of reality itself, without specific, delimited form, 
wherein the Buddha is identified with the spiritually charged nature of everything that isÓ (Ray 2001, 
p.13). 
51 Key term through which Prophet Muhammad is referred to in the QurÕan.  
52 ÒAnd all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are 
being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another.Ó 2.Corinthians 3.18 / 
ÒÉChrist, who is the image of God.Ó 2 Corinthians 4.4 / [Christ] is the reflection of GodÕs glory and 
the exact imprint of GodÕs very beingÓ Hebrews 1.3. (Salvesen, p.158). 
53 An excellent source on the topic is Cole (1982, ¦ 3) and this is his introductory definition: ÒThe Bah' 
concept of the intermediary between God and humankind expresses itself paradigmatically in the term 
"manifestation of God" or "theophany" (mazhar ilahi, zuhur). This idea emphasizes simultaneously the 
humanity of that intermediary and the way in which he shows forth the names and attributes of God. 
According to the Bah' writings, the manifestation of God is not an incarnation of God, as the 
transcendent Godhead can never incarnate itself in a mere mortal frame. But neither is the manifestation of 
God an ordinary, sinful mortal. He acts as a pure mirror to reflect the attributes of the Deity into this 
temporal plane. The term "manifestation of God" is not the only name the Bah' scriptures apply to this 
figure. They refer to him as prophet-messenger, prophet endowed with constancy, Primal Will, Word of 
God, Universal Intellect, and Primal Point. It should be clear that the concept of the manifestation of God 
in Bah' thought involved many elements. In some ways, the Bah' writings affirm the validity of terms 
and ideas which appear in past scriptures, theologies and philosophical systems. Much terminology, for 
instance, derives from the Qur'an (which Bah's regard as authentic revealed scripture) and ultimately 
reflects the Judaic religious heritage. For example, in the Bah' writings the Jewish insistence on the 
oneness and transcendence of God are consistently present. One also finds terminology similar to that of 
John's Gospel, especially to those passages where John explicates the Logos concept. But in the Bah' 
writings, these past terms are integrated into a new vision, and sometimes endowed with new significance. 
Although perhaps none of the terms and concepts which Bah' scripture employs to describe God's envoy 
to humankind appear there for the first time, including that of the manifestation of God (an epithet used by 
Shi'i thinkers), the Bah' scripture's use of these terms and concepts creates a new theology. It differs 
from the conventional Imami Shi'ite prophetology in some respects, and often has more in common with 
the prophetology of the Muslim philosophersÓ [my emphasis]. 
54 The complex ShiÕa doctrine which posits limited contact with a Saviour both in and out of history at the 
same time (hence, also named the ÒHidden ImamÓ) until the moment of his full return.  
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ManÓ55 etc. It becomes obvious at this point that this intermediate notion is associated 
with entire fields or even schools of religious thought. In its spiritual aspect, the concept 
relates to the domain of Pneumatology56, to the mystical theology of Plotinus, to 
Sophiology57 (which can, however, lead to Mariology58) to Taoism59, and so on. In its 
human aspect, it relates to the general problematic of ÓprophetologyÓ60 which then 
branches out in specific fields such as that of ÒChristology.Ó61 What is essential here is 
that the manner in which these theological issues are grappled with determines the 
ontological and epistemological status of human beings. In other words, the notion of 
                                                             
55 The Sufi notion of the ÒPerfect ManÓ goes as far as to claim that the mystic can become one with 
Reality or the essence of Being.  
56 The branch of religious thought that deals with the notion of the Holy Spirit, usually as a matter of 
doctrine.  
57 Òif Sophia, as the Wisdom of the Word, as Logos, is the self-revelation of God in the Second 
Hypostasis, then the Glory is the Self-revelation of God in the Third Hypostasis. In other words, Sophia as 
the Glory belongs to the Holy SpiritÓ (Bulgakov 1945, cited in Sergeev 2000, p.6). ÒThe world and the 
centre of the world Ðman, is the creation of God through Wisdom [Sophia], through Divine Ideas, and at 
the same time it is the child of meonic uncreated freedom, the child of fathomless non-being.Ó 
ÒPersonality is the image and likeness of God in man and this is why it rises above the natural lifeÓ 
(Berdyaev 1959, pp.29-55). It should be mentioned here that Berdyaev differs from Bulgakov, in that he 
subordinates Sophia to Logos as Christ: ÒAt the centre always there ought to remain the God-Man Christ, 
as the principle of sacred anthropology. The principle however of a sacred cosmologism, of a sophianic 
femininity, which can only be virginity, is a principle subordinate to the LogosÓ (Berdiaev 1929, p.97). 
58 ÒThe sophiological theological efforts of Fr. S. Bulgakov signify a return to the sacred, the Divine 
cosmos, the restoration of the organic-mystical connection between God and the creaturely world. In both 
the world and in mankind there is reflected and acts the Most Holy Trinity and it is foremost through the 
Wisdom of God. The summit of the sophianic aspect, of creation's wisdom, is manifest in the Ever-
Virgin Mary, the Mother of God. Without the sophianic aspect of the creature, without the 
manifestation of the wise, the virginal femininity, there would be impossible the Incarnation of God 
and God-Manhood. Sophiology carries over into MariologyÓ (Berdyaev 1929, p.95).  
59 ÒThere was something vague between heaven and earth arose. How calm! How void! It stands alone, 
unchanging; it acts everywhere, untiring. It may be considered the mother of everything under heaven. I 
do not know its name, but call it by the word TaoÓ (Lao-tzu, cited in Watts 1958, p.16). Like in other 
Eastern religions, the notion of kenosis [ÒBone like dry bone/Mind like dead ashes/This is true 
knowledgeÓ Chuang-tzu, cited in Watts, p.24)] seems to overwhelm the notion of imitation Dei in Tao, but 
the final results are the same. By training oneÕs mind to achieve a state of Òno mindÓ (Òwu-hsinÓ) which 
Watts (pp.24-25) describes as Òun-self-consciousnessÓ the Tao follower Òbegins to show the special kind 
of ÔvirtueÕ or ÔpowerÕ called te,Ó which is the form of participation in Tao.  
60 Bodies or traditions of religious thought, usually of Jewish or Muslim extraction, which discuss the 
ontological status of prophets as a specific theme (Cole 1982).  
61Ò[I]t is impossible to dissect the objective Christ into a form, whose sole property is to ÔappearÕ 
externally, and a formless light which is what remains for the religious interiority. The whole mystery of 
Christianity, that which distinguishes it radically from every other religious project, is that the form does 
not stand in opposition to infinite light, for the reason that God has himself instituted and confirmed such a 
formÓ (Hans Urs von Balthasar 1982, cited in McFarland 2005, p.51). 
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Òimago DeiÓ hides within it the central notion of the Divine-human agent, which is 
essential in the definition of the human being (anthropology). When narrowly expanded 
then, the notion of Òimago DeiÓ provides an ontological, epistemological and 
anthropological model of God, Divine-human agent and human being. If the Divine-
human agent is the mediator in this scheme, the question of what the process of 
mediation signifies or requires from human beings becomes crucial. It is here that the 
metaphor of the mirror (already contained in the notion of Imago Dei) and the notion of 
the two axes come into the picture. In short, one finds that the divine reality of this 
mediating process is generally alluded to through symbolic analogies and that one of the 
key examples used is that of the mirror-metaphor. This involves an analogy between the 
Sun of Reality as God, the Divine Mirror as the Divine-human agent, and the mirror of 
man as the human heart. For the light of God to reach the mirror of man, the simile goes, 
the mirror must 1) be cleaned or purified and 2) must be turned towards God. In the first 
case, the analogy points to the process of emptying or purifying the heart, of renouncing 
the self, all human knowledge and worldly attachments. This is the starting point for 
engaging with divine reality or the mediating process. Without it the human heart cannot 
sense or reflect the divine light:  
ÒKnowest thou why thy mirror reflects not? 
Because the rust has not been scoured from its face 
If it were purified from all rust and defilement,  
It would reflect the shining of the SUN of GODÓ (Rumi 2001, p.6). 
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In the second case, the analogy states that it is not enough or even possible to achieve a 
pure mirror of the heart in the absence of another process. This mirror must be turned 
towards God, in this case the Divine-human agent. It must seek to reflect divine 
qualities. It is to turn to the knowledge of God, to the love of God, to recognition of 
God, to the laws and ordinance of God. In a sense, as Foucault (1993, p.211) observes 
for Christianity, these processes imply each-other: ÒA Christian is always supposed to be 
supported by the light of faith if he wants to explore himself, and conversely, access to 
the truth of the faith cannot be conceived of without the purification of the soul.Ó The 
heart cannot reflect God if it has not been purified, but purification cannot take place 
without the heart turning unto God. One cannot move closer to God without moving 
away from oneÕs self and one cannot move away from oneÕs self without attempting to 
be nearer to God. In some cases, the analogy is continued with the assertion that it is the 
fire of the love of God that cleans the heart:  
ÒOnly he whose garment is rent by the violence of love  
Is wholly pure from covetousness and sinÓ (Rumi 2001, p.5). 
The analogy is therefore, somewhat paradoxical. In a sense, one aspect must occur 
before the other, in the other, both are simultaneous. These are the symbolical limits of 
the analogy or simile, which interpretation must transcend, but this is another matter.   
It can be noticed now that the first aspect of the analogy corresponds to the axis of 
sacrifice in the mirror-mechanism (Ôthe myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything 
 
 
249 
for something greater than himselfÕ) and, in Christian terms, to the notion of ÒkenosisÓ62. 
Similarly, the second aspect corresponds to the second axis of the mirror-mechanism 
(Ôthe myth of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the GoodÕ) 
and to the notion of Ôimitatio Dei,Õ with its specific forms such as Ôimitatio ChristiÕ63 or 
Ôimitatio MuhammadiÕ64. As alluded before, Ôimitatio DeiÕ can refer both to certain 
                                                             
62 To start with, I prefer this succinct definition from Wikipedia, because it offers a neutral and general 
perspective which emphasizes the meaning of the term both as a concept and as a form of practice: 
ÒIn Christian theology, kenosis (from the Greek word for emptiness κένωσις, knōsis) is the 'self-
emptying' of one's own will and becoming entirely receptive to God's divine willÓ (Wikipedia, 
ÔKenosisÕ).Ó In Christian tradition, the notion has been discussed particularly in relation to a paragraph in 
Philippians 2:5-8: ÒHave this mind in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, existing in the form of 
God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the 
form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled 
himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the crossÓ (McClain 1993, pp.88-89). In 
terms of a conceptual definition I find that McClain (p.93) offers a good account of the standard Christian 
view: ÒWe may say, then, that the eternal Son, existing in the form of God - robbed with the glory of 
Deity in its external manifestation, possessing and exercising all the incommunicable functions of 
the true God - counted not this being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped, but with loving 
condescension emptied Himself, taking servant-form; and as a result of this one act His whole 
earthly life became the life of a bond-servant, in which he does nothing, speaks nothing, knows 
nothing by Himself: but all is under the power and direction of the Father through the Holy Spirit. 
In this sense, during His earthly sojourn, the Ôexternal gloryÕ was utterly laid aside. ÔHe was in the 
world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.Õ But there was another, an 
inner glory: and this glory, of which the external glory had been indicative, was still present, though 
veiled by the servant-form. He did not - it is not too much to say that He could not - empty Himself 
of this. And to those who came to know Him because their eyes were enlightened by the Spirit, His 
blessed inner glory became apparent in spite of the veil of flesh, so that they could witness that, Ôthe 
Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten 
from the Father) full of grace and truthÕÓ [my emphasis]. More than just a theological notion, 
however, ÔkenosisÕ has historically been an issue of both dogma and religious practice, and one which has 
separated Eastern and Western Christianity. An example of this more complicated dimension of the term 
is given by Nigrini (2006, pp.171-172): ÒThe history of the idea of kenosis embedded in various 
Christologies expressed various theological notions. Some are embedded in a broader history of Christian 
doctrine and theology; others are not. Some deal with the more technical aspects of Christological dogma, 
doctrine and theology, while others deal more with the changing images of Christ which Christians and 
perhaps others have held through the centuries (Pelikan 1985:xv, 5).Ó 
63 ÒÔHe who follows Me, walks not in darkness,Õ says the Lord. By these words of Christ we are advised to 
imitate His life and habits, if we wish to be truly enlightened and free from all blindness of heart. Let our 
chief effort, therefore, be to study the life of Jesus Christ.... Yet whoever wishes to understand fully the 
words of Christ must try to pattern his whole life on that of ChristÓ (Kempis 1441, Book 1: Chapter I). 
64 ÒWhen the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is considered the Perfect Man (al-Insān al-Kāmil), 
it is from this point of view. It is not because he substantially possessed any supernatural or divine law but 
because he became, in his everyday life and in his prophetic leadership of his community, a kind of living 
QurÕan, offering a perfect realization and implementation of the QurÕanic ethics. He was divinely elected 
(mustafā) to such an honour, and nobody can expect or claim to share it with him. Every Muslim is, 
however invited to follow him in his humble and loving worship of the Lord God, Islam being essentially 
an imitatio Muhammadi (peace be upon him), between the unacceptable extremes of a-scriptural 
naturalism and innovationÓ (Michot 2006, pp.173-174). 
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qualities that should be reflected, to the pattern of life of a sacred figure, or to the laws 
and ordinances laid down by such a figure. Overall, the two axes can intersect, as in the 
notion of the mortification of self resulting into martyrdom or sacrifice as Ôimitatio 
Christi.Õ As discussed, both aspects imply the idea of purity of heart. In a sense, one 
notion involves the purification of the heart through detachment from oneÕs self, while 
the other, purification of the heart through reflection of God65. Nonetheless there is also 
a noteworthy difference in perspective. While the first aspect is described as the mirror 
being purified from all the Ôrust and defilementÕ of self, or as the heart emptying itself 
from attachments to self, the second aspect presupposes that a certain state of cleanliness 
of the mirror of the heart has already been achieved, and that the heart has started to 
reflect divine qualities, or to be filled with states of the spirit66. For this reason, although 
alluding to the purification process described in the first axis (and as ÔkenosisÕ), the title 
of the second axis as Ôthe myth of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively 
internalize the GoodÕ fits very well with the second aspect of the mirror analogy (and 
with that of Ôimitatio DeiÕ).  
As hinted at before here and more specifically discussed in relation to Foucault in the 
Methodology chapter, the mirror-mechanism is an allegorical structure, but also, a 
highly symbolic matrix out of which ontological, epistemological67 and 
                                                             
65 ÒO Son of Spirit! My first counsel is this: Possess a pure, kindly and radiant heart, that thine may be a 
sovereignty ancient, imperishable and everlastingÓ (Bah'u'llh 1986, p.9).  
66 This dynamic is well captured by Thomas  Kempis in his ÒImitation of ChristÓ (Book 2: Chapter 1, 
ÔMeditationÕ): ÒThe kingdom of God is within you," says the Lord. Turn, then, to God with all your heart. 
Forsake this wretched world and your soul shall find rest. Learn to despise external things, to devote 
yourself to those that are within, and you will see the kingdom of God come unto you, that kingdom which 
is peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, gifts not given to the impious. Christ will come to you offering His 
consolation, if you prepare a fit dwelling for Him in your heart, whose beauty and glory, wherein He takes 
delight, are all from within.Ó 
67 Saiedi (2000, pp.137-154) views these two axes, or what I have called the Òmirror-mechanismÓ as an 
issue of epistemology relating to divine revelation, and so as a hermeneutical principle.   
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anthropological68 frameworks can emerge (including Foucaldian apparatuses such as 
that of the Christian pastorate). Probably, in its most complex form, this matrix is 
identical with the description of the nature of the Divine-human agent. The simple point 
that I am making is that the mirror-mechanism represents a symbolic master-structure, 
but one which specifies criteria and even clear guidelines about the ontological reality 
and epistemological possibilities of human existence. However, the language is 
allegorical and the possibilities of interpretation, if only we judge historically, are 
countless. Nonetheless, the two aspects of the mirror-metaphor specify the directions of 
human action in a way that is almost practical to follow. What I mean by that is that, if 
pursued, the next level of interpretation would most likely result not only in the 
establishment of a well-defined ontological or epistemological framework of a religious 
or philosophical kind, but, most importantly, in concrete human practices. To give more 
definite structure to this allegory is to formulate an entire body of Christian or Islamic 
doctrine, of Jewish jurisprudence or Sufi mysticism (the same applies to Eastern 
religions if considering the nature of the Divine-human agent as the first emanation from 
God, or as his energy of illumination), and what is more importantly here, of religious 
and, thus, of cultural and social practice. The mirror mechanism, I argue therefore, is a 
symbolic matrix or structure that conceptually prefigures, but from only one-step away, 
any institutionalized religious discourse or practice. In this sense, the mirror-mechanism 
prefigures, but from only one-step away, the Christian apparatus of pastoral power and 
its technologies of self. The relationship between them is as close as that found between 
the axis of ÔkenosisÕ and the two practices of ÒexomologesisÓ (Foucault 1988, V, para. 7-
                                                             
68 See for example Berdyaev (1959) who explicitly constructs human ÒpersonalityÓ as derived from Òthe 
God-Man Christ, as the principle of sacred anthropologyÓ (Berdiaev 1929, p.97). 
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9) and ÒexagoreusisÓ (idem, VI, para. 3) (see the Methodology chapter). Kenosis is the 
general principle, while exomologesis and exagoreusis are two specific historical 
interpretations given to it at the level of institutional practice. On the other hand, the 
notion of ÔPastorshipÕ (Foucault 1988, pp.203-207) is just another modality of 
interpreting the more general concept of Ôimago Dei.Õ 
To conclude with, these are some of the ÔscripturalÕ reasons for which I have argued the 
mirror-mechanism originates with religion, that is, that the mechanism is of a religious 
kind. Inasmuch as religion equally implies both the orders of culture and politics, this 
mechanism can be seen to function both as a cultural mechanism and as a governance 
mechanism. Of course, within any religion, the idea is that God or the Divine Mirror 
itself would control the mechanism most often through an administrative structure of 
some kind. The distinction between a system administered by God and one administered 
by man is impossible to make in real life. But things are differently at the level of 
ideology. What happens when such a structure is operated from a non-transcendental, 
maybe more extreme humanistic dimension? Could someone assume the position of 
Logos and start dictating the definition of our human reality based on certain 
demiurgic/transcendental claims? What is there to learn from Communism about the role 
of religion and the other way around? Equally, should we view any state-religion or any 
type of religious movement as justified in employing such a mechanism? Otherwise put, 
what are the limits of use for such a mechanism in terms of governance and political 
systems, or in the sphere of culture? Is there a special use-value to it? Moreover, are 
such mechanisms becoming extinct in capitalism, or on the contrary, have they been 
transformed and are now multiplying? This is how the mirror-mechanism would appear 
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as a problematic of history from the perspective of religion. Or, in other words, this is 
the horizon of a problematic to which an analysis of Communist culture inspired by 
Foucault has unexpectedly led. But this does not constitute the focus of this thesis, 
which operates largely with the notion of mirror-mechanism as a sort of humanistic 
device operating in the realm of culture. For this reason, and in its relation to 
Communism, the device has been designated and conceptualized as a Ôhero-mirror 
mechanism,Õ with its own logic and larger forms of discourse corresponding to different 
historical periods.   
 
The Logic behind the Mirror-Mechanism 
Ultimately, in the Romanian context, the hero mirror-mechanism is a device that 
operates a communist-humanistic discourse which it adjusts in order to govern the 
possibilities of the mind to imagine reality. While the mission of the mirror mechanism 
is to create and regulate positive avatars (heroes imbued with the best of humanity) for 
every social category Ð its main function is not so much to maintain a certain discourse 
or ideology but rather to maintain control of all possible, alternative discourses, even to 
the extent of accepting, hybridizing with or even ÔgrowingÕ certain new discourses Ð 
anything necessary to make sure the universe of the mindÕs many independent 
trajectories is reconfigured for one exit only: the safeguarding of whatever aims the 
Party and its leadership might have at a specific moment. The discourses used can be 
Marxist, pastoral, nationalistic, imperialistic, universalistic and humanistic, ecological 
and even Orthodox-Christian or postmodern [that prominent members of the G80 and no 
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less literary critics combined such an outlook with a strong sense of ÔhumanismÕ only 
confirms this possibility (Şiulea 2003)], it makes no difference as long as they are 
reconfigured the proper way. This is so because the principle followed is one of 
saturation of the collective discursive space with avatars that bear, even if sometimes 
only remotely, the imprint of the party. 
If in the first stage, this logic leads to the emptying of society of its substance, in the 
second, it results in it being filled with countless chains of hero-avatars which derive out 
of the higher, ubiquitous, absolute image of the Leader (or which are made to bear its 
imprint as a condition for their circulation), although sometimes the process can and 
does occur almost simultaneously, with more emphasis given to one or another aspect 
depending on the particular stage. In conclusion, the hero-mirror mechanism can thus 
also be described as that which regulates the process of the totalitarian emptying and 
filling of society in its simultaneity. 
 
The Mirror-Mechanism: Forms of Discourse 
Previously, the term Òsocialist realismÓ has been invoked to describe the first phase of 
the Communist transformation of society (inhale/destruction), while Òsocialist 
humanismÓ the second phase (exhale/creation). However, in this thesis, Ôsocialist 
realismÕ and Ôsocialist humanismÕ also feature as official discourses of the regime, being 
therefore conceptualized not only as phases but also, via examination, as discursive 
formations of the mirror-mechanism: ÒThis literary current [socialist realism] is in fact 
an institution of the socialist party-state. It receives its name from it, it is not a current of 
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opinion, neither a literary one per se, but one of political expression of a single opinion 
that had become dogmaÓ (Mitchievici 2005i, p.176). 
This is a very loose categorization and a confusing use of concepts, but it serves the 
timing of the appearance of these official discourses (1945 and 1964 respectively), and 
the common division of Romanian Communist history according to two periods, one of 
direct oppression between 1945/49 and 1964, and the other, of regime consolidation 
between 1964 and 1989 (Negrici 2010, for example): ÒFrom structure to superstructure, 
just to remain faithful to the Marxist-Leninist algorithm, the transition is predictable: the 
popular revolution starts by modifying the political and economical world and ends by 
modeling, in a Promethean fashion, the conscience of millions of peopleÓ (Stanomir 
2005i, p.262).  
In this historical scheme, the term Òsocialist humanismÓ is preferred for the period 1964 
to 1989 for several reasons. First among them is the impression that ÔhumanismÕ is 
essential to the discursive matrix of the mirror-mechanism. Secondly, because judging 
from the results of the present, unlike socialist realism and protochronism, socialist 
humanism does not seem to have diluted much, which could point to it being the most 
adaptive, most encompassing and most difficult to deconstruct out of the three. Thirdly, 
because the concept belongs to the official discourse of the regime itself and has been 
central at the level of policy since the introduction of the concept of Òsocialist nationÓ in 
1968: ÒSocialist nationalism, though nobody in RCP branded it like this (it was just Ôthe 
socialist nationÕ), became necessary in order to insure Ômaximum nourishment of the 
material and human potentialÕ that was crucial in the efficient (de)(em)ployment of the 
forces of production for the achievement of the nation-building process Ð the MDSS. 
 
 
256 
That is why, the developmental tasks, the process of modernization, was accompanied 
by Ôa project of Enlightenment,Õ by a discourse of the new man and of the new type of 
human existence, of the communist conscience. ...The RCP project of Enlightenment 
was contained in its doctrine of socialist humanism...Ó (Gavrilă 2004, pp.49-50). 
Fourthly, because since at least 1969, the concept has arguably become central to 
ethical, moral and educational discourse: ÒThe established formula for describing the 
new ethics was that of Ôsocialist humanismÕ, considered as revealing the lack of 
consistency of bourgeois pseudo-values and restoring forever the kingdom of Ôgenuine 
valuesÕ: Ô . . . individualism and selfishness are replaced by collectivism, the spirit of 
social responsibility, the noble relationship of friendship and comradeship, based on 
mutual help; instead of the cynicism and disdain for human being the esteem for human 
being; instead of preaching amoralism, the care for moral purityÕÓ (Dumitrana 2001, 
p.12). Fifthly, support is also found in the fact that literary critic Eugen Negrici (2008, 
p.181) confirms the term of ÔhumanismÕ as Òa formulaÓ found Òfor succeeding the 
repudiated Ôsocialist realism,Õ for defining the culture of the Ceauşescu era, giving it a 
higher meaning.Ó Finally, because of frequent readings which in the subtext seem to 
indicate an aspect of socialist humanism. Thus, for example, while Goldiş (2011, 
pp.283-284) sees the field of literary criticism as dominated by a paradigm of Òthe 
autonomy of the aestheticalÓ which constantly puts off that of Òsocialist realism,Ó he 
nevertheless notes that this very paradigm Òis illuminated internally by an existentialist 
philosophy, of ontological plenitude and of the idea that literature, at its highest levels, is 
life,Ó feature which renders it unable to proclaim the death of the author.   
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Social Realism as the first period/discourse of the mirror mechanism 
  
My intention here is to show that, in fact, socialist realism and socialist humanism are 
not only variations of the same mechanism, or different moments of a similar logic, but 
also, expressions of the same nucleus or discursive matrix.  
As discussed previously, socialist realism emerges as a rejection of aestheticism with its 
associated states of nostalgia and defeatism and its principle of Ôart for artÕs sake,Õ 
promoting instead a state of vitality and positivity compatible with Òthe lan of the 
ascending classesÓ (Mitchievici 2005i, p.172). How, then, is this realism different from 
the critical realism of the bourgeoisie? To start with, socialist realism chooses to 
distance itself from critical realism on the judgment that the capacity for critique existing 
within a bourgeois society could never overcome the constraints of that societyÕs own 
decadent condition. As an effect, therefore, socialist realism not only has the task of 
describing reality accurately, but also that of correcting the weaknesses identified: 
ÒObviously, in such conditions, like Gorki shows, socialist realism will set itself apart 
from the critical one from the past. It becomes an affirmative, fortifying realism. In the 
past, to describe life realistically meant to unmask capitalism. In the socialist world, by 
describing realistically, truthful, without embellishments, writers confirm socialism. 
This is the truth. But, at the same time, they critique the deficiencies; try to help with 
their rectification. This is why the heroes, the exemplars of this current, are successful 
not only in the case of the negative characters, but also, at the opposite; in their 
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description, presentation, characterization and action, the positive heroes are also 
successfulÓ (idem, p.177).  
In short, this casting of socialist realism as a critique and correction of reality through 
the exemplars of the positive hero, from a position that confirms socialism, marks the 
inscription of socialist realism as a mirror-mechanism discourse functioning on the 
humanistic discursive matrix of the hero.  
Initially, the use of positive models, even if at the level of fiction, is seen, by Gyrgy 
Lukcs for example, as accelerating the process of emancipation for the oppressed: ÒIn 
this way, they [the characters] incorporate in their constitution the most diverse, the most 
hidden yearnings of the people, which are trying to make their way towards light and 
words; in this way, they not only express what today finds itself in a conscious mode at 
the surface of life, but they also penetrate into the true history of the birth of oppression, 
of degeneration, and also into the road for freedom, creating models which accelerate the 
process, in order for the nostalgia of liberation to become conscious and firmÓ (The 
Historical Novel, cited in idem, p.170). 
This corrective dimension of socialist realism is nevertheless, explicitly associated with 
the controlled and planned implementation, at the level of the imaginary, of a humanistic 
utopia: ÒLiterature, primarily, but also painting, cinematography or music participated in 
the scientific complex in equal measure through their object and function. The object: to 
reflect the world, in its essence and dynamic, not just according to appearances. The 
function: to teach common people to live like heroes from a novel. The new ÔrealismÕ 
means not only simple transposition, but also revelation and even transfiguration. 
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Working like a man of science, the writer explored present reality in order to find in it 
the embryos of a future world. Tried to discover, in the multitude of human exemplars, 
the new man in its becoming. Assumed the mission to make perceptible the genesis of 
tomorrowÕs world. In his discourse appeared a world truer than the authentic world, 
more in conformity with the profound tendencies of historical evolution. Perfect 
communism truly existed, of course, not in deeds, but with certainty in the libraries and 
the museums of the imaginary. Similarly to the project of the engineer, the literary 
model was the scheme for the final construction. Even in larger measure than with the 
engineers specialized in ÔproductionÕ, the responsibility of the future rested with the 
Ôengineers of the soulÕÓ (Boia 1999, p.152).  
It is in this description of socialist realism that one can read as dominant the utopian 
project of the Enlightenment (the humanistic project as a form of scientific planning) 
uncovering socialist realism as truly an incipient form of socialist humanism. Only 
because socialist realism implies a perspective wholly circumscribed to the Communist 
movement, a utopian belief in a new humanism set as the only discourse in society, and 
only because such a discourse allows for the installation of a governing machine of the 
imaginary, can the difference between utopia and reality, between dream and 
science, really disappear. Only thus can the name of realism be ascribed to planned 
dreams of utopia (the new man) propagated according to the hero mirror-mechanism. 
Because, for the true believer his faithÕs utopia of the ideal world is the true reality of the 
world, gradually and ineluctably manifesting itself throughout history. In a simple 
reading, while the extent to which that utopia has been confirmed in society gives the 
measure of realism, the extent to which the utopia remains unfulfilled gives the measure 
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of the romantic dream. On the whole, this quest to adjust the world according to the 
reality it should manifest is called socialist realism: ÒHere does truth reside, for some 
curious, for others inexplicable: why socialist realism by studying reality is also 
romantic. And nevertheless it is simple: in his quality of a realist, he confirms the 
surrounding socialist reality; as a visionary romantic he dreams the world of tomorrow, 
he feels it, searches for it, calls for its fulfillment and embodies itÓ (Stanomir 2005i, 
p.181). 
Ultimately, then, socialist realism and socialist humanism are expressions of the same 
activity, namely, the description of the world according to a utopia which allows for the 
prescription of ideal heroes at the level of the imaginary. At the core of this mechanism 
lies a similar utopian nucleus, of a humanistic kind: the myth of the hero ready to 
sacrifice everything for something greater than himself, and the myth of the pure-hearted 
individual who seeks to actively internalize the Good. ÒThe goodÓ pertains to the 
planned utopia while Ôsomething greaterÕ refers to anything from the Communist Party 
to the nation, from the workers to the people and to the entire humanity. In short, any 
imaginary hero requires an imagined community of reference and an ideal program that 
can guide his development. The nucleus is humanistic, because the hero engages with a 
humanistic project (The new Man or humanity is the source and ultimate aim of this 
project) by attempting to become the reflection of humanistic values Ð qualities which 
together form the Good.  
A communist hero, not motivated by the betterment of mankind, and acting not in 
accordance with the highest standards of humanity, is simply inconceivable. If in 
socialist realism, the heroic focus is primarily on the workers and the ideal values that 
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should guide them, during Ôsocialist humanism,Õ this focus incorporates the people and 
the nation, later on addressing directly humanity. In all stages, however, the idea is to 
produce the exponent of perfect humanity, that is, the New Man. 
 
Socialist Humanism as the second period/discourse of the mirror-mechanism 
Socialist humanism (1964-1989) has been previously described as a discourse under the 
auspices of Party rule, which makes way for a Ôgeneralized humanism,Õ able to 
disseminate the desired Socialist mentality within the population at large. As formerly 
discussed, this Ôgeneralized humanismÕ was already part of socialist realism, forming the 
nucleus of the mirror-mechanism.  
Because of de-Stalinization casting a negative light on the former regime of Dej, and 
because of the main audience of the Communist Party being extended from workers to 
the entire population, the humanistic element emerges as central to the new, Ceauşescu-
led regime.  
Externally, this turn towards humanism was also motivated by the revisionist projects 
launched in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 60s in order to establish a 
Ôsocialism with a human face.Õ These projects assumed that the system of power could 
be humanized and democratized from within (Tismăneanu 1997, p.82), necessity which 
had come into focus because of de-Stalinization. Newly established, CeauşescuÕs regime 
had only to gain by posing as the standard bearer of similar ideals. Firstly, such 
alignment guaranteed an increase in popularity. Secondly, it ensured the capture of the 
discursive space alternative movements could have occupied to challenge the state.  
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With humanism being such a strong revisionist option both inside and outside the 
Communist Bloc, it is understandable why the Ceauşescu regime chose to adopt this 
discourse as its political platform69: ÒSocialist humanism was a central symbolic point of 
reference for the policy of the Romanian Communist Party. This was the most abstract 
name given to the CommunistsÕ vision about how society should be governedÓ (Preda 
2004). 
In conclusion, humanism can be seen to function as an excellent binomial structure, 
constantly forming the background for the appropriation of other powerful discourses. If 
in socialist realism, the emphasis is on the proletariat emerging as the leading social 
force in the liberation of humanity (through the discourse of Marxism/Leninism), in 
socialist humanism, this emphasis is turned towards the nation. Finally, in what follows, 
the rest of this thesis will test the assumption that this discourse corresponds to the entire 
period of 1964-1989 by comparing against it (and against the hero-mirror mechanism), 
in terms of compatibility, some of the main cultural discourses (in terms of public 
impact) of this period. It shall be remarked here that for reasons of structure, all 
discourses of the period mentioned (i.e., 1964-1989) will be classified under the notion 
of Òsocialist humanism,Ó but that is only for reasons of periodization and so as to form a 
basic hypothesis against which they can be tested.  
 
 
                                                             
69 After its disappearance in 1989, the term would re-emerge 15 years later as the term defining the 
political platform of the Union comprising the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Romanian 
Humanist Party (PUR) (Preda 2004). 
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The Turn to Nationalism 
 
Despite the general assumption that the Party willingly adopted the nationalist ideology 
in order to obtain support of the masses (and of the intelligentsia) and to limit the 
influence of the USSR, not a lot is clear about how or why exactly the Romanian 
Communist regime turned towards the ideology of the nation. As the different 
interpretations below show, this matter merits more investigation.  
 
The Elite Theory 
The attempt by Stelian Tănase (ÒElite şi societate,Ó 1998) to explain the governance of 
the Dej regime through the role and formation of the Communist elite also provides an 
interpretation of the turn to nationalism.  
By discrediting the essence of the system, namely its ideology, the 1956 de-Stalinization 
campaign opened the doors for two competing factions within the Russian Communist 
elite (Tănase 1998, p.137): those against the cult of personality (the reformists or the 
revisionists) and those still in support of Stalinism (the dogmatists or the conservative 
wing). The period between 1953 and 1964 was thus marked by instability and conflict at 
the level of almost all Communist elites. In general, the periods, from 1953 and until the 
Hungarian Revolution from 1956, and from 1961 to 1964 (when Khrushchev, with his 
program of reform, is ousted from power by conservative forces), can be seen as 
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dominated by attempts at de-Stalinization and revisionism. In contradistinction, the 
period between 1957 and 1961 can be seen as a return to dogmatic Stalinism.  
Starting with 1953, then, the Romanian elite, ruling a party with very little social support 
at home and heavily dependent on the USSR, is confronted with a crisis that targets its 
very existence and identity.  
That the process of de-Stalinization could anytime lead to the direct replacement of the 
current Romanian elite with a less Stalinist one constitutes only the most visible part of 
this challenge. For in the background, through measures such as decentralization, 
collective governance, less emphasis on planned economy, the limitation of censorship, 
etc., the de-Stalinization reforms advocated by Khrushchev imply nothing else than the 
eliteÕs separation from its main source of power, namely, that of the violent control of 
society.  
Similarly daunting is the 1962 economic strategy advocated by Kremlin, which 
envisaged countries like Romania having to renounce their own program of 
industrialization in order to provide raw materials and agricultural products to the more 
developed countries in the ÒCMEA.Ó70 To a Romanian Communist elite that saw 
industrialization on a Stalinist model as the sole answer to the national problem of 
modernization71 (namely, the problem of catching up with the more developed countries 
while possessing a massive agricultural population) this seemed simply unacceptable: 
ÒThe leaders that emerged from the postwar RCP struggles of the late 1940s and early 
1950s were thoroughly committed to ending their countryÕs relative backwardness 
                                                             
70 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, CMEA, or CAME), 1949Ð1991. 
71 ÒThey saw their own dictatorship being motivated by the necessity of a powerful state, which would 
concentrate resources for an intense effort of ÔmodernizationÓ (Tănase 1998, p.212). 
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through a program of heavy industrial development and rapid agricultural 
collectivization, even at the expense of straining their relations with the Soviet Union. 
RomaniaÕs insistence on the priority of national goals over the principle of specialization 
within the CMEA conformed with this outlookÓ (Crowther 1988, p.64). 
Starting with 1962, then, the Romanian Party elite begins to respond to these challenges 
by establishing industrialization and elite autonomy as main priorities. As Tănase (1998, 
p.229) observes, a first turn towards nationalism appears when the elite attempts to win 
popular support by linking ÔindustrializationÕ with the nationalist feeling. Starting with 
1962, the Party looks to expand its autonomy by increasing the numbers recruited in the 
Party apparatus (by 50 percent between 1962 and 1964) so as to gain wider support from 
society: in terms of the selection process, class criteria are replaced with support for 
nationalism (as a reaction against the exploitation by the USSR) and industrialization 
(now associated with the concept of Ônational sovereigntyÕ) (p.219). Essentially, this 
newfound nationalism also acts as a mode to secure the direct help of professional elites 
with the industrialization agenda (p.256). At the same time, in order to derive mass 
support, the Party also attempts reconciliation with the population through adoption of a 
patriotic perspective and through the 1962-1965 de-Sovietization of the public space 
(pp.193-224). These last measures succeed in increasing the popularity of the regime 
significantly.  
To sum it up, while the problem of industrialization leads the elite to identify with and to 
call for a patriotic and nationalistic feeling within its own ranks and institutions (in order 
to increase its autonomy and alleviate its feelings of insecurity), at the mass level this 
call is reflected in the capturing of a widespread anti-Soviet feeling through the de-
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Sovietization of the public space. In conclusion, by connecting national feeling with 
industrialization and autonomy, and patriotism with popular anti-Soviet feeling, the 
Party effectively opens the door for a nationalistic ideology between the years 1962-
1964/1965.  
Thus, by 27 April 1964, and after the changes described above, the Romanian 
Communist elites feel secure enough to publish a Ôdeclaration of independence,Õ which 
can be taken as the official starting point72 for the turn to a nationalistic ideology. The 
document, reflecting concerns with industrialization and national autonomy, proclaims 
the right of any sovereign Marxist/Leninist state to choose its own path of socialist 
development without the interference of the USSR: 
ÒBearing in mind the diversity of the conditions of socialist construction, there are not 
and there can be no unique patterns and recipes; no one can decide what is and what is 
not correct for other countries or parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist party; it is a 
sovereign right of each socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and 
methods of socialist construction ... It is the exclusive right of each party independently 
to work out its political line, its concrete objectives, and the ways and means of attaining 
them, by creatively applying the general truths of Marxism-Leninism and the 
conclusions it arrives at from an attentive analysis of the experience of the other 
Communist and workersÕ parties ....Ó (RCP Central Committee 27th of April 1964, cited 
in Tismăneanu 2003, p.182)   
                                                             
72 Ò1964 is the year in which for the first time the behaviour of the Party is being talked about in terms of a 
Ônational directionÕÓ (Ştefan Borbly, in Borbly et al. (2002)]. 
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The declaration was meant to block the propagation of KhrushchevÕs reforms, and this 
was achieved inasmuch as conservative forces ousted Khrushchev in October 1964. As a 
conservative reaction to reform, the proclamation, rather than advocating a new socialist 
model, demanded the return to previous Stalinist models. This, along with other issues73, 
explains why the declaration succeeded in affirming national autonomy within rather 
than against the Soviet or Communist Bloc. As Tănase (1998, p.230) observes, the 
declaration marked, paradoxically, a moment of continuity rather than of discontinuity: 
the same elite that contributed, in total subordination to the USSR elite, to the Ôsatellite-
izationÕ and Stalinization of Romania, was now developing a discourse of autonomy. 
Ultimately, as Crowther (1988, p.66) points out, the significance of this declaration of 
independence lies in RomaniaÕs loss of economic support from the Soviet Union in the 
context in which the path of civil/state accommodation pursued by other EE countries 
(after de-Stalinization) had already been declined. In this context, the only 
developmental path left available was an internal one74, and its continued pursuance 
during later years would ultimately establish the peculiar, if not unique, character of the 
Romanian Communist regime: ÒThe Romanian political elite was thus impelled to look 
inward for a solution to its problems. By the close of the transition period RCP leaders 
were feeling their way toward a uniquely Romanian political strategy; one which 
differed significantly from those of the other East European state-socialist regimesÓ 
(idem).  
                                                             
73 For example, 1) the maintenance of strict control over population at all times, throughout crises in the 
Eastern Bloc and during the turn to nationalism, 2) the refraining from publicly humiliating or 
condemning the Soviet Union, from denouncing the Warsaw Treaty or from proclaiming neutrality, and 3) 
the lack of any attempts to assert a new ideology (Tănase 1998, p.230). 
74 Essentially, both the model of autarkic development with which the Ceauşescu regime will come to 
almost fully identify, and the corresponding phenomenon of Òcultural protectionismÓ that is 
ÒprotochronismÓ (Verdery 1991, pp.179-180, 183) can be traced back to this moment. 
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In addition to TănaseÕs (1998) attempt to give a coherent account of the Romanian turn 
to nationalism, other factors that center around the year 1964 must also be considered. 
Firstly, that by bringing the peasantry under complete control in 1962 (when 
collectivization is completed), the Communist elite gained complete control of society 
(p.187) and thus started requiring an ideology that appealed to all the masses (and not 
only to the workers).  
Secondly, that the first generations of intellectuals and professional elites produced 
entirely through the Communist system of education made its appearance in the 1960s 
(p.195). These elites had to be co-opted in the Party apparatus, thus making the link 
between nationalist feeling and autonomy an interesting ideological alternative.  
Thirdly, that the political detainees of the previous regime were released in 1964 
(p.231). In relation to this, Borbly (Borbly et al. 2002) describes the nationalist turn as 
a subtle mode of capturing the nationalist feeling associated with the intellectuals 
formed prior to the Communist regime: ÒThese people come out of prison, they start 
talking about the old times, the majority of them are part of the Legionary Movement 
and nationalistic, members of some of the historical parties, they come with a cultural 
offer, restitutive and alternative, and the Power does everything to capture this message, 
in order to give a relative character to its social impact through the suggestion of 
legitimacy. Which fits really well because it has as corollary relative political and 
doctrinal independence from Moscow. Here, in my opinion, psychologically, the whole 
thing was very well worked out, because to allow this message to circulate at will, to 
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become a sort of idyllic or energetic Ôpass-ism,Õ represented a danger. In the moment in 
which it is introduced in the ideology, into the doctrine of the party, already then it 
becomes something else, it is not as illicit as it could be. Here I think that Dej and those 
in power have disarmed an ideological bomb, a cultural bomb: they legislated, and 
essentially removed the detonator.Ó  
Fourthly, that since 1953, revisionist projects had advocated two main directions: a 
return to the socialist humanism promoted by the early Marx in the West and the sort of 
nationalistic ideology adopted through either Titoism or the Hungarian Revolution. 
These could not have failed to influence the Communist elite in Romania:75 ÒWe must 
act for the development of socialist features in our activity, of socialist humanism, to 
make from the Romanian saying ÔA fi om de omenieÕ (ÔTo be a humane manÕ/ ÔTo be a 
man of humanityÕ) a new saying ÒA fi comunist de omenieÓ (ÔTo be a humane 
ComunistÕ)Ó (Ceauşescu, in Ceauşescu et al. 1971, p.194). 
Out of these observations some major questions arise: Why does the Romanian 
Communist Party operate major turns towards nationalism and also towards an own 
version of Ôsocialist humanismÕ at around the same time? Which discourse is the main 
one, or the more important? Are we even talking about two or more distinct discourses? 
Do they operate in different spheres? Are these discourses art discourses and to what 
extent? Or are they policy discourses? Are these incipient or already developed 
                                                             
75 In fact, Deletant (1998, p.70) argues that after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, ÒDej began to 
distinguish between the soviet model and the Soviet Union,Ó converting himself, while still a convinced 
adept of the Leninist-Stalinist model of industrialization, to ÒÔnational-communism.ÕÓ However, talking 
about the Òhumanist approach to socialism that emerged in Poland and Hungary from within the 
communist eliteÓ after the death of Stalin, Tismăneanu (2003, p.80) argues exactly the opposite: that 
Ò[i]ronically, documents from the long-secret archives indicate that no such critical temptation occurred 
among Romanian communists.Ó Which documents those are it is not mentioned. 
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discourses in 1964? Admittedly, considering the lack of research about socialist 
humanism as a discourse in Communist Romania, this paper can only underline the fact 
that an investigation of such themes is needed.  
In my opinion, there are at least two reasons for which socialist humanism might have 
been appealing to the Communist party in 1965. 
The first reason is that inasmuch as the conceptual sphere of the word ÔhumanityÕ 
extends beyond that of the word Ônation,Õ socialist humanism, as an abstract term, 
simply contains more possibilities. In fact, because of this, nationalist values or appeals 
can always be framed as a subset of a socialist humanist discourse. The socialist 
humanism phrase simply has more policy appeal to a Party looking for an abstract, 
positive and catchy concept that can be quickly shifted to justify a large array of 
measures and to cover multiple discursive fields. At the same time, until 1964/65 at 
least, the language of humanism had been more entrenched in Marxist and Communist 
discourses/theories than that of nationalism, thus providing a more familiar terrain.  
The second reason is that except for the recovery of a general appeal to humanistic 
values, Romanian socialist humanism has almost nothing in common with the socialist 
humanism of the revisionist kind76. While the revisionist project seeks to reform the 
socialist system through its ÔhumanizationÕ (comprising measures such as 
decentralization, economic liberalization, reform of the administration, more democratic 
structures, freedom of the press, even a civil society etc.), the Romanian Party sees the 
term functioning only at the level of values and ethics, that is, as a mode of advocating a 
                                                             
76 This also explains the apparent contradiction between the adoption of the term socialist humanism and 
CeauşescuÕs dislike and condemnation of revisionists.  
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change in the moral character of individuals. It would appear then, that initially, the term 
was taken on because of de-Stalinization, and in order to counter the negative image of 
the abusive party activist. This was of strategic use to Ceauşescu and his regime, which 
could thus build a positive image through contrast with the Dej regime.77 From there on, 
the term somehow brought to light the pre-existent connection between socialism and 
the ideal of the new man and of the new society, namely, the old humanism of Marxist-
Leninism. Arguably, this linkage set the stage for the recuperation of an Enlightenment-
like discourse aimed at promoting general models for ethical behaviour and for directing 
cultural strategies. In comparison with socialist humanism, the nationalist discourse 
lends itself less to such applications, its strength deriving mostly from its capacity to 
function as a motivating ideology and as a unifying force (in relation to the interests of 
the state apparatus).  
Nevertheless, it must be observed that, at the time, neither socialist humanism nor the 
nationalist discourse was filled with enough substance to demand a new political model. 
Both discourses sought a return, or a continuation of the Stalinist model. Both were 
essentially subject to its priorities. In this respect, social humanism constitutes a 
continuation of socialist realism, reason for which, paradoxically, the period 1965-1989 
in Romania has been described by some (Cordoş 2003, pp.12-14; Simuţ 2008, 2008i; 
Liseu 2004), at the cultural level, mainly as another attempt at socialist realism.  
 
                                                             
77 ÒBy exposing Gheorghiu-DejÕs role in the Stalinist atrocities of the 1950s, Ceauşescu fostered his own 
image as the restorer of legality. The rehabilitation of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and other communist leaders 
executed or imprisoned under Gheorghiu-Dej enhanced the general secretary's posture as a custodian of 
socialist legality and advocate of democratizationÓ (Tismăneanu 2003, p.199). 
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 ÒThe Indigenization of MarxismÓ Thesis 
Very different from the elite theory mentioned above, VerderyÕs (1991) cultural foray 
into the cultural politics of CeauşescuÕs Romania targets directly the issue of national 
ideology.  
If the elite theory presupposes the existence of a subject as central in the formation of 
discourses, VerderyÕs approach sees actors themselves as a property or function of 
discourses. At a general level, the main thesis advanced by Verdery contains two parts.  
Firstly, Verdery (1991, p.12) sees Òthe years between 1947 and 1989Ó as the Òlocus of a 
battle between two powerful discourses: Marxism, and the discourse of the nation.Ó In 
this encounter Ôthe nation,Õ Òfortified by many decades of work that had given it an 
institutionalized baseÓ (p.12) eventually prevails over Marxism, subordinating and 
subverting its terms in its favour. Secondly, Verdery (p.4) identifies the disruption of 
Marxism through the discourse of the nation as Òa major element in destroying the 
PartyÕs legitimacy,Ó and thus, as a main factor in the fall of Communism.  
In contradistinction to TănaseÕs theory, which assumes an empty space, or an unformed 
and incipient nationalistic Party discourse, VerderyÕs approach has the advantage of 
bringing into consideration the powerful pre-existing discourse of the nation, considered 
at all times actively engaged with the Communist language of politics. Identifying the 
discourse of the nation as domestic and Marxism as a discourse Òimposed by force, from 
outside,Ó her research starts with the following question: ÒHow did powerful preexisting 
discourses, such as the national one, domesticate the intruder, becoming in their turn part 
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of its trajectory as the two bonded together toward forming a new hegemonic order?Ó 
(p.139) 
Part of the answer lies, according to Verdery, with the deep discursive structure 
uncovered through the tracing back of the nationalist thread. As observed by writers 
such as Boia (2005, p.121) and Verdery (1991, pp.46-71), nationalist ideology had 
emerged as a main discourse in the context of the formation of the modern Romanian 
state and from the interaction of very strong diverging views on the relationships 
between national culture and the European model, that is, between local tradition and 
Occidental values. According to Verdery (1991, pp.46-71), three types of groups or 
orientations were formed within this discursive space: the ÒWesternizersÓ  - for whom 
Romania rightfully belongs to the European space and is thus compatible with the 
European model, the  ÒIndigenistsÓ Ð for whom Romania has a national essence from 
which an unadulterated model of organic culture and political organization must be 
allowed to emerge, without foreign interference, and the  ÒPro-OrientalsÓ or the 
ÔOrthodoxistsÕ Ð favoring the East and particularly Eastern Christianity as the model for 
cultural/social organization. Debates between groups corresponding, in some way or 
another, to these three positions, Verdery (p.122) concludes, have pushed the national 
idea to become the master discourse in Romania, structuring all other discourses, 
including the Marxist one.  
VerderyÕs (1991, p.122) explanation differs, thus, radically from that of Tănase (1998) 
and Tismăneanu (2003), in that it assumes that the national discourse forced the 
Communist Party onto its domain and not the other way around:  
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ÒWhy did a Marxist-Leninist regime employing a symbolic-ideological mode of control 
give so much weight to an ideology that was national? This question has been handled at 
greater or lesser length by a number of political scientists, most of whom see the answer 
in the regimeÕs need for public support, either in general or in quarrel with the Soviet 
Union. Nationalism, it is argued, was the CeauşescuÕs leadershipÕs main instrument for 
legitimating its rule with the populace and for keeping the intellectuals coopted or 
subservient (Croan 1989, Crowther 1988, Gilberg 1990, Jowitt 1971, King 1980, 
Schopflin 1974, Tismăneanu 1989).  
I do not adopt this line of argument. I see the national ideology that became a hallmark 
of CeauşescuÕs Romania as having several sources only one of which was its purposeful 
instrumentalization by the Party. To a considerable extent, I argue, the Party was forced 
onto the terrain of national values (not unwillingly) under pressure from others, 
especially intellectuals, whom it could fully engage in no other manner.  
These intellectuals were drawing upon personal concerns and traditions of inquiry that 
made the Nation a continuing and urgent reality for them despite its official interdiction. 
They were also engaged in conflicts among themselves for which, as before, the Nation 
provided a basic idiom. To use a different phrasing, Romanian intellectuals were 
utilizing something Ð the Nation- that we might call a master symbol, one having the 
capacity to dominate the field of symbols and discourses in which it was employed, 
pressing the meanings of other terms and symbols in its own direction.Ó  
From this perspective, control of the idea of the nation became essential to the Party, 
because it represented both the position from which the Party could most efficiently be 
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challenged and also the position from which Party support could be best consolidated. In 
a sense, everything in Romania had been somehow defined through the idea of the 
nation or through claims relating to it, including, as Verdery (1991, pp.63-71) notices, 
the entire specter of academic disciplines: ÒIf national ideology struck outside observers 
as the most salient feature of Romanian politics, this was not because the Party 
emphasized nothing else but because the Nation was so well entrenched discursively in 
Romanian life. It was the one subject that guaranteed to get RomaniansÕ attention, 
because so many of them were using itÓ (p.125).  
While the Party was initially just drawn into the nationalist discourse78, its further 
attempt to control its rhetoric meant that the door was open for competing claims by 
different cultural groups regarding the value of the nation, which augmented the national 
discourse even more: ÒAs the PartyÕs attempt to monopolize culture sharpened conflict 
among the producers of symbols and images, different groups began to compete by 
recourse to national values ... The older disputes among indigenist and pro-western 
definitions of the Nation reappeared, all sides claiming to represent the true national 
valuesÓ (p.126). Starting with the late 60s, the Ceauşescu regime gradually chose to 
identify explicitly, in this debate, with the position of the Indigenists - for whom 
Romania had a national essence from which an unadulterated model of organic culture 
                                                             
78 In fact, the turn of the Communist Party toward the discourse of the Nation can be seen to have occurred 
not only because of cultural factors but especially because of a number of factors that could be ascribed to 
the political context through which the Party was formed and in which it activated: 1) the lack of an 
educated communist elite profoundly embedded in Marxist theory (which had disappeared with the early 
purges), 2) the lack of legitimacy of the elite in power, in the absence of nationalism, 3) the attraction to 
identify with an indigenist position rather than with a discourse imposed monolithically and hierarchically 
from outside, 4) the challenge, in the context of de-Stalinization, to find another governing ideology in 
order to replace the Stalinist ideology, 5) the need to govern through ideological control in the absence of 
decent levels of economic prosperity, 6) the powerful influence, not only of nationalism as a pre-existent 
discourse, but the importance, at the level of policy, of the nation-state as a unit to be administered by the 
Communist Party.  
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and political organization could emerge under the right conditions. This process, through 
which the Marxist discourse was displaced and subverted through a nationalist 
discourse, is therefore referred to, by Verdery, as the Ôindigenization of Marxism:Õ ÒAs 
to the problem of the nation in the conditions of socialism, we have to say that the 
victory of the new system has opened up the road for the achievement of a true national 
unity, for strengthening and developing the nation on new bases. On freeing itself from 
class oppression, the working class became the exponent of the entire nation and 
assumed the responsibility for the development of national unity on new, superior bases, 
for the prosperity of the socialist nationÓ (Ceauşescu 1972, cited in Verdery 1991, 
p.45).79 
In conclusion, while in general agreement with VerderyÕs comments about the cultural-
political importance of the nationalistic discourse and its subversion of a Marxist 
discourse [though, not of the Communist one, in my opinion], one must emphasize the 
active background role of a third discourse, that of humanism. From this perspective, the 
new hegemonic order Verdery speaks about implies not only the bonding of the Marxist 
and nationalist discourses, but their hybridization and articulation through the humanist 
discourse. In a very simplistic way, it can be assumed that while Marxist-Leninism 
functioned as an ideology for getting into power and taking control of a society (political 
strategy), the nationalist discourse served to obtain the support of the majority of the 
population and to govern a society (governance), this while the humanist discourse 
visibly employed by Ceauşescu in order to get into power (on a de-Stalinization agenda) 
                                                             
79 Contrast this with the original socialist views expressed by a former member of the Romanian Social 
Democratic Party (1893- 1948): ÒThe nation is a sentimental ideological-utopian fantasy that does not 
existÓ (C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea cited in Verdery 1991, p.53). 
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operated continuously but mostly in the background, as the motivating impulse and 
ethical foundation for the attainment of the utopian society, features to be constantly 
readjusted by the Party in their articulation to diverse specific practices, aims and 
prescriptions.  
 
ÒRomanian Culture between Communism and Nationalism:Ó a critique 
of Verdery 
In his essay, ÒRomanian Culture between Communism and Nationalism,Ó parts of which 
have surfaced online in the cultural journal ÒRevista 22,Ó Mircea Martin offers a direct 
critique of VerderyÕs ÔIndigenization of MarxismÕ thesis.  
Firstly, Martin (2002iv) argues that Verdery assumes a certain continuity of the 
nationalistic discourse, for which no foundation can be found, in order to fit with the 
direction of her essay. National ideology, he states, is not the same throughout the whole 
Romanian Communist period, and its effects cannot be considered to be the same. 
Martin (2002iv, ¦ 2-8) distinguishes, then, three different phases in the state 
development of national ideology, and two main orientations (a protochronist and an 
anti-protochronist one) in terms of how intellectuals relate to the discourse of the nation. 
For him, national ideology commences in the 1960s as a form of resistance against the 
USSRÕs colonial type of influence, more a Òcounter-ideologyÓ (idem, ¦ 32) than an 
ideology, signaling openness towards Europeanism and universalism. Next, starting with 
the July theses of 1971, the center-stage is taken by the attempt to promote a Maoist-like 
cultural revolution (idem, ¦ 33), which Martin (2002iv, ¦ 23) interprets as Òa clear 
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abandonment of nationalism and the restoration, within culture, of a firm and orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.Ó Finally, the end of the 70s and the beginning of the 80s see 
the reinstatement of the nationalistic ideology, this time, in the extremist, ethnicist, 
traditionalist, isolationist and strongly anti-Western variant developed by Eugen Barbu 
at ÒSăptămnaÓ (a widely distributed cultural magazine with strong backing from the 
Party). These stages are overlooked by Verdery (1991) who, in MartinÕs (2002iv, ¦ 3, 7) 
opinion, also assumes that different groups reconstruct the same idea of the nation. 
Instead of that, Martin argues that each group recreated its own image about the Nation, 
the protochronists assuming a narrow, ethnicist, traditionalist and isolationist discourse 
which later became institutionalized as official discourse, and the anti-protochronists, a 
discourse assuming modernity and the idea of Europe as central to Romanian culture80.  
Secondly, Martin (2002iv, ¦ 8) accuses Verdery of sharing in the neo-Marxist view that 
Òidentifies national ideology with nationalism, more precisely, with extremist 
nationalism.Ó The deeper critique, which will emerge later in more concrete forms, is 
that Verdery tends to value Marxist notions over the idea of the nation. For this reason, 
Martin (2002iv, ¦ 11-13) sees it important to argue that while the 1949-1960 Marxist 
emphasis on ÔclassÕ and Ôclass-struggleÕ (and not on Òinternal diversityÓ 81 as Verdery 
                                                             
80 This point, is to a considerable extent, an unfair criticism of Verdery, for she clearly states that she sees 
the discourse of the Nation gaining a center-stage position because of the competing claims launched by 
different groups with regard to the idea of the Nation.  
81 Essentially, this is the paragraph around which Martin constructs his critique of Verdery (it is evident 
that while Verdery was referring here to Marxism as a theoretical outlook and a cultural discourse, Martin 
has interpreted the same paragraph as referring to the Marxist-Leninist political-economical orientation of 
the regime): ÒAs I showed in chapters 4 through 6 especially, the diligent intellectual work one or another 
group expended on the ÔNationÕ deconstructed the categories and the teleologies of Marxism, substituting 
a push toward national unity in place of internal diversity, and replacing MarxismÕs progressive, 
discontinuous time with the continuities of the Romanian people. Not all intellectual projects fitted this 
exactly: ProdanÕs Horea, for example, concentrated on one class within a class Ð differentiated society and 
plotted its narrative progressively Ð Prodan, remember, was analytically a MarxistÓ (Verdery 1991, 
pp.313-314). 
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would have it82) had produced a state of continuous warfare and aggression, the 
introduction of the idea of the nation in the 1960s (a sort of ÒblessingÓ by comparison) 
had marked a period of relative peace and freedom, and a return to normality: ÒThe 
national idea at the beginning of the 60s came ...to overcome this permanent threat, that 
anyone could be the target, meaning, the victim of class struggle, of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, including the proletarians themselves!Ó 
Next, Verdery is charged with two instances of overgeneralization, namely, with 
equating the situation in the sphere of culture with that in the larger society (idem, ¦ 18), 
and with identifying the nationalism of the entire Communist period with the extremist 
nationalism from the 80s (idem, ¦ 18-22). Here, Martin (idem, ¦ 18) contends that while 
the cultural sphere had witnessed some changes in the direction of liberalization with the 
early nationalistic discourse, these were never reflected in the economic structure of 
society, leaving him to conclude that the nationalism of the 1960s emerged as a form 
compatible with Marxist-Leninism, and not as a form of displacement.  
This leads us into the main criticism which Mircea Martin (2002iv) brings to VerderyÕs 
(1991) work on Romania: 1) that she assumes the existence of a pure Marxist discourse 
in Communist societies, and 2) that she values this Marxist discourse over the discourse 
of the nation.  
Verdery is wrong, therefore, to assume that the subversion of official Marxism through 
the nationalist discourse led to the fall of the Communist regime in Romania, with 
Ceauşescu the resulting main victim of this displacement. According to Martin (2002iv, 
                                                             
82 In direct opposition to Verdery (see below), Martin (2002iv, ¦ 24) argues in fact that, in the 60s, Òthe 
national idea served primarily the acceptance and promotion of diversity,Ó but that such diversity and 
pluralism could not be fully attained because of the limitations imposed by Marxism. 
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¦ 18-22), until the 80s at least, the Communist regime was too strong for it to be pushed, 
against its will, towards nationalism. If a more national path was being pursued in the 
1960s and 1970s, this was so because the national idea seemed compatible with the 
interests of Marxism-Leninism at the time (idem, ¦ 23). From this perspective, the 
discourse of the nation was not disrupting or displacing the Marxist discourse, but rather 
was a form co-opted by it. National ideology, as Martin (2003) puts it, did not lead to an 
authoritarian form of socialism. It was rather the maintenance of the authoritarian form 
of socialism that demanded the incorporation of nationalism as a motivating factor.  
Verdery is even more wrong to assume that a pure Marxist discourse structured, at any 
point in time, the Romanian Communist society, or for that matter, the society of any 
other Communist state. Communist regimes, Martin (2003, ¦ 21) observes, have been 
more cynical in their use of Marxism than even its adversaries, because of the Marxist-
Leninist emphasis on the maintenance of power and control. Starting with Lenin and 
continuing with Stalin, there is no such thing as a pure Marxist discourse in Communist 
societies (¦ 13). However, Martin (¦ 37) argues, Communist regimes should be seen as 
the expression of Marxism, even when this expression is reduced ideologically to the 
Marxist-Leninist concept of the unique ruling Party, that is, Ôthe dictatorship of the 
Party.Õ This concept of the unique ruling Party (a party that rules dictatorially through 
state-terrorism and mass-supervision) forms that tough Marxist-Leninist nucleus which 
resisted unchallenged between 1949 and 1989, and which thus gives Romania its 
essential Communist, and not Nationalistic, character: ÒIn any case, at no moment in 
time, in Romania, did the national(ist) discourse enter into contradiction or even just 
competition with the principle of the Party leadership of all activitiesÓ (¦ 9). In fact, 
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Ceauşescu, through movements like Protochronism, sought not so much to affirm a 
certain national idea or a traditional Romanian-ness83, but rather to insert the Communist 
Party into the history of the nation as its uncontested leader, and into the discourse of the 
nation, as its main regulatory force (idem, ÒNationalist sau comunist?,Ó para. 9).  
From this perspective, MartinÕs (idem, para. 10) conclusion reverses, in the end, that 
reached by Verdery: ÒIn fact, his objective [CeauşescuÕs] was the communization of the 
Nation, not the nationalization of Communism or the indigenization of Marxism.Ó  
 
Conclusions to the Three Theories Regarding the Turn to Nationalism 
Lack of consensus regarding what had caused the turn to nationalism? 
As pointed out initially, despite the general assumption that the turn to nationalism can 
be explained away as a strategy secured by the Party in order to obtain the support of the 
masses (and of the intelligentsia) and to limit the influence of the USSR, the whole issue 
proves more elusive when the three theories discussed above are put together.  
While the first theory identifies the turn to nationalism as a reaction started by the elite, 
which, because of insecurity, moved for autonomy and de-Sovietization, thus 
encouraging patriotism (with other competing factors also possible activating causes), 
the second theory describes the same process as the delegitimization of Marxism 
                                                             
83 Martin (2003, ÒTimpul progresiv al marxismuluiÓ si Òtimpul plat al Partidului,Ó para. 1-7) argues for 
example, that ÒsystematizationÕ Ð Òsystematization consisted largely of the demolition and reconstruction 
of existing villages, towns, and cities, in whole or in part, with the stated goal of turning Romania into a 
"multilaterally developed socialist society" [Wikipedia, ÒSystematization (Romania)Ó], together with the 
destruction of traditional Christian churches or of vestiges such as the Văcăreşti complex, actions to which 
even the protochronists were publicly opposed, gives the measure of CeauşescuÕs Communist beliefs.  
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through a discourse of the nation, so powerful, that it succeeded in forcing the 
Communist Party onto its own terrain. All this, while the third theory posits several turns 
to nationalism, depicting the one from the 60s more as a positive return to national 
culture, with its European and humanistic dimensions, and the one from the 80s, as a 
turn towards an excessive, anti-Western, narrow nationalism Ð in either case, any turn to 
nationalism during CeauşescuÕs rule being interpreted as a personal strategy designed to 
enhance his own status. Most importantly, as part of the third theory, nationalism is seen 
as a discourse limited to the cultural sphere, that does not affect the economic order, and 
which therefore is, at all times, compatible with Marxist-Leninism and, in fact, subject to 
its priorities: hence, the expression Òthe communization of the nationÓ (directed at the 
Ònationalization of communismÓ thesis proposed by Verdery) to describe Ôthe turn to 
nationalismÕ as CeauşescuÕs insertion of the nation into a Communist project. 
In short, while one theory identifies the issue of autonomy/security as central to the turn 
to nationalism, another identifies the source of such a turn in the cultural dominance of 
the discourse of the nation, and, yet another, in the turns to nationalism acting at 
different times either 1) as a counter-ideology, a space of freedom, and normality, 
emerging with the demise of the colonizing Soviet influence (not to be understood as 
Marxist-Leninist or Stalinist) or 2) as a Machiavellian strategy designed to consolidate 
CeauşescuÕs cult of personality and his neo-Stalinist regime.  
It terms of agency, these explanations are quite discordant: 1) an elite group, 2) a 
discourse, 3) the spontaneous expression of the cultural space after colonial involvement 
- naturally including a concern with the idea of the nation (the intellectuals), and 4) the 
desire of an individual leader, namely Ceauşescu, for personal power. As exemplified in 
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the discussion above, similar disagreements center around the issue of the timing of the 
turn to nationalism, the continuity and strength of such a discourse over the entire 
Communist period, and the nature of the discourse, both intrinsically and as manifested 
in relation to official Communist discourse. 
If these theories indicate something clearly, this is that the problem of the turn to 
nationalism is far from having been agreed upon in any significant manner, pointing to a 
need for a diversity of additional approaches.  
 
Other assessments regarding the nature of CeauşescuÕs regime generally point to 
different and sometimes opposed determinants of its national character 
KolakowskiÕs (2005, p.792) view of Stalinism as the continuation of a Leninism itself 
contained in Marxism (though as one of many variants possible) is well-known: ÒThe 
equation: truth = the proletarian world-view = Marxism = the partyÕs world-view = the 
pronouncements of the party leadership = those of the supreme leader is wholly in 
accordance with LeninÕs version of Marxism.Ó Another interpretation (idem, pp.664-
856) for it is given by this parallel equation: Òdictatorship of the proletariatÓ (Marx) = 
Òdictatorship of the partyÓ (Lenin) = Òloyalty to the rulerÓ (Logos Incarnate). If 
attempting to judge Ceauşescu and his regime against the Kolakowski scale, it can be 
observed that Ceauşescu ticks all the boxes for Stalinism except in two major respects: 
1) the features of mass repression and terror and 2) in identifying himself as Òthe 
coryphaeus of scienceÓ and as the ultimate interpreter of Marxism-Leninism in all 
academic disciplines and fields of life (Pollock 2006, p.1), meaning, as Logos incarnate. 
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CeauşescuÕs obvious emotion at receiving, at 55 (in 1973), the title of ÒDoctor Honoris 
CausaÓ (and in his mind, the title of an intellectual) from the University of Bucharest is 
quite telling in this respect (Ujica 2010, 1:33:00 Ð 1:37:00). Whatever the case, it cannot 
be said that Ceauşescu displayed that ÒurgencyÓ of Stalin Òto become a great theorist in 
the tradition of Marx, Engels, and Lenin,Ó or that he similarly Òidentified himself as a 
scholar and saw that identity as a central component of being a successful Marxist-
Leninist leaderÓ (p.217). Such an inability to build up his reputation as a Ôgreat theorist 
in the tradition of Marx, Engels, and Lenin,Õ (or even to the level of Stalin) would go 
some way in explaining why Ceauşescu had chosen to construct his legitimacy around 
the statues and myths of national historical figures (and around the national idea) 
instead. For these two reasons, then, Ceauşescu and his regime deserve to be viewed, 
according to the Kolakowski scale, more as Leninist than Stalinist.  
Based on the continuation of two essential features, Òthe dictatorship of the proletariatÓ 
and the abolition of private property, Martin (2003) interprets the same regime as 
ÒLeninist-Stalinist communismÓ but not as a Ònationalist regime.Ó Furthermore, because 
of its Òmass-terror and surveillance,Ó the Ceauşescu regime is seen as a variant of Òneo-
Stalinism,Ó while, because of its minority policies and restrictions of contact with the 
outside, the regime also appears described as Òan extremist nationalism which could be 
considered, in fact, neo-fascism.Ó  
Verdery (1991, pp.121, 315) does not refer to the nature of the regime except to observe 
that it had switched (as part of its strategy of a Òsymbolic-ideological mode of controlÓ) 
from an ideology of Marxist-Leninism to an ÒIndigenistÓ one to such an extent that this 
had led to Òthe discursive constitution of a nationalism even more powerful than before.Ó 
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The same Ceauşescu regime appears as Leninist to Chen (2007) but this is because of an 
interesting redefinition of Leninism in two key aspects usually associated with 
Stalinism. Chen (37) argues that, by being forced to link nationalism with socialism 
because of the need to support the Communist revolution in nation-states fighting for 
decolonization, Lenin had developed the pragmatic understanding that despite not being 
supposed to be national, the proletarian revolution would have to first proceed as a 
Ònation-state revolution,Ó within national bounds. In the first case, this had led him to 
develop Òa new theory of development and nation-buildingÓ (p.40) acting, in fact, as Òa 
particular program of statist development designed to allow economically backward 
countries to catch up and accelerate the transition to Communism without going through 
fully developed capitalism (p.6).Ó Chen identifies this program with the Stalinist 
economic model. From a mild acknowledgment of the role of the nation, Chen (p.43) 
also maintains, Lenin was already moving towards a standpoint of Ònational Marxism:Ó 
ÒFor Lenin, the goal of the proletarian revolution was Ôeconomic construction for the 
sake of national emancipation,Õ which was to be achieved through Ôpolitical, ideological, 
in short, <superstructural> means.Õ Nations not yet prepared for industrialization could 
still adopt it as a state-led project and eventually catch up with and even surpass the 
West.Ó As Chen (pp.40-44) suggests, even at this level, Lenin only operates with the 
concept of the nation because this represents the largest political unit or collectivity 
available for rule to the Party. However, for Chen, both this sort of Ônational MarxismÕ 
and LeninÕs Ôprogram of statist developmentÕ are well confirmed in CeauşescuÕs 
Romania.  
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A similar argument is reflected in Gavrilă (2004), whose discursive analysis of policy 
documents and programs in the 70s reveals RomaniaÕs regime as Ònational-CommunistÓ 
[Gavrilă (p.2) argues the term also applies for the entire period between 1957 and 1989]. 
At the theoretical level, a term such as Ònational-CommunismÓ is justified because it had 
been foreshadowed by the Leninist notion of the Òright to self-determinationÓ (which 
provided enough leverage for Communist parties to pursue autonomy if mindful of the 
goal of a world-wide Communist revolution) (pp.7-8). At the discursive level, this term 
is validated through Òthe conceptual construct labelled by the regime as the Ôsocialist 
nation,ÕÓ construct which emerges as central to official discourse between 1964 and 
1974. Essentially, this insertion of the nation in the socialist project is not motivated by 
nationalism but by the need to mobilize all the productive forces at the regimeÕs disposal 
in fulfilment of the Leninist model of state-development: ÒSocialist nationalism, though 
nobody in RCP branded it like this (it was just Ôthe socialist nationÕ), became necessary 
in order to insure Ômaximum nourishment of the material and human potentialÕ that was 
crucial in efficient (de)(em)ployment of the forces of production for the achievement of 
the nation-building process Ð the MDSS [Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society]Ó 
(p.49). In conclusion then, this focus of Communist concerns on Òbio-powerÓ (Foucault 
1978, p.140) is essentially responsible for the dual mobilization of the discourse of the 
nation and of Òthe RCP project of Enlightenment [that] was contained in its doctrine of 
socialist humanismÓ (Gavrilă 2004, p.49).   
 
The acknowledged absence of the feature of mass-terror does not stop Tismăneanu 
(2003) from defining the regime of Ceauşescu as Òmature StalinismÓ (p.319), and as 
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Ònational Stalinism.Ó To a large extent this is so also because of CeauşescuÕs open 
admiration for Stalin, which had even led him to describe himself as a Òmodern StalinÓ 
in August 1989 (RFE/RL, 2009). In TismăneanuÕs acceptation, therefore, Stalinism 
refers primarily to a type of personality, a despotic one, obsessed with absolute control, 
and, secondarily, to the repressive social system generated when such a personality 
becomes the absolute locus of power [which places Tismăneanu in the Òtotalitarian 
modelÓ camp described by Gleason (1995)]. In that sense, far from relying on any 
authentic features of nationalism, aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or fragments of 
dependency or Òself-relianceÓ theories from the Global South (Rist, 1997) CeauşescuÕs 
dictatorship is only Òa combination of Byzantine political rites, Stalinist methodology of 
deception and manipulation, and resentful fantasies evocative of some Third World 
tyrannyÓ (Tismăneanu 2003, p.225). 
With the 1964 Ôdeclaration of independenceÕ from Russia and the continuous refusal of 
the path of civil/state accommodation pursued by other EE countries the only 
developmental path Romania could pursue was an internal one, argues Crowther (1988, 
p.66), and this led to the Romanian regime becoming a unique political system, different 
from other EE countries, and which deserves to be studied on its own: ÒMarxist ideology 
and Leninist party organization were melded with the intense nationalism and 
paternalism of a peripheralized nineteenth century Balkan state to form a unique 
political/social entity. The outcome of this course of events was the emergence in 
Romania during the 1970s of a comprehensive political model that constitutes an 
extreme variant of state-socialismÓ (idem, p.109). The amazing insight of Crowther 
(pp.99-100), however, is the observation (well-founded if looking at the division of 
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Communist society according to classes, different types of councils such as the 
ÒWorking PeoplesÕ CouncilsÓ, and Òspecialized mass organizations such as the Trade-
unions, Communist Youth and Students Associations, WomenÕs Cooperatives, and 
Creative Artists UnionsÓ etc.) that, in the end, the internal path of development followed 
by the Ceauşescu regime ended up reproducing RomaniaÕs Far Right ÒCorporatistÓ 
model of the interwar era: ÒNot only does the current eliteÕs perception of autarkic 
industrial development as an imperative of national survival mirror the attitudes of 
Manoilescu and his compatriots, but its state-directed design for development conforms 
in its essentials with his vision of corporatismÓ (p.156). Furthermore, Crowther (idem) 
considers Òthe idolisation of the LeaderÓ as also of Romanian Far Right inspiration. In 
conclusion, his work establishes the national legacy of interwar Romania as essential to 
ÒCeauşescuism,Ó84 both in terms of state-development and in terms of its leader cult.   
 
Attempting a synthesis of the three theories 
Where, then, does this leave us with regard to the nationalistic discourse? The following 
is a quick attempt at a personal synthesis of the theories discussed above.  
First of all, it is undeniable that a lot of factors tend to position the turn to nationalism as 
taking place between 1962 and 1964/6. The number of factors involved require, 
however, a multidimensional model, with further research undertook on each axis to 
                                                             
84 CrowtherÕs (1988, p.16) theory regarding the specific nature of CeauşescuÕs regime, or of 
ÒCeauşescuism,Ó has also received support from research in the domain of reproductive policies (Pălăşan 
2009). 
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calibrate the overall influence of each factor. From what has been presented so far, a 
certain scenario can be assumed.  
Clearly, at the time, the RCP elite found itself in an insecure position because of not 
wanting to accept KhrushchevÕs CMEAÕs proposals regarding its economy. This point 
has been well confirmed by Dragomir (2014)85. The eliteÕs subsequent move for 
autonomy opened the door for de-Sovietization, which slid into patriotism while also 
opening the cultural sphere for a revival of national culture. It is possible that the Party 
came to understand only gradually the powerful effects of a nationalistic discourse, both 
in terms of popular support and as a motivating ideology. The fact that somehow the 
USSR was partially involved as an advocate of de-Sovietization, and even of a move 
towards nationalism as a way of securing the foundations of external Communist 
regimes, cannot be ignored either. At the same time, it is however possible that the Party 
had somehow intuited the potential of (or maybe, just simply walked into realizing the 
need for) a nationalistic discourse prior to 1962, when the last social class opposing it, 
the peasantry, was completely brought under its control, signaling the need for a 
unifying ideology (one that could go beyond the notion of Òclass-struggle,Ó rendered 
irrelevant by the success of the Communist elite in obtaining control over the whole 
society). That would explain the reform in the recruiting strategies within the Party 
apparatus and also the release from prison of the political detainees/intellectuals formed 
in the nationalistic tradition of the inter-war period. Yet another possible explanation 
could charge the elite of the Communist Party as having, subconsciously or maybe even 
                                                             
85 Whether at any time the RCP elite also perceived the de-Stalinization reforms advocated by 
Khrushchev as another threat to its position is no longer as certain an argument as it once seemed (see 
Tănase 1998, p.138 discussed at the beginning of the chapter, or Tismăneanu 2003, p.168, versus 
Dragomir 2014, p.66). 
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consciously, internalized aspects of the nationalistic discourse prior to 1962 or even 
1949, which then resulted in the later reforms of the 1962-1965. Bucur (2009, p.178) is 
adamant, for example, that the 1965 Òovertly nationalist discourse about World War IIÓ 
was Òjust a continuation of a vision Ceauşescu had been finessing since the 1950sÓ and 
not the ushering of Òa new course.Ó Crowther (1988, p.64) comes close to the view 
above by admitting that nationalism Òcolored the political sensibilities of the [Dej] 
Romanian leadership,Ó although, not strongly enough to have caused by itself Òthe 
rupture with Moscow.Ó This, while an old Romanian communist like Alexandru 
Brlădeanu, the key economist drafting the 1964 Ôdeclaration of independenceÕ and 
negotiating the CMEA agreement, and also an Òalternate member of the politburo under 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej from 1962 to 1965Ó (Tismăneanu et al. 2006), argues that Dej 
was a man of high intelligence and political acumen who did wonders in fighting for 
Òthe independence of the countryÓ (Brlădeanu 1997, cited in Pruteanu 1998). More 
recently, Dragomir (2014) lends considerable support to such a perspective by showing 
that the RWP elite constantly preferred to risk its domestic position by opposing the 
CMEA project, rather than engage with anything that it perceived Òcould infringe on the 
national independenceÓ (Dej 1963, cited in Dragomir 2014, p.71)86. This is, for example, 
how Dragomir (p.70) describes the perceptions of the ruling elite during the 5-8 March 
1963 Plenum of the CC of the RWP: ÒThe Politburo members emphasised that the 
CMEA integration threatened RomaniaÕs national interests, her independence, 
                                                             
86
 “Some scholars Ð like Ungureanu or Miroiu Ð argue that in the early 1960s the Romanians' declared 
concern with the stateÕs national interests was not genuine, but simulated. Others Ð like Tănase, Stanciu or 
Tismăneanu Ð contend that the Romanian- Soviet 1960s divergences were not about RomaniaÕs 
sovereignty, independence or economic interests as the Romanian leaders claimed, that the RomaniansÕ 
sovereignty related arguments were merely propaganda. However, this study found that in the early 1960s 
the Romanian leaders were genuinely convinced that the Soviet leadership intended to infringe on 
RomaniaÕs national sovereignty, independence or even territorial integrity and national identityÓ 
(Dragomir 2014, p.180).  
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sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even the stateÕs Ônational characterÕ was in danger, 
they argued, since the other bloc members aimed to create an Ôideological, cultural 
integrationÕ, through the creation of Ôsome extraordinary thingsÕ such as Ôthe integration 
in the field of the school textbooksÕ.Ó Moreover, by arguing that ÒRomanian opposition 
to the bloc specialization was formulated in different CMEA bodies as early as 1958 or 
1959Ó (p.181) and that the RWPÕs Òpost-war grand strategyÓ of ÒbandwagoningÓ with 
the USSR (policy which had originated with support from the Romanian elites as a 
whole, and which was maintained almost throughout the Communist period) had been 
motivated by the perceived need to safeguard national independence, integrity and 
sovereignty in the face of an impending Russian threat (and not by ideology) (p.33), 
Dragomir (2014, p.35) indirectly points to the need to reconceptualize the role played by 
the idea and the ideology of the nation in the workings of the RWP and the RCP elite: 
ÒPublicly and officially, until the early 1960s, Romania acted both domestically and 
internationally as the most loyal satellite of the USSR. Behind the scenes, though, 
Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer or Pauker criticised and tried to block the Soviet exploitation of 
RomaniaÕs resources, and attempted to limit the interference of the Soviet counsellors in 
RomaniaÕs domestic affairs, as early as 1947-1955.Ó 
Noticeably, one of the big research gaps the three theories above indirectly single out is 
that concerning the mentalities and belief-structures of Communist personalities and 
institutions87. As mentioned before, it is highly likely that, for example, in terms of 
                                                             
87
 Paradoxically, this is also the area of research that has been most strongly developed in Romania, 
particularly through the writings of Vladimir Tismăneanu. However, Tismăneanu has been too quick to 
interpret the entire history of the RCP and all the big questions regarding the nature of the Communist 
regime and its policies through the psychological profile of its leading figures, assumed, strangely in all 
cases, to essentially mirror a Stalinist mindset reducible to one single feature: that of Òresentment.Ó 
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models of leadership, the national model had played an essential role alongside the 
Stalinist or Marxist/Leninist models in shaping the way in which Communist leaders 
would have come to understand their own role, actions and options, even as early as 
1949, and not only after 1965 or 1980. After all, the Ònational factionÓ of Dej and 
Ceauşescu (Deletant 1998, p.62), had, from the very beginning, felt the imposition of a 
colonial like attitude and discourse from Moscow [this is very clearly emphasized by 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
ÒDevoid of any significant unorthodox temptation, isolated from the mainstream in the interwar years, and 
slavishly loyal to the Stalinist model,Ó Tismăneanu (2003, p.112) argues, Òthe political culture of 
Romanian communism expressed itself in extreme authoritarianism, bureaucratic centralism, worship of 
the party leadership, persecution of the handful of critical militants, conspiratorial factionalism, sclerotic 
dogmatism, persistent refusal to engage in theoretical debates, intolerance, exclusiveness, and 
unconditional loyalty to the world communist center, represented as Ôproletarian internationalism.ÓÕ Not 
surprisingly then, Dej manifested Òthe same desire to play little StalinÓ like also Òhis chief ideologueÓ 
Leonte Răutu (p.135) because, despite not having studied at the CominternÕs school like the others, he had 
aptly developed a ÒStalinism of instinct, not ideology.Ó What better description for him and his party than 
this, then: ÒOr perhaps one should rather say that Dej was a Stalinist Machiavellian who played a bloody 
game for power in a Byzantine sect of zealotsÓ (p.99)? Not a surprise then, that Dej had promoted 
Ceauşescu because of seeing he Òwas the perfect embodiment of the Stalinist apparatchikÓ (p.176). And, 
of course, Ceauşescu was not to disappoint in DejÕs footsteps: ÒNicolae Ceauşescu asserted himself as a 
master manipulator and outreached his Stalinist mentors in cynical astuteness and hypocrisyÓ (p.190). As 
for the turn to nationalism, TismăneanuÕs verdict is in line with the above and straightforward - the RCP 
was only fighting de-Stalinization by manipulating the national idea:  ÒWorried by KruschevÕs Ôsecond 
thaw,Õ the Dejites try to resist de-Stalinization by devising a national strategy to entice the intelligentsia 
and bridge the gap between the party elite and the populationÓ (p.168) and again ÒBreaking with hard-core 
Stalinism and rehabilitating national history were vital: in Romania, however, they were not the result of 
activities championed by critical intellectuals, but rather an opportunistic attempt on the part of the party 
elite to disguise its unwillingness to engage in real de-StalinizationÓ (p.151). Thus, what for Martin counts 
as an authentic first turn to nationalism in the 60s is revealed in Tismăneanu as only another brilliant 
manipulative scheme employed by Ceauşescu to achieve complete hold of power. Recently this position 
of Tismăneanu has been severely contested by Dragomir (2014, p.66): ÒWhile scholars often explain 
RomaniaÕs opposition to the CMEA integration through the Romanian leadersÕ goal of preserving their 
domestic power in the context of de- Stalinisation, the archival materials provide us with a different 
explanation. The Romanian leaders believed that their power positions would have been in fact secured 
had they agreed to the Soviet CMEA projects and that, on the contrary, their opposition would have 
jeopardised their domestic power positions, as the Soviet leaders might have decided to replace the 
opposing Romanian leadership with an obedient new team. As Bodnăraş put it, had Romania accepted 
integration, the state would have faced Ôthe beginning of the abolishment of its sovereigntyÕ, but Ôas much 
as our leadership is concerned I think that we will have plenty of time for hunting and other activities; we 
will become bailiffsÕ. Thus, a perceptual approach reveals that the Romanians opposed the USSR not 
because they feared that the Soviet leaders might have imposed a new leadership in Romania, but in spite 
of that fear.Ó 
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Tismăneanu (2003),88 who views the resulting inferiority complex of the RCP and its 
leaders, and, in particular, the psychological feature of ÒresentmentÓ as somehow 
responsible for all the major policy aspects and features of the Romanian Communist 
regime89 Ð without, however, ever linking them to the potential development of a 
nationalistic outlook], and even as they proceeded with the elimination of Pătrăşcanu - 
the only Communist leader arguing for a national path to Communism in Romania - they 
must have somehow empathized with the national idea as a form of resistance 
challenging the USSR (even if only from within an authoritarian Stalinist system). How 
else can we account for the fact that the Communist elite of 1964/65 identified itself 
with, indeed, defined its mission in terms of the perennial issue of national 
modernization, even while this was to be solved through a program of Stalinist 
industrialization, to the point of challenging the USSR in terms of its economic policy in 
1964? As Crowther (1988, p.151) suggests: ÒFrom its inception the nationalistic element 
within the RCP elite was committed wholeheartedly to extensive industrialization as a 
teleological goal. While consistent with Soviet Marxism, this ideological preoccupation 
was just as much a part of the Romanian cultural heritage. Once Soviet designs for 
                                                             
88 ÒCeauşescu and his cult were in fact less of an aberration than they appeared to external observers. 
However, as Ken Jowitt has shown, Romanian communism could never fully overcome its pariah 
genealogy: during its years underground, the party elite had been made up primarily of allogenic elements 
(such as Bulgarian, Hungarian, Jewish, or Ukrainian Romanians) with little understanding of the country's 
national values and its people's aspirations. The party championed ideas and slogans with minimal appeal 
to the class it claimed to represent, portraying Romania as a "multinational imperialist country'' and 
advocating the dismemberment of the Romanian nation-state brought into being by the Versailles and 
Trianon treaties of 1919-20. Its endorsement of Russian territorial claims on Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina failed to stir a responsive chord in either Romania's urban proletariat or its radical intelligentsia 
(who were, in any case, overwhelmingly attracted by the extreme right). Lacking a mass base, dominated 
by foreigners, fractured, and pathetically impotent, the RCP was, moreover, treated contemptuously by the 
Comintern, further enhancing its pariah psychology- indeed, an excruciating inferiority complex on the 
part of its cadres. The anti-Soviet outbursts of Gheorghiu-Dej's last years and of Ceauşescu's twenty-four-
year rule thus have to be seen in the context of the overall history of Romanian communism. In any other 
East-Central European communist party, it would have been much more difficult for a Ceauşescu to amass 
so much powerÓ (Tismăneanu 2003, p.24) 
89 For this reason, that of benefiting from a more balanced account, I have chosen to rely in this chapter on 
the elite theory put forward by Tănase (1998) instead of that of Tismăneanu (2003). 
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southeastern Europe shifted from rapid industrialization to a plan for regional 
specialization that would have relegated Romania to the status of a perpetual Ôbread 
basket,Õ it became apparent that the RCP leadersÕ attachment to economic development 
emanated primarily from the latter source.Ó To conclude with, then, it might be that a 
more convincing explanation would have to account for the integration of all three 
viewpoints of Tănase, Verdery and Martin, in light, also, of other research available that 
is more specific in focus (such as Dragomir 2014).  
 
Conclusion: Nationalism, the Turn to Nationalism and Socialist 
Humanism 
Whatever the case, it can be assumed that the resultant opening allowed for the 
previously existent strong nationalistic discourse to partially advance its own claims, 
nevertheless in a context where it was being defused and appropriated as part of an 
evolving Communist discourse. While the nationalistic discourse was being expressed 
and also appropriated, the Communist Party (as well as different intellectual groups) also 
learned about its strategic uses, which can explain the differences in national emphasis at 
different times during the regime, or the different uses of the nationalistic discourse. At 
the same time, it cannot be denied that the national discourse at times forced the 
Communist Party onto its own terrain, by advancing claims regarding the nation that 
could not be ignored. Similarly, the Party also managed to restrict forms of the national 
discourse, when and where it deemed important, as it learned how to control the 
discourse. Despite this, it cannot be denied that starting with the 1980s a monolithic 
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form of nationalism had become as important as the Marxist-Leninism foundations of 
society and of Party rule, and as the humanistic discourse that connected both, marking 
the end-result of a very complex process of hybridization. Metaphorically, this 
hybridization is captured well through policies like the 1976 formation of the ÒThe 
FatherlandÕs Falcons:Ó with one side of the flag representing the nation and the other the 
red colour of the Communist Movement, but with their motto being ÒThe FatherlandÕs 
Falcons do a good deed every day!Ó 
It is this hybridization, I wish to argue, that should form the focus of research, rather 
than just imagined clear-cut versions of Marxist or nationalistic discourses or policies. It 
is through this focus that I choose to position myself with regard to the conflict theories 
of Verdery and Martin: that of asking how discourses might have come together into one 
hybrid and shifting form, rather than just how they appeared, subverted or were 
subverted, disappeared and re-appeared as autonomous structures. Verdery is right to ask 
why at some point the national discourse had become so important and to ask at the 
expense of what discourse this has happened. Verdery is also right in observing the 
colonial vs. domestic discourse divide and in questioning what had happened to more 
authentic forms of Marxism, to Marxist notions and, generally, to the intellectual 
movement of the Left, in Communist Romania. Her analysis of national culture is 
absolutely essential in terms of explaining cultural politics within Romania during the 
Communist period, even if her emphasis is placed on continuity rather than difference. 
In a context in which intellectuals and political scientists have given much priority to the 
agency of the Party or the presumed psychology of its leaders, any attempt to build 
explanations based on structural and cultural factors can only be welcomed. However, 
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Martin is also justified in suggesting that the discourse of the nation did not subvert a 
Marxist discourse, firstly, because there was no such thing as a pure Marxist discourse at 
the time operating in the Communist systems, and secondly, because it did not succeed 
in displacing some form of it as essentially defining the Communist system (with its 
appropriations of nationalism), that form being associated with Marxist-Leninism and 
Ôthe principle of Party leadership of all activities.Õ Martin is also right in claiming that a 
nationalist discourse can have positive value, but also, in claiming that rather than 
subverting the foundations of a Communist discourse, the nationalist discourse was co-
opted into it because it gave it added strength.90 ÔThe communization of nationalismÕ is, 
therefore, a very worthy concept and expression, which could form the basis for new 
research. At the same time, it can be also ascertained that in some ways the exacerbated 
nationalist discourse was a main factor in the demise of Communism (see for example, 
the use of the national-hero archetype by protesters during the 1989 Revolution), 
however, not because such a discourse had weakened an existing discourse that could be 
mainly classified as Marxist. Last but not least, it is as fair to accuse Verdery of being 
neo-Marxist in her assumptions as it would be fair to consider Martin biased because of 
his affiliation with the anti-protochronist intellectual faction leaning towards humanism, 
liberalism and the West. It is easy to see that while Verdery looks at the nationalist 
discourse as a larger sociological structure stemming from the cultural field, Martin 
views it as a more specific cultural form engaging directly both the Party and the 
intellectuals. Because of the regulation of the status and practices of the intellectuals, the 
July theses are thus understood by Martin as a departure from the nationalistic discourse 
                                                             
90 Essentially, the same opinion is voiced by Lucian Boia (2005, p.130): ÒIn assuming Ôthe cultural 
heritage,Õ Communism had followed its own legitimization, even at the cost and, primarily, through the 
cost of deforming the authentic content of national culture.Ó 
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(which is assumed to be limited to that in which intellectuals functioned in the late 
1960s), although the mini-cultural revolution could easily also be construed as deeply 
nationalistic in character and implications91. Last but not least, Martin seems to adopt the 
tendency so common among the former humanistic anti-protochronists siding with the 
West, that: 1) the explanation for structural events of the Communist period lies 
predominantly with the distorted/deficient/egocentric character of Ceauşescu and his 
effort at manipulation and control, and 2) that, ultimately, Communist systems, Stalinist 
and totalitarian, are the direct and only possible embodiment of Marxism. Moreover, 
despite the fact that he explicitly highlights the importance of humanism for one of the 
intellectual groups involved in the debate regarding the idea of the nation, Martin fails to 
acknowledge that humanism could also be seen as part of the nationalist discourse 
promoted by the Party, or generally, as an important part of the larger Communist 
discourse. Ultimately, both the arguments of Verdery and Martin single out the same 
questions: 1) What is the true nature of a Communist system and its main discourse/s, 
and, in particular, that of the Ceauşescu regime? 2) To the extent to which significant 
hybridization is taking place, what is the nature of that hybridization process and of its 
forms?  
                                                             
91 This makes for an interesting discussion. Martin (2002iii) sees the July Theses as marking a six-year 
interruption in the Communist PartyÕs investment in the nationalistic discourse, from 1971 to 1977. In his 
opinion, Ceauşescu had reverted to a more Marxist-Leninist mode through the new model of the Maoist 
Cultural Revolution because the thesis of national unity had started developing uncontrollable 
consequences. Hence, the more stringent control on culture and the activity of intellectuals. With the crises 
of the year 1977 (the oil crisis, the devastating earthquake, the minersÕ uprising, Paul GomaÕs dissident 
movement, the formation of the first free syndicate Ð SLOMR), Ceauşescu came to realize that the cultural 
mini-revolution lacked support, and decided to play Ôthe national cardÕ once again in order to consolidate 
his personal power. This contrasts heavily, for example, with interpretations like that of Lucian Boia 
(2005, p.132), who sees the July Theses as marking the shift to a more totalitarian and isolating regime 
which uses this closed space to propagate the message of unity around the Party through the ideology of 
nationalism.   
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It is to this problematic that I want to add the notion of socialist humanism. My 
suggestion so far has been to identify two main periods, with two main discourses, 
socialist realism and socialist humanism, where the second discourse is a hybrid form 
between discourses such as humanism, Marxism (or, rather, ÔMarxism-LeninismÕ) and 
nationalism (with other discursive influences present as well). Thus, the next part of the 
thesis will attempt to describe, in chronological order, the other important cultural 
discourses succeeding (or rather responding to and being framed by) Ôthe turn to a 
national cultureÕ in this second period, with an aim at emphasizing, via their insertion of 
the hero-mirror mechanism, their hybrid and neglected socialist humanist character. 
As for this section, my aim here has been to challenge the very common view that the 
period 1964/5 to 1989 should be viewed mainly as a period of excessive nationalism 
imposed by the Party, underneath which has survived, at all times, an authentic form of 
nationalism, both of which can be willingly or unwillingly recuperated in the post-
communist period.92 As I hope to have proven, the question of what or who has triggered 
the turn to nationalism is far from resolved, while the assumption that some form of 
authentic and pure nationalism (and in fact, national culture as a whole) has escaped the 
hybridization process and the massive internal reconfigurations of Communism (as, also 
the assumption that nationalism has only played a passive/victim role in relation to the 
Communist Party) seems at best utopian. From this perspective, Ôthe communization of 
the nation,Õ as also the pressures to impose the category of the Nation on Communist 
discourse, did not result in Òthe distortion of the authentic repository of national cultureÓ 
                                                             
92 Ò...the Communist period is interpreted as a traumatic interruption of an organic historical growth of the 
national identity in question. Communism is thus externalized, deinternationalized, and portrayed as the 
sum of the traumas to which a foreign power subjected oneÕs own identity, which now requires therapy so 
that said identity can become intact againÓ (Groys 2008, p.156). 
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(Boia 2005, p.130), but rather, into the complete hybridization and transformation of 
national culture into what we have today. Pure Romanian culture, if it ever existed, 
cannot be recuperated for, whatever it was, it has been forever inextricably linked with 
that of Communism93. All that can be done from here is to assess this heritage and make 
something new of it. At the level of Romanian literature this has been achieved at a 
remarkable level by I.D. Srbu (2004, pp.31-32):  
 ÒEven the historical past (full of valiant heroes and decapitated martyrs) had become 
new under the frenetic and optimistic avalanche of the last wave of rebirth and 
reconstruction. ...miraculous it seemed to me (...) this dialectical reconciliation, on the 
plane of the subconscious, of any contradiction between word and act, between reality 
and praise, between the dreamy-dream and its material basis. Here no one had insomnias 
because of the future, no one experienced remorse because of some wickedness, the 
values of culture and civilization, borrowed (not owned) because of reasons of 
opportunism and imitation, were so well wrapped in appearances and quotations, that the 
whole world could consider itself both quick-witted and damn good at stealing and being 
resourceful. A river of candour and indifference washed everything in poetry and 
patriotism.Ó 
 
 
                                                             
93 ÒBeyond thatÑand this is, probably, the worst part of the storyÑthe contemporary Western cultural 
markets, as well as contemporary cultural studies, require that the Russians, Ukrainians, and so on 
rediscover, redefine, and manifest their alleged cultural identity. They are required to demonstrate, for 
example, their specific Russianness or Ukrainness, which, as I have tried to show, these post-Communist 
subjects do not have and cannot have because even if such cultural identities ever really existed they were 
completely erased by the universalist Soviet social experiment. The uniqueness of Communism lies in the 
fact that it is the first modern civilization that has historically perishedÑ with the exception, perhaps, of 
the short-lived Fascist regimes of the 1930s and Õ40sÓ (Groys 2008, p.163). 
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 ÒSolar LyricismÓ and the Recuperation of the 
ÒInner SpaceÓ (or of the Inner Self) 
 
Eight Reasons for the Appearance of Lyricism in the 1960s 
More or less concomitant with the 1960s turn to nationalism occurs the gradual 
recuperation of aestheticism, particularly under the form of a certain type of lyricism 
later labeled by some as ÒCeauşist orphismÓ94 (Cernat 2004ii, p.381): ÒIf the poetry of 
the 50s had been one epical-dogmatic, and that of the 80s would be one of Ôde-lyricism,Õ 
the 60s generation is defined, essentially, through lyricismÓ (Cernat 2005, pp.227-228).  
If the poetry of the 1950s is concerned, before 1953 (the beginning of de-Stalinization), 
with epical heroes (martyrs of the Communist Cause or heroes in the field of work) and 
the cheerful motivation of class struggle and activism (including calls to violence), 
during the late 1950s, a more lyrical poetry Òdedicated to the party, history, to the 
struggle for liberation and peace or to the pure sentiments of the Communist eraÓ (p.227) 
gradually enters the scene. Why would the old, proletarian, Manichean, aggressive 
optimism, and the old, pedagogical, activist like folklore of the 50s suddenly give way to 
the Òmythicizing, ritualistic and ceremonious, almost liturgicalÓ new optimism, and to 
                                                             
94 Orphism refers here to the themes, symbols and states related to the pre-Christian, pagan, naturist 
religious cults associated with practices of initiation, mysteries, magic, the duality of body and soul, 
pantheism and a concern with immortality: ÒThe new orphism concerned the rediscovery, through song, of 
the archetypes of the community, the integration in the harmony, totality and cosmic immortality having 
as their center the new CosmoscratÓ (Cernat 2004ii, p.385). Romanian Orphism has been associated with 
tracology or Dacia-mania, and has its roots in the poems of Lucian Blaga and the religious theories 
advanced by Mircea Eliade regarding the cultural roots of Romanians (idem).  
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the new naturist, pantheistic, magical-incantatory form of neo-folklore (p.231) of the 
60s? 
One explanation sees this significant shift as the result of an essential change in the 
mechanisms of control advocated by the Communist Party. This is certainly confirmed 
by Lefter (2012, p.231) who sees the ÒatypicalÓ recuperation of modernity in the 60s, or 
in his terms, the emergence of Òneo-modernismÓ (1960-65 Ð 1980), as occasioned by the 
decision of the Communist party to put an end to the Proletkult experiment. Thus, while 
the years between 1949-1964 correspond to the annihilation of class-enemies or to the 
Ôleveling of societyÕ (and to social realism at the level of culture), the years after 1960 
see the emergence of a more seductive and more subtle strategic mode of governance, 
concerned primarily with the ideological control of society95 (i.e., social humanism, at 
the level of culture). From this perspective, the new lyricism marks the partial 
annexation of the oppositionÕs discourse through the recuperation of national ideology 
and aestheticism, and through that, the establishment of a kind of truce between the 
Party and the representatives of these traditions, namely the intellectual/political 
detainees of the interwar era (Cernat 2005, p.225). Here, the concern of the Party with 
attracting famous intellectuals in its own structures is best represented by the 1950s 
strenuous attempts by Dej to refashion the more aesthete poet Tudor Arghezi into the 
Ônational poetÕ of the Communist regime, and also by the later rehabilitation of severely 
                                                             
95 ÒBy abandoning a mode of control based on material incentives and shifting to symbolic-ideological 
ones, the Ceauşescu leadership saved itself from the decentralization of power inherent in many 
technocratic reforms. Moreover, it increased the relative weight of humanist and cultural intellectuals over 
technical ones. That is, because there was no reform of the Romanian political economy, engineers, 
economists and enterprise managers lost some influence over the apparatus whereas historians, writers and 
philosophers Ð the linchpins of ideological and symbolic creation Ð gained relative to themÓ (Verdery 
1991, p.107). 
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marginalized cultural figures such as the symbolist poet George Bacovia (1958), the 
philosopher-poet Lucian Blaga (1962) and the art critic Titu Maiorescu (1963) (idem).  
The same problem, namely, that of an essential change in the conduct of the regime 
towards society, can also be looked at in another way. If the first stage, of the 
annihilation of society, can be viewed as a negation of a Hegelian kind, namely, as an 
anti-thesis, then the second stage can also be perceived as one of synthesis, where 
society is made to identify with the rule of the Party through the formation of a unifying, 
common ideology Ð which sees the nucleus of Communist ideology ready to engage and 
absorb elements of the national-cultural discourse: ÒCeauşist Totalitarianism, lyrical and 
epical, conceived itself as a political alchemy, through which the lead of national 
tradition could be transformed into Communist goldÓ (Cernat 2004ii, p.385).  
Another interpretation, however, credits the turn to nationalism as effectively opening 
the doors for a return to interwar cultural discourses, while at the same time positioning 
as national symbols and Romanian icons poets such as Mihai Eminescu. Moves such as 
these, the argument goes, had indirectly signaled the freedom to return to lyricism and 
forms of Romanticism. Or, to put it otherwise, faced with a period of relaxation in the 
sphere of culture, the new generation of poets/intellectuals were simply trying to 
continue from where Romanian poetry had left off during the interwar period. However, 
while a partial return to the Romantic lyricism of Eminescu and the orphic lyricism of 
Blaga etc. was allowed for, this implied a compromise that required the 
communization96 of the national tradition: ÒWe are not dealing so much with a poetry of 
                                                             
96 For Cernat, these Orphic elements define not only the encomiastic poetry of the 60s, but in continuation, 
also the later rituals of the ÒFlacăra CenacleÓ (ÒThe Flame CenacleÓ), that is, the late 70s attempt by the 
Ceauşescu regime to win the cultural battle with the West by creating a Communist state-led Ôhippie 
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the struggle, but with one of becoming [fulfillment], breathing through all its pores 
paradisiacal felicity, confidence in the permanence and glory of the nation Ð rescued 
through the Communism hypostasized by the absolute LeaderÓ (Cernat 2004ii, p.382). 
Yet another explanation views the traumatic feelings of relief associated with the partial 
liberalization of the cultural sphere in the 60s as generating the illusion of freedom for 
intellectuals and poets, and even feelings of gratitude. In fact, by Òjubilantly evading 
from the socialist-realist psychosis into the delirium of the germinative-incantatory 
metaphors of hieratic purity and of patriotic fundamentalismÓ the poets from the 60s 
generation did indeed recover, even if just partially, an important space of creative 
freedom (Cernat 2005, p.230). For the first time, poets were allowed to be preoccupied 
with that which had formed an essential context to their formation, and which had been 
denied them for almost 15 years, that is, their notion of self, their feelings and emotions, 
their adolescence, their families, and the idea of the nation, together with forms of 
religiosity and mysticism. To this was added the freedom to express such themes in an 
aesthetical manner, arguably, without being suspected of creating decadent art. As Paul 
Cernat observes, Ò[t]he current themes of their poetry: childhood, adolescence, the 
parents (tradition), nature, and Ôthe patriotic feelingÕ are the resultants of the sublimation 
of a common biographical experienceÓ (idem, pp.230-231), itself generated because of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
counter-cultureÕ. Moreover, these elements, namely Òthe oracle-like solemnity, the sacralizing 
grandiloquence, the attraction for ÔrootsÕ, naturism, animism, festive, heroic and euphoric syncretism, the 
appetite for the grandiose and the sublimeÓ (p.384) are essential in forming that type of Òdeviated, 
ÔsyntheticÕ religiosityÓ which feeds the personality cult of Nicolae Ceauşescu (and of the national poet 
Mihai Eminescu and of other historical figures Ceauşescu chooses to identify with) throughout the latter 
phases of his regime. For these reasons, Cernat (p.384) classifies the totalitarianism of the Ceauşescu 
regime as a Ògrotesque ÔOrphic totalitarianism.ÕÓ Continuing on the same line, Cernat (2005, p.232) 
ascertains that the personality cult of the Leader required Òthe cultic sacralization of PoetryÓ as placed in 
the service of Òsocialist patriotism,Ó and that this, in turn, led lyrical poetry to become  Òthe magic Center 
of national identity and the propagandistic vehicle for the manipulation of collective emotions.Ó A very 
similar opinion can also be found in Dobrescu (2001, pp.148-152). 
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the post-traumatic decompression following the partial liberalization of the cultural 
sphere.  
Furthermore, a similar type of psychological interpretation identifies a possible source 
for the lyricism of the 60s in the subconscious internalization of the Stalinist trauma. 
This argument relies on an observation made by art critic and psychoanalyst Charles 
Mauron. According to Mauron, Ôthe themeÕ of a poet is formed with the constitution of 
the Ôorphic self,Õ and expresses the subconscious internalization of a trauma. Paul Cernat 
thinks this theory is applicable to the products of the 60s generation: ÒHence Õthe 
crying,Õ result of the torn candour, which, discovering the world, runs towards 
something that is Ômuch higher and much soonerÕ97. On the other hand, the solemn use 
of the first person plural expresses the fear of individuation, the subconscious desire to 
fuse with the impersonal, collective energies, be they of nature, of the nation, of love or 
of the multitudesÓ (idem, p.241). 
Another, more practical, explanation is offered by Dobrescu (2001, p.49), who sees the 
new poetry as resulting from two traditional phobias of the modernizing intellectual 
elite, one towards the party and its human emblems of totalitarianism, and the other, 
towards the uneducated masses: ÒTo write pure, Orphic, self-reflexive poetry laden with 
alchemy, Kaballah or Hesychasm meant as much to absolve yourself for your 
participation in party meetings as to abstract yourself from the sea of proletarian 
vulgarity.Ó  
                                                             
97 This part reproduces a verse from Nichita StănescuÕs well-known poem entitled ÒCntecÓ (ÒSongÓ): 
ÒTake me happiness, on high, and hit/my temple into the stars, until /my world prolonged and never-
ending/becomes a column or something else/much higher, and much sooner. Ò  
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Alternatively, Dobrescu (1998, p.211) also argues in a different place, the new type of 
poetry emerged as a reaction to the materialism and atheism of Communist ideology. 
Here, the officially sanctioned return to the poetic universe of Blaga made less risky and 
partly acceptable the presence of a diffuse mysticism with roots in underground poetry. 
Derived subconsciously from the inter-war Orthodox poetry that had continued in the 
Communist prisons during the 50s, this mystical orientation was considered attractive 
both because of its emphasis on the sacred and because it carried an aura of dissent and 
opposition to the party: ÒHeroism, meant, also to be mystical, to exalt revelationÓ 
(idem).  
Finally, in an essay on Nichita Stănescu, largely considered the most significant poet of 
Romanian neo-modernism, Dobrescu (1998, pp.179-184) puts forward a third 
explanation. In a nutshell, Dobrescu sees the case of Nichita Stănescu as an example of 
how effectively counter-culture was being subsumed into the official culture by the 
regime. Stănescu, and here it is assumed the argument stands for other members of his 
generation, was in touch with Western forms of alternative culture and can be 
considered to have started his career as an ÔundergroundÕ poet. His initial themes, like 
for example the motif of the sun, the call for liberty and even the reference to the long 
hair, mirrored those of Western hippie poets:   
ÒThe sun ascends from objects, crying, 
shakes the borders, voiceless and grave.  
My soul meets Him, Ave!  
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My horse rises on two shoes.  
My pale mane burns on the wind.Ó98 (Stănescu, cited in Dobrescu 1998, p.180) 
Under immense and diverse pressures from the censors, critics and fellow artists in the 
literary field as well as from the public, Stănescu, however, moves away from the poetry 
of Western counter-culture and the emphasis (through a Òlanguage of intimacyÓ) on the 
self as individuality and finally assumes a form of philosophical and hermetical 
communication that refuses itself reference to the world and to a concrete self: ÒThe 
indistinct self or the astral projections are preferred to the right of an own image, of an 
own personaÓ (Idem, pp.182-183).99  
 
Conclusion: ÒSolar Lyricism,Ó the Hero-Mirror Mechanism and 
Socialist Humanism 
The mirror mechanism has been previously defined as Ôa device that operates a 
Communist-humanistic discourse which it adjusts in order to govern the possibilities of 
the mind to imagine reality,Õ its mission being that of creating and regulating Ôpositive 
avatars (heroes imbued with the best of humanity) for every social category.Õ How does 
the lyricism of the 60s generation in poetry then, relate to this mechanism and to the 
wider discourse of socialist humanism?   
                                                             
98 This translation of the poem ÔO călărire in zoriÕ (ÔOn horseback at dawnÕ) was provided by Thomas 
Carlson and Vasile Poenaru at http://www.romanianvoice.com/poezii/poezii_tr/horseback.php       
99 In terms of the last explanation, the reader must be warned that Caius Dobrescu represents one of the 
important poets of the G80 generation, who as a general rule, are opposed to the highly abstract poetic 
modernism of the 60s in Romania, and also heavily influenced by the poetry of the American counter-
culture movement.  
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Solar Lyricism as ÒInner SpaceÓ 
As suggested before, the socialist realism of the 1950s had produced an epic poetry that 
was celebratory and didactical, and whose aesthetical value paled against a dogmatic 
influence requiring, through Ònarrow and deforming models,Ó the Òservile and artificial 
imitation of a reality ideologically cosmeticizedÓ (Boldea 2004, ¦ 1). From this 
perspective, the partial recuperation of the criterion of aesthetical value from its ethical 
imperatives and the traumatic return to the self with its biographical themes was bound 
to lead to an Òeulogizing poetry, expansive, jubilating, dreamy and euphoric, naturist-
seraphic, orphic and mythicizing, like a balm of the present covering the wounds of the 
immediate pastÓ (Cernat 2005, pp.227). Also a return to the poetry of the inter-war 
period, this exuberant lyricism could not avoid re-envisaging the poetic self as an Òinner 
universeÓ of Òauthentic emotionsÓ and ÒfeelingsÓ in which Òthemes such as love, death, 
time and history,Ó and, therefore, the totality of existence or the Absolute, were central 
(Boldea 2004, ¦ 1,3,5): Òwe are talking about an exuberant vitality, of Blagian origin 
[from Lucian Blaga], but also orphic, through which the lyrical self aspires at integration 
in the flux of elements, searching for the cosmic roots of its own being.Ó It is for these 
reasons, therefore, that this lyricism has been adequately described as Òsolar lyricismÓ 
(Cernat 2005, p.228). 
This Òinner universe,Ó this Òrehabilitation of the self, of interiority, of feelings and of 
confessionsÓ (Cernat 2005, p.231) gives us, then, the essential dimension through which 
the lyricism of the 1960s generation100 is inserted both in the tradition of modernist 
                                                             
100 The 1960s generation is ushered in by Òpoets such as A.E. Baconsky, Victor Felea, Aurel Rău, Aurel 
Gurghianu,Ó and particularly by Nicolae Labiş, and is represented by figures such as  ÒNichita Stănescu, 
Cezar Baltag, Ioan Alexandru, Marin Sorescu, Ana Blandiana, Ion Gheorghe etcÓ (Boldea 2004, ¦ 3-4). 
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poetry and, also, in the wider discursive space of the Communist regime: ÒThis 
individual [the Òindividualized selfÓ of modernist poetry] has a psychology, has inner 
states. Therein, in fact, lies the essential. The world exists on the outside, but it only has 
meaning to the extent to which it is lived, relived in the interiorÓ (Muşina 2004ii, p.153). 
ÒThe poetry of the 1960s generationÓ (Boldea 2004, ¦ 6) also confirms, Òis based on the 
problematic of the self.Ó  
 
ÒInner spaceÓ and the 2
nd
 Axis of the Mirror-Mechanism 
At this point, the first part of the question concerning the existence of a relationship 
between Òsolar lyricismÓ and the mirror mechanism (as well as, socialist humanism) can 
be answered. Here, the term Òsolar lyricismÓ proves a very appropriate one, indicating 
the aspiration of this poetry to mirror the heart of the universe, the essence of reality. 
This, of course, corresponds to the second axis of the mirror-mechanism: Ôthe myth of 
the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively internalize the Good.Õ The same, 
however, can be said about the entire notion of Ôinner space,Õ with its guiding values of 
sincerity, abnegation, candour, moral fervour etc., where Beauty is Good and the 
ultimate ideal, and where full becoming or achieving higher and higher states of being is 
the main aspiration. For, like in the case of Constantin NoicaÕs philosophy (see later 
chapter on ÔNoicaÕs SchoolÕ), while a specific code of values is not made explicit, a 
Humanistic ethics exists, and one which demands nothing less than the interiorization of 
all values of humanity (seen not only as values but as states of being), in fact, of the 
entire cosmos: ÒA second dominant feature of the Õ60 generation is the discovery of 
 
 
311 
living and uttering with an ethical subtext (but not at all moralizing, like before!)Ó 
(Boldea 2004, ¦ 5). 
One of the poems of Nichita Stănescu, ÒTo Galatea,Ó can serve here as a useful example 
of the themes discussed so far:   
ÒI know all your times, all your moves, all your perfumes 
and your shadow, and your silences, and your breast 
what shiver they have and what colour, 
and your walk, and your melancholy, and your eyebrows, 
and your blouse, and your ring, and the second 
and I can't wait anymore and I put my knee in rocks 
and I beg you, 
give birth to me. 
 
I know whatÕs far from you, 
so far, that close doesnÕt exist anymore- 
afternoon, after the skyline, after the sea... 
and everything that is after them, 
and so far, that it doesnÕt have a name. 
ThatÕs why I bend my knee and put it 
on the rockÕs knee, which is humming. 
And I beg you, 
give birth to me. 
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I know everything that you never know, from inside you. 
The heartbeat that follows the one youÕre hearing now, 
the end of the word whose first syllable youÕre just saying 
trees- wooden shadows of your veins, 
rivers- moving shadows of your blood, 
and rocks, the rocks- rock shadows of my knee, 
which I bend in front of you and I beg you, 
give birth to me. Give birth to me.Ó101 
The name Galatea refers to the myth of Pygmalion, in which a statue he had created and 
with which he had fallen in love is, upon his requests, finally instilled with the spirit of 
life by Aphrodite. Galatea represents, therefore, a symbol for the work of art. It is this 
myth, Ştefania Mincu (Stănescu 1987, p.27) argues, that Stănescu turns up-side-down in 
this poem: Òattributing himself the condition of the ÔunbornÕ...the artist invokes his work 
to create him as a living being, at the same time creating the world.Ó We have here a 
clear expression of the sacralization of poetry or of the cult of Poetry. Also present is the 
orphic element with the self Ôsearching for the cosmic roots of its beingÕ and for 
Ôintegration in the flux of elementsÕ. Another part of MincuÕs explanation of the poem is 
also noteworthy here. Mincu (p.28) remarks that the poem repeats a certain gesture of 
prostration, of the artistÕs ÒkneeÓ touching Òthe rocks,Ó several times. On the one hand, 
she explains, this Òsuggests the sacrifice of his heart, of his own bodyÓ (idem). And the 
trees and rivers are not living ones, for like the author, they are all Òshadows,Ó that is, 
virtual or unborn (p.29). The meaning of the poem becomes thus clear: Òthe work of art 
                                                             
101 Translation found at http://mihaela94.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/to-galateea-catre-galateea-by-
nichita_26.html   
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begets everything Òtrees, river, rocks Ð the surrounding world, only through the medium 
of the artistÓ (who knows everything and more about her and thus contains all the 
knowledge of the new world, but is only in a state of potentiality) who Òoffers himself as 
model to the world, humanizing it, sacrificing himself in order to make the rock 
resemble himÓ (the ÔrockÕ becoming him as part of the reversed myth of Galatea in 
which the statue receives life) (idem). The aspiration of poetry to mirror the heart of the 
universe, the cult of Poetry, the notion of the self as an interior dimension or Òinner 
spaceÓ which can become the entire Cosmos, the theme of sacrifice as union with the 
universe, the idea that the current self is an ÔunbornÕ one that must be transcended, the 
idea that knowledge is like being ÔrebornÕ in the right act of poetic creation, all these 
exemplify, it can be seen, the central themes discussed in this section as belonging to 
ÒsolarÓ or ÒOrphicÓ lyricism.  
 
ÒInner spaceÓ and the 1st Axis of the Mirror-Mechanism 
As already alluded in the poem above, the notion of Òinner spaceÓ also confirms the first 
axis of the mirror mechanism: Ôthe myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything for 
something greater than himself.Õ For while the notion of Òinner spaceÓ does not 
exclusively ask for Òceremonial sacrificeÓ (Mitchievici 2005, p.354), what it does ask for 
is pathos, authentic emotion, Òsincerity, spontaneity, exultation, abnegation, candour, 
moral fervor, lived interiorityÓ (Cernat 2005, p.231), in other words, a similar type of 
complete engagement (a sort of Ôfull inner mobilizationÕ), through which the self can 
integrate in the harmony and the totality of the cosmos. Of course, this imagery implies 
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the annihilation of self at some level, but the manner and extent of this are usually 
ascetic in nature, and not always reaching the final point of a ritual death. 
While this does seem to be the case, the matter is, however, a lot more complicated than 
it seems. This is so because Romanian culture has been historically structured according 
to two central, but slightly different mythological tendencies, one linking the notion of 
Òinner spaceÓ with that of a Ôceremonial sacrificeÕ and the other, linking it with the 
notion of a Ôritual death.Õ I am referring here to the two central myths of Romanian 
culture: that given by the pastoral ballad ÔMioriţaÕ (ÔThe Little EweÕ) and that contained 
in the ÔLegenda Meşterului ManoleÕ (ÔLegend of Master ManoleÕ).  
In the first myth, one of three shepherds attending to their flocks together is made aware 
by an enchanted ewe that the other two are planning to assassinate him. Rather than 
opposing this plan, this shepherd decides to accept his death serenely, imagining his 
death as a sort of wedding integrating him into the cosmos:  
ÒAt my wedding, tell 
How a bright star fell, 
Sun and moon came down 
To hold my bridal crown, 
Firs and maple trees 
Were my guests; my priests 
Were the mountains high; 
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Fiddlers, birds that fly, 
All birds of the sky; 
Torch-lights, stars on high.Ó  (Wikipedia, ÒMioriţaÓ) 
The ÒMioriţaÓ myth, it is thus apparent, links that Ôlived interiorityÕ which seeks to 
integrate the self into the Cosmos, with a Ôceremonial sacrificeÕ assuming oneÕs peaceful 
resignation of his life.  
In the second myth, Master Manole is commissioned with building the most beautiful 
monastery in the country, but despite countless attempts, its walls keep falling in. In a 
dream, he is told that for the construction to last, he must wall in someone very dear to 
either him or his other nine masons. Together, the builders agree that the first of their 
wives to arrive the next day will be the one sacrificed. Fate sees Master Manole having 
to wall in his own wife Ana together with her unborn child (he does so via the pretense 
of a game). Through this Òritual of deathÓ the monastery102 is finally built, but for fear of 
them not building something even greater later, the king has the builders stranded on the 
roof. In the end, the builders attempt to fly off with wooden wings but only manage to 
plunge to their death. Essentially, at the place where Master Manole dies, a spring is 
formed which runs through the stone of the Monastery.  
Certainly, the Òinner spaceÓ of the 1960s lyrical generation does not explicitly involve 
this notion of Ôritual death.Õ However, the Eliade (2004, ÒÔEn-liveningÕ an 
ÔarchitectonicÕ body,Ó para. 1-5) interpretation, that through Òviolent death,Ó a Òcreative 
sacrificeÓ is able to secure the lasting foundation of a future edifice, also gives the myth 
                                                             
102 Identified in the ballad as the ÒCurtea de Argeş MonasteryÓ of today.  
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an essential cosmic dimension: ÒIf, as a considerable number of archaic traditions reveal, 
any violent death is creative, that is, it projects the soul of the one who was sacrificed 
into a new body, it goes without saying that the soul of the one ritually sacrificed at the 
foundation of a building is projected in his new architectonic body, which, by Ôen-
liveningÕ it, it makes long-lasting. Hence, regarding the Romanian legend, Master 
ManoleÕs wife lives inside the monastery, in the sense that the monastery itself makes up 
her body. So, had the Master died a natural death, he wouldnÕt have been able to meet 
her for the mere reason that she wasnÕt dead. What is admirable in the Romanian ballad 
is the intuition of the author or of the authors who, for reuniting the two spouses, worked 
out the only possibility of them meeting: the violent death of the Master. Indeed, this 
death, which Ð altered as it might seem in the ballad as to its meaning Ð is still a ritual 
death, prolongs ManoleÕs existence on the same cosmic level that his wife continues 
hers; she Ð with an architectonic body; he Ð with the body of a running water [my 
emphasis]. Their bodies are close, for the spring is: 
ÔWith clear water 
Running through stone, 
With salty tears, 
By Caplea shed.Õ 
The ÔstoneÕ is the new body of the wife. Their embrace is now fulfilled on another 
cosmic level [my emphasis], where the circuit is slower, so slow that, to the human eye, 
it seems like eternity.Ó 
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From the Eliade (2004) perspective, then, it can be said that the ÒLegend of Master 
ManoleÓ links that Òinner spaceÓ which aims for integration of the self into the Cosmos, 
with a Òritual of deathÓ implying the violent death of another person, in this case, one 
most dear to that self. 
Both the ÒMioriţaÓ and the ÒManoleÓ myths, it can thus be concluded, effectively link 
the notion of Òinner space,Ó and its theme of integration into the cosmos, with the need 
for total sacrifice (the slight difference is between self-sacrifice and sacrifice of a dear 
one). In that sense, and because these two myths are central to Romanian culture and 
poetry, the notion of Òinner spaceÓ can be seen to fully confirm, at least as a dominant 
predisposition, Ôthe myth of the hero ready to sacrifice everything for something greater 
than himself.Õ  
Moreover, such a predisposition has already been confirmed at the historical level, in a 
moment prior to the 1960s lyrical generation and which is, also, of great importance to 
its poetic roots. This moment is exemplified by the Legionary movement and its poetry, 
which Òmarginalized Mioriţa and exalted the Legend of the Master Manole insteadÓ 
(Oişteanu 2002), transforming its theme of Ôcreative sacrificeÕ into Òa true mysticism of 
death in the service of the nationÓ (Petreu 1999, cited in idem): ÒHow beautiful appears 
this meaning of the founding-death ... in the ballad of the Monastery on the Argeş! How 
all-encompassing its teaching! If you do not kill what you have as most dear, most good, 
most precious, if the weaklings and not the heroes die, if your sacrifice is not 
 
 
318 
consummated, like the sacrifice of ManoleÕs wife, in a mute, a tragic tension, you will 
build nothing solid. Let us learn how to die!Ó (Dan Botta 1936, cited in idem).103 
 
 ÒInner spaceÓ and Socialist Humanism 
Having discussed how Òsolar lyricismÓ confirms, via the notion of Òinner space,Ó both 
axes of the mirror-mechanism, attention can now be given to the role played by this 
aesthetical discourse in the wider discourse of socialist humanism.  
As Muşina (2004ii, p.153) observes, this Òinner spaceÓ or Òthe individualized selfÓ only 
exists through reading, through it being assumed by the reader. The main function of this 
lyrical poetry (also, a modernist one) is then, Òto balance, to harmonize, to give a sense 
to the interiorÓ (p.154) by Òexploring the inner space, shaping the way in which man 
relates to the world, but also the way he communicates with othersÓ [my emphasis] 
(p.159). Through the mirror-mechanism, it can thus be concluded, the solar lyricism of 
the 1960s attempts nothing else but the inner development of the readerÕs self, the 
formation of a new self, and one which engages with his own self-development 
according to certain humanistic ideals.  
However, this occurs in the context of the emergence of a wider socialist-humanist 
project, that of post-Stalinist Communism, also attempting the reconstruction of the 
Òinner spacesÓ of citizens according to similar humanistic ideals of self-development. 
Considering the political weight of each of these discourses, it is clear that one was 
                                                             
103 On this point, the words of the Iron Guard founder and leader, and the historical reality they helped 
generate, are most edifying: ÒThe legionary loves death, because his blood will serve to mould the cement 
of Legionary RomaniaÓ (Corneliu Zelea Codreanu 1933, cited in idem).  
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bound to try to exploit and annex the other from the very beginning: ÒIn the epoch in 
which the political elite aims to demarcate itself from the sombre episode of Stalinism 
and to unite around a new political project that is more liberal, this type of Ôsolar 
lyricismÕ seems to correspond to its intentionsÓ [my emphasis] (Macrea-Toma 2009, 
p.305). Reason that, it should be added, explains, even if only partially, the dominant 
position which the 1960s generation had come to occupy in the intellectual field until the 
very end of the Communism period (idem, pp.107-123).  
From this perspective, then, it can be said that the Òcultivation of selfÓ (Foucault 1988) 
envisaged by the lyricism of the 1960s generation provided the project of Ôthe formation 
of the new manÕ with an even stronger avenue into Òthe inner selvesÓ or the Òinner 
spacesÓ of its citizens (thus, providing an important degree of legitimization for the 
regime). Of course, such an assertion does not seek to neglect or to minimize the fact 
that some tendency for Òmoral exigencyÓ or a Òradicalization of discourseÓ towards 
Òrecording any deviation from normality, from ontological and ethical ordinarinessÓ did 
exist in the lyricism of the 1960s, and particularly in that of the 1970s generation104 
(Boldea 2004, ¦ 7, 11). However, even in such a case, it must be acknowledged, the 
Ôrecording of the deviations from normalityÕ would have been issued from a perspective 
about the Òinner spaceÓ (and about the ideal Òhumanistic valuesÓ) also shared by the 
Communist party official discourse. Moreover, it is exactly this emphasis on the notion 
of Òinner space,Ó which the 1960s generation establishes as dominant, that sees the 
possibility of political or cultural resistance in the intellectual field (and not only) being 
                                                             
104 This is referred to by Boldea (2004, ¦ 11) as comprising the following poets: ÒMircea Ciobanu, Mircea 
Dinescu, Emil Brumaru, Şerban Foarţă, Ileana Mălăncioiu, Cezar Ivănescu, Dan Laurenţiu, Virgil 
Mazilescu, Ion Mircea, Adrian Popescu, Dorin Tudoran, Daniel Turcea, Mihai Ursachi etc.Ó 
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gradually reduced to a Ôpassive resistanceÕ defined as Ôthe autonomy of the aestheticalÕ: 
ÒThe members of the Õ60 generation affirm themselves as the continuators of a literary 
trend preoccupied with pure emotion and uninterested in social reflectionsÓ (Macrea-
Toma 2009, p.304).  A similar opinion is added by Dobrescu (2001, p.151): Òin a world 
governed by Evil, public acts and attitudes lose all of their relevance, ÔexteriorÕ freedom 
is in objective manner lacking sense, only the ÔinteriorÕ one counts.Ó Dobrescu (idem) 
puts forward an interesting hypothesis in remarking that the 60s emphasis on Òpurity and 
truthÓ had an early dimension which combined artistic with civil freedoms (particularly 
in the ÔOnirismÕof Dumitru Ţepeneag and the later protest letters of Paul Goma), but that 
this subsided in a period which, also through the Ôsolar or Orphic lyricismÕ, saw the 
entire artistic Generation of the 60s somehow induced to establish the distinction 
between the ethical (ideological) and the aesthetical as the key artistic principle of the 
entire period of socialist humanism (i.e., the principle of the Ôautonomy of the 
aestheticalÕ): ÒAs a general phenomenon, Ôthe poetic of oppositionÕ inaugurated in 1960s 
met a continuous slide, deviation, glissade, at times slower, at times faster, from moral 
purism towards aesthetical purism.Ó Not only this, Dobrescu (1998, p.204) argues, but 
after 1989, such Òfighters for the cause of the poetic purity of ÔbeingÕÓ have managed to 
aestheticize even the meaning of actual ÔresistanceÕ against Communism. Using the 
example of Ana Blandiana, a famous G60 poet with a poetics that emphasized 
pantheism but who had also temporarily lost the right of signature because of several 
poems105 which subtly criticized the reality of everyday life in Communism, Dobrescu 
                                                             
105 See for example, her 1984 poem ÔEverythingÕ:  
Ò... Leaves, words, tears 
Tinned Food, Cats 
Trams from time to time, queues for flour 
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(pp.202-203) shows that, during post-communism, a certain heroic aura had been 
transferred to her from one of the real figures of resistance, Elisabeta Rzea. This 
Òinterpretation of militant anti-Communism through the Ôcult of Culture,ÕÓ Dobrescu 
(pp.204-206) thus concludes, is dangerous in that it emphasizes a spiritualizing 
orientation at the expense of the political, thus leading to the degradation of civic 
virtues. Real resistance, he warns, is not the same as Ôcultural resistanceÕ (idem). 
Ultimately, the importance of Òsolar lyricismÓ to the mirror-mechanism of the socialist 
humanist period and discourse is underlined by the indirect but essential support given to 
the other cultural discourses analyzed or mentioned in the remaining chapters of this 
body of work, which succeed it.   
The almost exclusive importance given to the Òinner space,Ó to the Òinner selfÓ which 
must develop from within inside himself, through exploration of his own being, (and 
thus, indirectly, the abstraction or separation from everyday social reality) finds itself 
expanded, within protochronism, from the level of the individual to the level of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Weevils, empty bottles, speeches 
Elongated images on the television 
Colorado beetles, petrol 
Pennants, the European Cup 
Trucks with gas cylinders, familiar portraits 
Export-reject apples 
Newspapers, loaves of bread 
Blended oil, carnations 
Receptions at the airport 
Cico-cola, balloons 
Bucharest salami, diet yoghurt 
Gypsy women with Kents, Crevedia Eggs 
Rumours 
The Saturday serial, coffee substitutes 
The struggle of nations for peace, choirs 
Production by the hectare 
Gerovital, the Victoriei Avenue Mob 
The Hymn of Romania, Adidas shoes 
Bulgarian stewed fruit, jokes, sea fish 
Everything.Ó (Translation found at http://www.beyondtheforest.com/Romania/RSR4.html ) 
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nation. As discussed in the next section, protochronism demands Òthe assertion of a self-
sufficient culture, which must define its values after its own criteria, without 
consideration for the criteria and values from outsideÓ (Martin 2002ii, Protocronism vs. 
modernitate, para. 2). Furthermore, in this case, Òthe inner spaceÓ of the nation, namely, 
its internal culture, holds in exclusive manner, both as tradition and as a potentiality, the 
key not only to the autarkic self-development of its nation-state, but also, to the spiritual 
regeneration of the whole West. Where Òsolar lyricismÓ had been concerned with 
Ôcultivating the self,Õ protochronism is, thus, concerned with cultivating the soul of a 
nation from which a majestic culture emerges. Thus, while Òsolar lyricismÓ contributes 
its fair share of Òethnical mysticismÓ (Cernat 2004ii, p.383) to that asserted by 
protochronism, essentially, through the emphasis on Òinner space,Ó its efforts combine 
with those of protochronism in ensuring that Communist society Òis a concrete society 
functioning in the register of the imaginaryÓ (Boia 1999, p.220). 
As for the ÒNoica School,Ó and this has already been touched upon, Òsolar lyricismÓ has 
in common with it three main features, which, in everyday discourse, tend to reinforce 
each other. 
The first feature reveals an implied Humanistic ethics, which, instead of promoting a 
specific code of values, demands nothing less than the ÔinteriorizationÕ of all the values 
of humanity. 
The second features emphasizes the essential role given to the idea of personal 
becoming, seen as implying a form of cosmic unification with the totality of reality and 
described, philosophically, as the union between the Determinations of the Individual 
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and the Determinations of Being (see the ÔNoica SchoolÕ chapter): ÒIn truth, what is it 
that I wanted all throughout my life? And I will answer: I wanted what anyone wanted 
and all I did was to say what we all want, maybe without knowing. I wanted to embrace 
him who embraces me, to embrace the encompassing that encompasses meÉ. Such an 
aspiration towards totality manifests itself as a tendency to incorporate the medium, to 
absorb it in yourself: I call it the passing of the external medium into the internal 
mediumÉ.The passing of the external medium into the internal medium is, it would 
seem, exactly the entrance into the condition of <to be>Ó (Noica, cited in Liiceanu 1983, 
pp.90-91). 
Last but not least, the third feature consists of a similar pedagogical desire, and in fact, 
project, to cultivate the self through the medium of culture.  
In truth, however, what ultimately renders the Òsolar lyricismÓ of the 1960s generation 
similar to the ÒNoica SchoolÓ project, is their shared emphasis on the notion of Òinner 
space,Ó on the soulÕs rise to the status of universal spirit through transformation of his 
own internal medium, namely, on Òan interior dimensionÓ that seeks to contain the 
entirety of humanity, Òthe infinite inside the finiteÓ (Noica cited in Liiceanu 1983, p.92): 
ÒWhy is Jesus called <Son of Man> and not <Son of God>? Precisely because he has 
made from humanity, from the entire humanity, his internal medium. And divinity is the 
sense of this totality that has become an interior dimensionÓ (idem). 
As for the Flacăra Cenacle, by turning the Orphism of the 60s lyricist generation into 
magical-ritualistic sessions in which Òelite poetryÓ was mixed with folk/hippie music 
and official propaganda, this series of festivals effectively transformed Òsolar lyricismÓ 
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into a mass-based phenomenon. Moreover, through the Flacăra Cenacle, the Òinner 
spaceÓ of the lyrical self was transformed into a Ôcollective inner space,Õ where a form of 
collective Òaesthetical self-fictionalizationÓ (Poenaru 2010) could take place, combining 
an aesthetical escape and the illusion of freedom with a form of entertainment laced with 
propaganda. In this sense, it is impossible to understand the impact of Òsolar lyricismÓ as 
cultural discourse, without looking at the Flacăra Cenacle. 
From the lyricism of the 1960s generation, an element of Òethnical mysticismÓ and the 
theme of spiritual rejuvenation, particularly in Christian terms, feature strongly in the 
discourse of the ÒNew RightÓ movement (which sees itself as a continuation, in the years 
2000, of the Legionary movement). Incorporating protochronist features after 1989, the 
ÒNew RightÓ emphasizes, in a manner reminiscent of the notion of Òinner spaceÓ and the 
Ôcultivation of selfÕ of Ôsolar lyricism,Õ a Òprocess of interior ChristianizationÓ through 
which the qualities of a Ònew man,Ó of a Òhero in the service of the nationÓ can be 
developed (Noua Dreaptă 2008, ¦ 3).   
With regard to the Păltiniş group, the notion of Òinner spaceÓ or Òsolar lyricismÓ fits 
right in with the central category of Òinner utopiaÓ which Şerban (2010) employs so as to 
describe this intellectual grouping. In short, the notion of Òinner utopiaÓ originates with 
the Platonic idea that knowing oneself should form the basis of political organization, 
and envisages political change or political models as fundamentally requiring an 
existential change in the inner selves of the people, of the masses, of each individual. 
Therefore, the category of Òinner utopiaÓ is directly opposed to the notion of 
representative democracy, in which Òthe sphere of politics stops at the limit of the 
private spaces of the citizensÓ (Şerban 2010, p.132). Whereas representative democracy 
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emphasizes the role of procedure, formal institutions and political doctrines, Òinner 
utopiaÓ highlights, instead, Òthe search for self-consciousness,Ó Òmyths, symbols and 
ritualsÓ and the dominant role of beliefs and existential experiences (idem, p.139). 
However, this notion of Òinner utopiaÓ (also referred to as Òinner justice,Ó Òinterior 
republicÓ, Òutopia of the self,Ó and Òthe utopia of inner conscienceÓ) can prove 
dangerous inasmuch as its transformation into Òan aim of political actionÓ can justify 
extension of absolute power to an elite minority (as is the case with PlatoÕs ÔRepublicÕ) 
(p.131). Moreover, as Şerban (p.144) warns in his conclusion, Òthe political languageÓ 
associated with the Western tradition of political thought and with modernization, has 
been, since the dawn of the Romanian nation, constantly undermined by Òan 
interpretative languageÓ favouring the terms of an Òinner utopiaÓ and the return to an 
autochthonous model. To what should the lack of dissidence, or of an organized 
opposition to communism in Romania, be attributed, Şerban (p.142) asks, if not to the 
fact that Òas also during the interwar years, the central preoccupation of intellectual 
engagements with politics has been one of interior nature, of confrontation with their 
own dubitative conscienceÓ? Moreover, he continues, has not the same notion of Ôinner 
utopiaÕ been responsible, during post-communism, for the choice of the intellectuals to 
develop Òan anti-communist pathosÓ instead of a critical analysis of political discourses 
and a survey of the political strategies available (p.143)? Has it not been reflected in the 
dominant belief of the Ôanti-communistÕ intellectuals that Òpublic discourse aloneÓ can 
alter Òthe general course of eventsÓ (p.141) and in Òthe confiscation,Ó by the same 
intellectuals, Òof the exclusivity of Ômoral conscience...in the orientation of the 
governing actÕÓ (idem)? 
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Although directly challenging the  Òmodernist abstraction and objectivityÓ of Òsolar 
lyricismÓ through Òan unlimited subjectivity, marked by the colloquial,Ó in other words, 
by a Ò(micro)realist and biographicalÓ orientation (Cărtărescu 1999, pp.151, 153), the 
G80 (or the Generation of the 1980s) poets would, nevertheless, retain the ideal of 
sincerity of the 1960s generation, and in some cases and despite their postmodernist 
orientation, a strong Humanistic orientation.  
Moreover, the same Òpoetics of sincerityÓ (Cernat 2005, p.231) will continue to feature 
in the 1998 ÒFracturist Manifesto,Ó poetic program with which important poets of the 
1990s generation were identified at one point, and which declared a radical break with 
the postmodernism of the G80.  
Last but not least, it can be considered that the Romanian New Wave of cinema, despite 
its neorealist style, also features the notion of  Òinner space,Ó however, not as one of 
becoming (like in the Òsolar lyricismÓ tradition) but as a ghostly one, in need of 
elucidation/recuperation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
327 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328 
Protochronism 
 
Defining Protochronism 
Launched in 1974 by the comparativist Edgar Papu, protochronism, it is generally 
agreed, originated106 as a concept in literary theory. The term, derived from Greek 
(ÒprotosÓ = first and ÒchronosÓ = time) referred, in PapuÕs designation, to the notion of 
ÔpriorityÕ or ÔprecedenceÕ in cultural discovery. ÒThis idea,Ó as Verdery (1991, p.167) 
observed, Òencouraged critics and literary historians to look for developments in 
Romanian culture that had anticipated events in the better-publicized cultures of Western 
Europe.Ó As such, the concept, reminiscent of attempts made earlier by Bogdan 
Petriceicu Haşdeu and Nicolae Densuşianu to establish the Dacians as an important 
reference point for national identity and as foundational to European culture (tendency 
identified as Ôdacomania107Õ or ÔthracomaniaÕ by its critics and ÔdacologyÕ by its 
                                                             
106 As it stands, however, the origin of this ÔideaÕ has been the subject of much debate. In 1977, the critic 
Nicolae Manolescu and literary historian Ovidiu S. Crohmălniceanu protested that the term and theory 
around it were Òconstructed in obvious contradiction to the theory of synchronism launched by the literary 
historian Eugen Lovinescu (1881-1943) in the 1920sÓ (Maier 1977, p.3). More recently, Verdery (1991, 
p.343) has stated that, according to a source at the magazine ÒSecolul 20,Ó the article giving birth to 
protochronism had been commanded from above. Whatever the case, as Tomiţă (2007, p.15) has 
observed, the notion would probably have passed un-noticed without the existing political context, which 
encouraged the development of ÔindigenismÕ.  
107 ÒUsually glossing over the fact that Dacian society lacked such basic instruments as a writing system, 
protochronists attempt to prove either that Dacians had a major part to play in Ancient history, or even that 
they had the ascendancy over all cultures (with a particular accent on Ancient Rome, which, in a complete 
reversal of the founding myth, would have been created by Dacian migrants). Also noted are the 
exploitation of the Tărtăria tablets as certain proof that writing originated on proto-Dacian territory, and 
the belief that the enigmatic Dacian language survived all the way to the Middle-Ages. An additional - but 
not universal - feature is the attempted connection between the supposed monotheism of the mysterious 
Zalmoxis cult and Christianity, in the belief that Dacians easily adopted and subsequently influenced the 
religion which would have been preached to them by Saint Andrew (considered, doubtfully, as the clear 
origin of modern-day Romanian Orthodoxy)Ó (Wikipedia, ÒProtochronismÓ). 
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advocates) (Wikipedia108, ÒProtochronismÓ), established the priority of certain major 
cultural discoveries with Romanian figures, although without claiming that these had 
actually influenced their appearance in the West. In this, Papu himself led the way by 
employing the term so as to identify a number of ÒRomanian literary firstsÓ: Òhe sees the 
15th century ënvăţăturile lui Neagoe Basarab catre Fiul sau Teodosie (The Teachings of 
Neagoe Basarab to His Son Teodosie) as anticipating European baroque literature, 
presents Dimitrie Cantemir as a romantic writer avant la lettre, regards Eliade Rădulescu 
as anticipating 20th century emphasis on psychoanalysis, Costache Negruzzi an earlier 
but superior Flaubert, Alecsandri  a pre-symbolist, and Eminescu an ancestor of 
existentialism, etc.Ó (Maier 1977, p.2).   
Starting from this foundation, the meaning of protochronism soon extended beyond that 
of a simple notion. While initially describing an essential trait of Romanian literature in 
the universal context (Papu, according to idem), the concept quickly developed into a 
Ònew critical methodÓ (Tomiţă 2007, p.60) and a ÒÔbasicÕ theoryÓ (Maier 1977, p.1) 
concerned Òwith RomaniansÕ self-image and with the relation of Romanian values to the 
rest of the worldÓ (Verdery 1991, p.176). This was likely the result of an unforeseen 
chain reaction in which protochronism triggered a revival of certain inter-war arguments 
about RomaniaÕs engagement with modernity that resulted in a new dimension for the 
concept itself.  
                                                             
108 The reader would have observed the use of materials belonging to the Wikipedia online encyclopedia 
and to sites such as ÒYoutubeÓ. Due to the lack of resources on certain of the themes discussed, this has 
been considered, at times, a necessity. It is interesting to note that Alexandra Tomiţă, in her monograph on 
protochronism, also relies on articles from Wikipedia (2007, p.19). Whenever used herein, such resources 
have been checked in light of other documents, and not used as single sources in the presentation of any 
main argument.  
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Verdery (1991, pp.46-52) describes the inter-war discursive space about the nation as 
being distributed between three different ideal groups: the ÒWesternizers,Ó the 
ÒIndigenistsÓ and the ÒOrthodoxists.Ó In this scheme, the protochronists, with their 
emphasis on the autochthonous, on national essence and the strategy of autarchy, fall 
within the ÒIndigenistÓ category. This is not simply because of some similarity in 
features, but because of how protochronism chooses to position itself in relation to the 
dominant cultural orientation of its time. In order to illustrate this argument, a brief 
outline of cultural history is needed. 
In the interwar period, the ÒIndigenistÓ orientation spanned a multitude of ideological 
discourses, from the Junimist109 theory of ÒForms without Substance110Ó to 
                                                             
109 ÒJunimismÓ is one of the most important Òideological and cultural movementsÓ in Romania, 
synonymous, in the second half of the 19th century, with Òthe critical conscience of national identity and a 
program for reconstruction of cultural identity within modern coordinatesÓ (Georgiu 2002, p.124). 
ÒÔJunimeaÕ was a Romanian literary society founded in Iaşi in 1863, through the initiative of several 
foreign-educated personalities led by Titu Maiorescu, Petre P. Carp, Vasile Pogor, Theodor Rosetti and 
Iacob Negruzzi. The foremost personality and mentor of the society was MaiorescuÓ (Wikipedia, 
ÒJunimeaÓ). 
110 Maiorescu first outlined the theory of Ôforms without substanceÕ in 1868. Its immediate context was 
that of two major transformations: 1) the formation of the modern institutional structure for the Romanian 
state, particularly during the reign of Cuza (1859-1866) Ð this period saw, amongst others, the 
modernization of the educational system and the establishment of the Universities of Iaşi (1860) and 
Bucureşti (1864) and, also, of the Romanian Academy (1866) (Georgiu 2002, pp.118-119) 2) the 
transition, governed in great extent by the Junimists, from the cultural model of the 1848 Romanian 
intellectuals Ð based on the Romantic notion of the cultural hero as an encyclopedic intellectual and a 
national prophet undertaking titanic tasks for the construction of the nation, to a cultural model more and 
more in favor of Ôthe specialistsÕ and of critical thinking that could more realistically evaluate and direct 
the modernization process. It is in this context that Maiorescu (1868, p.134) argues against the discrepancy 
between the new democratic institutions and the real state of the country (between Ôthe legal country,Õ and 
Ôthe real countryÕ) (Georgiu 2002, p.117): ÒIn appearance, according to the statistics of external forms, 
Romanians possess today almost the entire civilization of the Occident. We have politics and science, we 
have journals and academies, we have schools and literature, we have museums, conservatories, we have 
theatre, we even have a constitution. But in reality all these are dead productions, pretensions without a 
foundation, ghosts without a body, illusions without truth, and in this way, the culture of the higher classes 
of Romanians are null and without value, and the abyss which separates us from the lower [-class] people 
becomes day by day deeper.Ó To Maiorescu, such Ôforms without substanceÕ are simply destructive of the 
cultural and social development of the nation. This is so because Maiorescu espouses a model of organic 
growth, in which cultural forms can only develop out of the inner substance of their culture [equivalent 
also with the social classes corresponding to a society (Drăgulin 2010, ¦7)]. To create forms that lack 
cultural substance is to delay and sap at the process of the constitution of that substance in the future, and 
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Sămănatorism111, Popularism112, Ţărănism,113 and even Gndirism114 and Trăirism.115 
The ÒIndigenistÓ character is apparent in that, despite their different emphases on the 
national essence, the autochthonous, the rural masses, tradition and folklore, these 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
to discredit the existing forms. The imposition of Ôforms without substance,Õ therefore, can only lead to the 
creation of a Òfalse culture,Ó one living in ÒuntruthÓ (Maiorescu 1868, p.136). 
111 Developed around the literary and political magazine ÒSemănătorulÓ (ÒThe SowerÓ) (1901-1910) and 
the figure of historian Nicolae Iorga, this traditionalist ideological/cultural current consisted of several key 
ideas. Firstly, that the development of nations required a form of organic growth through which social 
change could be circumscribed within the coordinates of Òslowly deposited and codifiedÓ tradition 
(Georgiu 2002, p.188). Secondly, that the organic evolution of 19th century Romanian society had been 
severely disturbed by the separation of the elites from the masses, manifested in the eliteÕs adoption and 
import of superficial (consumerist) forms of foreign, Western culture (idem, pp.189-190). Thirdly, that in 
order to return to organic growth, the Òrestoration of a national cultureÓ based on the Òrecuperation of 
tradition and of the values deposited in the rural worldÓ was needed (idem). Finally, that the answers to 
both the agrarian problem and modernization as well as to the Òlost unity of Romanian societyÓ were, thus, 
primarily cultural (as opposed to political or economical) in nature, with literature playing almost a 
messianic role (p.190). 
112 ÒPopularismÓ (or Romanian Populism), is a multifaceted and complex ideological current of partial 
Narodnik inspiration founded in 1890 by Constantin Stere. Because of advocating the peasant structures as 
the essential reservoir of a national culture that could elevate the nation, Popularism falls in the family of 
traditionalist ideologies such as those of Junimea and Sămănatorism. Nevertheless, the cultural current 
departs from these movements in appreciating the influence of the Occident as positive, and in seeking a 
middle ground between ÒaestheticismÓ (and European modern art) and a useful art that is both national 
and aware of its social background (Georgiu 2002, pp.213-214). Through its rejection of the viability of 
the Communist social-economic model for Romania and through its political demands for an agrarian 
reform, for a universal voting system, and for a model of economic development that emphasizes the 
modernization of agriculture over that of industry (because of the social character of the Romanian nation 
and its technological backwardness) Popularism forms a complex political doctrine of the center (idem, 
p.198). 
113 Like Popularism, the inter-war ideological current of Ţărănism focuses on the rural population, in 
addition advocating the maintenance of the agricultural structures and modes of organization and 
production (against capitalist like reform or interventions), identified as the most authentic forms of 
Romanian life (Wikipedia, ÒŢărănismÓ). 
114 Formed around the magazine ÒGndireaÓ at the beginning of the XXth century, this current was in 
many ways similar to Sămănătorism, however, with a strong emphasis on Orthodox Christianity which, in 
politics, translated into support of the extreme Right among its followers (Georgiu 2002, p.299): ÒIts 
orientation is towards Orthodoxism and the autochthonous, promulgating traditionalism, nationalism and 
national unity under the auspices of the Orthodox ChurchÓ (Wikipedia, ÒGndirismÓ). 
115 ÒTrăirismul (the Romanian version of the German notion of Lebensphilosophie) is an inter-war 
philosophical current that had as founder and main figure the Romanian philosopher Nae IonescuÓ 
(Wikipedia, ÒTrăirismÓ). Based on Òthe primacy of ÔlivingÕ over the intellectÓ this current drew on 
philosophers such as ÒKierkegaard, Nietzsche, Spengler, Bergson, Soloviov, Berdiaev etc.Ó to position 
mystical attitude as more important than intellectual or analytical concerns (idem). Although the current 
allowed for different positions and paradigms, Nae Ionescu saw the fulfillment of Romanian philosophy 
based on a combination (characteristic of Eastern European societies in his view) between mysticism and 
authoritarianism (idem). Important inter-war Romanian intellectuals such as Mircea Vulcănescu, Mircea 
Eliade, Constantin Noica, Emil Cioran, Petru Comarnescu and even Mihail Sebastian are considered to 
have been disciples of Nae Ionescu. The relation between these figures (with the exception of Sebastian 
and Comarnescu) or Trăirism as a philosophical current, and the Legionary ideology/movement, has been, 
and still is, the subject of much debate (Petreu 2003, Călinescu 2001).  
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ideological currents viewed Western-type modernization at the turn of the 20th century in 
similar manner: as endangering the living soul of Romanian culture, the formation of the 
Romanian nation and, effectively, the everyday life of the common Romanian people 
(largely identified with the peasantry). With Romanian liberalism having played an 
important role in the formation, modernization and governance of the Romanian nation 
since 1848, and with the National Liberal Party governing almost uninterrupted between 
1867 and 1937, the attempts at Western like modernization ushered in by the Liberals 
constituted the butt of all ÒIndigenistÓ discourses. However, while their combined line of 
attack was framed through the 1868 sociological theory of ÒForms without substance,Ó 
the Liberal line of defense had its own sociological response in LovinescuÕs 1924-25 
theory of ÒSynchronismÓ.  
To the critique of the imposition of Western models as foreign forms that did not 
correspond to the mentalities, levels of culture and creativity of the Romanian people, 
Lovinescu opposed the argument that, since the first half of the XIX century, the 
introduction of Western capitalism had been the main force behind RomaniaÕs 
modernization. The continuation of modernization, Lovinescu further asserted, 
demanded the ÔsynchronizationÕ of Romania with the West, through mass adoption of 
those Western institutions, practices and ethics that reflected Òthe spirit of the timeÓ 
(Georgiu 2002, p.288). As for the theory of ÒForms without Substance,Ó even though the 
process of synchronization had started, arguably, with such forms, the problem was 
simply one of gradual development or evolution. In time, such forms would eventually 
develop substance and the law of imitation or synchronization would prove its worth. It 
seemed a revolutionary step, but, as a backward society, Romania was never going to 
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catch up with the rest of Europe simply by continuing on its own ÔorganicÕ path of 
development (idem, pp.289-290). Overall, the phenomenon of Ôforms without substanceÕ 
was, thus, not a destructive but a creative one.  
Lovinescu died in 1943 and later disappeared, together with most other national figures, 
from the literary canon of Romanian socialist realism. However, his late 60s 
ÒrehabilitationÓ (Macrea-Toma 2009, p.308) was essential in spurring a new generation 
of intellectuals to demand the return to a national culture inclusive of its European and 
humanistic dimensions (Martin 2002ii, 2002iv). As these modernist intellectuals 
continued to grow in stature in the 70s, LovinescuÕs theory also grew in importance.  
Thus, when Edgar Papu fashioned the concept of protochronism in 1974, he did so out 
of engagement with LovinescuÕs theory of synchronism (Martin 2002ii, Apariţia 
protocronismului sau protocronismul ca atitudine culturală, para. 2; Maier 1977, p.3). By 
affirming the originality of Romanian literature and its priority in relation to Western 
literature, Papu challenged the widespread intellectual tendency to read Romanian 
literature as marginal and backward when compared with that of the West: ÒThere are 
movements and works in the autochthonous literary history which appeared Ð 
chronologically speaking Ð before others from outside, and, still, Romanians, with their 
eyes traditionally fixed towards the Occident, deem these later ones as anticipatory. 
Surrealism and Dadaism are the examples given in this caseÓ (idem, para. 1). Whatever 
the best of his intentions, however, his act of declaring protochronism Òone of the 
dominant and defining traits of our literature in the world contextÓ (Papu 1974, cited in 
Maier 1977, p.2) effectively opened up the Pandora box for the re-emergence of all 
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Indigenist interwar discourses, and for the application of phrotochronism to all 
domains116 of knowledge.  
This also triggered a shift in the criteria proposed for determining value in the literary 
world, both in terms of market competition and circulation here and abroad. Believing 
that Òbeing first ought to guarantee recognitionÓ117 the protochronists advanced as their 
main criterion the notion of priority (Verdery 1991, p.181). In response, the 
Òantiprotochronists Ð insisted the guarantor of successÓ was Ònot priority but something 
else Ð originality, qualityÓ (idem). What ensued was a struggle over who was to 
Òestablish criteria of value within the Romanian literary communityÓ (idem, p.182) and 
have a say in the re-evaluation118 of the existing literary canon. As an expression of this, 
starting with 1977, the concept of protochronism was transformed into a discourse 
supported, or appropriated, by a group of intellectuals Ð the protochronists, and moved 
from the level of a cultural attitude or imperative to a form of Òcultural politicsÓ: ÒEdgar 
Papu desired the changing of the self-image Romanians had about themselves; his 
critique was an internal one. The critique of his successors is not only internal, but also 
external, referring to the relation between ÔcentreÕ and ÔperipheryÕ and rejecting, 
                                                             
116 See Tomiţă (2007, Chapter 5: ÒA Glorious HistoryÓ) for a description of the domains of knowledge 
affected.   
117 Ò...because, as Serafim Duicu explained in the above-mentioned Tribuna article, Ôthe prominence or 
paternity of ideas and initiatives is a question of national dignity, and, why not, of national prideÕÓ (Maier 
1977, pp.3-4). 
118 Tomiţă (2007, pp.99-104) also describes how the protochronists have been able to Òbuild a fictive 
tradition and to revendicate themselves as its legitimate continuatorsÓ by assuming the functions of re-
edition, revision and reintroduction of the works of the classics (either heavily censored or lacking re-
edition during the first phase of the Communist regime). The policy of re-editing the classics and 
providing versions ÒaccessibleÓ to the public should be seen as one of the main instruments of Ôhistorical 
revisionismÕ on behalf of the Party (Verdery 1994:332, cited in Tomiţă 2007, p.99), and, generally, as an 
attempt to alter the collective consciousness of the population according to the aims of the regime: Òthe 
appraisal of the cultural heritage becomes Ôan efficacious instrument for the formation of the new man 
(Itu, 1984: 3)ÕÓ (Tomiţă 2007, p.103). 
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ultimately, the cultural dominance of the WestÉÔRomanian culture is not subaltern and 
the road towards our own values does not pass through the OccidentÕÓ (Martin 2002ii, 
Dezvoltarea protocronismului sau protocronismul ca actiune politica, para. 1).  
Thus, while protochronism started as an assertion of self-confidence regarding the 
competences and values of oneÕs own culture, it moved towards Òthe assertion of a self-
sufficient culture, which must define its values after its own criteria, without 
consideration for the criteria and values from outside,Ó thus proposing autarchy and 
isolation for Romanian literature and culture (idem, Protocronism vs. modernitate, para. 
2). This form of cultural politics effectively allowed its representatives (the 
protochronist group) to simultaneously entertain a double-game of power: one cultural, 
of disconnecting the process of valuation and value-creation from those established in 
the West and from those of the anti-protochronists, thus leaving themselves as the only 
group determining the criteria of value for Romanian culture; the other, political, of 
seeking to advance their influence over the regime and their position in its 
cultural/political structures by adopting an ÒindigenismÓ favored by the Party. This is 
observed by Verdery (1991, p.205) who summarizes the protochronist ÒgameÓ as 
Òseeking to build cultural authority on the basis of an innovation that potentially 
undercut the authority of others, through its insistence that only those accumulations 
based on indigenous values were legitimate.Ó 
Considering this potential for political conformism it comes as no surprise that 
protochronism was soon captured by the Communist Party and refashioned into the main 
official cultural discourse of the 80s. Verdery (1991, p.206) has captured in great detail 
the ways in which, by its very nature, protochronism lent itself available to the purposes 
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of the regime: ÒProtochronist writings supported the personality cult of Ceauşescu, the 
relative autarchy attempted in the Ceauşescu era, the interweaving of Party history with 
the millennial history of Romanians, the call for socially/politically relevant art, the 
aggressive emphasis on territorial borders that might in fact be even bigger than the ones 
now on world maps, and the resistance to Soviet imperialism in all quarters. Within a 
social order whose dynamics was to maximize the control of the apparatus over 
resources, protochronism promised a literature that was Romanian, values that were 
Romanian Ð that is, literature and values of scant use to any but a Romanian state. 
Protochronism argued for a literature that was Romanian first, expressed openly its 
intentions of being useful to the state, and created lineages of Romanian cultural heroes 
through whom the broad reading public might be linked to the past and bright future of 
the Nation. Theirs was a literature that both lent cultural authority to the political sphere, 
giving the Party leadership the appearance of being supported by learning and culture, 
and gained its producers (writers) and policemen (critics) great political influence. It 
pushed cultural production into the service of a new political order and enabled the 
executors of that order to penetrate a field of activity that had resisted penetration. And it 
helped to construct a fictive mono-ethnic cultural heritage from the political reality of a 
multi-national state. These effects constitute the Ôuse-valueÕ of protochronism to the 
political apparatus.Ó  
In conclusion, protochronism as a concept before 1989 should, therefore, be understood 
at three levels: as a notion in literary theory originating with Papu (early 70s), as the 
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Ôcultural politicsÕ119 promoted by the protochronists (late 70s), and as the official Party 
discourse which aimed for an excessive type of nationalism (the 80s). Where the line 
should be drawn between Papu, the protochronists, and then between them and the Party 
is an issue still subject to much debate. While some consider Papu an innocent victim of 
the protochronists (Patapievici, in Tomiţă 2008), embraced and ÒcultivatedÓ by 
protochronists such as Paul Anghel and Dan Zamfirescu in order to give Òa more 
militant direction to his comparativismÓ (Martin 2002ii, Aparitia protocronismului sau 
protocronismul ca atitudine culturala, para. 5), others tend to view him as someone who 
sided with the PartyÕs cultural faction because of not being able to resist the privileges 
associated with official academic and political recognition (Tomiţă, in Tomiţă 2008). In 
terms of how and to what extent the protochronist group and the Party influenced each 
other there also are important differences. For example, according to Tomiţă (2008), 
Verdery had a source in the pressroom of the magazine ÒSecolul XXÓ (The XXth 
Century) confess that Edgar Papu was in fact commanded to write about the concept of 
protochronism. Tomiţă (idem) also states that, according to protochronist Eugen 
Florescu, Ceauşescu himself encouraged the idea of protochronism. Despite this, 
however, Verdery (1991) credits the protochronist/anti-protochronist competition for 
resources and for the definition of cultural values with having pushed the discourse 
under the control of the Party. From another perspective, Martin (2002iv) sees the 
exacerbated nationalism of Ceauşescu as having been considerably influenced by the 
protochronists. In his opinion, when Ceauşescu turned from the failed Ôcultural 
                                                             
119 The term can be used with two meanings, 1) to refer to the change of protochronism from a literary 
discourse to a cultural-political one, and 2) to actually refer to the set of political strategies through which 
the protochronist group managed to extract influence from the Communist Party in order to secure a ruling 
position in the cultural sphere.  
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revolutionÕ towards the nationalist idea, the ÒSăptămnaÓ magazine group led by Eugen 
Barbu somehow succeeded in persuading him to adhere to their narrow version of 
nationalism (idem). Despite the fact that, as an official organ of the Party, the 
ÒSăptămnaÓ group did work together with the ÒSecuritateÓ (Secret Services), and that, 
at the time, Eugen Barbu did have direct access to even Ceauşescu (Berdeli 2007), the 
extent to which the protochronist group and the Party had influenced each other remains, 
as yet, undetermined.  
Moreover, despite the description provided so far, essential questions remain about the 
nature of protochronism (its functionality) and the reasons for its emergence and 
affiliation with the Communist regime. It seems imperative that any adequate inquiry 
into this phenomenon be able to give a consistent answer to the following question: how 
does protochronism originate as a public discourse? However, when translated into 
specifics, the question gains an added dimension of complexity: does protochronism 
derive from the nature of the regime or from the structure of the cultural field?  
With regard to the first part of this inquiry, a number of questions seem essential. Was 
the Ceauşescu regime Leninist (Chen 2007), Stalinist (Martin 2003, Tismăneanu 2003), 
of Chinese or Asian extraction (Tolnay 2002) or one whose nature is essentially 
particular and unique (Crowther 1988)? How did the nature of the regime relate to the 
Ônationalist turn,Õ to the Ômini-cultural revolutionÕ (the July Theses), to Ôthe cult of the 
leader,Õ to economic and foreign policy and to the political guiding of culture? What, if 
anything, could be discerned about the origin and character of protochronism from such 
an inquiry into the nature of the regime?   
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As for the second part of the inquiry, not that much is clear either, and a lack of 
consensus prevails if the views of different authors are put together.  
Due to limitations imposed by the size of the chapter neither type of questions can be 
engaged with here. However, it is important to emphasize that without answers to such 
questions, the phenomenon of protochronism remains largely unexplored. For now, from 
both the cultural dimension (Maier 1977, Vedery 1991, Martin 2003, Tomiţă 2007 and 
Macrea-Toma 2009) and from the political science perspective (Tismăneanu 2003, 
Tolnay 2002, Gavrilă 2004 and Crowther 1988), the only consensus remains that the 
phenomenon of protochronism, as either a form of Ôcultural protectionismÕ (Maier 1977, 
Verdery 1991), a motivational discourse mobilizing production in all fields of activity 
(Gavrilă 2004), or as a Òsymbolic-ideological mode of controlÓ (Verdery 1991) seeking 
to divert direction from massive economic failure (Crowther 1988), corresponded 
extremely well to the autarkic mode of development of the Communist regime, its cult 
of the leader, and its huge emphasis on production.  
 
Protochronism as a Battlefield in Literary Studies 
When discussing the pre-1989 effects of protochronism in the cultural sphere the usual 
reference is to a cultural battle taking place between two groups of intellectuals. A 
smaller group of intellectuals, advocating an excessive and autarchic nationalism, but 
able to elicit the support of the Communist State - the protochronists, and a larger group, 
which envisaged national culture as inseparable from its European and humanistic 
traditions - the anti-protochronists (Martin 2002ii, Verdery 1991, Tomiţă 2007; 2008). 
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Martin (2002ii, ¦ 1) explains that the tendency for such an opposition had been 
triggered, prior to the appearance of protochronism, by Òthe rediscovery of national 
identityÓ generated by the regimeÕs turn to nationalism. As early as the late 60Õs then, 
this had led to the rediscovery of an idealized Òrural specificityÓ and historical past, for 
some, and to the reconnection not only with internal tradition, but also, with European 
and global culture, for others (idem).  
The first group, Martin (idem, ¦ 3-5) asserts, was comprised of ÒideologuesÓ Mihai 
Ungheanu (literary critic), Paul Anghel (reporter) and Dan Zamfirescu (philologist and 
theologian), specialists in old Romanian culture and literature such as Virgil Candea, Al. 
Duţu, Gh. Mihăilă, Răzvan Theodorescu, Dan Horia Mazilu, Doina Curticăpeanu, Elvira 
Sorohan and writers such as Ion Lăncrănjan, Ion Gheorghe, and Gheorghe Pituţ.  
The second group was larger and included intellectuals of different ages, specialties and 
political orientations: a) interwar writers or literary critics, most of whom had been 
jailed - Ion Negoiţescu, Adrian Marino, Nicolae Balotă, Ştefan Augustin Doinaş, Ovidiu 
Cotruş, Alexandru Paleologu etc., b) Òsympathizers of communism such as Vera Călin, 
Silvian Iosifescu and Paul Georgescu,Ó c) former members of the Central Committee of 
the Party such as Paul Cornea and Ion Ianoşi, d) former Ôsocialist realistÕ literary critics 
such as Ovid. S. Crohmălniceanu or Savin Bratu, and e) relatively younger intellectuals 
such as Alexandru George, Gheorghe Grigurcu, Lucian Raicu, Livius Ciocrlie, Matei 
Călinescu, Ion Pop, Eugen Simion, Mircea Iorgulescu, Gabriel Dimisianu, Valeriu 
Cristea, Dan Grigorescu and Alexandru Călinescu etc. (idem, ¦ 2). 
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Protochronism came into ascendance when the autarchic nationalist group fused with the 
more influent Eugen Barbu collective from ÒSăptămnaÓ. This led to the formation of a 
protochronist group which had Edgar Papu and Eugen Barbu as mentors, Mihai 
Ungheanu, Paul Anghel, Dan Zamfirescu and Artur Silvestri as theoreticians of the new 
current, and figures such as Constantin Vadim Tudor and Adrian Păunescu as 
preeminent spokespersons (Tomiţa 2008). Controlling important press outlets with a 
wide audience, such as ÒSăptămnaÓ (Eugen Barbu, Dan Zamfirescu, Constantin Vadim 
Tudor), ÒLuceafărulÓ (Mihai Ungheanu, Artur Silvestri, Nicolae Dragoş), Flacăra 
(Adrian Păunescu, Ilie Purcaru), and ÒScnteia TineretuluiÓ (ÒSuplimentul literarÓ), the 
protochronist group was able to launch a protochronist campaign that would last a 
decade (idem). Despite the fact that criticism of protochronism had become almost 
equivalent with criticism of PartyÕs policies, the anti-protochronists responded, but in 
magazines that could not compare in terms of levels of audience or were usually 
provincial. While ÒRomnia literarăÓ (Nicolae Manolescu, Gheorghe Grigurcu), ÒViaţa 
RomneascăÓ and ÒSecolul 20Ó constituted the main anti-protochronist magazines, 
important anti-protochronist articles were published by Andrei Pleşu in ÒSecolul 20,Ó 
Gheorghe Grigurcu, Alexandru Dobrescu, Alexandru Ştefănescu and Valeriu 
Condurache in ÒConvorbiri LiterareÓ, Norman Manea in ÒFamiliaÓ and Tudor Cătineanu 
in ÒSteauaÓ (Martin 2002ii, ¦ 13-14). Outside the country, the dissidents Monica 
Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca confronted protochronism and the Communist regime 
through their cultural shows at Radio Free Europe.  
The results of this unequal confrontation that had dominated the cultural field in the 80Õs 
have been somewhat mixed. On the one hand, through official support and a larger 
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influence in the mass-media, protochronism must have somehow succeeded in 
permeating the conscience of the entire population. On the other hand, as Martin 
(2002iii, ¦ 30) argues, it cannot be said that the protochronists won the battle: ÒOn the 
contrary, the prestige of the interlocutors, the tacit refusal of the majority of intellectuals, 
the growing audience of Radio Free Europe, the general impression that that group [the 
protochronists] played according to the interests of a Power more and more hostile 
towards culture, contributed to its isolation in the literary world [my emphasis] and, 
implicitly, to a decrease in its measure of legitimacy. The spaces truly legitimating 
remained still Ôon the other side.ÕÓ 
 
Protochronism in the Domain of History 
While protochronism is usually discussed, like above, in relation to the literary world, it 
should be observed that, for the Communist Party, its principles were never as applicable 
to literature as to the domain of history. While an autarchic orientation was important, 
the criteria for how to produce literature were those of socialist humanism (and not of 
protochronism), that is, criteria aimed at creating typologies of heroes that reflected the 
ideals of the Communist nation. Protochronism did not succeed in severely altering the 
field of literary studies therefore, but its impact was greatly felt within the discipline of 
history, where the Party actively sought to reorder and capture the mythological 
dimensions associated with the nationalist idea.  
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As observed by Boia (2005, p.104), because in the 19th century the main objectives were 
the formation of a unified state and its alignment to the models and values of the 
Occident, a pro-Occidental type of nationalism dominated the scene. Starting with the 
year 1900, 30 years after the young Romanian state had adopted, between 1860 and 
1870, the European legislative and institutional system (a constitution, a parliament, a 
responsible government, laws, universities, an academia etc.) (p.65) the focus shifted 
towards a nationalism concerned with its Romanian Òindividuality, specific culture and 
distinct destinyÓ (Boia 2001, p.59), defined primarily in relation to the rural system of 
values (Boia 2005, p.105) and which questioned the import of forms without substance 
(and, thus, of modernization). This contest found a sudden conclusion in 1948, when the 
Communist takeover resulted in 1) the adoption of a Russian model and a return to the 
East, 2) the promotion of anti-nationalism (with class struggle replacing nationalism) 
and 3) a violent program of industrialization at the expense of the rural population 
(pp.121-122). However, this only lasted until the end of the 1950s, when the Communist 
regime opted for a return to nationalism. Between 1964 and 1971, therefore, Romanian 
nationalism began its rehabilitation and reintegration into Romanian culture and contact 
with the West was resumed (p.128). This was not to last, however. For, finally, in 1971, 
the Party returned to the autochthonous nationalism of the interwar period, this time, 
directed according to the specific aims of the Communist regime, and expressed, 
increasingly, as Ôprotochronism:Õ  
ÒNationalism became the decisive historical and political argument. United throughout 
their whole history, united around the single party and the Leader, the Romanians were 
infused with the vocation of unity, in other words, the subordination of the individual in 
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the face of the national organism and, at the same time, a strict delimitation of their own 
nation in relation to others. As a political instrument of legitimization and domination, 
nationalism gained advantage from the amalgamation of the authentic nationalist 
tradition and the specific aims pursued by the communist dictatorship. It seemed like a 
recuperation when in the first instance it was actually a manipulation (Boia 2001, p.77).   
In this turn to nationalism, Boia (2005, p.143) argues, Communism associated the notion 
of the Party and its leader with the Ògreat mythical configurations around which national 
conscience had crystallized and evolvedÓ: the origins of Romanians, their continuity 
(territorial), their unity (as a people), Romanians and the Other/s, and the ideal Prince.120 
Each of these configurations were altered in specific ways in order to function as forms 
of Party legitimization and control, and strongly emphasized, they managed to dominate 
the imaginary of the Romanians long after the demise of Communism.  
 
The Origins 
This question regards the Dacian/Thracian-Roman origins of the Romanians, also mixed 
with the Slavic element. In the 1950s both Dacians and Romans are more subdued 
categories, while the Slavic element receives more attention than ever before. The 
emphasis is placed, at this stage, on reading ancient history in terms of the class struggle, 
with the Romans taking more or less the role of the Western imperialists and the Dacians 
                                                             
120 This section relies extensively on BoiaÕs ÒHistory and Myth in Romanian Consciousness,Ó (2005/1997 
for the Romanian version and 2001 for the English translation) which, in my view, stands as the most 
influential work on Romanian history as a whole in the post-Communist period. The five Ôgreat mythical 
configurationsÕ discussed here, namely, the origins of Romanians, their continuity (territorial), their unity 
(as a people), Romanians and the Other/s, the ideal Prince, constitute not only themes but the actual titles 
of five of the seven chapters of BoiaÕs book. In that respect, their discussion in light of protochronism also 
constitutes a schematic summary of this extensive body of work.  
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maintaining a low profile because of the anti-nationalist stance. Next, between the 60s 
and 70s, the focus shifts to a Dacian-Roman synthesis as the origin of the Romanians. 
From 1970s, however, the extreme RightÕs obsession with the Dacian element (from the 
interwar period) takes center stage, the biological essentialism associated with the 
idealized Dacians providing a solid foundation for an autochthonous nationalism. This 
makes it possible for the Party to celebrate, in 1980, Ò2050 years from the formation of 
BurebistaÕs Ôunitary and centralizedÕ Dacian stateÓ - a perfect way to legitimate 
CeauşescuÕs unitary, centralized and authoritarian state (Boia 2005, p.134). 
 
The Continuity 
The problem of continuity relates to the question of the territory within which 
Romanians were constituted as a people. The question also marks the struggle for 
identifying the main aspect of Romanian-ness as either Latin or Dacian, or, sometimes, 
but more rarely, as a combination of such elements.  
The ÒcontinuityÓ debate has its roots in the lack of historical evidence for the period 
between the retreat of the Roman Empire in the 3rd century AD and the formation of the 
first medieval state formations in the 14th century. The problem is compounded by the 
fact that while the Roman colonizing influence was much greater south of the Danube, 
the Latin element is historically manifested more strongly at north of the Danube. Thus, 
different historical theses posit the formation of the Romanian people on a territory 
similar to that of todayÕs Romania, in a limited space within the same area (sometimes 
severely reduced in size), in a much larger territory that includes great portions from 
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Central and South-Eastern Europe, and, finally, somewhere south of the Danube, 
completely outside of the current borders of Romania (idem, p.189). Obviously, these 
interpretations can support different and sometimes very divergent political claims. For 
example, positing the formation of the Romanian people at south of the Danube can 
serve as 1) an argument for the Latinists, 2) as a way to affirm a Slavic (and, thus, 
Russian) influence as essential, or 3) as a way to argue that Hungarians were in fact the 
original inhabitants of the territory at north of the Danube (Boia 2005).  
For obvious reasons then, while the 50s saw Romania defined in terms of the territory it 
then occupied (excluding claims for Bessarabia), but mainly as part of the larger Slavic 
element, the 70s affirmed the uninterrupted material and spiritual continuity of the 
Dacians on the same territory: the territory of the former ÔDaciaÕ being ÔconstructedÕ as 
equivalent to that of ÒThe Greater RomaniaÓ from 1918121 (pp.205-206). As Boia 
notices, the problem of continuity was not only territorial/ethnical, but also, political. 
Establishing the political continuity between Romanian and Dacian ruling elites would 
have bestowed a dignified political heritage to the Romanians. The Communist regime, 
in particular, could not resist such an opportunity. Thus, by defining Dacia, in 1975, as 
an Òunorganized stateÓ (a real contribution to the theory of the state, Boia comments 
ironically, observing that the notion of the state implies, by definition, some form of 
organization), the Communist Party managed to establish as dogma Ôthe uninterrupted 
existence of the state from Burebista to CeauşescuÓ (p.208). This served several 
purposes at the same time: it gave an argument for claiming more territory and for 
                                                             
121 In addition to the established territory of Romania this also included the provinces of Bukovina, 
Bessarabia and Dobrudja (see maps of ÒThe Greater RomaniaÓ at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Romania). 
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solving the Hungarian problem in Transylvania, affirmed the essential Dacian features 
associated with the recently revived autochthonous nationalism, and legitimated 
CeauşescuÕs rule by portraying him as a descendant of Burebista. Last but not least, by 
imposing on a history of 2000 years and more the image of the unchanged territory of 
ÒGreater Romania,Ó CeauşescuÕs regime projected the image of an eternal Romania, and 
of an eternal Communist regime, self-sufficient and always able to fend off for itself 
(Boia 2005, p.201).  
 
The Unity 
The notion refers here to an ethnic or national type of unity that is exacerbated and 
imposed over the differences existing between regions and districts and within the larger 
population.  
During the first phase of Communism this notion of unity was not of major concern. 
National unity was historically represented as a by-product of the economic need for a 
unitary market, while the 1859 unification of the two provinces, Moldova and Ţara 
Romnească, was taken to exemplify the Romanian bourgeoisieÕs struggle to secure its 
position by dominating a common market (and not a spirit of national unity)122 (idem, 
pp.228-229).  
Not surprisingly, this trend is completely reversed in the 60s. At this stage, the 
interpretation which saw Michael the Brave having conquered Transylvania for the 
                                                             
122 In the same vein, the 1918 unification with the provinces of Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina 
was considered an example of the aggressive actions of the Romanian bourgeoisie at the end of the First 
World War.  
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Austro-Hungarian Empire, is reversed to mark the first unification of Romanian 
territories, namely, Ţara Romnească, Moldova and Transylvania, in 1600 (p.230). After 
Michael, other kings and rulers would fall in line, consciously advocating the ideal of 
national unification. History erases, in this phase, the conflicts between the three 
provinces, or the fact that the 1848 revolutionary generation had different aims in each 
of these provinces, and had put forward different political programs for unification 
(p.233). Ethnic differences are overlooked in the attempt to claim the strong continuity 
of the Romanian element in all provinces. In schools, Òstudents find out from some of 
their teachers that the Ôgolden dreamÕ of Romanians, their ideal for centuries, had been 
that of unityÓ (p.236). Eventually, the emphasis on unity also structures the weather 
reports, where to pronounce the names of RomaniaÕs regions is forbidden by the 
propaganda section of the Party: ÒEven the wind, rain and snow had to respect the 
Romanian unity. It was forbidden for rain to fall in Moldova, rain could fall at will, but 
in the north-east part of the country, not in Moldova!Ó (p.234). 
As Boia concludes (p.229), this emphasis on unity was of great assistance to the 
totalitarian project of Communism. The use of history in order to emphasize the idea of 
unity as an essential aspect of Romanian-ness served to efficiently promote the 
formation of a uniform society, united around the figure of the leader/Party. 
Furthermore, this tendency was only strengthened by the fact that the concept of unity 
posited the timeless existence of a national Romanian soul, which the Party could claim 
to best represent. 
Romanians and the Other/s 
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In my estimation, the author fails to relate this theme directly with the Communist 
regime. Nevertheless, the discussion of this mythical configuration can be seen to 
emphasize certain protochronist features.  
Two main factors, Boia (2001, p.153) claims, have shaped the way in which Romanians 
tend to perceive the Other/s: 1) Òthe reactions of a rural and somewhat isolated 
civilizationÓ and 2) Òthe massive and uninterrupted impact of foreign rulers and 
models.Ó 
With regard to the second point, Boia (2005, p.277) observes that Romania had 
witnessed three great disruptions within the last 150 years: the late 19th century break 
from the Orient, the 1948 departure from the Occident through the installation of 
Communism, and the 1989 return to the Occidental matrix. The superimposition of 
models and currents resulting from these disruptions has caused Romania to become a 
Òtransitional civilizationÓ (engaged in an Òendless transitionÓ) deeply concerned with the 
Other: Òfrom here, the tensed search for what others might be able to offer, from here, in 
no lesser a measure, the fear for what could be lost through contact with the others, from 
here, thus, the amalgam of fascination and rejection, in other words, the obsession with 
the foreignÓ (p.277).  
A result of this has been that in the last few centuries Romanians have adopted the 
French, the autochthonous or the Soviet model almost religiously (p.271). If in 1853 the 
liberal politician I.C. Brătianu contended that a unified future Romania would function 
as a colony of France, at 1914, politicians of an independent Romania argued for entry 
in the First World War simply in order to save France (p.263). Similarly, after the 
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Second World War, Romania adopted the Soviet model (and its mythology) more 
faithfully than any other satellite-nation (p.271), and to such an extent that at the end of 
CeauşescuÕs regime in 1989 Romania was deemed Òcloser to the original Stalinist model 
than the Soviet Union itselfÓ (p.273).  
On the one hand, Boia (2001, p.166) argues, Ò[t]his spirit of imitation highlights the 
fragility and instability of Romanian society, always looking for reference points that 
could be easily mythologized.Ó On the other hand, this Ôspirit of imitationÕ gives undue 
emphasis to the twin features of fascination and rejection. The fascination with the West 
is at least partly responsible for the negative stereotypes ascribed to the traditional 
neighbours of the country (for example, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Serbs, the 
Hungarians, and the Albanians), seen as deficient and undermining of RomaniaÕs 
development on a Western model. At the same time, the fascination with the 
autochthonous model tends to single out the Hungarians, the Rroma and the Jews as the 
enemy within (pp.166-174). Protochronism, as a form of exacerbated nationalism, has 
often treaded this path, particularly through the discourses of Corneliu Vadim Tudor. 
More essentially, by attributing the backwardness of Romania to the pressures 
associated with internal and external enemies, protochronism and the autochthonous 
model have led to the formation of a Òbesieged fortress complexÓ123 (p.155) at the level 
of the population. Employed by the Communist regime as a form of societal control, this 
sort of mentality has contributed to another popular subject of protochronism, namely, to 
                                                             
123 The historical version of the argument, for example, states that the Occident was able to develop and 
prosper because Romania sacrificed and fought to stop invasions such as that of the Ottoman Empire. 
Interestingly, this complex is still part of Romanian society today, with protochronist Dan Zamfirescu 
(2011, ¦ 8-9) openly arguing that a Òcertain layer of JewsÓ is responsible, through global political 
machinations, for the waging of a Òwar of exterminationÓ at the Romanian people.Ó  
 
 
351 
conspiracy theories stating that the great Powers had aligned together with the aim of 
impeding RomaniaÕs glorious development (pp.175-177).  
Last but not least, the fascination with the great Powers has also worked to cultivate a 
subconscious imperialist dream (pp.177-183). In the case of Communism, this finds 
expression in the desperate need of Ceauşescu to present Romania as indispensable to 
international negotiations and agreements, as a rising economic power and a country 
with an ever-expanding population, in short, as Òa great countryÓ (pp.183-184). After 
Communism, this Òimperial temptationÓ is reflected in the continued currency of the 
view that ÒCeauşescu had,Ó indeed, Òdiscovered the recipe for the metamorphosis of a 
small country into a great powerÓ (pp.177, 184). So much so that in 1993, the 
protochronist Dan Zamfirescu felt justified to claim that, from 1964 and until 1989, 
Romania had been the fourth greatest political power in the world, after Israel, USA and 
USSR (Zamfirescu 1993, cited Boia 2001, p.184).  
 
The Ideal Prince 
The myth of the saviour, of the hero, namely the presence of mythologized personalities, 
has taken in Romania a dominant particular form through the historical notion of the 
ideal prince. In larger terms, the notion is, in fact, no stranger to Communism. As Boia 
(2005, p.308) shows, the emphasis on mythologized personalities concerns the evolution 
of Communist ideology and historiography as a whole: ÒHistory as seen by Marx 
signifies problems, structures, laws, social-economical mechanisms, in any case, not 
personalities which take the center-stage. However, the Communist project needed 
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heroes, in order to justify and illustrate its own historical schema. É Once installed in a 
position of command, the political inevitably generated a cult of the great makers of 
history. In fact, far from renouncing the pantheon, Communism only ÔrepopulatedÕ it.Ó It 
started by first replacing royal figures with the leaders of important uprisings and with 
famous revolutionaries stretching Òfrom Spartacus to RobespierreÓ (idem). Then, as 
regimes consolidated, the theme of the great leader (Stalin, Mao, Ceauşescu) was 
installed at the heart of the system. Finally, in the later phases, the pantheon was altered, 
allowing personalities that announced and legitimized the rule of the great leader to be 
included as forerunners, even where this clearly stood against the principle of class-
struggle: ÒThe rise of Stalin brought Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to the 
foreground, and Ceauşescu annexed for himself the whole constellation of Dacian kings 
and medieval voivodesÓ (Boia 2001, p.190). 
Specifically discussing the formation of the Romanian pantheon of national heroes over 
a period of 200 years Boia (2005, p.309) sees the centrality of the Òfather of the nation,Ó 
national saviour or hero motif as stemming from the need to cling to a fixed point of 
reference amidst violent and uncertain transitions. This need can be seen as responsible 
for the dominant tendency, within the discipline of history, to configure national history 
around the personalities of rulers.  
In the early phases of national formation, which are also the early phases of the 
discipline of history, the heroic-warrior type of historical ruler is the overwhelming 
motif: ÒTo submit after a fight is more praiseworthy than to submit without a fight, 
regardless of the price paidÓ (Boia 2001, p.192). The motif corresponds both to the need 
for militancy and sacrifice in achieving the national-political goals of independence and 
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unity, but also to the need, for a smaller new nation, to symbolically counter its own 
complex of inferiority by reminiscing moments in history when it had bravely resisted 
the great powers of Europe (idem).  
Despite the lack of historical evidence, and despite Ioan BogdanÕs Junimist criticism (in 
1905) of an emphasis on personalities at the expense of culture, the early historians of 
the nation thus centered the constitution of national history around a succession of 
rulers, in many cases constructed according to false biographies124 because of the biases 
associated with national sentiment (pp.191-199). In their attempt to construct a 
discipline of history and a past worthy of any European nation so as to legitimize the 
unification and sovereignty of Romania, the Romantic nationalists can be thus credited 
with having founded the national pantheon of historical heroic figures. From there on, 
this pantheon of figures would be revised and reconstructed with each new political 
regime coming into power, the apex of this process being reached during the later phase 
of Communism when Ceauşescu had himself made a king-like scepter.  
Within the domain of history, Boia (pp.196-198) identifies the national pantheon 
between 1890 and 1940 as cementing a principle of authority that saw the mechanism of 
political power inserted into a single human being (with different parties, including the 
liberal one, believing that social reform and progress required a heavy hand). The myth 
of the ideal prince and of the saviour of the nation receives a new, romanticized 
emphasis through the royal dynasty of the Kings Carol I and Ferdinand, and also partly 
through the dynastic role of the Brătianu family in national politics. Starting with the 
1930s, however, the new heroes or saviours of the nation develop a Òtotalitarian 
                                                             
124 The list includes Michael the Brave (Boia 2001, pp.133-137), Vlad Ţepeş and Ioan Vodă the Terrible, 
to name just a few of the most important cases (pp.197-199). 
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vocationÓ (p.212) with King Carol II, Marshall Ion Antonescu and the leader of the 
Legionary Movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the main examples. In each of these 
cases, the national pantheon gets reshuffled. And the same thing happens again when the 
new national saviours, the Communists, come into power.  
The Dej regime makes sure to exclude from the pantheon the kings and rulers (or at least 
de-emphasize their status), 125 and the famous political figures of modern Romania such 
as the members of the Brătianu family (pp.214-215). These are replaced with leaders of 
popular uprisings (Horea, Cloşca si Crişan, or Tudor Vladimirescu) with the focus being 
placed on the 1848 revolutionary Nicolae Bălcescu (the figure from 1848 most 
accessible to Party symbolic recuperation and investment), and on the heroes of the 
working class, all constantly gravitating around the figure of the leader, but gradually 
disappearing or fading away in order for Dej to emerge as the only great leader from his 
time (pp.215-219). Ceauşescu follows in DejÕs footprints, but he reinstates almost in an 
obsessive manner, and under the influence of the protochronists, the Dacian kings and 
the rulers of the Romanian provinces (Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, etc.) 
(pp.219-223). Dej himself disappears from the pantheon of Ceauşescu, which now 
reactivates the figures first promoted by the Romantic nationalists (p.224). In contrast, 
the twentieth century is marked by an immense void in terms of national personalities126 
present in the pantheon, which only serves to better accentuate the amazing stature of 
Ceauşescu, who even as a 14 year old participated in Communist uprisings (p.225). 
Culturally, the Ceauşescu regime is responsible for the most prolific circulation of 
                                                             
125 With the major exception of King John, seen as historically a political ally of the Russian Czar (Boia 
2001, p.215). 
126 The figure of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu would be rehabilitated in order to support domestic policy in the 60s 
and later, in the 80s, Romanian foreign policy would engineer the recuperation of Nicolae Titulescu so as 
to locate a worthy predecessor of Ceauşescu on the international scene (idem, pp.224-225).  
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symbols associated with the national pantheon and the protochronist themes. These 
include figures imprinted on different banknotes, countless statues and ceremonies and 
most importantly, the cultural productions which see the appearance of popular films 
centered on the theme of the ideal prince, with all the main historical figures being 
covered between 1963 and until 1989.127  
In conclusion to the discussion on the Ôideal princeÕ, and as a way of underlining the 
influence the political can hold on national history, Boia (p.221) describes the simplified 
versions of the Romanian pantheon in the twentieth century as follows: ÒTrajan128 and 
Carol I around 1900, Bălcescu and Gheorghiu-Dej in the 1950s, Burebista and 
Ceauşescu in 1980.Ó 
These, then, are the five mythological configurations described by Boia, many of which 
will be reflected again and again in all sorts of protochronist productions, some of which 
will be briefly analyzed in the remainder of this chapter. However, beyond the impact of 
these mythological configurations, what exactly has been the overall impact of 
protochronism on the field of history? Like Mircea Martin with regard to the resistance 
put forward by the literary world, Boia argues that protochronism did not succeed to 
impose itself in the academic departments of history. The Party, acting through the Party 
Institute of History and through the Center for Military History, ultimately failed to 
impose a protochronist direction in the university departments and in the civic research 
centers that served the domain of history (p.81). This lack of commitment from the 
                                                             
127 ÒTudorÓ in 1963, ÒThe DaciansÓ and ÒThe ColumnÓ (in 1967 and 1968), Michael the Brave (1971), 
Stephen the Great: Vaslui 1475 (1975), Dimitrie Cantemir (1975), Vlad Ţepeş (1978), Burebista (1980) 
and Mircea the Great (1989) (p.221). 
128 The Roman emperor who had colonized the Dacia province, representative of the Latin element in 
Romanian identity.  
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academic world resulted in a Òdisorganized and inefficient historiographical movement,Ó 
which saw, for example, the great Communist project of a ten volume synthesis of 
Romanian history (started in 1975) miserably fail before the appearance of the first 
volume (idem). In the words of Boia, Ò[t]he pure, hard Dacianism of the Party and 
military historians came up against the more balanced position of the university 
historians and professional archeologistsÓ (idem). Nevertheless, BoiaÕs conclusion is that 
despite the subtle forms of resistance put forward by the historians, the population at 
large had been subjected to a propaganda of Òvirulent nationalist demagogy,Ó the forms 
of which continue to shape peopleÕs imaginary in the present (p.82).  
 
Protochronism: from History to Legend Ð the Stereotypical Hero and 
ÒPackaged CommunismÓ 
 
While creating or reshuffling a new national pantheon is quite an accomplishment, it is 
the manner of representation which gives this enterprise its particular substance and 
effect. In terms of CeausescuÕs regime, the main representational strategy, of 
protochronist extraction, is based on endowing historical figures with contemporaneity 
(Mitchievici 2005, p.337). This feature allows the heroes of the nation to actively 
participate in the glorious undertakings of the Party as spread-through-time versions of 
the ideal model embodied in the Ôgreat leaderÕ. In protochronism, therefore, heroes have 
no age, so that they can all move throughout history, speaking the same Òlanguage of 
Communist-nationalist propagandaÓ (idem, p.340). Borrowing from the Romanticist 
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historians of the nation, Communism sets the heroic-warrior type of figure as 
emblematic. The features of this iconic representation which pervades disciplines such 
as history, poetry, literature, which shapes the moral ideal in the educational field and 
which constitutes the central symbol of popular movies of the Communist era, unfolds 
on two axes. The first, an axis of moral virtues, with humbleness, hospitality, openness, 
honesty, generosity and pacifism (p.355) as main features which fix the hero in the 
humanistic genre Ð moral features which could be summarized under the designation 
Ôpurity of heartÕ. The second, a dimension where the peaceful hero (usually, a common 
individual) is forced to defend against an enemy infinitely stronger, in a sort of Ôone 
against allÕ scenario, by activating a sacrificial attitude of the kamikaze type, a sort of 
emotional paroxysm which can make up for the lack of strength, weapons or numbers, in 
order to defend certain ideals (usually involving the nation and generally reflecting the 
idea of justice and of the greater good) (pp.348-351): ÒInvincibility is in this case 
assured by pathos, what counts is the intensity of hate, of the fury doubled by the 
legitimacy of the causeÓ (p.351). As observed by Mitchievici (p.348), the principle of 
Òthe most destitute = the weakest = the most honestÓ turning out to be the greatest hero, 
has roots both in Christian mythology and in the romantic myth of the noble savage who 
is good because he is pure. The principle is also one, which, because of its reversal from 
zero to hero, seems designed to appeal to the masses. In fact, by cultivating a certain 
devotion regarding the ideals of the nation, Party and its leader, the function of the 
principle seems to be that of inserting an attitudinal trigger device that can elicit total 
engagement from the masses, to the point of ceremonial sacrifice and ritualistic death. 
For death, as the Romanian mythical heroes portray it, is something to laugh at 
fearlessly while in the quest for eternity. And, in case the hero fails to succeed and is 
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martyred, then, often a case of treason can be invoked, meant to substantiate the belief 
that RomaniaÕs great destiny is somehow always thwarted by fate, in the form of some 
aggression induced by an external factor (p.364).129  
Overall, then, the heroic-warrior type of figure is, in fact, a perfect illustration of the two 
main aspects of the hero-mechanism associated with socialist humanism: 1) the myth of 
the hero ready to sacrifice everything for something bigger (Nation, Party, Justice, 
Eternity, etc.) and 2) the myth of the pure-hearted individual who seeks to actively 
internalize the Good. The mythological procedure through which the ÔheroizationÕ of 
history takes place in the second part of the Communist period, however, reflects not so 
much a strategic investment at the level of beliefs (like during the Romantic nationalism 
of the 19th century or in the early phases of Communism), but rather, the shaping of 
attitudes and psychological reactions through a sort of consumerist appeal to what is 
Ôcool.Õ Partially, this explains the amazing influence of ÒPovestiri istoriceÓ (ÒHistorical 
stories/legendsÓ), a collection of storybooks by Dumitru Almaş130 (and a fantastic 
illustration of the tenets of protochronism), which became compulsory school material 
and guided the formation of textbooks while also dominating the personal libraries of 
Romanian families. For ultimately, by pushing history into legend and then further into 
utopian and contemporaneous myth, Almaş opened the way for a new type of 
ÒparaliteratureÓ (p.346), one not only successful in terms of sales, but later 
institutionalized into the official canons of the school-environment: ÒHeroism is brought, 
after all, in the quotidian through a subtle slip, the heroic style of reading history, which 
                                                             
129 Reflecting a deep inferiority complex, this sort of scenario ultimately functions as another way of 
emphasizing the Òbesieged fortress mentalityÓ previously discussed by Boia (2005). 
130 The essay of Mitchievici (2005) focuses, in fact, on assessing the role of Dumitru Almaş and of his 
collection of historical stories from the perspective of cultural studies.  
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Almaş proposes in these storiesÓ (p.364). One example, from the many given by 
Mitchievici, should suffice here: ÒGelu the Romanian does not hesitate to place even the 
last of his arrows in the bow in order to launch it towards the enemy, this is exactly the 
arrow stuck in his own chest. As if this was not enough, Gelu also prefers his dead body 
not to fall in the hands of the enemy, and he has time for this [his horse quickly burying 
him according to the heroÕs indications ÐÔWith your hoot, dig my grave, here near the 
water, then grab me with your teeth and throw me in the holeÕ]Ó (pp.252-253). 
The emphasis on heroic coolness (and on the heroic type figure) as a consumerist 
strategy is even more obvious in the movies of Sergiu Nicolaescu, the most successful 
film-maker in Communist Romania, and considered, in fact, the innovator of the 
consumerist-communist mix in the genre of adventure or historical movies (Manolescu 
2004i, p.308). Based on the promotional strategy which forced the buyer to purchase his 
favourite book only as part of a package containing less tasty products such as 
discourses of Ceauşescu, Communist school pedagogy or anthologies of lyrics dedicated 
to the Romanian Communist Party etc., this phenomenon of Communist consumerism 
has been creatively characterized by Manolescu (p.283) as Òpackaged Communism.Ó As 
described by Manolescu, (p.281) Òpackaged CommunismÓ works by Òintegrating the 
segments of official ideology into the structures of consumer culture,Ó thus adding a 
version of soft Communism (adventure plus political propaganda) alongside an already 
existent version of hard Communism (political discourses presented in print, at radio or 
television). At first glance, soft Communism seems to benefit everyone involved, the 
authors, for giving them the possibility of exercising a duplicitous strategy which can 
involve financial gains, the Party, in terms of making official dogma more accessible, 
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and the public, because of access to some form of entertainment making the totalitarian 
regime more tolerable (idem). However, in overall terms, the only real winner to be 
counted is the Party (p.282). For, by acting as the Òcreator, diffuser and collector of its 
own ideologyÓ and also as a Òcontestant of it, through directed subversion or tolerance,Ó 
the Party is able to disseminate itself in the field of cultural commerce (and to enter the 
aesthetical canon) through a totality of strategies Òfor whose political ÔanalysisÕ and 
cultural ÔdeconstructionÕ they [the masses] ha[ve] neither the presence of spirit, nor the 
motivation or the necessary professional trainingÓ (idem). Thus, what starts in the period 
of socialist realism as the direct, religious, hard Marxist-Leninist discourse of the hero-
mirror mechanism continues, in the period of socialist humanism, as a complex 
discourse which proposes, alongside the hard version, an alternative and more subtle 
consumerist-humanist version. The mirror mechanism of the hero stays the same, but the 
resulting product is different.  
This is how Manolescu (p.309) describes the prototype of the new hero of socialist 
humanism, based on the main character of the famous police-movie series of 
Nicolaescu: the ÔcommissaireÕ Moldovan Òdoes not drink (only occasionally, when 
lecturing his enemies); does not smoke; does not read; has an exemplary-child in school, 
Ôthe second in his classÕ (the communist clich of scholarly diligence), whom the 
legionaries, at the command of corrupt politicians, hurry to kill; he does not play cards; 
has no erotic life; is dedicated, at the same time, both to his small job and to the great 
ideals of humanity, above all, hating dirty and easy money (the clich of incorruptibility 
and that of making a profit through honest work). ÔObjectiveÕ from a political point of 
view, he embodies both the qualities of the adventurer (courage, speed of reaction, spirit 
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of initiative, enjoyment of action, colored language etc.), and those of the Party member 
(faith in the leftist ideals of social and political justice, bombastic patriotism, declared 
modesty, civic spirit, predispositions toward the Ôwooden tongueÕ and didacticism of 
Ôthe golden eraÕ).Ó  
It is clear that what distinguishes the hero of the movie in this case is the myth of the 
pure-hearted individual seeking to actively internalize and reflect the Good (of the 
nation, of humanity, and at personal level, in terms of universal values).131 
Not surprisingly then, that Moldovan, the Òvirtual communistÓ (p.309), the pure-hearted 
hero described above, would die fighting against all odds, and in a most memorable 
scene (though later he would be ÔrevivedÕ for the continuation of the series), thus also 
                                                             
131 Nevertheless, there are also elements of subversion in the character of Miclovan/Moldovan (modelled, 
in fact, paradoxically, after the action heroes played by James Cagny and Humphrey Bogart in their 
gangster movies). The movies are shot in the American, Hollywood style, always including some musical 
or dancing scene typical of Hollywood but totally exotic on the Romanian scene and completely 
unavailable in Romanian everyday life. These instances of complete bourgeois/capitalist culture are 
reflected in the character of the hero, a bourgeois man with an adventurous spirit who seeks to enjoy life 
fully (fashion, guns and cars, but also women; there are even allusions in one of the 6 movies in the series, 
namely ÒThe Duel,Ó that he had been visiting high-class prostitutes), and who is also neutral or apolitical 
(though he is slowly won over by the Communists and, eventually, these leanings towards the 
Communists will bring him extremely close to them if not completely in their camp). After all, as 
Nicolaescu has confessed after 1989, the character of Miclovan/Moldovan had actually been constituted as 
a tribute to his uncle (ÒHe was elegant, impressed through physical build, and was fond of women and fast 
cars.Ó), Gheorghe Cambrea, a real police commissaire, who despite having opposed the Legionnaires (the 
Iron Guard) at the time of their rule, was unjustly kicked out of the police force (in 1945) and then, 
subsequently jailed (between 1950 and 1965) by the Communist regime (Condurăţeanu 2004). It seems 
that, despite these subversive elements, these movies of Nicolaescu were allowed to pass censorship 
because of the desperately low attendance records shown by the Romanian films of the time in movie 
theaters around the country (especially when in comparison with Western movies). Indeed, this possibility 
is only strengthened by Macrea Toma (2010, p.186)Õs argument that, since the end of the 1950s, the 
cinematographic trend had been to use Western movies, only 10% of the total number of movies imported, 
Òto cover the losses caused by the propaganda films.Ó Whatever the case, it is also clear that another 
reason for these movies meeting the criteria of censorship, and probably the main one, is given by the 
actual consumerist-communist mix (or Ôpackaged CommunismÕ) manifested at the level of content. From 
this perspective, these movies of Sergiu Nicolaescu constitute a prime example of that form of cultural 
resistance that resembles ÒdiffidenceÓ and which Macrea-Toma (2010, pp. 233, 280-281,328) describes as 
Òintegrated non-conformism.Ó 
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confirming the other original axis of the hero mechanism, namely, the myth of the hero 
ready to sacrifice everything for something greater (Nicolaescu 1974).  
In fact, a quick look at NicolaescuÕs most popular movies reveals that the hero-mirror 
mechanism, with its two axes (virtue/sacrifice), is always the essential motif around 
which the plot unfolds. His first movie, ÒDacii,Ó (The Dacians) illustrates this through 
the ritualistic self-sacrifice of King DecebalusÕ son Cotyso, Òthe most handsome, the 
most good-hearted, and the most brave,Ó as a messenger sent to communicate the wishes 
of his people to their god Zalmoxis in times of approaching war. ÒWhy do the Dacians 
laugh before they die?Ó the roman envoy asks Decebalus. Because Zalmoxis has given 
them many lives and therefore the best way to depart into the next one is through 
laughter and not crying, comes the answer. In the opening scene, the advancing Romans 
troops demand the Dacians to open their frontier wall to Òthe Rulers of the worldÓ in 
exchange for their lives and freedom. ÒYou will be, but only if we die,Ó shout the 
Dacians, calling the attack. Following a circular structure, the last shot in the movie 
freezes with the Dacian king and his army attacking the onrushing Roman armies head 
on (quickly followed by a glorified representation of their actually lost battle taken from 
TrajanÕs Column). In between, the rest of the movie centers around one theme: the 
readiness of Dacians to die for the independence of their land (punctuated at the level of 
the plot by three important instances of Dacian self-immolation), in order to assert their 
values of freedom in the realm of the Absolute (and also, in that of universal history) 
(Nicolaescu 1967)132.  
                                                             
132 Interestingly, this first movie of Nicolaescu (and others of the same genre) corresponds, at the level of 
policy, to the August 1968 reintroduction of the ÒPatriotic GuardsÓ and the formulation of the doctrine of 
ÒWar of the Entire PeopleÓ (1969) Ð both measures aimed to ensure that a militia force of 900.000 and 
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That the same motif applies to ÒMihai ViteazulÓ (ÒMichael the BraveÓ/ÓThe Last 
CrusadeÓ) is evident from Òthe opening sequence where a man in the midst of battle in a 
muddy swamp cries out ÔvictoryÕ and is immediately turned, Mifune-like133 into a 
human porcupine, with arrows flying into his chest from all directionsÓ (Fish 2009). In 
the movie, probably the most renowned of the Communist period, the historical figure of 
ÒMichael the BraveÓ is depicted as a symbol of the unity of all Romanians and of self-
sacrifice for that ideal. The movie, allegedly an authentic representation of history, 
presents MichaelÕs relentless struggle to unite the three main provinces of Wallachia, 
Transylvania and Moldavia into one country, despite competing interests from the 
Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. With 
countless sacrifices (including that of his son, which is counter to historical reality) and 
through many battles, Michael the Brave achieves this unification of the future territories 
of Romania in 1600, but this is short-lived as betrayal sees the Prince quickly lose even 
his province of Wallachia. Fighting Òto the very end,Ó Michael just about accomplishes 
the unification of the three provinces once again, but through betrayal of his ally, he dies 
assassinated in his day of victory. The end of the movie makes it explicitly clear that, 
despite his death, Michael the Brave had achieved, if only briefly, the national idea 
which had always motivated him. Through his heroism and sacrifice, the viewing 
audience is told, Michael the Brave had secured the formation of the Romanian nation 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
which could expand to 6 million, Òwould provide the backbone of a guerilla struggle of the entire 
population against any invading armyÓ (Crowther 1988, p.93). Furthermore, this is how Tismăneanu 
(2008) interprets CeauşescuÕs speech condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: ÒCeauşescu 
cynically used the crushing of the Prague Spring as an excuse to enhance his own personality cult. He 
insisted on imposing a unified domestic front to counter any supposed Soviet attack. He created a self-
serving mythology in which he was the fearless hero, the symbol of the unity of party and nationÓ 
[my emphasis]. 
133 Toshiro Mifune is a famous Japanese actor who plays the warrior-hero in many of the Akiro Kurosawa 
films.  
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for the future. Thus, in the last shot of the movie, Michael, despite being deadly injured, 
walks serenely (the heroes of Sergiu Nicolaescu can only die standing) towards the 
viewer, reminiscing on the import of his lifeÕs vision: ÒI will go until the very end, 
wherever this end might take me. And I want this people to know, more and more, what 
it wants, and to realize what it can, because I leave as heritage to it an accomplishment. 
Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia, this is what I have always wished for!Ó 
(Nicolaescu 1970) 
It shall be remarked here, that this scene at the end of the movie is remarkably similar to 
the typology of the hero adopted by Dumitru Almaş (1982) in his protochronist-
consumerist historical tales: ÒWhatever the case, the hero refuses to die before he has 
completed his symbolic mandate, this sometimes consisting in the enunciation of a 
simple encouraging formula. The hero has always something to say at the end, he is 
always given time to conclude, to have the last word. ...This cardboard superman cannot 
end the conflict in the quotidian, but he will resolve it in the absolute. Death is never the 
final station, but only the place from which forces will be rejuvenated for a second 
comingÓ (Mitchievici 2005, p.352). The protochronist character of the movie is also 
confirmed by how its structure unfolds around the myth of Unity, the myth of the Ideal 
Prince and the myth of Conspiracy, before culminating in the Ôbesieged-fortress 
complex.Õ 
Truly a Òpriority,Ó however, is to ascribe to Michael the Brave the intention of building a 
unified national state, Òtwo centuries before the concept of the national state had 
crystallized in the rest of EuropeÓ (Boia 2001, p.139). Or to read his achievement as 
derived from a Òconsciously RomanianÓ sense of action (idem) for national unity, in the 
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context in which Romanian historiography of the 17th and 18th centuries, and even a 19th 
century movement of national consciousness such as the Transylvanian School, had 
interpreted the 1600 moment through anything else (the exceptional ambition of the 
Prince, his defense of Christianity, his close ties with Emperor Rudolf II) except the 
presence of a national idea (p.39-42). As it stands, because of Communist 
historiography, but especially through the movie of Nicolaescu, the myth of Michael the 
Brave remains one of the most important and most lasting protochronist myths. Such has 
been the influence of this myth and movie in Romanian consciousness that in order to 
boost Mr. George BecaliÕs image as a modern Michael the Brave, his party (ÒThe New 
GenerationÓ) employed scenes from the actual movie in the 2004 presidential campaign, 
being sued for it by the daughter of the actor Amza Pellea.  
The story of Michael the Brave (1970) continues with ÒNemuritoriiÓ (ÒThe ImmortalsÓ) 
(1974), Òa fairy tale on a historical themeÓ (Zaharia 2011, ¦ 13) where thirteen soldiers 
of Michael return to the Romanian provinces 10 years after his death, to retrigger his 
dream of unification. Together they carry with them, across Europe, a chest supposed to 
contain all the riches of Michael the Great, and, also, the standard of the union of the 
three provinces. On their trails are the Ottoman troops of Selim Paşa who is intent on 
capturing the treasure. After many adventures, the 13 heroes manage to return to 
Wallachia, only to find out that the ruler they were hoping to aid in continuing MichaelÕs 
dream had been removed by forces of the Ottoman empire, who now control the region 
(with the aid of the local authorities). What they also find here is an almost empty 
fortress, whose caretaker was guarding it from the time of Michael the Brave. When an 
army led by Selim Paşa and local Romanian support is spotted approaching them, the 
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remaining twelve heroes decide to have a stand-off in order to defend the union flag 
placed on the top of the highest tower of the Romanian fortress. This decision is taken 
despite the fact that their chest of riches contains only stones - now revealed as only a 
fabrication of the groupÕs original leader (now dead) meant to convince his troops to 
return home and fight for the ideal of re-unification. The caretaker is sent to spread the 
news of the return of MichaelÕs standard to the peasants, with the promise being made 
that the flag will still be flying high by the time the rallied forces return. The twelve 
resist heroically the offensive of an entire army, dying one by one until only Captain 
Andrei (played by Sergiu Nicolaescu himself) is left. In the end, Captain Andrei is asked 
to surrender the chest in exchange for his life and freedom. He agrees to do so, but when 
Selim Paşa, the local leader and few of their troops approach him in a hurry (pressed by 
the news that thousands of armed peasants are approaching), Captain Andrei blows 
himself up, killing everyone else as well. As a conclusion, the clear implication in the 
movie is that this heroic sacrifice and the flag have fulfilled their mission: the Romanian 
peasants are now ready to fight for the twin ideals of independence and unity.   
Like ÒMichael the BraveÓ then, ÒThe ImmortalsÓ are equally centered on the hero-mirror 
mechanism and the myth of Unity. Essentially, the movie was supposed to end with the 
thirteen heroes standing near their own graves, just behind their own crosses, an image 
supposed to point to their true immortality, and to the idea of their return. The Party 
censored this scene, probably because advocating such an idea of return in the present 
was rightfully interpreted as potentially problematic for the regime. After all, the idea 
that heroes who can ÔawakenÕ the whole Romanian people to fight for independence can 
appear anytime in the present was not exactly the type of message the Communist 
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system wanted mass-distributed. Particularly, as the excellent soundtrack of the movie 
featured the famous Romanian rock-band ÒPhoenixÓ (name which constitutes another 
symbol of immortality and return), who had since left the country illegally.    
What essentially differentiates ÒThe ImmortalsÓ from ÒMichael the BraveÓ in terms of 
the mirror-mechanism then, is the idea that these 13 heroes are not only historical 
characters, but archetypal essences, combining virtue, courage and sacrifice, in a manner 
comparable with that of the 12 apostles of Jesus or the 12 Imams of Muhammad 
(together, also 13): ÒEven since 1971 I had this idea of a group of Ô13 immortalsÕ, who 
appeared in history whenever they were needed, showing that courage and readiness of 
sacrifice which could have served as an example for othersÓ (Nicolaescu cited in 
Wikipedia, ÒNemuritoriiÓ). 
In the end, then, by mixing the legendary with history, the mythological with the real, 
and the cool with the idea of self-annihilation, the productions of Almaş and Nicolaescu 
not only contribute to the general investment of Communist society in a utopian 
dimension (Ôa society living in the imaginaryÕ), alongside the dimensions of the hero-
mirror mechanism, but also, essentially, towards making protochronism digestible and 
even trendy.    
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Conclusion: Protochronism as a Discourse of the Mirror Mechanism 
(and of Socialist Humanism) 
 
It would seem strange, because of its apparent rejection of European values and its 
nationalistic focus, to associate protochronism with Socialist Humanism.134 
Nevertheless, rejecting European values and asserting nationalism does not take place at 
the expense of the hero mirror-mechanism or of its central focus on humanism and the 
ideal of the perfect human. If in the first stage, the humanistic discourse is restricted to 
the legitimization of the revolutionary movement and to constructing the perfect man 
and society after the Russian model, in the second, the process expands by allowing 
humanistic forms to include and be coloured by themes relating not only to Marxist-
Leninism but also to nationalism. Rather than a disruption, this counts more as an 
enlarged and more hybrid form of continuity. Where in the first stage generalized 
humanism had its implications attached to Marxist-Leninist concepts and objectives, in 
the second stage, the resulting implications of this are themselves impressed with a 
nationalistic orientation. That is why, despite the differences in final implications, both 
the ideal Communist and the ideal nationalistic Communist must be devoted to the great 
ideals of humanity as a starting point. In fact, the only difference between the two is that 
the national idea allows for more implications in the dissemination of a Ôgeneralized 
                                                             
134 Socialist humanism (1964-1989) has been previously described as a discourse under the auspices of 
Party rule, which makes way for a Ôgeneralized humanism,Õ able to disseminate the desired Socialist 
mentality within the population at large. 
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humanismÕ: in socialist humanism, a good human being is not only a Communist hero, 
but also a national hero of some sort. That the humanistic device of the mirror-
mechanism continues through protochronism and nationalism (and even receives a more 
humanistic orientation) is also clear from the types of archetypes promoted.  
The quintessential kamikaze-heroes of Dumitru Almaş who appear, from antiquity to the 
present, from children to women to men, from peasants to workers to intellectuals and 
political leaders, as embodiments of the same heroic ethnic substance (Mitchievici 2004, 
p.348), faithful and ever-ready to honour their death-hero contract with the Party 
(p.365), or the popular film-heroes of NicolaescuÕs movies, where the most pure, the 
virtuous and the best die, in absolutely inspiring fashion, for the good of the nation, in a 
chain stretching from the Dacians, to the historical figures of the Middle Ages, to 
completely made up mythological characters, and to the heroes of the War of 
Independence or of the First and Second World Wars135, these all confirm, within the 
context of humanistic ideals, the two axes of the hero-mechanism: purity of heart (sum 
of humanistic virtues) and sacrifice for a larger cause. And, indeed, what else is 
protochronism if not the ÔheroizationÕ of nationalism?  
And here there might be a more important question to be found. For if protochronism 
produces heroization and heroes, the next question to then ask should be why that is so.  
Is the notion of priority in culture employed primarily in order to create heroes and 
masterpieces that can compare with or surpass those of the West, in fact launching the 
                                                             
135 The last such movie, about a heroine of the First World War, appeared in 1999 (ÒTriunghiul MorţiiÓ Ð 
ÒThe Triangle of DeathÓ). A similar movie about the Second World War (ÒTrenul MorţiiÓ Ð ÒThe Train of 
DeathÓ) was in the books for 2012 but filming has been delayed and the project could be aborted because 
of the large number of army soldiers needed as figurants.  
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claim that Romanian culture should be included alongside those great cultures which 
have come to represent the best achievements of humanity? Is that how we should 
explain the production of endless lineages of protochronist contributions and heroes136, 
from scientific fields like biology, medicine, metallurgy and aeronautics to disciplines 
like psychology, mathematics and linguistics, culminating of course, with the domains 
of literature and culture137 (Tomiţă 2007, pp.123-163)? 
There is certainly an appeal to such explanations, considering the complex of inferiority 
that has traditionally dominated Romanian culture. However, another possibility is that 
the Communist system simply could not stop producing heroes. That once it started on 
the road to utopia via the use of the hero-mirror mechanism there was no way back or 
outside of it. And that as it moved, through economic and then through cultural policy, 
towards an autarkic model, its production of heroes became more and more limited to 
the space of the nation. For as long as the Communist system was set up as a spiritual 
form of government, governing through the Òinner utopiaÓ or the inner aspect of the 
human being (his private self) (Şerban 2010), it could only continue to rule through a 
mirror-mechanism that circulated images of heroes as fulfilled standards of morality. Or 
otherwise put, a revolutionary movement that thought it was meant to refashion the 
notion of very humanity through mobilization of all its forces (especially those of the 
population as a whole) could only try to do so by promoting ideal images of it, in which 
it might be added, it also believed. What is the idea of the Ônew manÕ even in Romanian 
Communism? It is first the projection of an ideal of humanity, and only secondarily, a 
                                                             
136 ÒThe series of precursors opens with the Geto-Dacians, traverses Antiquity, the Middle Ages and 
Modernity, before closing triumphantly with the figure of the Ôgenius LeaderÕ Nicolae Ceauşescu, himself 
the forerunner of some major tendencies in world politicsÓ (Tomiţă 2007, p.132). 
137 Even the ÒFlacăra Cenacle,Ó which forms the subject of a later chapter, was involved in a mass-media 
campaign to reveal worldwide pioneering achievements in the medical-pharmaceutical field (idem, p.131). 
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matter of national character. And maybe the argument should be extended, at least as a 
possibility, also to the notion of protochronism. Maybe protochronism too could be 
primarily represented as a form of humanism (or at least, as also a form of humanism) 
rather than just as an excrescence of nationalism, if not in its effects at least in its cause. 
For, as Tomiţă (2007, pp.92-93) observes, while indigenist and nationalistic, 
protochronism goes at length to portray the space of the Balkans (and of Romania, in 
particular) as Òa new European spiritual centerÓ Òready to take on the mission of 
Ôspiritual renewalÕ of human experienceÓ by providing the declining West with Òthe 
dough of a new humanity:Ó Òa humanity of human solidarity, instead of the humanity of 
universal hostility in which we live.Ó The implication, of course, is that the 
protochronists themselves are, or should be, heroes, ÒSupermenÓ of a new humanism, 
for as one of them observes: ÒIt is no small matter to be the spiritual dough for a new 
humanityÓ (Purcaru 1986, cited in Tomiţă 2007, p.92).  
Finally, it can then be concluded, through the protochronist discourse, the humanistic 
device of the hero-mirror mechanism remains central and largely unchallenged during 
communism. Moreover, this legacy of protochronism continues into post-communism, 
although in much diluted form.   
However, a note of caution should be sounded here. TomiţăÕs (2007, pp.318-319) final 
assessment is that protochronism was caused by the influence of politics over culture, 
even in its mature phase never reaching beyond the status of a Òfalse ideaÓ with chaotic 
ramifications, before vanishing with the demise of Communism. Nevertheless, as 
Negrici (2008, p.222) shows throughout his book on ÒThe Illusions of Romanian 
Literature,Ó protochronism was only exploiting weaknesses (Òthe confusion, obsessions 
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and the tendency to idealizeÓ) already present in Romanian culture and literature since 
the beginning of the nation. As Negrici (p.8) argues, the Romanian Òeffervescence of 
mythogenesisÓ is caused by the feeling of insecurity, which the turbulent historical 
development of Òour national beingÓ almost constantly generates. Thus, mythogenesis in 
Romanian literature derives from two impulses: a ÒprotectiveÓ one, derived from Òa 
diffuse feeling of danger,Ó and a ÒcompensatoryÓ one, derived from Òa feeling of vacuity 
and of frustration.Ó As Negrici (2008) views it, the protective impulse generates three 
types of mythological constellations, Òthe tabooing of the literary patrimonyÓ (a cult for 
the classics and their masterpieces, a belief in perennial values and their stability, 
resistance against any revision of the canon etc.), the deification of literary personalities 
as defenders of the nation (Òcivilizing heroes,Ó Òfounding fathers,Ó geniuses, protective 
spirits, the ÒrecuperatedÓ figures etc.) and the idealization of some literary periods or 
generations. On the other hand, the compensatory impulse leads 1) to an attempt to 
mime normality by ignoring grave dysfunctions of evolution (like those induced by the 
Communist system in the literary field, or by the pressures of pre-Communist ideologies 
such as Sămănatorism, Popularism and Gndirism) and their effects, 2) to an obsession 
with distant origins, greatness and elements of ÔpriorityÕ for Romanian literature and 
with suggesting for it a great richness and diversity that it does not possess (the artificial 
claims that currents such as Humanism, Renaissance, Baroque, Pre-romanticism etc. 
existed and were well-grounded in Romania, for example) and 3) to a desperate need to 
achieve synchronization (which results in problematic claims regarding the existence of 
a Romanian Romanticism in literature, to a false situation in which truly modernist are 
only the Romanian neo-modernists, and to the unproductive urgency to develop and 
claim a post-modernist current that can oppose modernist literature, in the conditions in 
 
 
373 
which modernist literature itself, and literature as a whole, is actually underdeveloped) 
(idem). Despite its possible idiosyncrasies, this analysis of the overall state of Romanian 
literature has a certain merit: that of revealing literary protochronism as only the 
exaggerated continuation of mythological constellations, themes and concepts already in 
existence. This finding has significant import. Firstly, because it signals that, despite 
TomiţăÕs optimistic outlook, protochronism has not vanished and is bound to reappear 
(very possibly, in new forms), being, at a structural level, always present138 in Romanian 
culture. Secondly, that deconstructing the phenomenon of protochronism requires going 
beyond the visible part of the proverbial iceberg, to the deep structures, which in this 
case involves the entirety of Romanian culture in relation to the processes of nation-
formation and modernization (and, here, the political influence of the Romanian 
Communist regime, still unaccounted for with any degree of certainty, remains crucial).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
138 See, for example, one of the latest protochronist documentaries about the Dacians released in 2012: 
ãDacii Ð Adevăruri tulburătoareÓ (ÔDacians Ð Unsettling TruthsÕ) by Daniel Roxin. 
